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Praise for Work in the Digital Age
‘Work in the Digital Age is a superb collection of articles that 
together provide a wide-ranging, comprehensive analysis of the 
challenges and opportunities for labour in a period of rapid tech-
nological change. This volume is essential reading for academics 
and policymakers alike’.
—Kathleen Thelen, MIT
‘Everybody is in favour of technological innovation and mod-
ernisation, yet not enough research and discussion is devoted 
to the actual consequences for society. Work in the Digital Age 
brings together leading European academics and thinkers to help 
us find our course, as the future hurtles toward us at breakneck 
speed’.
—László Andor, European Commissioner for 
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (2010–2014)
‘Work in the Digital Age should be required reading for the many 
groups around the world that are being formed to plan for the 
future of work in the age of digitisation. These European experts 
explore the broad terrain of private actions, public policies, and 
social dialogue needed to ensure that technological innovations 
can be shaped to benefit society while providing adequate com-
pensation and adjustment opportunities for those who might 
otherwise bear the costs. As such, they lead the way for the rest 
of us’. 
—Thomas A. Kochan, MIT Sloan School of Management
‘Work in the Digital Age is a valuable contribution to under-
standing how technology is disrupting the way we work and 
threatening the safety net that has long undergirded successful 
economies. We need a clear vision for the path forward, and this 
book helps provide that’. 
—Steven Hill, Berlin Social Science Center
‘This edited volume provides a very valuable overview over the 
general discussion about the potential impact of new technolo-
gies on the future of work. The book is unique in the way in 
which it brings together a series of case studies showing how the 
topic is discussed in different countries. It is essential reading for 
everybody interested in this crucial public policy debate’. 
—Henning Mayer, Social Europe
‘The transformation of employment in the digital era raises fears 
of insecurity, technologically induced unemployment and more 
stress at work. The political and academic discourse of digital 
technology and its impact on work is often alarmist and resorts 
to drastic policy recommendations. The collection of essays in 
Work in the Digital Age is a highly welcomed contribution that 
offers a rich understanding of the complex interaction between 
the role of new technologies in the world of work and the wel-
fare state. There will be no simple solutions to maintain good 
work and a good society in the digital age. Policymakers have 
to shape it themselves and need high quality intellectual input 
of this sort’.
—Anke Hassel, Hertie School of Governance  
and Institute of Economic and Social Research (WSI)
‘Work in the Digital Age is a cutting-edge collection of articles 
on the future of work, offering a comprehensive treatment of 
current debates regarding the effects of new technology on 
employment, labour relations and inequality. As the authors 
make clear, the implications for public policy are profound. This 
book is an essential guide to the challenges of equity and policy 
that are emerging as digital technologies reshape the workplace’.
—Michael J. Handel, Northeastern University
‘The editors of Work in the Digital Age have done the rest of us 
a great service in bringing together this remarkable group of con-
tributors. Carefully balancing broad themes and detailed country 
studies, the collection is a must-read for scholars and students 
from multiple disciplines interested in how current technological 
change is affecting work and employment’. 
—Christian Lyhne Ibsen, Michigan State University
‘Work in the Digital Age is the major contemporary challenge. 
This book not only provides access to the outstanding trends, 
developments and challenges in the world of work and how to 
deal with them, it also provides country-specific access to the 
topic of digitalisation through country case studies’. 
—Wolfgang Schroeder, University of Kassel
‘How does the process of digitalisation transform the nature of 
work? Do the new technologies lead to labour disruption includ-
ing rising wealth inequality or increasing regional disparities? 
Do they offer the potential for new and exciting business oppor-
tunities and economic growth? What are the major challenges for 
policymakers? This excellent volume offers a range of compel-
ling answers to these pertinent questions by some of the world’s 
leading labour market experts’.
—Jette Steen Knudsen, Fletcher School of  
Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University
‘We are living in a time of major change in the labour market. 
Automation is altering both the amount and the nature of work as 
well as the skills, protections, and opportunities of people in all 
corners of society. Coming alongside unprecedented advances in 
human health and the ageing of populations, these changes throw 
up many challenges for policymakers. The proposals outlined in 
this impressive collection are an important contribution to the 
conversation about how to enable all citizens to have the oppor-
tunities they need to succeed in the new world of work’.
—Seamus Nevin, Institute of Directors, London
‘The thematic arc of Work in the Digital Age makes clear that 
many futures of work are possible – and these futures are the 
consequences of choices that will be made by governments, busi-
nesses, technologists, educators, unions and activists working at 
the grassroots. Prior periods of technological innovations ushered 
in great social changes as people explored the uses and functions 
of new tools and systems. What is singularly remarkable about 
the digital age is that innovations are driving unpredictable, black 
swan events that are occurring at increasing frequency, in many 
forms, on multiple fronts and at a global scale. The challenge for 
policy makers is to see past each new technological event and, 
instead, establish and articulate and enduring set of principles 
that will guide the uses of unimagined technologies to the benefit 
of people and societies. Work in the Digital Age provides a great 
foundation that will help policy makers meet this challenge’.
—Peter A. Creticos, Institute for Work & the Economy
‘This is a refreshingly broad and original exploration of the cur-
rent upheaval in work and employment. The power of the contri-
butions by remarkable team is greatly enhanced by their brevity. 
It will be important in shaping the gathering international debate 
on policy choices’.
—William Brown, Cambridge University
‘Going beyond the buzzwords Work in the Digital Age provides 
a comprehensive analysis of how emerging technologies reshape 
the workplace and the labour market. Particularly the compara-
tive perspective is highly valuable for academics and policymak-
ers. This book is a major reference point in ongoing discussions 
on the future of work’. 
—Professor Dr. Werner Eichhorst,  
IZA – Institute of Labor Economics
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The first industrial revolution at the end of the 17th century was pos-
sibly the first time in human history that sustained economic growth 
and technological progress collided with falling living standards 
and employment conditions, resulting in the great social upheavals 
described in Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation. By now, it 
is undeniably clear that technological development and economic 
growth do not necessarily go hand in hand with social progress. 
Therefore, it should be the goal of our politics to ensure industrial 
and societal transformations provide opportunities for social mobil-
ity and citizens’ personal and professional development – rather than 
being cause for concern and insecurity.
We must not be misled by recent electoral defeats: the current 
frustration of social democracy across Europe is not due to our 
fundamental values becoming less relevant. If anything, our mis-
sion towards freedom, fairness and equality of opportunity is more 
important than ever in the digital age, and these values should be 
the cornerstone of our renewal. Crucially, we must focus on how 
to better communicate these values through a convincing narrative, 
with a political agenda and concrete policy measures that address the 
difficult challenges faced by modern society.
PREFACE
xviii PREFACE 
But how can we design a narrative that combines our enthusiasm 
for innovation and technological change with a commitment to 
individual security and fairness across society? How do we put into 
practice our mission for socio-economic development and social jus-
tice in the context of disruptive changes brought about by the fourth 
industrial revolution?
A strong progressive narrative will not be sufficient to face the 
challenges of the digital transformation. Our movement needs to be 
able to translate our vision into concrete solutions, firstly through 
adapting and modernising existing policies, particularly in the areas 
of labour market regulation, social protection and welfare. On top of 
this we must think ahead to develop brand new policy instruments 
to address those problems that may have not yet fully materialised. 
Only by looking forward will we be able to fully address citizens’ 
concerns and ensure their wellbeing is secure, enabling them to view 
our transformed society as a land of opportunity.
To achieve this, public participation will be particularly valuable, 
expanding our understanding by allowing us to keep a close eye 
on different country case studies and evaluate a range of concrete 
measures. As president of the Foundation for European Progressive 
Studies, I am glad that our organisation and the editors of this book 
have been able to compile such a wide range of expertise into one 
accessible volume and provide a valuable resource for policymakers 
across Europe. The purpose of our collaboration is to avoid a frag-
mentation of expertise and enthusiasm within our movement among 
those keen to develop a progressive approach to social democracy fit 
for the modern world of work.
If we have learnt one thing from the advent of the digital age, it is 
that collaborative models can be enormously valuable. It is therefore 
with a collaborative spirit and an open-minded approach that we 
should develop a new plan to ensure the digital transformation has 
more winners and fewer losers. In terms of immediate actions, in 
the short term we must move quickly and with conviction to imple-
ment the recently adopted European Pillar of Social Rights, which 
provides a new opportunity for political reform on social protection, 
 xix PREFACE
work-life balance and improved security for atypical workers, such 
as those who peddle their labour on digital platforms. It is this new 
generation of workers that our movement must adapt to advocate for 
to ensure social democracy and its values can have maximum impact 
in the midst of a fourth industrial revolution.
Maria João Rodrigues
President of FEPS – European Foundation of Progressive Studies
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Policy Network, Das Progressive Zentrum and the Foundation 
for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) and our commitment 
to advance progressive thinking and inform public policy reform 
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The enormous growth in the rate of IT computing power, storage 
capacity, connectedness and software applications is transform-
ing employment, disrupting businesses and challenging labour 
regulations. Businesses and governments grapple to contain the 
quasi-anarchic deployment of apps, data analytics and new forms 
of business and employment. Employees scramble to be, or to stay, 
connected. A proliferation of digital platforms is creating new kinds 
of good and poor quality jobs and businesses opportunities. Positive 
and pessimistic scenarios abound of an increasingly fragmented, 
digitalised and flexible transformation of work across the globe, a 
transformation that is hoped will boost economic growth, raise pro-
ductivity levels and create an inclusive new vision of social integra-
tion for all in the digital age.
The fourth industrial revolution, according to (Schwab 2016; 
2018), is characterised by a blurring of the distinctions between 
physical, digital and biological spheres, as major technological 
advancements are having a profound impact on economies, busi-
nesses and the personal lives of people throughout the world. Some 
of the technological forces in this transition include the development 
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of big data, algorithmic management, 3D printing, quantum com-
puting, smart robots, artificial intelligence (AI), the internet of 
things, nanotechnology, biotechnology and alternative forms of 
energy technology. These debates have recently received consider-
able media and government attention, for example in the German 
Industry 4.0 debate (see Rahner and Schönstein this volume), and 
in the 2017 independent, UK-government-commissioned Taylor 
review of modern working practices report (Taylor, 2017).
However, some authors are critical of the ‘revolutionary’ claims 
of this transition (Atkinson this volume), others point out that this 
multi-layered transformation is a longer term process that was first 
identified back in the 1990s (Castells 1996; see also Soete this 
volume). Nevertheless, the poignancy of changing forms of work 
through the process of digitalisation makes it an apposite time to 
examine the consequences of these emerging trends.
With this aim in mind, drawing on a wide range of interna-
tional expertise, contributors to this volume examine a range of 
existing empirical examples to assess the policy challenges that 
arise from the transformation of work in the digital age. They 
discuss the effects of labour disruption including the rising levels 
of wealth inequality, low social mobility and increasing regional 
disparities within and between countries. They consider how to 
unlock the vast economic potential of new technologies and the 
implications for policy innovations at firm, governmental and 
societal levels.
Contributions to this book are structured around two main sec-
tions. In Part I contributors examine particular dimensions raised by 
debates around the fourth industrial revolution, and consider how 
it is affecting the changing face of work, labour relations and the 
welfare state. In Part II contributors focus on country case studies 
that range between high, medium and low digital density economies. 
Authors here outline the context of digital transformation and recent 
policy reforms in specific countries and regions that are related to 
the issues raised in Part I. We conclude by bringing together this 
analyis, discussing the policy challenges that have been identified by 
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the authors in this volume, and presenting tentative policy solutions 
and considerations.
DEBATING THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
The volume opens with Luc Soete situating current concerns with 
the emergence of the fourth industrial revolution in a broader his-
torical perspective. He argues, first, that levels of fear and anxiety 
concerning the consequences of automation for employment today 
are comparable to those of the 1970s and 1980s, or even of the 1930s 
and 1940s, an opinion that is echoed by Colin Crouch. However, 
Soete points out that this anxiety was higher in earlier periods and 
today appears to be more of a concern in the US than in Europe. 
Cécile Jolly also argues that in some countries people are unaware 
or underestimate the potential consequences of the digital era, while 
in other countries media reporting suggests that people are anxious 
about digitalisation and the internet in general. Negative opinions 
about digital communication via the internet have also been associ-
ated with more populist and protectionist attitudes, as evidenced in 
the result of the Brexit referendum (O’Reilly 2016).
Despite identifying similar levels of anxiety to earlier periods of 
significant industrial change, there are also some important differ-
ences that distinguish the current period, which Soete suggests is 
becoming increasingly recognised as the emergence of a new form 
of digital ‘winner-take-all’ monopoly capitalism, from pervious 
eras. First, the digital transformation is characterised by what Haskel 
and Westlake (2017) have called “capitalism without capital”: the 
growth of investment in the intangible economy of knowledge-based 
assets. Compared with traditional tangible assets, intangibles are 
more likely to be scalable, have sunk costs, and create spillovers and 
synergies with other intangibles. The capacity for disproportional 
‘rent taking’ from intangibles is significant. Whereas capital invest-
ment requirements imposed limits to growth in previous periods, 
today the ‘winner-takes-all’ dynamic lasts much longer. Second, a 
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major difference with previous periods of economic development 
is that entry barriers to the digital economy have been significantly 
reduced and the process of creative destruction through the constant 
updating and development of technology is now possible as a result 
of the internet and ‘app economy’.
Soete reasons that private investment in information and commu-
nications technology (ICT) in Europe has been lagging, compared 
with the US. Zysman and Kenney argue that in the US a growing 
ecosystem of different types of venture capital and private equity 
investors, ranging from expert ‘angels’ to crowd funding vehicles, 
are chasing ‘unicorn’ investment opportunities.1 Such investors 
are not overly concerned about immediately generating profits, but 
rather are more interested in market domination strategies. In these 
circumstances labour is a cost to be minimised, rather than an asset 
contributing to the long-term value of the firm. As a result Zysman 
and Kenney suggest that the disruptive effects of these venture 
capital and private equity investment ecosystems are likely to have 
dire consequences for the increased commodification of labour in 
platform companies.
Yet, the increased commodification of labour will affect particular 
groups of workers differently. In their examination of the digital 
gender gap Debra Howcroft and Jill Rubery illustrate how persisting 
gender inequalities are perpetuated through the process of digitalisa-
tion, and how emerging forms of employment reinforce women’s 
role in social reproduction in new ways. They argue that we need 
to think about the consequences of these transformations in relation 
to structural changes in the growth and decline of particular sectors, 
changes to the nature and quality of work affected by patterns of 
displacement and recruitment, change to the employment relation-
ship, and change to access to work over the period of childbirth and 
childrearing. Their policy recommendations focus on issues related 
to working-time flexibility, revisiting the societal value of care and 
‘caring jobs’, and the regulation of new forms of employment.
Digitalisation will change jobs, but this does not mean that 
robots will replace them; new jobs and tasks will also emerge. 
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Daniel Arnold, Melanie Arntz, Terry Gregory, Susanne Steffes and 
Ulrich Zierahn argue that the potential for job automation has been 
greatly exaggerated. ‘Non-automatable niches’ within the bundle 
of tasks constituting a job make many jobs less vulnerable than 
suggested by Frey and Osborne (2017). According to Arnold et al. 
these threats also vary significantly by country, and in workplaces 
where qualifications and communications are higher, the threat 
is lower. There are a number of barriers to the more extensive 
implementation of Industry 4.0. These barriers include the need to 
provide data protection and cyber security, to improve employee 
training, to acquire high levels of investment, and to create ecosys-
tems that generate new forms of dependency on external contrac-
tors. The authors suggest that there is less need to be anxious about 
automation per se. Instead it is the policies around automation that 
ought to be cause for concern. Three key policy areas are identified 
that will be essential: upgrading workers’ qualifications and skills, 
deciding how displaced workers should be supported, and deter-
mining how the distribution of the economic benefits of digitalisa-
tion are translated into taxes and wages that are beneficial to local 
economies and workers.
Paul Hofheinz reinforces the argument that the revolution will be 
political and social rather than industrial or technologically in nature. 
He contends that the four most fundamental shifts have become the 
dematerialised state of “capitalism without capital” (Haskel and 
Westlake 2017), the dramatic improvement in life expectancy, 
increased access to education, and data as the equivalent today of 
what raw materials were in previous periods of industrialisation. 
The key issues for Hofheinz are not how much industry is adapt-
ing, because it will do so anyway. Rather, what is of more concern 
should be the social disruption and discontent that this transforma-
tion will likely cause. While Hofheinz considers the introduction of 
a basic income as a “primitive solution” to a complex problem, that 
“would lead to poor social results”, he argues that it reflects a move 
in the right direction. Data sharing has become the contemporary 
currency in the workplace, but the ‘sharing economy’ that extends 
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to the inclusion of information about us also needs a sharing of the 
rents that are generated by it.
Other authors like Robert Atkinson challenge the whole concept 
of the fourth industrial revolution as both inaccurate and exagger-
ated. According to Atkinson, we are already approaching the sixth 
industrial revolution.2 He expects that technological innovation 
associated with ICT and AI will be modest, but progressive, as 
improvements to technology will develop relatively slowly. There 
will be productivity gains, but these will depend on the right policy 
combination, which should not involve taxing robots or introducing 
a basic income. He argues that the question and concern with job 
quality is misplaced. Job creation, he argues, will be based on con-
sumption patterns, and some of these trends will create good quality 
jobs, for example in education, and also poorer quality jobs in per-
sonal services, or what Morel (2015) calls “servant” jobs.
For Atkinson the key issue is related to raising productivity and 
how this would reduce the costs of goods and services. Reduced 
costs could generate further consumption and job growth in better-
paid jobs. He argues that there is no reason to believe that this 
would lead to a disproportionate growth of self-employment or 
“crowdwork”. Atkinson also argues that growing inequality has 
been largely attributable to changing pay rates within occupations 
as some workers make winner-take-all incomes at the expense of 
others in their occupation, with workplaces becoming dualised 
between insiders and outsiders. But, he argues, this is not about a 
general polarisation of the labour market and a hollowing out of the 
middle-level occupations; contrary to the arguments of Bruno Palier. 
Atkinson is also quite sanguine about the need to develop future 
skills as a large proportion of Europeans already say that they are 
overqualified for their current jobs:
Automating low wage jobs will mean not only the creation of fewer 
low-wage jobs and more middle- and higher-wage jobs, but also this 
will usually lead to higher output per worker in the remaining work-
force, meaning that their wages can be more easily increased.
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For him a progressive agenda will require governments to help 
workers make the transition to new employment, but basic income 
is not the way to protect workers from temporary periods of job 
loss. Inspired by Nordic flexicurity models and systems of lifelong-
learning in France, he suggests that models of higher education must 
be overhauled and disrupted. For him these are the ingredients nec-
essary to bring about a progressive vision of future growth.
As these contributions illustrate, the concept of the fourth indus-
trial revolution is contested, and assessments of its expected impli-
cations are diverse and complex. Inevitably there will be some very 
significant changes in the way that work is organised in the future, 
but the speed and extent of these changes are disputed. To get a 
sense of what some of these changes will look like, in the following 
section authors identify some of the key transformative technologies 
and the implications of digital platforms for new forms of employ-
ment. One theme running throughout these contributions is that the 
consequences for jobs that are displaced, or created, by the process 
of implementing digital technologies will require new forms of gov-
ernance and consultation between employers, social partners and 
governments.
THE CHANGING FACE OF WORK 
IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Looking at the labour displacement and productivity effects of AI 
on employment, Georgios Petropoulos argues that middle-level 
jobs that require routine manual and cognitive skilled are the ones 
that are most at risk. In the long run, initial labour displacement 
effects of jobs with routinised manual or cognitive skills, as in 
previous industrial revolutions, will be compensated for by the 
growth in non-routine jobs at the high and low end of the economy. 
However, the speed of change today is significantly faster than 
it was in the past. Petropoulos focuses on the growth of machine 
learning and improved machine performance and explains how 
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these advancements are produced through the development of so-
called ‘deep neural networks’ that are inspired by the architecture 
of the human brain. Although these are still very far from achieving 
the level of complexity associated with the human brain, on very 
specific tasks machines have outperformed humans. The author 
draws attention to the nexus between what is possible, and which 
firms will be willing to invest to implement these technologies. The 
introduction of multifunctional robots has been most extensive in the 
EU, followed by the US and China. The sectors that have adopted 
these with the greatest enthusiasm include car production, and plas-
tic and chemical production, where job displacement effects will 
be felt the most. Policymakers will need to develop a framework 
of rules for the operation of machines and AI systems. This should 
involve collective consultation with affected parties and experts, 
and a comprehensive debate on the regulation of the liability, safety, 
security and privacy of these technologies, alongside the updating 
of relevant skills and training programmes working with these new 
technologies.
Manufacturing has always been at the forefront of game-changing 
technological innovation. Enrique Fernández-Macías, drawing on a 
Eurofound (forthcoming) study, examines the impact that advanced 
industrial robotics, additive manufacturing, the industrial internet 
of things, electric vehicles and industrial biotech may have on the 
future of work. He identifies four trends: the increasing centrality 
of digital information, mass customisation, the increased impor-
tance of the service relationship (‘servitisation’), and increased 
resource efficiency. Like Petropoulos he agrees that the effect of 
new technologies is likely to have a profound impact on employ-
ment, by displacing jobs, but it will also lead to an upgrading of 
occupations, the development of more hybrid skill sets, a decrease 
in repetitive routine work and a reduction in hazardous industrial 
tasks. Despite these advantages, firms interviewed in the Eurofound 
study also expressed concern for how this would affect the degree 
of privacy and control for workers who will feel permanently moni-
tored through an intensification of work and a declining sense of 
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autonomy. Fernández-Macías argues that greater social dialogue 
around policy is required, similar to that which exists in Germany 
around Industry 4.0 and Work 4.0 (see Rahner and Schönstein this 
volume).
Examining the idea of an ‘inclusive robot agenda’, Monique 
Kremer and Robert Went are more sceptical of the exaggerated 
claims regarding the roll out of the fourth industrial revolution. 
Between the hyperbolic commentary they make a distinction 
between long standing traditions of research in AI, where technol-
ogy is intended to replace people, and intelligence augmentation 
(IA), where computers are used to enhance human learning and 
innovation. Questioning the idea of technological determinism, they 
argue that the process of implementing technology through regula-
tion and reforms to skills and education will shape its outcomes.
While tempering the most radical claims regarding the future 
of work, the problem for Kremer and Went is one of work and 
money, and how it is distributed, a theme that runs through many 
of the contributions in this volume. They situate this problem in 
relation to a long running debate that makes a distinction between 
skill-biased technological change that is beneficial to the well edu-
cated and higher skilled, in contrast to capital-biased technological 
change, where those who own the robots benefit more. An ‘inclusive 
robot agenda’ covers a number of dimensions. This includes co-
production, educational expertise, the distribution of productivity 
gains through co-ownership and the possibility of a universal ‘robot 
dividend’ to be paid into a social wealth fund. There are a variety 
of opinions on policies such as a robot or ‘bit’ tax (see Soete this 
volume). While some like Crouch are more positive of such pro-
posals, Atkinson dismisses them as ‘progress-killing ideas’. These 
contributions clearly illustrate how new ideas are being proposed to 
identify a portfolio of innovative policies to ensure the pursuit of 
an inclusive agenda that prevents the exclusion of an increasingly 
fragmented workforce; but there is also considerable disagreement 
on how such an agenda should be implemented and what it should 
include.
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Turning to examine workforce perspectives of the changing face 
of employment in the digital age and the consequences of new forms 
of work for social protection, Huws et al., Schor, and Berg and De 
Stefano draw on some recent international studies of clickworkers 
and crowdworkers. Precise measurement of this sector is difficult 
and contested, as are the range of policy challenges that it presents.
Berg and De Stefano draw on an International Labour Organization 
(ILO) survey of clickworkers in 2015 that suggests over 40% of 
respondents said this platform work was their principal source of 
income, and the average time spent on platforms was 30 hours per 
week (Berg 2016). But for most crowdworkers this is as an addi-
tional income stream to a more regular job (Huws et al. 2017). Schor 
argues that platform work effectively ‘free rides’ on conventional 
employment, which raises questions about how sustainable it will 
be. In the US there is a discussion about whether or not platform 
work may have peaked (Farrell and Grieg 2017) because income 
rates for clickworkers have been falling, there is a very high turnover 
rate, and the relative proportion of those want to do this type of work 
is declining due to changing demographic trends.
While appreciating the flexibility that this form of work can offer 
different communities, crowdworkers also complained about diffi-
culties in communication, the way that work was allocated and paid, 
the impossibility of challenging negative ratings from customers, 
and the sometimes arbitrary deactivation of their accounts. Sources 
of stress came from long or unpredictable working hours, the reluc-
tance of workers to refuse work in case they would be excluded from 
future offers, as well as risks of sexual harassment and sometimes 
being asked to conduct illegal tasks (see Huws et al. this volume).
Schor highlights the negative environmental consequences of 
using these platforms, and evidence of racial discrimination. Ge et al. 
(2016) and Edelman, Luca and Svirsky (2017) found that non-white 
participants using platforms were more likely to experience discrimi-
nation when acquiring services, and this cohort also received lower 
ratings and lower prices for the services they offered in the US.
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As Berg and De Stefano argue, the digital revolution is rebrand-
ing casual work. A key message coming out of these contributions 
relates to the gap in existing labour regulations and social provi-
sions. A number of legal judgments in the UK and at the European 
Court of Justice illustrate the questionable status of these workers 
being self-employed and autonomous. According to Berg and De 
Stefano regulatory reforms would involve platforms guaranteeing 
a minimum number of hours of paid work, as is the case for zero 
hour contract workers in the Netherlands, as well as the introduction 
of a ban on exclusivity clauses for this type of work, as is seen in 
the regulation of zero hour work in the UK. The authors also sug-
gest that technology could be improved to reduce the time spent 
searching for work and to facilitate the accrual of social security 
contributions. They cite examples where collective bargaining for 
ride-hailing platforms in Seattle has been introduced, as initiatives 
that mark a step forward to help protect platform workers to organise 
and achieve collective rights.
The growth of crowdwork raises some significant issues con-
cerning existing regulation of welfare systems and labour markets. 
This requires guidelines on the definition of self-employment relat-
ing to tax, national insurance contributions and social protection 
entitlement, where the onus of proof rests with the employer rather 
than the worker (Prassl 2015). Further clarification of workers’ 
rights to minimum wages, holiday entitlements and other benefits 
is needed. While some authors have suggested that a basic income 
policy could address these problems, Huws et al. point out that this 
raises a number of additional problems with regard to who should 
be entitled to these benefits, how immigration from outside Europe 
affects this policy, and whether it would encourage employers to 
withdraw their contributions to social welfare. According to Schor 
three areas for future policy makers to focus on are the need to 
reduce worker’s dependency on this form of crowdwork through 
social measures, monitoring carbon impacts, and tackling racial 
discrimination.
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LABOUR RELATIONS AND THE WELFARE STATE
This volume also considers the potential actors who might bring 
about some of the changes that are required for improvements to 
labour relations and welfare reform. Colin Crouch expects that 
the threat to jobs is as likely to affect better-qualified workers as 
those in middle- or lower-skilled jobs. He argues that the growth 
of ‘non-employees’, those not covered by legal and social protec-
tions, can affect a very diverse array of people. While these working 
arrangements can be attractive at particular times during the life 
course for some, it prevents others from establishing the stability 
that is required in adult life (O’Reilly et al. 2017; 2018). Current 
labour law disputes over which economic sectors these firms oper-
ate in is a clear illustration of how these platforms are reshaping the 
employment relationship. For example definitions of employers and 
workers, contractors and dependent contractors are being contested 
in the courts and in some countries subject to new statutory defini-
tions (Jolly this volume). Recent judicial decisions in the UK have 
found Uber to be an employer and not a transport company (Berg 
and De Stefano this volume). Crouch argues, like Zysman and 
Kenney, that ‘non-employees’, such as those who drive for Uber, 
are less likely to be seen as an asset to be invested in. The autonomy 
of ‘non-employees’ at work is more likely to be reduced through 
digital technology, increased surveillance and new digital systems 
of managerial control. These changes all contribute to a redefinition 
of the employment relationship (Howcroft and Rubery this volume).
The global implications of these disruptive processes for different 
groups of workers are illustrated in the contribution from Virginia 
Doellgast. Drawing on extensive international research of call 
centre workers (Batt, Holman and Holtgrewe 2009), telecom firms 
(Doellgast et al. 2016) and unions (Doellgast, Lillie and Pulignano 
2018), Doellgast points to how the changing balance of work in the 
networked economy is taking shape through global and regional 
outsourcing. This undermines workers power and increases inequal-
ity and precariousness. Returning a larger share of power and voice 
to workers has to be part of a larger project designed to address 
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inequality and to extend democracy. She proposes the closing of 
existing legal loopholes and the extension of collective agreements 
across companies to their subcontractors and staffing agencies. 
These suggestions illustrate the need for new and internationalised 
governance systems.
Examining the transformation of social dialogue Cécile Jolly also 
argues that we need new institutions of collective bargaining, as 
existing institutions are not well adapted to address the changing 
nature of work. A continuous dialogue is required over a number of 
crosscutting issues related to jobs, skills, working life and personal 
data protection. Currently social dialogue is organised around rigid 
timeframes, and largely focused on issues of working time and 
wages. Nevertheless, Jolly points to some innovative company level 
initiatives in France, Germany and Spain where employers have 
sought to establish clearer boundaries around email communications 
outside business hours. Furthermore, new forms of regulating tele-
workers have been found in a number of European collective agree-
ments. There has also been an emergence of new forms of unionism 
to represent these new workers and freelancers in Canada, the UK 
and the US (Vandaele 2018). Reforms to labour law have been 
introduced in Italy and Spain to recognise the category of ‘the eco-
nomically dependent self-employed’ and ‘para-subordinated work-
ers’; French reforms have also resulted in conflict between different 
national actors. However, despite these initiatives, much remains 
to be done to attempt to grapple with the integration of casualised 
labour resulting from the growth of platform organisations.
The issue of labour market deregulation is particularly pertinent 
in recent discussions around the UK’s departure from the EU. Kate 
Bell examines whether Brexit will lead to a race to the bottom for 
workers’ rights and productivity. In February 2018 the UK minister 
responsible for UK’s withdrawal from the EU, David Davis, dis-
missed the idea that Brexit would result in a dystopian ‘Mad Max’ 
style exit (Brown 2018). However, Bell illustrates, on a number of 
dimensions, that the UK’s poor performance – low productivity, 
low wages, precarious employment, limited employee voice and 
inadequate skills training – does not provide a fertile bedrock for 
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transition to the digital age. She argues that, given these shortcom-
ings, trade unions today have as much relevance as they did at the 
beginning of the industrial revolution.
The need to develop new adaptive skills to capitalise on techno-
logical change is examined by Thomas Aubrey in his investigation 
of the long-term deficiency in technical skills provision in the UK 
and its effects on productivity. Employers in the UK frequently 
complain that it is very difficult to fill jobs that require core technical 
skills, and Brexit is expected to exacerbate this problem. Students 
are often unaware of the skills that they will need to find work as 
they receive poor careers advice. Given the pace of technological 
change and its implementation, it is an urgent requirement for poli-
cymakers to establish a programme of adaptive skills development, 
to be delivered through local collaborations at a regional level, in 
order to build up a strong skills ecosystem that is essential to ensure 
that communities across the UK are not left behind.
Taking up this issue of those who are most vulnerable to the 
consequences of the digital transformation, Bruno Palier examines 
the politics of social risks and the existing gaps in social protection. 
He suggests that digital workers in lower status jobs face higher 
risks of not being covered by social and employment protection. 
This exacerbates trends towards labour market dualisation and a 
hollowing out of middle-skilled jobs, although not all contributors 
to this volume agree with this. For Palier the challenge is to build a 
new social contract between the winners in the knowledge economy 
(the productive and ‘creative’ types) along with the emergent class 
of ‘servant’ gig workers (Morel 2015). Palier identifies five groups 
of precarious workers who are most at risk: women, the young and 
ethnic minorities in precarious non-standard employment, unskilled 
workers on short-term contracts, independent workers or micro-
entrepreneurs, and platform workers. Renewed forms of social pro-
tection will need to be adapted to the different types of welfare state 
regimes that currently exist in Europe. Palier identifies three types of 
welfare state regime: a liberal solution based on a universal, uncon-
ditional, basic income; a Bismarckian model that improves condi-
tions for independent workers; and a flexicurity model that develops 
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and finances social rights for all. While none of these regimes will 
definitively solve all of the risks these workers may face, Palier’s 
piece asserts that Europe’s welfare systems need urgent reforms.
In the final contribution in this section on the changing face of 
digital work and the new conceptualisation of the future of work 
in 2030, Salima Benhamou outlines four possible scenarios. She 
distinguishes between the development of learning organisations, 
new virtual learning organisations, the super-interim model and a 
new age of Taylorism. Learning organisations capture those organ-
isations that seek to encourage high quality jobs where employees 
with different skill sets are integrated in the delivery of the services 
and caring sectors. New virtual learning organisations refers to col-
laborative platforms for high quality production where virtual teams 
manage complex processes. In contrast, the super-interim model 
is about improving working conditions for low skilled workers by 
integrating them into highly skilled networks where they can access 
a variety of different sources of employment from different employ-
ers. Finally, the new age of Taylorism includes homeworkers per-
forming individual tasks remotely. These four scenarios provide a 
heuristic device to think about the future of work and how different 
models can coexist, but will also be affected by differences in the 
skills and qualifications of the local labour market.
A major thread running through all these contributions points to 
the need for new forms of collective dialogue to anticipate the major 
risks and opportunities and to identify which policy bundles are 
required in different national contexts. The implementation of these 
changes is evident from some of the examples of company level 
initiatives cited by Jolly. In some cases there has been evidence of 
these being expanded to the sectoral level, and that national govern-
ments are beginning to initiate new forms of regulation to cover 
these newly emerging labour markets and forms of social protection. 
However, these initiatives are in their infancy. To capture how these 
developments are evolving in more detail, Part II of this volume pro-
vides a selection of country case studies from the EU and across the 
world, including Canada, India and the US, to understand the his-
torical context in which digitalisation is happening in these different 
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societies, to identify how political agendas are evolving, and to 
assess the impact of locally developed solutions to address change.
COMPARING THE DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION 
OF WORK ACROSS COUNTRIES
While global in nature, it is clear that the impact of the fourth indus-
trial revolution has been embedded to different degrees in different 
national contexts, and has moved at different speeds in advanced 
industrial economies. An incredible volume of international research 
is being produced from a wide range of organisations, which 
attempts to measure and estimate the likely consequences of the 
fourth industrial revolution in general, for particular sectors and 
between countries. This includes the business intelligence com-
munity (the World Economic Forum) and management consultants 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, McKinsey, Accenture, and collaboration 
with academics such as Oxford Economics); thinktanks (Pew); and 
international organisations, such as the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, Eurofound and the ILO (2016). 
These are to a large degree in their infancy in developing com-
parative methodologies and reliable, comparable cross-national 
data. This volume seeks to contribute to this body of research, and 
to address its shortcomings by going beyond a mere quantitative or 
single case study analysis.
One measure to differentiate between countries has been to draw 
on data that measures ICT usage in the population at large mea-
sured through household access to the internet and internet speeds 
(Eurostat 2017a). A second approach compares the density and 
nature of digital technologies used in enterprises (Eurostat 2017b), 
while a third approach has been to aggregate these individual dimen-
sions to generate the Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI), 
which ranks and compares advances in the digital sector in the EU 
(European Commission 2017); see Figure Int 1.
Using the DESI index we differentiate between three types of 
countries in the EU: high, medium and low digital density coun-
tries. Four countries stand out from the rest as digital forerunners: 
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Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands. Middle digital 
density countries are those ranking above the EU average, and all 
those below are considered to be low digital density countries. Some 
of the countries found in these categories and rankings might at first 
be a little surprising. For example, Estonia performs particularly 
well because it is seen as the egovernment champion in the EU; 
Spain is not far behind it on this dimension and performs better than 
Germany. The countries in the low digital density group are quite 
varied, ranging from France at the top to Romania at the bottom; this 
category could be further differentiated, but for our purposes here 
this rather rudimentary demarcation allows us to talk at a broader 
level about overall similarities and differences in the evolution of 
digitalisation in Europe. Although these figures change annually as 
countries improve, to varying degrees on the different dimensions, 
Figure Int.1 Digital ranking of EU countries in the Digital Economy and Society 
Index, 2017. Source: European Commission (2017).
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the overall rankings between the forerunners and those lagging 
behind have not changed very significantly in recent years.
The DESI ranking is based on five key dimensions: connectivity, 
human capital and digital skills, citizens’ use of the internet, business 
integration and digital public services.3 Connectivity measures the 
speed and quality of the broadband infrastructure, as fast broadband 
speeds can be seen as essential for competitiveness. Human capital 
measures both basic and advanced digital skills ranging from simple 
internet use to the proportion of ICT specialists and science, technol-
ogy, engineering and mathematics graduates in the labour force, draw-
ing on various Eurostat surveys. Citizens’ use of the internet includes 
consumption of online content, communications, online shopping and 
banking. The integration of digital technology by businesses measures 
the use of electronic planning and management software, social media, 
cloud services and ecommerce for sales. And egovernment measures 
the proportion of public services accessible through the internet.
While the index provides a basic benchmark to compare the 
extent of digitalisation between European countries, we go further 
by providing empirical evidence and country specific expertise from 
across the EU28, and beyond the boundaries of Europe, to under-
stand how policy debates in this field are being developed within 
different national contexts. Contributors to this volume provide 
in-depth country case studies, which are used to draw more general 
conclusions on the causes and policy options needed to address the 
challenges of the digital age and the changing nature of work in dif-
ferent societies.
Contributions from high digital density countries (DESI score 
greater than 60) include Denmark (Anna Ilsøe), Finland (Jenni 
Karjalainen), Sweden (Fredrik Söderqvist) and the Netherlands 
(Maarten Keune and Fabian Dekker). Contributions from middle 
density countries (DESI score lower than 60 and greater than 
EU average) include Belgium (Patrizia Zanoni), the UK (Olivia 
Bailey and Andrew Harrop), Ireland (Seán Ó Riain and Amy 
E. Healy), Austria (Jörg Flecker), Germany (Sven Rahner and 
Michael Schönstein), Spain (Rafael Grande) and Portugal (Joana 
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A. Vicente). Contributions from countries that are below the EU 
average DESI score (= 51) include France (Enzo Weber), eastern 
Europe (Jan Drahokoupil), Slovenia (Aleksandra Kanjuo Mrčela), 
Latvia (Dmitrijs Kravcenko), Poland (Maria Skóra), Italy (Carlotta 
de Franceschi) and Greece (Sotiria Theodoropoulou). Finally, 
by including perspectives from Canada (Juan Gomez and Rafael 
Gomez), the US (Arne L. Kalleberg) and India (Marc Saxer) we pro-
vide a global perspective on these developments, while recognising 
that despite having an already large volume of contributors, an issue 
for future research and debate would be to include more extensive 
coverage of Asia and developments in Africa and Latin America. 
This book should be seen as a catalyst to developing these future 
comparisons and debates.
CHALLENGES OF WORK IN THE DIGITAL AGE
In this high-risk, high-opportunity era (Ranft 2016) a mixture of new 
technologies and less regulated labour markets have led to contrac-
tual employment agreements becoming more flexible and hybrid, 
especially for young people in Europe (O’Reilly et al. 2018). The 
standardised employment relationship is in decline and distribu-
tional conflicts between labour market ‘outsiders’ and ‘insiders’ are 
on the rise. Middle-income jobs that drove social mobility in the US 
and Europe during the second part of the 20th century are at risk of 
erosion, with digitalisation of work systems replacing jobs across 
the spectrum from low to medium-skilled managerial positions 
(Eurofound 2017; Goos, Manning and Salomons 2014). Job creation 
is also polarised between those at the lower and upper end of the 
income scale and between advanced and less advanced societies and 
regions (OECD 2017, 85–88).
As a consequence, in most countries welfare systems are facing 
escalating pressures in their capacity to tackle the new social risks 
of the 21st century and in relation to demographic and fiscal sustain-
ability. Pay gaps are very likely to widen and women and minorities 
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are likely to be hit the hardest in the initial phases as low-wage jobs 
– where these cohorts are concentrated – have a higher risk of auto-
mation (Lawrence, Roberts and King 2017; Nelson 2018). Supporting 
those who fall through the social safety net as a result of emerging 
forms of employment is one of the most significant challenges facing 
advanced societies on the threshold of the fourth industrial revolution.
The main objective of the contributions to this volume is to dis-
cuss a wide range of the challenges that have been identified, and 
to outline how these are being addressed in particular countries or 
regions. The guiding questions shaping these discussions revolve 
around: What will the decent jobs of tomorrow look like? Where 
will they come from? What forms will they take? And, how can poli-
cymakers capture and combine the innovative dynamism of these 
changes with enhanced social justice?
Finding answers to these questions is crucial as the negative conse-
quences of the digital revolution might provide a feeding ground for 
the spread of emerging populist politics that are widely recognised 
to be opposed to the consequences of globalisation and the internet. 
Our contribution here is intended to inform a progressive agenda on 
how we can develop shared narratives and solutions across a range 
of advanced industrialised countries. It touches on the core mission 
of how progressive movements and trade unions can contribute 
to the ongoing policy debate about the future of work in modern 
economies, and the opportunities, threats and potential solutions we 
need to identify to address some of the most intriguing and grip-
ping economic and social challenges of our time. We conclude by 
outlining the key challenges and political realities identified by these 
contributions, and how they can inform a progressive framework for 
policy reform to address the consequences of digitalisation at work.
NOTES
1. Unicorn investments are software start ups that reach US$1bn valua-
tions. The term derived from Aileen Lee, founder of CowboyVC, a venture 
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capital fund from Palo Alto. She estimated that of the software start ups 
founded in the 2000s only 0.07% every reached US$1bn valuations. Their 
rarity made them comparable to mythical unicorns. This has become a 
widely accepted term in financial circles with Fortune magazine listing the 
top 100 unicorns.
2. The first industrial revolution of steam power was in the late 1700s 
and early 1800s. The second, based on iron, in the 1840s and 1850s was 
followed by the third at the turn of the millennium with steel and electricity. 
The fourth revolution in the 1950s and 1960s was based on electromechani-
cal and chemical technologies, and the present fifth revolution is based on 
ICT. The sixth wave, grounded in AI, robotics and perhaps nanotechnology 
and biotechnology, will not emerge until after a relatively long period of 
stagnation.
3. The main dimensions of DESI indicators are weighted in equal terms.
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Part I
Debating the fourth industrial revolution

AThe destructive creation of employment 
in the digital age
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The technology in itself is neither good nor bad. It is the use 
which human beings make of any technology which determines 
both the nature and extent of the benefits.
—Christopher Freeman
Debate regarding the impact of new technologies on jobs and the 
organisation of work has raged for decades, if not centuries. While 
notable, this is hardly surprising. After all, we talk today about the 
fourth industrial revolution, following on from the first, second and 
third industrial revolutions. To gain insights into what the potential 
impact of the current phase of disruption might be, taking a look at 
previous industrial revolutions is both logical and revealing.
In this short contribution, I will attempt to provide some analyti-
cal insights into the possible consequences of the fourth industrial 
revolution for work and incomes. In doing so, it follows the more 
detailed analysis of Daniel Arnold and colleagues on the digitalisa-
tion and automation of manufacturing processes (Arnold et al. 2016; 
see also Arnold et al. this volume). My analysis will primarily be 
based on comparing current developments with the immediately 
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foregoing, third industrial revolution, the one most closely linked to 
the emergence and rapid diffusion of microelectronics and the com-
puter in the last quarter of the 20th century. I limit myself to such a 
comparison for two reasons.
First, most of the technologies associated with the fourth indus-
trial revolution can undoubtedly be described as ‘new’ and ‘dis-
ruptive’ in their current and future applications, but are in essence 
based on improvements and developments to technologies which 
are characteristic of the third industrial revolution, including micro-
electronics and in particular the continuous exponential improve-
ments in the performance of integrated circuits following Moore’s 
law.1 As Klaus Schwab of the World Economic Forum put it, this 
built on the foundations prepared by the third industrial revolu-
tion. The improvements of these technological advancements, and 
improvements to processing speeds, continuously opened new 
areas for further research in robotics, and many other technolo-
gies associated with the fourth industrial revolution: 3D printing, 
quantum computing, artificial intelligence (AI) (Petropoulos this 
volume), the ‘internet of things’ (Fernández-Macías this volume), 
nanotechnology, biotechnology, materials science, energy storage, 
and in many other fields. Unsurprisingly, since the 1990s, micro-
electronics has been identified by economists as the most charac-
teristic example of a so-called general purpose technology – one 
that affects all sectors of the economy (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 
1992).
Second, having written articles and books in the 1980s and 1990s 
on the impact of microelectronics and computerised technologies 
more broadly on employment and the organisation of work,2 I feel 
that I am well placed to highlight in these pages some of the similari-
ties and differences that exist between these two phases of industrial 
transformation as they have confronted our economies over the last 
40 years. In particular, when debating the possible consequences 
of revolutionary transformations one can enter quite quickly into 
debates in which speculation and visions based more on science 
fiction of future societies can become dominant, which ultimately 
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offers little help to policymakers. This contribution seeks to address 
this shortcoming in the literature.
SIMILARITIES WITH THE PAST: THE FEAR OF 
JOB LOSSES AND A PRODUCTIVITY PARADOX
The first similarity when comparing the third with the fourth indus-
trial revolution is the fear of significant job losses. The similarity 
between Clive Jenkins’ 1979 book The Collapse of Work and the 
multitude of current analyses on the likely job losses associated with 
AI and robotics is striking and characteristic of the intrinsic fear 
of the way that new technologies can replace labour and automate 
routine jobs (Jenkins 1979). Arntz et al. (2016) refer to a widespread 
“automation angst”. In the 1970s and 1980s, following the wide-
spread adoption of microelectronics, similar references were made 
to the literature of the 1930s and 1940s about the fear of ‘permanent’ 
technological unemployment, that would be brought about by auto-
mation.3 Whereas such fears were particularly articulated in Europe 
in the 1980s,4 far fewer concerns were raised about these issues in 
the US, where the debate shifted quickly to a more positive vision of 
the potential employment ‘displacement’ aspects of new technolo-
gies and the potential ‘skill-bias’ dimension associated with it – the 
fact that new technologies favoured skilled over unskilled labour, 
which increased the productivity of skilled labour, and hence the 
demand for skilled labour.5 Thus, the temporary friction that new 
technologies could introduce would be solved by education and 
training.
Paradoxically, the debate today regarding the fourth industrial 
revolution appears much more a feature of the US American rather 
than the European academic and public discourse, with important 
contributions from the likes of Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew 
McAfee – curiously called The Second Machine Age – focusing on 
past trends towards jobless growth following economic recovery 
in the 1990s, and the role played by new digital technologies in 
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replacing routine jobs (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014). The focus 
of the debate on employment displacement today has also shifted 
from the consideration of unskilled to routine jobs. The possibility 
that technology could be causing jobless US recoveries was first 
suggested by Jaimovich and Siu (2012), who argued that middle-
skilled jobs involving routine tasks are susceptible to replacement by 
new technologies, and were likely to become permanently destroyed 
during recessions, which would result in slower job growth during 
any recovery. The focus here was again on new computer-based 
technologies, but the impact of employment displacement on routine 
white-collar work would be far greater than in the past. As Jerry 
Kaplan (2015), author of Humans Need Not Apply, puts it: “automa-
tion is now blind to the colour of your collar”. Brian Arthur (2011) 
describes this as the arrival of an underground, totally automated, 
digital ‘second economy’ that involves little to no physical employ-
ment in the ‘first economy’, while the title of Martin Ford’s (2015) 
book is The Rise of the Robots.
The dominance of the debate on the implications of new technolo-
gies linked to the fourth industrial revolution on jobs can be explained 
by the fact that no evidence for such trends can be found outside the 
US, where modern technologies appear unlikely to be causing job-
less recoveries (Graetz and Michaels 2015). This is in all likelihood 
also a reflection of US global dominance in the new digital technol-
ogy industries, as illustrated by the impact of the public statements 
on these topics by some of the leading American high-tech chief 
executive officers such as Elon Musk and Bill Gates (Delaney 2017; 
Kharpal 2017). In the 1980s it was similarly IBM who asked Chris 
Freeman and me to write a report on the impact on employment of 
computers (Freeman and Soete 1985). The report had no impact in 
North America, however. In Europe, by contrast, with unemploy-
ment remaining stubbornly high and barely recovering from the 
1982 recession, the report led to a European Commission-backed 
expert study on the information society (European Commission 
1996) and the inclusion in the Jobs Study launched in the mid-1990s 
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by then secretary general of the OECD, Jean-Claude Paye, of a 
specific chapter on the potential impact of technology on employ-
ment and skills (OECD 1994). Today despite high levels of youth 
unemployment in many European countries there is, paradoxically 
apart from Germany, little interest and attention being paid to the 
emergence of new technologies that affect future jobs and the organ-
isation of work.
A second, more striking similarity between the third and fourth 
industrial revolutions is the puzzling evidence of trends in produc-
tivity growth following the emergence of the aforementioned radical 
new technologies that are identified with the fourth industrial revolu-
tion, the ‘core’ variable in any econometric analysis on the impact of 
research and innovation on growth and welfare. Generally speaking, 
productivity refers to a measure of how much output (or income) is 
generated for a fixed amount of input, typically an average hour of 
work. Productivity growth is essential for understanding any discus-
sion on the impact of new technologies on employment. Over the 
long run, the only way a society can generate higher standards of 
living is if the average level of productivity grows.
Rather surprisingly, and in contradiction to the revolutionary 
evidence on the emergence of new technologies, productivity did 
not increase following the third industrial revolution. In the 1980s, 
this became known as the ‘Solow paradox’, following a remark by 
Robert Solow (1987):
what everyone feels to have been a technological revolution, a drastic 
change in our productive lives, has been accompanied everywhere, 
including Japan, by a slowing-down of productivity growth, not by a 
step up. You can see the computer age everywhere but in the produc-
tivity statistics.
Even more surprisingly, the current evidence regarding the fourth 
industrial revolution appears to be accompanied by a similar lack of 
evidence of productivity growth. As Millar and Sunderland (2016) 
point out:
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in a period where not only many new technologies are being intro-
duced, more firms and countries are integrated into global value 
chains, [and] workers are more highly educated than ever, it remains 
surprising that productivity growth is not rising. For sure the financial 
crisis may be part of the explanation, but OECD data show that pro-
ductivity growth has been slowing since the early 2000s in Canada, 
the United Kingdom and the United States (Millar and Sunderland 
2016).
The link between productivity growth and technological change 
is not that straightforward, however. In earlier analyses I compared 
the evolution of technological change and its impact on productivity 
growth to the movement of a snake, where the head (technological 
progress) moves ahead while the tail remains more or less in the 
same place.6 In this analogy, productivity growth, as expressed by 
the average progress of the snake, is relatively limited, versus the 
tail moving to join the head, which remains more or less in the same 
place with little or no technological progress, while average pro-
ductivity increases rapidly. It is as if the gap in productivity growth 
between global firms and the more domestically oriented firms has 
grown during the fourth industrial revolution, with the body of the 
snake expanding. As the current OECD secretary general, Angel 
Gurria (2016), put it: “The knowledge and technology diffusion 
‘machine’ is broken.”
A lot has been learned over recent decades from research that 
analyses previous productivity ‘paradoxes’. There is broad agree-
ment that much more attention needs to be paid to the time lags 
involved in the diffusion of new, ‘radical’ technologies. Those new 
technologies might for example involve a first phase of declining 
capital productivity as Paul David and Gavin Wright (1999) argued 
on the basis of historical comparisons, or might require essential 
organisational changes to fully exploit the often, in the first instance 
at least, unnoticed efficiency gains associated with new technolo-
gies, as Chris Freeman and Luc Soete (1987) and Paul David (1990) 
argued with respect to the second industrial revolution and the 
introduction of electricity. Here the authors point to the importance 
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of the discovery of unit electric drive replacing line shaft (Devine 
Jr. 1983). Such changes also required the development of new skills 
and on-the-job learning before new technologies would result in 
overall efficiency gains, dubbed “the race between technology and 
schooling” by Jan Tinbergen (1975).
To conclude this first section; given the current low global pro-
ductivity growth trends, concerns about the negative impact of the 
fourth industrial revolution on employment and job displacement 
appear not entirely convincing. There seems to be a tendency to 
overestimate both the speed and the impact of the new technolo-
gies associated with the fourth industrial revolution (Atkinson this 
volume), including AI, robotics, 3D printing, automotive driving, 
quantum computing and nanotechnology. For example, just look 
at the complexity involved in using robots simply to lift patients in 
a hospital, which requires numerous physical security interaction 
problems, or using AI to assess written exams. Historically, the evi-
dence of skills disappearing as a consequence of the introduction of 
new technologies has not ushered in mass unemployment. Rather, 
digital technologies appear to have dramatically increased the distri-
bution of the gains associated with the emergence of new technolo-
gies, as if monopoly capitalism has re-emerged now in digital form. 
Let me turn to these concerns in the next section.
DIFFERENCES WITH THE PAST: FROM GENERAL 
PURPOSE TO GLOBAL PLATFORM TECHNOLOGIES
In so far as the core of the fourth industrial innovation is primarily 
associated with the application of digital technologies across the 
board – not just in production processes but also in the delivery 
of goods and services – it has become associated with a more sys-
temic ‘digital transformation’ process across society and across the 
world – what many economists today describe as ‘digitalisation’. 
Contrary to the previous third industrial revolution, digital innova-
tion in this transformation process is based much more on a number 
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of well-known principles of information economics, which are dis-
cussed below.
Traditionally, industrial innovation involves major structural 
transformations in the economy as incumbents, and sometimes 
whole sectors, are challenged by new unexpected innovators which 
force them to adjust or disappear. The previous industrial revolu-
tions are dramatic historical illustrations of such structural trans-
formations, in which Joseph Schumpeter’s process of ‘creative 
destruction’ became dominant. Such structural change came to 
be seen as essential to lead society to a higher level of economic 
development and welfare, as many incumbents are destroyed to the 
benefit of newcomers. In this process newcomers can benefit from 
extraordinary innovations in market ‘rents’. Introducing an inno-
vation endows the innovator with an advantageous but temporary 
exclusivity over their rivals. This is sometimes formalised through 
intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. Sometimes it is based 
on secrecy, which allows the innovating firm to set prices well above 
marginal costs gaining extraordinary rents. Those gains should be 
considered temporary, however. While the innovating firm would 
often have incurred substantial costs in the R&D phase of any new 
innovation, and must absorb the risks of launching the new product 
or process, competitors are often quick to acquire and exploit the 
knowledge behind the innovation, which economists explain by the 
non-rivalrous nature of knowledge. As a result, Schumpeterian com-
petition involves the continuous emergence of new innovating firms 
which undermine the initial extraordinary innovation rents yielded 
by innovative firms. History is full of examples of innovating ‘boom 
and bust’ firms, which illustrates the process of creative destruction, 
as described by Schumpeter.
Guellec and Paunov (2017) highlight how the process of digi-
talisation is being magnified in two ways. First, thanks to the much 
wider use of information, software and data in the current ‘digital 
transformation’ process, the marginal cost of production of goods 
and services is coming close to nil with the intangible component 
of capital including IPR, branding and reputation now representing 
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most, if not all, of the value of digital products. As a result, one is 
now witnessing the emergence of what Jonathan Haskel and Stian 
Westlake (2017) have called ‘capitalism without capital’ – a new 
form of intangible capitalism. In previous industrial revolutions, 
physical tangible capital led to significant scale and increasing 
returns, linked to continuous improvements associated with incre-
mental product and process innovations and ‘learning by doing’.7 
However, gains were always ultimately limited, as variable costs 
never reached zero, but required additional materials, labour, energy 
and other inputs. Notably, this is not the case with digital transfor-
mations. Here so-called ‘winner-take-all’ dynamics become domi-
nant as market concentrations allow the winners to extract profits 
globally, and for a much longer period of time. Going back to our 
previous analogy, the long tail of the snake has grown significantly 
while at the same time its head has grown exponentially.
The process of digitalisation raises dramatic, near endless, 
opportunities for ‘creative destruction’ by potentially reducing sig-
nificantly barriers to entry (Kenney and Zysman this volume). As 
Guellec and Paunov (2017) point out,
the capital requirement for programming software, the core of digital 
innovation, is much lower than for other types of innovative activities, 
such as those requiring special facilities to develop innovations (eg 
laboratories and experimental settings in pharmaceuticals).
The intangible nature of knowledge, and the opportunities for rapid 
scaling-up, facilitate creative destruction. This is exemplified by 
the ‘app economy’ (Guellec and Paunov 2017) – the full range of 
economic activities, from selling applications and advertising rev-
enues as well as hardware devices, on which apps are designed to 
run for mobile applications. Digitalisation can potentially lead to 
significant reductions in the costs of incremental innovations and 
product design, and the versioning of products and services for dif-
ferent consumer and users groups. Furthermore, digitalisation allows 
for global markets to be reached practically instantaneously, which 
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opens up many new opportunities for product and service delivery, 
including product upgrades, which obviate the need to purchase a 
new product. For example, the word processing programme used 
to type this chapter is based on a 10-year-old software programme, 
which is updated nearly every month.
In short, while digitalisation has increased the fluidity of markets 
and the ease of entry, it has also dramatically increased society’s 
dependency on global digital platforms. These digital platforms 
enable direct digital interaction between producers and consumers, 
but they also facilitate interactions of almost any kind involving 
two parties – so-called ‘two-sided markets’, with one selling, and 
the other buying services in areas as diverse as jobs, finance, travel, 
advertising, medicine, entertainment and leisure.8 The increase in 
global market access, fluidity – the speed with which prices will 
clear markets – and the achievement of scale without mass result-
ing from digitalisation, has undoubtedly contributed to much more 
competition. At the same time, though, the fact that digital platforms 
are crucially dependent on network externalities on both sides of 
the market leads naturally to monopolistic structures with various 
‘locking in’ strategies. Compared with the general purpose technolo-
gies of the third industrial revolution (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 
1992), the general purpose platforms of the fourth industrial revo-
lution appear intrinsically more monopolistic, which reflects the 
emergence of a new form of digital monopoly capitalism, in which 
winner-take-all features are becoming world leading.
CONCLUSIONS
Back in the mid-1990s, while I was chairing a high-level expert 
group for the European Commission on the information society, the 
prevailing view was that
a large proportion of public opinion was sceptical about the new 
opportunities offered by the information society and even fearful 
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about the job losses, employment displacement and work insecurity 
associated with a future Information Society (European Commission 
1997).
Let me quote from the group’s report in some detail: 
The lack of public support is also a reflection of the ‘technology 
dominated’ nature of the European Information Society policy debate. 
The latter offers little freedom of manoeuvre for policy action. Such 
an ‘international competitiveness/technological determinism’ argu-
ment runs as follows. We are forced through international competi-
tion to adopt new information technologies as rapidly as possible. It 
is an illusion to think we would be able to govern the speed of such 
change. Consequently, the only relevant policy issue is one of liberal-
ising and deregulating. Any delay would be extremely costly. At the 
social level, while there could be ‘local’ employment destruction, the 
cost of such destruction is minimal when compared to the aggregate 
employment ‘price’ rigid societies might have to pay in terms of loss 
of competitiveness when failing to adopt the new information and 
communication technologies quickly enough. In other words, these 
employment losses have to be accepted as a minimal cost, outweighed 
by the positive global welfare impact of the Information Society and 
the employment growth in new areas (European Commission 1997).
Viewed in retrospect, the ‘ideological’ line of the high-level 
expert group report that the information society is malleable and that 
there could be different models of information societies, just as one 
had different models of industrialised societies, seems somewhat 
naive. However, this view was based on a strong conviction that the 
so-called European model of social welfare, with its strong ethos of 
solidarity, would ultimately also come to characterise any European 
version of the information society. To achieve this, so it was argued, 
would imply substantial changes in the traditional structures of the 
welfare state, and in particular a shift towards an active rather than 
passive concept of solidarity. Despite this logic, little happened in 
this respect, and while the welfare state has remained, it has become 
based even more on a passive concept of solidarity.
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Thirty years on, at the advent of the fourth industrial revolution, 
concerns about massive employment losses have again led to wide-
spread moves away from long-term jobs towards self-employment, 
linked more closely to new digital technologies, robotics, AI, the 
internet of things, the cloud, 3D printing, blockchain, virtual and 
augmented reality and big data analytics. Cecilia Reyes, chief risk 
officer of Zurich Insurance Group, was quoted in a recent article in 
Computer Weekly:
Unless there is a concerted effort from governments and the private 
sector, this [digital technology] will put pressure on economies and 
may lead to social unrest. . . . Without proper governance and reskill-
ing of workers, technology will eliminate jobs faster than it creates 
them. . . . Governments can no longer provide historic levels of social 
protection, and an anti-establishment narrative has gained traction, 
with new political leaders blaming globalisation for society’s chal-
lenges. Governments, academics and businesses should be planning 
for huge social disruption because there are many real-life examples 
across the world of AI replacing people in the workplace (Flinders 
2017).
It is important to realise though that the social disruptions that 
some, including Reyes, predict are yet to manifest. Following the 
historical evidence on the productivity slowdown, it is clear that 
most of the impact on productivity of the new digital technologies 
has either not yet occurred, or remains more or less invisible. At 
the same time private investment in new technologies in Europe 
has been lagging behind other parts of the world. One notable line 
of argument is that the slowdown of private capital investment is 
directly linked to the macro-economic policies pursued in most 
European countries following the financial crisis of low-wage com-
petition. This in itself provided little incentive for most firms to 
invest in productivity enhancing capital. From this perspective, the 
lack of productivity growth calls for the diffusion and more rapid 
implementation of more robots and AI, despite the growing short-
age of labour following the retirement of baby-boomers in many 
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European countries. In short, employment displacement following 
automation is in the present context of increasing labour shortage 
not really an issue.9
What has arguably become the central concern in the current 
industrial revolution debate is the increasingly skewed distribution 
of the innovation rents associated with digital innovations and the 
digitalisation transformation. The record on addressing the distribu-
tion of innovation rents since the third industrial revolution has been 
disappointing to say the least. The current stage of development is 
typified by rising inequality, and a trend towards a race to the bot-
tom in existing European social welfare systems (Bell this volume). 
As Guellec and Paunov (2017) neatly illustrate in their OECD 
paper, the ‘rents’ from digital innovation affect income distribution 
and benefits directly, particularly in the top income groups through 
shareholders and investors, top executives and key employees of 
the ‘winning firms’ who often own capital and hold managerial and 
leading positions in firms:
In line with a Schumpeterian vision, innovation gives rise to rents 
from market power and scale economies. This is magnified with digi-
tal innovation, in which the intangible component (the source of rents) 
is much larger than in traditional manufacturing innovation. Highly 
concentrated market structures (‘winner-take-all’) allow rent extrac-
tion. In addition, digital innovation tends to increase risks because 
even only marginally superior products can take over the entire mar-
ket, hence rendering market shares unstable. Instability commands 
risk premia, hence higher expected revenues, for investors. Market 
rents accrue mainly to investors and top managers and less to the aver-
age workers, hence increasing income inequality.
By contrast, average workers have been confronted with more 
competition in the labour market, are increasingly employed in 
temporary work arrangements, and are becoming subject to national 
low-wage competition policy pressures. Adding it all up explains 
why the share of capital (as opposed to labour) in national income has 
increased, particularly in innovation-intensive economic activities.
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It is therefore essential to reframe the technology employ-
ment debate by focusing on the need for alternative income 
systems that are disconnected from employment, such as the 
notional ‘basic income’ (Palier this volume). Following Jahoda, 
Lazarsfeld and Zeisel’s (1932) study of unemployment in 
Marienthal, Austria, in the 1930s, employment could still be con-
sidered to represent one of the most important factors for social 
integration and personal recognition today. At the same time, 
and given the tremendously increased opportunities for social 
contact outside the sphere of employment following the develop-
ment of social media over the last 20 years, it is also reasonable 
to assume that an unconditional ‘basic income’ could well lead to 
a substantial voluntary shift in labour market participation, based 
on free choice and ultimately to the benefit of the individual, 
even to the health and happiness of the individual, as well as to 
the overall benefit of society.
Once ‘basic income’ is viewed as the monetised ‘digital manna 
from heaven’, resulting from technological change, the concept 
seems like a simple and attractive way to redistribute the gains from 
technical change to all throughout society. At the same time, the 
erosion of social welfare systems and more general state revenues 
following the digitalisation of society should also become a central 
issue of policy debate in experimenting with new tax revenues. More 
than 30 years ago, as part of our deliberation process on the infor-
mation society, I proposed that states should levy an internet tax, or 
so-called ‘bit tax’.10
It is clear that the global digitalisation transformation of society 
has many more implications than those dealing with employment 
and the organisation of work, as has been discussed here. Probably 
the most immediate question is the extent to which the extreme 
concentration of wealth and economic power associated with 
digital innovation will ultimately lead to a similar extreme con-
centration of political power, which might ultimately undermine 
democracy.
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NOTES
1. In 1965, Gordon Moore, co-founder of Fairchild and Intel, predicted 
that the number of transistors on an integrated circuit would double every 
two years, at least until 1975. What became known as Moore’s law proved 
valid at least until 2015. This continuous logarithmic improvement in 
microchip performance has been one of the major enabling factors behind 
the processes of digitalisation and the emergence of smartphone technol-
ogy, 3D printing, robotics and AI.
2. This is something we referred to as The Biggest Technological Jug-
gernaut that ever rolled, which is the title of chapter 3 in Work for All or 
Mass Unemployment (Freeman and Soete 1996).
3. For further insight into this, see for example Neisser (1942).
4. For further insight into this, see for example Unemployment and 
Technical Innovation (Freeman and Soete 1982) and more recently The 
Economics of the Digital Society (Soete and ter Weel 2005).
5. Typically, the use of computers requires certain human skills in order 
to be fully operational and to make use all available new opportunities the 
machines offer.
6. For further insight into this, see for example ‘Technology Diffusion 
and the Rate of Technical Change’ (Soete and Turner 1984).
7. These have been studied in more detail in industrial economics. The 
process of industrial innovation was first and foremost characterised by 
incremental process innovation improving nearly continuously such scale 
advantages and the accompanying increasing returns leading to various 
forms of monopoly capitalism as described by Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy. 
The process of creative destruction linked to new, radical innovations now 
and then undermined such trends towards monopoly capitalism (Baran and 
Zweezy 1996).
8. For further insight into this, see for example ‘Two-sided Markets: a 
Progress Report’ (Rochet and Tirole 2006).
9. For an argument along similar lines on the US economy, see the 
Washington Post interview with Josh Bivens (Bivens 2017).
10. Arthur Cordell first developed the proposal for a ‘bit tax’, which 
would be applied to all interactive digital services. It was based on a simple 
count of bits flowing over telecommunications lines. The argument in 
favour of such a new tax was primarily based on the way that globalisa-
tion undermines traditional national tax bases. At the same time, the dis-
incentive to the diffusion and use of new information and communication 
services could be assumed to be marginal, because generally speaking 
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these new services offer a new bundle of product or service characteristics 
(Cordell 1996).
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Venture financing, a form of entrepreneurial finance, has played 
a central part in the story of the digital revolution. Indeed, Silicon 
Valley, the global centre of the venture capital industry, draws its 
name from the substrate of the contemporary semiconductor, which 
is the computational engine for all digital products. The continuing 
performance improvements characteristic of Moore’s law provided 
ever new potentialities for new generations of start ups. While 
improvement in processing power was the core engine for this 
venture-capital-financed entrepreneurship, the new firms were not 
only in semiconductors, but also in layers in stack above the proces-
sor itself. There were semiconductor firms of various generations 
including Intel and AMD, Cirrus Logic, and even later NVIDIA. 
There were computer firms ranging from Tandem Computers to 
Sun Microsystems and Silicon Graphics on to Apple and Osbourne. 
As there were more computers, users wanted to network them 
together and with this came 3Com, Cisco and many other firms; all 
of which used semiconductor chips. In addition to semiconductor 
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components, they needed disk drives, input devices, printers and 
many other devices – many of which were also pioneered in Silicon 
Valley. However, the most powerful development of all was the 
establishment of an independent software industry – the most suc-
cessful was Microsoft, but there were many, many more, including 
Oracle, Adobe, Intuit and others successfully established in Silicon 
Valley. Eventually, these technologies were united in the internet, 
whose technologies were developed at CERN in Switzerland and 
the University of Illinois. At each stage in this development venture 
capitalists could be found who were willing to invest in the new 
firms (Kenney 2011). These entrepreneurial financiers had only one 
goal – to make capital gains. The vehicle for these capital gains was, 
quite simply, a firm whose product grew so rapidly that other inves-
tors would be willing to buy that firm, or buy equity in that firm, at 
massive capital gains multiples.1
Over the last two decades, we have been gradually moving into 
a phase in which technology has progressed to the point at which 
the ongoing digital revolution is resulting in a business environ-
ment within which platforms, intelligent tools and their application 
to manufacturing and services is becoming ubiquitous and even 
transformative. The rapid development and adoption of robotics and 
intelligent systems with self-learning algorithms are automating not 
only tasks associated with blue-collar work, but also less-routine 
tasks that have been considered knowledge-intensive (Brynjolfsson 
and McAfee 2012, 2014; Ford 2015).2 This digitisation process 
seems to be inexorably diffusing into more sectors of economic and 
social life. Though there is a debate about the extent and speed of 
the transformation, much of this work will be reorganised on digital 
platforms and undertaken with digital tools. These developments are 
a backdrop for considering the role of finance in this process.
As we enter an era in which platforms and intelligent tools become 
important for the entire economic system, the computation-intensive 
automation of services and manufacturing is upon us. Moreover, 
given that this phase is transforming work and, dare we say, value 
creation, broadly, it is important to consider whether the firms born 
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in this hothouse of entrepreneurship – motivated by capital gains, 
and driven to establish unassailable market positions – will also 
facilitate, let alone consider, the augmentation and promotion of the 
societal work force.
The ability of financial actors to fund firms introducing new 
disruptive digital technologies over relatively long periods of time, 
while experiencing large losses, is having a powerful impact on the 
relations and conditions of work and employment.3 Suggesting that 
it is important to consider the role of finance in the growth of digital 
platforms does not mean we must engage with the larger question 
of the role of finance in the US economy or to enter into the more 
general debate over the financialisation of the US economy, though 
these are an important context for our essay (Davis and Kim 2015; 
Lazonick 2010). We focus on the implications of the enormous sums 
of venture capital (and private equity) available, permitting investors 
to provide massive sums of capital to firms with the intent of restruc-
turing (or, in the current vernacular, disrupting) existing businesses 
or value chain organisation (Christensen 2013).
FINANCE, THE TRAJECTORY OF TECH FIRMS 
AND CONSEQUENCES FOR WORK
Investment euphoria is not unique to the current era. Carlota Perez 
(2003), in Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital,4 and 
William Janeway (2012), in Doing Capitalism in the Innovation 
Economy, have argued that because of the infrastructures built and 
technologies introduced during the investment euphoria, the politi-
cal economy is permanently altered (Soskice and Hall 2001; Zysman 
1983). The underpinnings of the current investment euphoria are 
important to consider. Financial conditions and start-up tools in this 
era permit a novel investment strategy that has real consequences 
for labour and work. The first element is that the cost of building 
digital ‘tools’, including platforms, has dropped dramatically. Cloud 
computing provides low-cost infrastructure for ‘users’ while vast 
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libraries of open-source software are available online at reposito-
ries such as GitHub or SourceForge (Murray and Zysman 2011). 
Together they allow low-cost experimentation in the name of disrup-
tion, seeing what sticks and creates enough market position quickly 
to drive capital valuations. Sustainable market positions for these 
firms can be a concern for a later day.
The ‘disruption’ meme suggests that a new more efficient busi-
ness model is being introduced to bypass the old-fashioned existing 
businesses. The automobile disrupted the horse-and-carriage busi-
ness; digital search engines and digitisation of content displaced or 
altered library operations. In this narrative, disruption is positive; 
it compels existing businesses to adapt or vanish. For example, 
Amazon dramatically shrank the number of physical bookstores.
Of course, the ultimate question is: why should we care? If 
consumers gain and the disruptors benefit financially, who should 
complain? Certainly, Uber makes finding a ride in London easier 
for a visitor from San Francisco and vice versa. Google changes our 
attitude and approach to information. LinkedIn replaced the rolodex 
and the job board by transforming the manner by which professional 
connections are maintained.
This logic that progressive ‘disruption’ advances society comes 
with consequences, however. Let us note at least a few. As the 
newspaper business struggles, some have argued that investigative 
and international journalism is declining, and some argue that it 
has contributed to a decline in our democracy. Alternatively, others 
might argue that entirely new sources of information from outside 
the mainstream are now available allowing for new perspectives. If 
there is a problem, then perhaps a solution is to subsidise journalism 
with the result that it becomes dependent on the government, rather 
than private interests. Uber drivers lack protections, so perhaps we 
rejigger employment law.
What is particularly interesting is that the current financial 
euphoria is concentrated on funding platform economy firms. One 
of the characteristics of digital platforms is that they exhibit pow-
erful network effects that often lead to winner-take-all outcomes 
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(Eisenmann, Parker and Van Alstyne 2006; Gawer and Cusumano 
2008). It is the winner-take-all outcomes that allow the young firm 
to outpace its larger competitors and, if it is successful in the mar-
ket, often establish a monopoly or near-monopoly position. For 
example, consider the position of Google in search, maps, YouTube 
and a variety of other services; Amazon in online retail; Facebook 
in social networks; eBay in online auctions; LinkedIn in professional 
networks; Yelp! or TripAdvisor in online reviews; OpenTable in 
restaurant reservation services; and the like.5
The start-up process in such winner-take-all environments assumes 
that the start up will initially be cash-flow negative as it grows and 
competes against other start ups and incumbents that are also seek-
ing to restructure the new business space that the technology’s prog-
ress has made possible. Such start ups begin by ‘bleeding’ money. 
Investors are wagering on the firm establishing a powerful market 
position – or what could be termed a ‘proto-monopoly’. These firms 
are not expected to win via early, sustained operating profit but by 
absorbing operating losses during their growth phase financed by 
venture investment, with the aim of driving incumbents and other 
new entrants out of the market. Investors are increasingly comfort-
able with absorbing the exceptional losses, if convinced that it will 
be possible to lock in a position to generate proto-monopolistic 
profits and, by extension, enormous capital gains.6
Because many of the start ups must sustain operating losses over 
long periods, it is possible to question the narrowly economic, as 
much as the social benefit. Are the disruptions, if they are driven by 
extended losses, really justified as welfare generating? These firms 
are structured to pursue growth at all costs as they endeavour to 
achieve market domination. In one sense, this appears to be preda-
tory, but it is also a natural outcome in many of these markets. For 
example, would the economy have been better off with 10 different 
incompatible personal computer or smartphone operating systems? 
Similarly, would the economy be better served with 10 search 
engines – moreover, technically in the case of search, there is learn-
ing from each search so ceteris paribus a search engine that attracts 
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more searches is likely to enter a virtuous circle of improvement 
that is impossible for laggards to overcome. Importantly, operating 
losses with the goal of market dominance may also encourage busi-
ness strategies of transgressing established marketplace and social 
rules, because locking in a winning position is everything.
Financing losses as a way of overcoming existing systems via 
social disruption and long-term operating losses forms a treacherous 
environment for incumbents that are judged by the profits they make. 
To illustrate, in its last annual report in 2017, Walmart had $486bn 
in sales and operating income of $23bn, while its greatest competi-
tor Amazon in 2016 (last annual report) had $136bn and operating 
income of $4.1bn. However, though Amazon has grown signifi-
cantly in the last year it still trails Walmart in profits and especially 
in income. And yet Amazon had a stock market valuation of $608bn, 
while Walmart had half the valuation at $301bn. Effectively, the 
stock market valued Amazon twice as highly as Walmart, despite 
Walmart having five times as much income. This stock market valu-
ation allows Amazon to make far less profit, thereby allowing it to 
undercut competitors, which are forced to generate profits to keep 
investors satisfied.
The point is not to dismiss the enormous value that digital tech-
nologies and platform-based business have created. Rather, it is to 
interrogate the enthusiasm for backing entrepreneurial start ups, 
losses or not, and for seeking to turbo-charge their growth to the 
point that they become a so-called ‘unicorns’ – firms whose most 
recent venture capital round valued the young firm at more than 
$1bn (see below).
THE DECLINE IN THE COST OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
AND BUSINESS EXPERIMENTATION
Over the past 20 years the cost of establishing a start up or experi-
menting internally has decreased dramatically. As important as the 
cost decline, incidentally, is how the abundance of software tools 
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and cloud-based operations speeds the time from forming the firm 
to actually launching a digital service (Kushida, Murray and Zysman 
2015). The reasons for this cost decline are numerous; a technical 
one is the secular decline in the cost of computation – a longstand-
ing tendency encapsulated in the shorthand of Moore’s law but far 
deeper than just the dynamics of semiconductors. It is evident that the 
economics of IT start ups have fundamentally changed. Previously, 
a start up had to purchase and build an entire IT infrastructure, 
which was a capital cost, and – as difficult – write original software 
for whatever product it was introducing. However, the emergence 
of merchant cloud-computing offerings allows a new firm to rent 
server capacity from a vendor, such as Amazon Web Services. What 
previously was a capital investment is now a variable cost, and 
capacity can be scaled up or down without any capital investment 
(Murray and Zysman 2011). Cost and time to market were further 
reduced by the availability of downloadable open-source software 
modules from sources such as GitHub. This open-source software 
eliminates the need to write code from scratch, thereby reducing 
cost, providing opportunities to customise, and avoiding vendor 
lock-in (Northbridge and Blackduck 2016). The availability of low-
cost infrastructure and open-source software dramatically decreases 
the cost of establishing a new digital business. Thus the technical 
changes permit the entry of far more new firms than ever before 
and encourage internal experimentation in existing firms. Of course, 
being able to easily enter does not guarantee success – there can be 
many more experiments, with only a few survivors.
ABUNDANT CAPITAL AND THE 
TOLERATION OF OPERATION LOSSES
The ample available capital and the belief that many industries are 
poised for disruption because of developments in information and 
communications technology (ICT) – such as big data, machine 
learning and the internet of things (which, with smartphones, are 
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new classes of computers) – and the development of new business 
models have convinced investors that start ups offer the opportunity 
for great potential capital gains. This has resulted in an enormous 
flow of capital into private equity, of which venture capital is one 
type.
Not only is the sheer amount of capital available remarkable, 
but there has been a proliferation of start-up funding mechanisms 
(Arrington 2010). Let us begin with conventional venture capital 
firms. Before the internet bubble that began in the mid-1990s, 
traditional venture capital firms were the predominant funders of 
successful technology start ups (Kenney 2011). As the elite venture 
capital firms became more successful, many of them raised and man-
aged mega-funds with $1bn or more in assets. These firms could no 
longer invest in early-stage firms, where an appropriate investment 
is $1mn or less simply because of the management time needed to 
ensure the investments were prudent.
The market gap created by the emergence of mega-funds evoked 
four institutional responses. First, a group of angels or ‘super-angels’ 
emerged easily able to invest up to a few million dollars in a firm’s 
early stages, particularly in Silicon Valley (Manjoo 2011). Many of 
these angels were successful entrepreneurs who had already started 
a company that generated sufficient capital gains so that they could 
now invest in a new generation of entrepreneurs. Second, accelera-
tors – which vet and then accept aspiring entrepreneurs, and then 
provide small amounts of capital and coaching in return for a small 
tranche of equity – emerged. Their goal was to assist in the growth 
of the entrepreneurs’ idea to the point that they could ‘graduate’ and 
form a proto-firm, able to raise money from super-angels or venture 
capitalists (Radojevich-Kelley and Hoffman 2012). Third, a wide 
variety of digital platforms for crowdfunding have been established, 
ranging from Indiegogo and Kickstarter – where funds are contrib-
uted to a project, but the funders receive no equity – to other plat-
forms, such as Angelslist – where only certified investors invest in 
return for equity (Belleflamme, Lambert and Schwienbacher 2014). 
Fourth, a proliferation of smaller, seed-stage venture capital firms 
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has created a functional segmentation of the venture capital industry. 
An ecosystem of organisations and networks now exists to provide 
funding for entrepreneurial experiments made possible by the tech-
nological changes, reducing the cost of starting an ICT firm.
With the reduction in the capital necessary to enter a market and 
the increased number of channels for securing seed capital, more 
firms can be established, thereby increasing the number of experi-
ments. If these experiments experience initial success as signified 
by rapid adoption of robotics, measured by the number of users or 
extent of use and not necessarily by revenue, access to far greater 
pools of capital is likely because, as we note, many of these digital 
markets have winner-take-all characteristics. It is imperative for the 
start up to grow as quickly as possible to occupy the space before 
other start-up competitors or an established firm can introduce 
a competitive product.7 During this phase, profitability is not as 
important as growth that captures the market. At this stage, success 
demands even more capital as the start up grows as expenditures 
out-strip revenue growth. Angels and incubators can no longer pro-
vide the capital necessary for such growth, and thus the expanding 
start up must secure much larger investments from the big venture 
capital firms.
The entrepreneurial environment is particularly munificent today 
as venture capitalists have been raising huge sums for investment. 
Fundraising in 2014, 2015 and 2016 were the largest since 2006, 
with a total of $51bn raised by 314 funds in the US and Europe 
(Pitchbook 2017). Effectively, there is an enormous amount of capi-
tal searching for investment opportunities.
In the current environment, firms are resisting making an initial 
public stock offering, remaining private for longer periods. It is 
possible to secure the required funding, because there has been a 
remarkable growth of pools of available capital through the large 
private equity firms, some of which such as Blackstone are listed 
on public markets. In 2017, the private equity capital available for 
investment (so-called ‘dry powder’) equalled $739bn (Pitchbook 
2017). This massive inflow into private equity and venture capital 
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funds creates a need for fund managers to find opportunities with 
the promise of significant returns. The returns to investors in earlier 
platform firms tells investors that they can expect to earn similar 
returns in future precisely because platforms have network effects 
and can result in winner-take-all markets, with their concomitant 
monopoly dynamics. In the next section, we explore the prolifera-
tion of privately held start ups whose value is over $1bn – the so-
called unicorns.
THE RISE OF THE UNICORNS
The availability and low cost of capital, the technical changes, and 
the belief in the possibility of disruption has resulted in a remarkably 
large number of start ups that are not publicly traded, but whose val-
uation at the last private funding was $1bn or more. Silicon Valley 
venture capitalist Aileen Lee termed such firms after the rare mythi-
cal creatures ‘unicorns’ – a term that has now passed into common 
parlance. In 2013, Lee identified 39 US public and private firms that 
were founded between 2003 and 2013 that had achieved $1bn valu-
ations in 2013. Remarkably, the number of unicorns grew quickly 
(Lee 2013). Verena Schwartz (2017) by combining a number of lists 
found that in February 2017 there were 267 unicorns worldwide. 
While the number of unicorns fluctuates, as do valuations, by 2018 
the sheer number of unlisted firms with such a high valuation was 
remarkable.8
The point of this discussion is not to determine whether this is a 
bubble, but to examine a related phenomenon: the willingness of 
investors to fund firms that are either losing money or not making 
profits at such high valuations. The assumption is that eventually 
the firms will generate sufficient profits in the future to compensate 
for the lack of profits currently. There are both public and private 
firms without any or only minimal profits. While Apple, Facebook, 
Google and Microsoft have large profit margins, Amazon only barely 
breaks even. Other important public platform firms – Pandora, Blue 
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Apron, Snapchat and others – have never made a profit and have no 
discernible path to profitability. More significantly, nearly all of the 
unicorns appear to be losing money.
The amount of private equity available, much of it raised from 
pension funds, also has made it possible for firms to stay private 
longer and lose money longer. The firm Airbnb is interesting from 
this perspective because it was founded in 2009 and become profit-
able in 2016 – a long period of unprofitability that was funded by 
private equity. Given its growth and crossover into profitability, 
it would appear to be ideally suited for an initial public offering. 
However, in 2017, rather than going public, it raised $1bn capital 
at a $31bn valuation. The massive influx of capital allowed it to 
acquire a smaller competitor and continue to grow without offering 
stock to the public – the traditional venture capital exit strategy – or 
worrying about profitability.
The large number of private unicorns is remarkable and differs 
in an important respect from the dot.com boom from 1997 to early 
2000, as during the dot.com bubble newly funded firms rushed to 
make an initial public offering. In the current period, now more 
common unicorns can remain private for a much longer period 
because they are able to raise capital privately. An ability to raise 
capital is vitally important, because a company with continuing 
influxes of capital can continue to offer its product or service with-
out being profitable. This provides a tremendous advantage against 
incumbents already listed on markets, firms that under normal condi-
tions are expected to generate profits.
FINANCIAL WEAPONS IN DIGITAL MARKETS: 
CONSEQUENCES FOR LABOUR
We made our way through this complexity by focusing on invest-
ment and business strategies that rest on enduring operating losses. 
The ability to access enormous sums of capital or an elevated 
stock valuation provides the focal firm with a powerful tool for 
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undercutting its rivals, as it can lower prices or even purchase its 
competitors, as the platform giants such as Facebook did with 
Instagram, WhatsApp and a host of smaller firms. The structure of 
competition is important not only for investors but also for labour. 
How firms compete can determine how much of what kind of labour 
is needed, who will deploy that labour, and where.
Establishing and contributing to the growth of start ups and inter-
nal firm experimentation by investors willing to incur long-term 
operating losses pose many questions. Rapid growth strategies by 
platform economy firms have, by implication, raised questions for 
government regulators in a wide variety of sectors, in practice an 
aggressive assault on regulatory boundaries, even as the labour plat-
forms place significant and often effective wage pressure on parts 
of the workforce. Current strategies seem to suggest less attention is 
paid to developing the talents and ability of workforces or forming 
structures that support workers. The implications are profound.
In the case of Uber, Google Maps, a set of pricing and dispatching 
algorithms, and a smartphone app, for example, have transformed citi-
zen drivers with limited knowledge of a locale into ‘contracted’ trans-
portation providers, creating a compelling service. These new Uber 
drivers – freed from the constraints of a taxi being a public convey-
ance – put downward pressure on prices for all. Unfortunately, there 
is no single narrative here except for the ineluctable fact that platforms 
and intelligent tools are shifting the grounds on which all economic 
activities are undertaken. By extension, this suggests the two funda-
mental conditions in a capitalist society – labour and competition. 
Beyond knowing that these two conditions and everything built on 
them will shift, the implications are contingent and continue to evolve.
The consequences for labour will vary dramatically depending on 
activity and the evolution of the technology, and this will vary across 
applications and market segments, and indeed among firms. What 
appears common to all is that loss-driven market domination strate-
gies that can generate capital gains without attaining even mid-term 
market sustainability appear certain to encourage strategies that will 
treat labour as a commodity whose cost is to be minimised rather 
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than as an asset whose value can contribute to long-term competitive 
advantage for the firm and superior social outcomes.
NOTES
1. The US economy gradually evolved to incentivise a capital-gains-
driven system and, by extension, a turn away from a long-term, earnings-
based system of corporate governance. The most important of these 
incentives was the dramatic lowering of capital gains taxes in the late Carter 
and early Reagan administrations. The lobbying effort was largely driven 
by American Electronics Association and the prime mover in Congress was 
Edwin Zschau, an entrepreneur who became a congressman from the dis-
trict that included Silicon Valley. For a detailed discussion, see The Passage 
of the Investment Incentive Act of 1978 (Johnson 1980). There were other 
important initiatives such as loosening interpretations of the Employment 
Retirement Income Security Act, easing rules on granting stock options, 
and easing various rules on stock trading and listing.
2. For a detailed discussion see Arnold et al. this volume.
3. It was perhaps with the success of Yahoo! that venture capitalists 
came to realise that giving a service away for free would work, if one could 
convince advertisers that they could reach customers through the internet. 
For a discussion of this realisation, see ‘On the 20th Anniversary – The 
History of Yahoo’s Founding’ (McCullough 2015). The discovery in 1994 
by the elite venture capital firm Sequoia Capital that a free service could if 
successful in capturing the market generate enormous capital gains led to 
a rethinking of the economics of venture capital investment. The venture 
capitals were convinced that even with enormous losses a service could be 
monetised in some way, if the market was captured.
4. Our discussion draws on studies of investment euphoria, current stud-
ies of financialisation and the separate discussions about how differences 
in national financial systems influence the relations between business and 
state structure (Perez 2003).
5. We have seen similar dynamics in earlier digital industries with 
Microsoft in the personal computer operating system and office productiv-
ity software, Intel in personal computer microprocessors, Cisco in com-
puter networking, and Oracle in relational databases.
6. We suggest that current antitrust and competition policy is completely 
unprepared to address the types of business strategies these small entrepre-
neurial firms use.
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7. For the incumbent firm in an industry receiving the attention of the 
new entrants the challenge is daunting. Each of the entrants is likely to 
have a somewhat different business model. Thus, the incumbent faces not 
a single entrant with one model, but multiple entrants with different mod-
els. If any of these models shows any promise of success, then the venture 
capitalists will provide further funding for its growth. It is these multiple 
experiments and challenges that contribute to making the current environ-
ment so treacherous for incumbents. A further difficulty is that the new 
entrants may not challenge the incumbent across its entire business, but 
rather only certain particularly valuable parts of its business model, which 
if successful could relegate the incumbent to the commodity portions of its 
business.
8. Recent research suggests that the clauses in the financing contracts 
dramatically lower the true valuation of the most recent investment to such 
an extent that nearly half of the “unicorns they studied were not, in fact, 
worth $1 billion or more” (Gornall and Strebulaev 2017).
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The prospects for gender equality arising from the fourth industrial 
revolution depend on current differences in the position of women 
and men in the division of both paid and unpaid work. Women in all 
societies are more involved in unpaid care work than men, though 
the amount of unpaid care work varies between countries and social 
classes according to family size, social norms and the availability of 
substitute services. Socio-economic differences mean that the imme-
diate impacts from the fourth industrial revolution on employment 
and care work are likely to have gender-specific impacts. To trace 
the likely patterns of these effects, this chapter begins by outlining 
some potential outcomes, based on the assumption that there will be 
no significant change in employment regulation, social protection 
and gender equality arrangements. We also recognise that the fourth 
industrial revolution has the potential to facilitate social change; 
with this in mind, we outline a number of recommendations.
Given men and women lead unequal lives, debates on the fourth 
industrial revolution present a timely opportunity to propose a 
rethink of both the structures of employment and the forms of work. 
Therefore, the main focus of this chapter is to identify positive 
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policy initiatives that could not only mitigate any immediate nega-
tive impacts but also harness the potential to make a positive step 
change towards gender equality. Here we should note that we would 
not expect to achieve progress through women-only adjustments to 
the world of work. Instead policies need to promote change on the 
part of men as well as women and to expand social support for care.
PREDICTING THE IMMEDIATE IMPACTS OF THE 
FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION BY GENDER
While prediction is a hazardous exercise, we suggest focusing on 
four dimensions to identify the potential gendered impacts of the 
fourth industrial revolution:
• structural change
• change to the nature and quality of work
• change to the employment relationship
• change to access to work during the period of childbirth and 
childrearing.
First, structural change has been explored by Piasna and Drahokoupil 
(2017) looking at the transformation of occupational structures 
across Europe. They found examples of job loss in both male-
dominated occupations such as construction and female-dominated 
occupations such as clerical work. There was also evidence of major 
gains in some male-dominated occupations (eg IT professionals) and 
in some female-dominated occupations (eg cleaners and helpers). 
This mixed pattern of growth is reflected in only a limited increase 
in the female share of all employment from 45% in 2008 to 46% 
in 2015. Segregation has also been changing but in complex ways, 
although the overall effect in the most recent period (2011–2015) is 
to upgrade women’s occupational position. Nevertheless, most of 
the job growth for men and for women depends on what is happen-
ing in male-dominated and female-dominated jobs. As Rubery and 
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Rafferty (2013) explored in relation to the impact of recession and 
austerity, men are particularly vulnerable to changes in manufactur-
ing and construction and women particularly vulnerable to changes 
in the public sector and private services. Arguably, future structural 
changes will be determined by not only technology but also the 
level and distribution of investment, the impact of subsequent job 
loss on consumer demands (particularly for private services) and 
the policies adopted towards the public sector, including whether to 
use technologies to simply reduce labour input or to assist staff to 
provide better care (Pritchard and Brittain 2015).
Trends in the second dimension, changes to the nature and quality 
of work for women, depend on three main factors: the pattern of dis-
placement, the current and future patterns of recruitment by gender 
into different types of jobs, and of course the overall pattern of work 
reorganisation. If automation occurs mainly in relation to repetitive 
or routine tasks, then the content of women’s jobs may improve on 
average. This is because, according to Piasna and Drahokoupil’s 
(2017) research using the European Working Conditions survey 
(2015), women are more likely to be involved in repetitive work 
throughout the labour market (with the exception of clerical support 
workers) and are also less likely to report that they are doing com-
plex tasks even with the same occupational group. This could thus 
raise the quality of women’s jobs while reducing their number, but 
in fact repetitive jobs will not necessarily disappear first, as it may 
still be cheaper to use labour than machines when more disadvan-
taged groups such as women are employed on low wages. The big 
gains with automation may come from displacing high-paid male 
jobs, for example as financial analysts.
When considering women’s future access to quality jobs, it 
should be noted that although there has been an historical tendency 
for women to be concentrated in repetitive work, recent trends 
uncovered by Piasna and Drahokoupil (2017) found women to be 
outperforming men in entering non-routine jobs requiring analytical 
or interpersonal skills. Not all trends are positive however. Women 
remain underrepresented in key growth areas such as jobs requiring 
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science, technology, engineering and maths (STEM) knowledge 
and skills, accounting for 23% of core STEM occupations in 2017 
(WISE 2017). This pattern persists despite women successfully 
moving into previously male-dominated areas such as life sciences 
and medicine. Their underrepresentation is particularly acute in 
the ICT sector, where levels of female employment are dropping 
(to 17% in 2017, from 18% in 2016), and where they tend to be 
concentrated in the lower-paid sectors (WISE 2017). Furthermore, 
retention is challenging as many women disappear within the first 
couple of years of entering the industry, with more leaving than are 
being recruited (Moore et al 2008). Recent reports of gender dis-
criminatory practices in big-tech firms suggest there is little sign of 
improvement. This points to barriers to working in STEM – beyond 
those related to the education system – that may be deterring women 
from entering these fields.
Finally, what may matter most of all for the pattern of change 
in the quality of work for women is whether employing organisa-
tions favour designing out human interventions or using the human 
dimension to enhance competiveness or the quality of the service 
provided. For example a recent report on the retail sector (Tait 2017) 
outlined three possible competitive strategies in response to the 
fourth industrial revolution: squeezing the cost base, automating to 
efficiency or, the most promising, competing through connectivity, 
building on human skills as a basis for the survival of the high street 
and retail centres. This could, if adopted, lead to automation com-
bined with reskilling rather than simple job displacement in retail, 
one of the sectors identified as most at risk from automation.
The third factor shaping the gender impact is the changing employ-
ment relationship, which can be expected to have gendered effects. 
The fourth industrial revolution marks a change from an open-ended 
agreement to sell labour time to one-off contracts for highly specified 
services and tasks (Bergvall-Kåreborn and Howcroft 2014), encour-
aging forms of dependent contractor and bogus self-employment. 
The gendered implications of these changes in the employment rela-
tionship are evident from women’s disproportional representation 
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in non-standard forms of employment and solo self-employment. 
Those working in the gig economy currently represent a relatively 
small share of the workforce,1 but this type of employment is on the 
increase. Online platforms have international reach and may offer 
new opportunities to women with limited access to the formal econ-
omy, but gendered promises of freedom and flexibility are situated 
in a context where around 60% of the world’s population – many 
of them women in low- and middle-income countries – still lack 
internet access (OECD 2017). While online platforms may appear 
to be gender-blind, research has revealed a gender pay gap (Adams 
and Berg 2017). Gender pay differentials operate regardless of feed-
back scores, experience, occupational category, working hours and 
educational attainment, which suggests gender inequality is embed-
ded in the operation of platforms (Barzilay and Ben-David 2017) in 
ways that require further exploration.
A more significant trend than crowdwork is the rapid rise in 
solo self-employment. Women-run online entrepreneur firms pre-
dominate in Australia, Canada, the Philippines, the UK and the 
US (OECD 2017). Taking the UK as an example, we find that 
men outnumber women by more than two to one among the self-
employed, but the number of self-employed women rose by three-
quarters since 2001, with the increase in part-time self-employment 
rising even faster, at 88% (CRSE 2017). The majority of these 
self-employed have been found to have a stable income and to be 
independent – not working for a single client. However, around 
two-fifths are classified as low paid and one-fifth receive low or 
medium pay and are also insecure. While gig economy work and 
self-employment affect men as well as women, there are differences 
in the implications for women, particularly those who are carers. 
More men than women are undertaking gig economy work as an 
additional source of income to supplement the day job but when 
women are carers these jobs are likely to be those women’s main 
source of income. Therefore the insecurity matters more to women, 
and a higher proportion of women’s total working hours are likely 
to be unpaid. The International Labour Organization has estimated 
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that those using platforms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk spend 
18 minutes in every hour searching for work (Berg 2016). This is in 
contrast to the traditional employment contract where the employer 
pays for on-the-job-inactivity within the guaranteed working day 
(Supiot 2001).
The fourth dimension for gender equality concerns change in 
access to work over the period of childbirth and childrearing. There 
is the risk that if work becomes more fragmented with competition 
for each new task, much of the progress made by women in retaining 
access to employment through paid maternity leave may disappear. 
Across the European Union, almost half of self-employed women 
are not entitled to maternity benefits (OECD 2017). But, even if the 
state makes some provision, taking leave may be risky as access to 
work for the self-employed often depends on how good your last 
job was, so taking time out can be very costly. At the same time 
new technologies could potentially make it easier for employers to 
accede to requests for flexible working, thereby perhaps reducing 
the proportion of women pushed into self-employment or the gig 
economy after childbirth. Again the issue is not with the technology 
but the policies of employers.
If the outcome of the fourth industrial revolution is unemploy-
ment through displacement of workers, then individual employees’ 
bargaining power may be reduced. This could make it more difficult 
to negotiate flexible working, particularly if this remains only a right 
to request, not a right in itself. This would have significant implica-
tions given that countries with the highest share of women work-
ing from home also have the highest rates of employment among 
women with children (OECD 2017). Furthermore, opportunities 
simply to work some of the time at home would not be sufficient 
to take into account caring responsibilities if very long total hours 
of work are maintained within a flexible but 24/7 economy. Indeed 
some employers may even consider the price for some limited 
autonomy over location and place to be willingness to be available 
outside standard working hours to meet the needs of the business 
or clients.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE
Given the increasing attention being paid to debating the future of 
work, it is prescient to consider the possibility of a more gender 
equal world and sketch out alternatives. Future scenarios are neither 
inevitable nor predetermined, but depend on how society chooses 
to engage with technology. With this in mind, we offer a number 
of recommendations in the hope of opening up spaces of possibility 
and initiating wider debate.
If automation is to achieve the elusive higher productivity levels, 
this need not necessarily exacerbate inequality. Research shows 
increasing job polarisation by skill level in many Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (Autor 
2015), but differentiation is not inevitable. While Frey and Osborne 
(2013) paint a fairly woeful picture of the reduction of labour 
demand through automation, they neglect the impact on working 
hours. Rather than polarise those in work and those out of work, 
automation could facilitate a reduction in average working hours and 
the working year, generating more free time for all without reducing 
economic output or increasing unemployment.
For free time to be beneficial, a sufficient income is vital and so 
the implementation of reduced hours should avoid triggering con-
comitant salary reductions, at least for those at the low and middle 
end of the pay distribution. This would allow for a more equal distri-
bution of wage work and income while providing the preconditions 
for a more equal sharing of care between men and women.
A woman’s position in the labour market is inextricably linked to 
experiences in the home and the distribution of reproductive labour 
remains imbalanced. Reduced working time could enable more 
innovative approaches towards domestic, reproductive and care 
arrangements. New forms of flexible working – no longer subject to 
the whim of employers and with adequate social protection – could 
help normalise the dual roles of carers and earners in households, 
challenging expectations about who holds responsibility for paid 
and unpaid labour. Furthermore, while technology can help facilitate 
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home-based working, to date this has primarily benefitted higher-
status, male occupations, while women self-employed teleworkers 
experience a greater risk of work–life spillover (Hilbrecht and Lerob 
2014). Rethinking the social relations of gender could transform 
home-based working to provide wider benefits for women.
Recent discussions on the future of work have enabled a revisit-
ing of the societal value of care work (Srnicek and Williams 2016), 
so that high-status work is not simply associated with labour that 
is profitable for capital. Historically, domestic technology, includ-
ing that related to physical and mental care, has been consistently 
marginalised due to an undervaluing of the feminine and the pri-
vate sphere (Cockburn 1997). However, demographic changes and 
the impending crisis of care in many developed economies has 
led to an expansion of research into assistive technologies. These 
technologies have the potential to reduce the burden of care work 
with automation, but as with many innovations a seemingly smart 
technological solution also has the potential to generate negative 
and unintended consequences (Pritchard and Brittain 2015). For this 
reason, it is important to look beyond simply employing technology 
to compensate for the potential human shortfall and instead give 
due consideration to how it can be usefully employed to extend 
personal connectivity and stimulate social interaction. Engaging 
with users (older citizens) of the technology in participatory design 
practices may inform developers as to how this may play out in 
future scenarios.
Given the growing demand for STEM knowledge and skills, the 
issue of low representation of women workers needs to be addressed. 
This is significant given the lack of opportunity for women workers 
in an area that is likely to expand rather than shrink as a consequence 
of the fourth industrial revolution. It is particularly problematic if 
women have practically no voice in the design and development of 
major technological innovations, especially if these are perceived to 
be transforming the imagined future. Despite a number of initiatives, 
gender inequality is endemic to the ICT sector, so a fundamental re-
orientation in the culture and organisation of work will be needed if 
we are to redress gender imbalances.
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Increasing levels of non-standard forms of employment and 
precarious work has been intensified by digitalisation, leading to 
increasing fragmentation (Rubery 2015). Ostensibly, the emergence 
of platform-based working and ‘gigs’ may appear to benefit women, 
providing flexibility for those with care obligations and offering paid 
work for those weakly attached to the labour market. In reality, this 
is primarily characterised by low and intermittent pay, highly frag-
mented and routinised work tasks, unpaid time spent searching for 
tasks, as well as exclusion from social protection and employment 
standards. While platform-based working lies predominantly in the 
jurisdiction of big-tech companies, which are intent on generating 
capital, alternatives such as state-owned platforms could offer mini-
mum guaranteed hours or income including financial compensation 
when work is not available at contracted times. Concurrently, ade-
quate regulation is essential, and the state needs to step up and tackle 
the huge black hole in labour law so that platforms can no longer 
continue to facilitate exploitable work practices (Taylor 2017). If the 
future world of work is left in the hands of high tech monopolies that 
actively pursue tax avoidance and regulatory arbitrage, the prospects 
for gender equality appear bleak. It has never been more opportune 
for significant state interventions to shape technological futures.
NOTE
1. The UK has the highest share of crowdworkers internationally at 
around 3% (ILO 2016).
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Technological change is increasingly turning the value chain into an 
automated and digitalised process. The digitalisation and automation 
of manufacturing processes is characterised by the use of increasingly 
autonomous systems and robots, as well as fully automated smart 
factories (Industry 4.0), which are interconnected with upstream and 
downstream business divisions. Similarly, service providers have 
been using intelligent software and algorithms on the basis of large 
volumes of data and web interfaces to digitalise and automate busi-
ness processes. To this effect, businesses make use of big data analy-
sis software, cloud computing systems or online platforms, to give 
but a few examples. In view of these technological developments 
– sometimes referred to as technologies of the fourth industrial revo-
lution – an increasing number of concerns have been voiced in the 
public debate that this might lead to many jobs becoming redundant 
in the future. The idea of ‘technological unemployment’ is supported 
by a number of US studies which suggest that almost 50% of jobs 
are at risk of being replaced by new digital technologies (Frey and 
Osborne 2017). This raises a number of questions for both political 
decisionmakers and the general public: is it true that automation and 
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digitalisation will result in major job losses? And if so, which jobs are 
at risk? In what ways are technological developments changing work 
processes and content? How will this affect qualification and skills 
requirements? Do we need to adapt in order to guarantee employee 
job security? This essay sheds some light on these questions.
AUTOMATION RISKS SEEM TO BE OVERESTIMATED
Frey and Osborne (2017) investigated how susceptible are jobs 
to computerisation by asking experts how easily certain occupa-
tions could be automated in the next two decades. As a result they 
estimate that 47% of all US employees are in occupations that are 
at high risk of becoming automatable in the next 10 to 20 years. 
Applying the same methods to determine the automation potential 
of specific occupations in Germany and Europe yields similar results 
(Bonin, Gregory and Zierahn 2015; Bowles 2014). Hence, these 
findings subsequently spurred widespread automation angst and 
have sparked lively political debate public debate in recent years. 
However, there are good reasons to assume that these figures vastly 
overestimate the number of jobs that will actually become redundant 
due to technological advances in the next two decades.
First of all, usually, not all the tasks outlined in a job description 
can be automated to the same degree. In fact, though machines may 
take over certain tasks of any given job description, there are others 
that they cannot. Therefore, whether an occupation can be automated 
or not depends on how significant the type of tasks are that can be 
carried out by machines. Hence, even within the same occupation, 
the automation potential can vary greatly from job to job. An analy-
sis of automation potential based on the actual task structure of indi-
vidual jobs thus produces very different results (see Arntz, Gregory 
and Zierahn 2017). According to this analysis, the percentage of 
jobs in the US with a high automation potential (>70%) falls from 
38% when applying Frey and Osborne’s occupation-based approach 
to just 9% when looking at individual jobs (see Figure 4.1). One 
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explanation for this significantly reduced automation potential is 
that many jobs involve tasks that are difficult to automate and that 
workers apparently specialise in different non-automatable niches 
within their profession. As a result, risk assessments that are based 
on occupational job descriptions for some representative workers 
do not sufficiently capture these non-automatable niches, and hence 
seriously overestimate the potential for automation. One potential 
reason for this result could be that workers increasingly shift their 
work towards tasks that complement these new technologies (Spitz-
Oener 2006).
These findings also hold for many other Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. In 
particular, the use of an individual job-oriented approach has shown 
that the automation potential of jobs in 21 OECD countries is far 
lower than previous studies would have us believe (Arntz, Gregory 
and Zierahn 2016), though the results vary from country to coun-
try. While 12% of jobs in Germany and Austria can be automated, 
the figure for Korea is only 6%. Even though the cause-and-effect 
Figure 4.1 Automation potential on the US labour market. Source: Arntz et al. 
2017.
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relationship is yet to be sufficiently studied, the analysis suggests 
that countries with the lowest percentage of jobs that can be replaced 
tend to invest more in information and communications technol-
ogy (ICT) and have a more communication-intensive workplace 
structure as well as a more highly educated workforce. Hence, 
there is some evidence that the automation potential has been exag-
gerated and that future potential for automation is actually lowest 
in the countries that have already undergone some adjustments 
through ICT investment and upskilling their workforce. Notably, 
these expert-based risk assessments also correspond more or less 
with subjective assessments of employees regarding technological 
change; according to a German survey, 13% of workers expect their 
job to be carried out by a machine within the next 10 years (Arnold 
et al. 2016).
HURDLES TO DIGITALISATION LIMIT AUTOMATION 
POTENTIAL IN THE SHORT- TO MID-RUN
Although the automation potential may thus be much lower than is 
often claimed, around 1 in 10 jobs still seems to have the potential to 
become automated. Expecting an increase in unemployment of the 
same magnitude, however, would be much too simplistic a conclu-
sion, since automation potential only reflects the technical potential 
for job displacement (see also Arntz, Gregory and Zierahn 2016; 
Bonin, Gregory and Zierahn 2015). For example, it is quite likely 
that it takes longer for these new technologies to be adopted by firms 
on a grand scale than is often asserted. Initial analyses based on the 
representative IAB-ZEW Working World 4.0 survey conducted in 
early 2016 have shown that although around half of German compa-
nies are using “technologies of the fourth industrial revolution”, on 
average only 5% of all firm assets could be described as “production 
facilities 4.0” and only 8% as “electronic office and communications 
equipment 4.0” (Arntz et al. 2016b).
Some of the main hurdles faced by firms when implementing tech-
nologies of the fourth industrial revolution are the increasing cost of 
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data protection and cyber security measures, the need for specific 
training for employees on how to work with new technologies, high 
investment costs, and an increased dependence on external knowl-
edge and services (Arntz et al. 2016a). Apart from these hurdles, a 
number of regulatory, legal or social road blocks do not prevent the 
introduction of these new technologies, but they could slow their dif-
fusion. Some of the obstacles will be overcome at some point. Social 
preferences for certain tasks to be carried out by humans rather than 
machines (eg in areas such as care services) may limit the adoption 
of new technologies even in the long run. This could be done by 
establishing technical standards for implementing networked manu-
facturing and liability issues surrounding self-driving cars.
DIGITALISATION IS CHANGING JOBS 
BUT NOT REPLACING THEM
The implementation of new technologies does not necessarily lead 
to job losses if employees are increasingly carrying out tasks that 
are made more efficient by using new technologies without being 
replaced by these technologies (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2017; 
Autor 2015). This may also explain why only a third of the 13% 
of employees who believe their job could potentially be automated 
expressed concern over the security of their own job (Arnold et al. 
2016). Since, from the perspective of companies, the use of new 
technologies goes hand in hand with increased work productivity as 
well as additional sales opportunities for new products and services 
(Arntz et al. 2016b), the effects of digitalisation on overall employ-
ment are not necessarily negative.
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE CREATES 
MORE JOBS THAN IT DESTROYS
In order to make any concrete statement on the changes to overall 
employment over the course of digitalisation, we must consider both 
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labour-saving and job-creating effects. From their initial empirical 
findings on the European level, Gregory, Salomons and Zierahn 
(2016) concluded that the net balance was previously on the whole 
positive. Figure 4.2 shows the corresponding aggregate effect of 
technological change in the period 1999–2010 on the labour demand 
of firms and dissects it into various causal factors. The lower limit is 
based on the assumption that only wage income leads to increased 
consumption in Europe, while the upper limit assumes that capital 
income also has a positive effect on the European economy through 
consumption. Overall, it appears that labour demand has increased 
as a result of recent technological change. The labour-creating 
effect of technological change thus seems to dominate the initial 
labour-saving effect. This is because the falling price of goods, 
together with increased consumption resulting from rising income 
levels, have led to an increase in labour demand in both the area of 
tradeable goods (this is an example of the positive product demand 
effect) and of non-tradeable services (this is an example of the 
positive product demand spillover effect). The latter effect is con-
siderably stronger if capital income also contributes to consumption 
within Europe. This suggests that the effects of digitalisation on the 
labour market might also depend on how the profits of technological 
change are distributed and utilised.
Figure 4.2 Labour demand in Europe, estimated change (in millions of jobs) 
1999–2010. Source: Gregory, Salomons and Zierahn (2016).
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DIGITALISATION ALTERS QUALIFICATION 
AND SKILLS REQUIREMENTS
Even though overall employment is unlikely to drop significantly, 
this does not preclude massive structural changes. Jobs in IT and 
education are likely to benefit, whereas jobs in manufacturing 
industries where the use of machines and technical equipment is 
widespread will probably be hardest hit by staffing cuts (Wolter 
et al. 2015). This structural change will also lead to a change in 
qualification and skills requirements. Overall, the findings sug-
gest that in the future jobs will be less physically demanding and 
instead more mentally demanding, as well as being more varied and 
complex. From the perspective of companies, job requirements will 
increase, particularly in the area of process expertise and interdisci-
plinary methods of working and transferable skills (see Figure 4.3). 
The latter primarily encompasses social skills (eg customer service) 
and creativity – in other words, skills where humans still have an 
advantage over machines. One of the side-effects of these develop-
ments, however, is an increasingly high mental strain on workers. 
Around two-thirds of employees believe that new technologies have 
Figure 4.3 Increasing automation and changing skill requirements. Source: 
Arntz, Gregory, Jansen and Zierahn (2016b).
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led to increased workloads, with more and more tasks having to be 
completed at the same time (Arnold et al. 2016).
TREND TOWARDS BOTH UP- AND DESKILLING
These changing skills requirements seem to be accompanied by an 
increased demand for better qualified workers even within occu-
pations. According to the results of a survey conducted among 
German companies, the demand for qualifications is shifting as a 
result of digitalisation, particularly in the service sector, in favour 
of expert and specialist jobs (for workers with vocational training 
or further training on the job) and high-skilled jobs (for university 
graduates) and away from unskilled work (Arntz et al. 2016b). 
Employees have also begun to perceive this trend towards more 
highly skilled workers. In Germany, four-fifths of workers see 
a need to continuously develop their skills in order to keep up 
with higher job requirements (see Figure 4.4). Although this was 
observed across all qualification groups, the share of individuals 
seeking to upgrade their skills increases with the level of qualifi-
cation. These changing skill and qualification requirements point 
to the new division of labour between man and machine in the 
near future. While machines take over tasks which are easier to 
programme and automate, human labour is mainly needed for less 
routine and skill-intensive tasks involving creativity and social 
interactions.
The trend towards more highly qualified workers is not seen 
everywhere, however. Companies in the manufacturing sector are 
reporting a polarisation of qualification requirements. Demand for 
both low-skilled and highly qualified workers has risen, to the det-
riment of workers with medium level technical qualifications – in 
other words, we are seeing a trend towards both higher and lower 
qualification requirements for workers. Indeed, 15% of workers in 
Germany reported that the skills and competencies required for their 
jobs had decreased over the past five years as a result of digitalisation 
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(Arnold et al. 2016). Low-skilled workers in particular – around 1 in 
3 – claim to have witnessed this sort of deskilling.
FROM RISING POLARISATION 
TO RISING INEQUALITY?
Even though digital transformation is not expected to trigger any 
negative aggregate employment effects, it is still creating a fun-
damental shift in labour demand between different occupations 
and fields of activity. This will put increased pressure on workers, 
particularly low-skilled workers, to adapt. The share of low-skilled 
employees performing tasks with a high automation potential is sig-
nificantly higher than among employees with high or medium level 
qualifications. Employees’ subjective expectations regarding the 
likelihood of their job becoming automated are similarly distributed 
across the different education groups (cf. Figure 4.5). Recent stud-
ies suggest that the pressure to adapt is shifting from workers with 
medium level qualifications, who were hardest hit in the 1990s, to 
low-skilled workers (Arnold et al. 2016; Arntz, Gregory and Zierahn 
2016; Wolter et al. 2015).
Figure 4.4 Competence requirements due to digitisation by education group, 
Germany.
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As a result, the effect of digitalisation on the employment and 
wage structure may change. While it is highly qualified workers 
in occupations involving a high level of non-routine tasks who 
benefit most from an increasingly demanding work environment, 
as machines and algorithms are complementary to their work and 
increase their productivity, until recently, it was primarily work-
ers with medium level qualifications in occupations characterised 
by a high degree of routine tasks who had reason to fear that their 
jobs might be replaced by machines. As a result, over the last two 
decades employment among highly qualified workers at the upper 
end of the salary distribution – and to a lesser extent among low-
skilled workers at the lower end – increased, while employment 
growth in the middle was fairly weak. In this way, labour markets 
in western economies have experienced widespread job polarisation 
(Acemoglu and Autor 2011). If in the future, however, low-skilled 
workers come increasingly under pressure as simple non-routine 
tasks become more easily automated, a period of job polarisation 
in the recent past might be superseded by a period of increasing 
inequality.
Figure 4.5 Automation potential and perceived threat from technological sub-
stitution by education groups.
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NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY RESPONSE
Overall, the challenges surrounding the digital transformation 
towards a Work 4.0 call for a policy approach that helps to unleash 
the full innovative and productive potential of this change, while at 
the same time ensuring that workers are not left out in the cold. In 
this regard, there are three key messages that can be derived from 
the research findings presented above.
First, workers’ qualifications will have a central role to play. 
Continuous further training is important if workers are to meet the 
ever increasing skills requirements in many sectors. For this reason, 
many companies are intensifying their further training schemes and 
adapting the contents of their training courses. However, those whose 
jobs have the highest automation potential – low-skilled workers – 
actually see less of a need to continuously train and gain new skills 
than other, more highly qualified groups of workers. Corporate 
measures alone are not enough to combat a potential increase in 
inequality as a result of technological change. In addition, govern-
ment programmes are needed to promote particular groups whose 
skill levels would otherwise fall further and further behind rising 
requirements. Moreover, these programmes should not only kick 
in once people have already lost their jobs; rather, they should be 
offered opportunities to gain higher qualifications alongside their 
current job that will help to keep them in stable employment.
Second, we can expect there to be a fraction of the labour force 
that is not in a position, and is unlikely to reach a position even 
through further training, to meet the growing demands of the labour 
market. Employment and income risks might increase for this group 
and will represent a challenge for social policy. Due to a lack of 
research, however, the extent of this challenge as well as any poten-
tial remedies remain underdeveloped.
Third, initial findings suggest that the aggregate employment 
effects of digital transformation depend, among other things, on 
how the profits of digitalisation are distributed and utilised. While 
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increased wage income bolsters local consumption and thus creates 
new jobs, increased capital income might be less beneficial for the 
local economy. This raises the question of whether lower tax rates 
for capital income compared with wage income represent a disad-
vantage to the input factor labour and whether an adjustment of the 
relative tax burdens could lead to more positive employment effects 
of digital transformation.
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It has been understood for centuries that society and the economy 
are linked. The ‘base’, as Karl Marx described it in his seminal 
depiction, provides a foundation for the ‘superstructure’ that sits on 
top of it (Marx 2014). But what happens when the base shifts? What 
occurs when the material foundation of the economy – the ‘means of 
production’, as Marx would have it – begins to change profoundly? 
Is the right policy response still to seize the ‘commanding heights’? 
Or is it rather time to start retooling that society to sit more com-
fortably on top of an economy where the fundamental underlying 
value arises from completely unforeseen new processes and wealth 
is being created in a fundamentally different way?
I believe something like that is happening now, even if analysts 
sometimes struggle to cast the challenge in a way that sheds more 
light on the future being born than the past being left behind. The 
question policymakers face is not so much how to keep industry from 
disappearing, though this discussion is perennial and appeals can be 
found in most major political platforms at every major election. 
It is also a point of reference and a too-obvious-to-be-questioned 
explanation within the communities that have been devastated by 
industry’s disappearance.1 The issue is how do we prepare for and 
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legislate for an economy where the social order will face a radically 
different set of challenges – problems that will themselves need 
to be mitigated with a radically different set of policies (Hofheinz 
2017). The social structure has shifted already. In the old days men 
ran the world, but now there is more access, more opportunity. Is 
that a good thing? It depends on where you sit. But for the vast 
majority of people – particularly women, immigrants and, yes, the 
world’s poor – this is a very good thing indeed (Sachs 2005).
So what, then, are the fundamental shifts?
THE ECONOMY HAS BECOME DEMATERIALISED
First and foremost, the economy has become dematerialised (Haskel 
and Westlake 2017). It is no longer about making and shipping 
goods. It has become about producing and selling services (OECD 
2017). Advanced manufacturers – at least the ones who understand 
the shift – are reacting cleverly and responding flexibly. Rolls-
Royce, for one, no longer sells airplane engines. Instead, it sells 
guaranteed ‘aviation hours’ to the world’s airplane manufactur-
ers – and monitors the engines it leases with advanced analytics 
(Dinges et al. 2015). This is not a unique development. Companies 
worldwide are starting to see the goods they make as part of a larger 
set of services to offer. And those services, in turn, can be parsed, 
outsourced and spread around the world in unique combinations that 
make us a truly global economy, despite what the Brexiteers will tell 
you (Hofheinz and Mandel 2015). There is no ‘little England’ any 
more. The economy is truly global.
IMPROVEMENT IN LIFE EXPECTANCY
Life expectancy has improved dramatically, with a consequent shift 
in the way public resources are spent and a major impact on the labour 
inputs available to the economy worldwide (Sachs 2005). Here, in 
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‘industrial Europe’, life expectancy has risen to 77.9 years for men 
and 83.3 years for women, up from a frighteningly low 25 years as 
recently as 200 years ago.2 With improvements in lifelong healthcare 
and decreases in crippling infant mortality, the size of families has 
consequently also shifted, falling from an average of around 10 in 
Europe 200 years ago to 2.3 today (interestingly, almost two-thirds of 
European families are now one- or two-person households).3
This latter point is a radical shift as well: mothers are no longer 
stuck at home, essentially running small child-rearing businesses 
that would have defied the management capabilities of the men who 
deserted them each day for the factory floor. And the true revolution 
in our time is that the phenomenon is no longer limited to the devel-
oped world (Sachs 2005). With the notable exception of Africa, life 
expectancy has also risen dramatically in the developing world, an 
achievement that is not coincidentally contemporaneous with the 
rise of globalisation. This has brought literally billions of hardwork-
ing, relatively cheap and often extremely talented people into the 
global workforce.
IMPROVEMENT IN ACCESS TO EDUCATION
Access to education has improved dramatically. Literacy rates are 
rising around the world and, guess what?, some of those who might 
not have learned to read in previous generations are fast becoming 
the world’s best engineers. Five years ago, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology agreed to let external students who followed a 
sophomore-level circuits and electronics course on the Institute’s 
popular massive open online course (MOOC) to sit the final exam. 
The result was an explosion of good results. One of the recipients 
was Battushig Myanganbayar, a 15-year-old Mongolian boy, who 
earned a perfect score from his desktop in Ulan Bator.4 More than 58 
million people have participated in MOOCs since their advent some 
five years ago. Some of them are now covering Master’s degree-
level material.5
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SHIFT IN THE ECONOMIC ‘BASE’
All of this is possible because of a dramatic shift in the economic 
‘base’, to use the Marxist term. The internet made possible instanta-
neous, zero marginal cost communication – at the local as well as the 
global level (see Soete this volume). This has been an enormously 
empowering and disruptive influence – not just on politics, but on 
the social order that prevailed in some places for centuries. But it 
has other, more deep-seated, implications. Put simply, it has turned 
data into the economy’s newest, most valuable vital asset (OECD 
2015). Policymakers have struggled to find a suitable metaphor; data 
is the new economy’s most important ‘commodity’, ‘currency’ and 
‘infrastructure’, to use just three of the concepts to which it is most 
often (and somewhat misleadingly) compared. But data is really 
something else entirely. Data is data. Its use has its own logic, and its 
own requirements (Hofheinz and Osimo 2017). In a nutshell, data is 
how global businesses communicate across the vast spaces they now 
occupy. And it is the crucial raw material from which those companies 
– as well as governments and individuals – will come to new insights, 
develop and deliver new services and derive vital conclusions.
Everywhere you see the economy shifting. Financial service com-
panies now derive more value from their ability to collect and learn 
from the data they gather than they do from the margins on routine 
financial transactions. Once obscure internet platforms have grown 
to be enormous global businesses, often offering excellent services 
for free in return for nothing more than the right to track how you 
use it. And now artificial intelligence (see Petropoulos this volume) 
is poised to take it to a higher level, holding out the possibility of 
automating more and more tasks with the knowledge internet plat-
forms gain from the data we feed them (Hofheinz 2016).
IMPLICATIONS FOR INDUSTRY
So what, then, are the implications for industry? First and foremost, 
industry in the developed world ignores these trends at its peril 
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(OECD 2017). Companies like Germany’s vast Mittelstand (see 
Rahner and Schönstein this volume) are particularly affected. The 
world is big, hyper-competitive and horizontally connected. There 
is little nostalgia. Price is king, though quality can still command 
a premium, but it is important that that premium remains afford-
able and within reach. The developed world is both challenge and 
opportunity. It is a challenge because developing-world products 
and manufacturing techniques have risen so dramatically and remain 
relatively cheap. It is an opportunity because that rise gives devel-
oped-world manufacturers bigger and bigger markets to sell into.
The larger question is not can and will industry adapt – contrary 
to its reputation, European industry is more competitive than we 
give it credit for.6 Rather, it is how we will deal with the dramatic 
social and political disruption that this brave new world gives rise to. 
First is rising inequality.7 While global income disparities are fall-
ing, demonstrable and quantifiably rising inequality is the unwanted 
side effect at ‘the local level’ – which is how we now refer to the 
nation state in a sign of how much change these times have already 
brought. Put simply, the spread of digital technologies and the 
concurrent rise of the global economy created winners and losers. 
If enough of the losers feel the game is rigged against them – and 
many have come to that conclusion – the result will be a nasty form 
of protest politics, which threatens the prosperity on which so many 
countries and societies are based (Clinton 2017). Policy does make 
a difference. And decisions to dismantle democracy – as the Polish 
government is doing – or drop out of important global trade flows – 
as the British have foolishly decided to do – will be felt directly, and 
sooner than you think. The Roman empire did collapse, though few 
at the time of Julius Caesar’s putsch could have foreseen the dark 
age that was to come.
There is something new, something truly ahistorical, about what 
is happening in the economy right now. It is the unforeseen shift in 
the way value is created (Hofheinz and Osimo 2017). More than is 
commonly perceived, the industrial economy was built on a model 
of strong property rights (including intellectual property) and the 
associated concept of individual accumulation of wealth.8 It started 
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with the great move towards enclosures in the 16th century – an 
effort to clear farmers from previously common land so that that 
land could be developed privately (until that time, the prevailing 
social order had been common, based mostly on unwritten feudal 
rights and duties, which tied owners and peasants together in pat-
terns of shared responsibility for each other). But the trend continued 
with the rise of factories and the scientific and industrial explosion 
of the 18th and 19th centuries. This development was driven not by 
ever larger markets but by stronger – and more easily enforced – 
property rights than had existed before. Most notable was patents – a 
legal monopoly on innovation, which made science and scientific 
discovery extremely lucrative. But the notion of ‘trademark’ meant 
that companies could organise at scale. And accumulated capital 
– the ultimate private property – could be invested and reinvested. 
A strong legal environment with easily enforceable property rights 
allowed the returns to be reasonably assumed, accurately calculated 
and ultimately quite lucrative. The history of roughly 500 years can 
be summed up in these words: by and large it worked.
But the digital economy – with its heavy reliance on speed, flex-
ibility and economies of scale – is pushing us towards a new, radi-
cally different logic. At the heart of the problem is data, a new kind 
of economic input, which not coincidentally has already become the 
new economy’s most precious. Put simply, data is not worth much 
to the individuals who own or create it.9 Data becomes valuable 
when it is combined. This is how we will find cures for cancer. This 
is how we will improve traffic in our cities. This is the area where 
large, industrial-scale services will be delivered with a level of per-
sonalised service that would have been unthinkable in the old days. 
And it is how the next, most advanced, innovation in our economy 
will be calculated and created.
And this has huge implications: society and the economy around 
it have a huge incentive to share their data with each other, putting 
it in larger and larger pools where the lucrative insights and bril-
liant innovations of the next phase of human history will come. 
We all have a very strong incentive to contribute to good economic 
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outcomes. In the past, that meant being good consumers, holding 
down jobs and paying our taxes. It still means all of those things. 
But now it means pooling our data – the information about how we 
live, work, drive and play – so that new and more original insights 
can be generated. And as those insights are derived collectively, we 
have a strong incentive to make sure that the benefits are shared and 
apportioned collectively as well.
This is the true revolution. It won’t be industrial. It won’t even 
be digital. It will be social and political. And it will speak not just 
to the way we share wealth but also to the way we generate it. We 
stand on the cusp of an important decision: will we find and develop 
the social innovation needed to make the digital revolution a win-
win-win for all? Or will we regress into our most atavistic politics, 
attacking and killing a system that has delivered uneven results, 
preferring to blind our neighbour’s cows rather than giving sight to 
our own?
SHARING MORE IN THE DATA-DRIVEN ECONOMY
And success is not guaranteed. The current wave of ‘post-truth’ 
politics is a dangerous lurch backwards. Rather than fixing a broken 
system, voters are choosing to smash the system itself. There are 
many reasons for this – including the fact that the pillars support-
ing that system have been poorly explained and were never widely 
understood. Many of the ideas floating around today – like universal 
basic income – are primitive, and would lead to poor social results 
if implemented. But they point in the right direction, and show that 
– in a crude way – people are thinking more or less correctly about 
the kind of change their future will require. One way or the other, 
the rise of a data-driven economy means that we will share more, 
which has implications on two levels: we will share more data about 
ourselves – with improved social outcomes that will be common and 
collective, and we need to find ways of sharing the wealth created in 
that process more equitably as well.
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USE NEW SYSTEMS TO SHARE DATA
Advanced economies need new systems for sharing data. Today, the 
area is blocked, still functioning under the old paradigm of individ-
ual property rights. Companies are hoarding data – sometimes even 
buying up other companies only for the data they own (Hofheinz and 
Osimo 2017). This is a fool’s errand. Recent practice tells us that 
the average machine-learning trained machine will need as many as 
10,000 to 100,000 times more data than single human workers will 
generate during the course of their professional life (Cutler 2017). 
This is well beyond the capacity of any one company to attain or 
provide. If the data economy is to be a success, we need common 
pools of data – a ‘data commons’, in other words, though this con-
cept is still in its infancy (Hofheinz and Osimo 2017; OECD 2015). 
Under that scenario, companies will base their competition on the 
services they offer, drawing insight from common pools of data to 
which all will have access.
MAKE DATA POOLS COMMON
If the data pools are common, the results should be more broadly 
socialised as well. Some of this will happen naturally. Cures for 
cancer will have broad and evident advances for all – though it will 
be important, when these advances come, to make sure that they 
are widely available. Improved traffic management in cities is a 
huge advantage to everyone as well, and data and the data-driven 
economy will play more than a small role here. The advent of ride-
sharing technology like Uber will make the ownership of cars less 
necessary and the cities much cleaner.
KEEP GLOBAL TRADE FLOWS OPEN
Global trade flows should be kept open. The challenge of managing 
the global economy within our own society should not become an 
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excuse for shutting down the global economy itself. We need to find 
ways to preserve the benefits. There needs to be more concrete, cred-
ible and robust policymaking to take care of communities that have 
thus far been left behind.10
FIGHT THE PRECARIOUSNESS 
OF THE DATA ECONOMY
The data economy is inherently precarious, but the effort to fight 
that precariousness should take the form of greater state-led social 
protection rather than greater requirements for social commitments 
from private-sector companies. The European social model grew up 
around a fairly simple concept – the best way to ensure social peace 
was to get companies to pay for it. The result is the highest non-
wage labour costs in the world, a situation which is itself contribut-
ing to a hollowing out of good jobs in Europe, pricing them rather 
directly out of the market. This needs to stop. The global economy is 
too competitive – and European workers too expensive – to continue 
adding costs in the way we have added them over the years.
More recently, the most successful social-policy initiatives have 
had a common theme – freeing up companies to compete by taking 
the social burden onto the state. Towards that end, the best and most 
illustrative policy is still Denmark’s ‘flexicurity’ model (Baily and 
Kirkegaard 2004, see Ilsøe this volume). It increased benefits to 
workers and lowered the direct requirement on companies to provide 
them. Legal severance was shortened to one week, for example. But 
the result was an explosion of new jobs, driving unemployment to 
2.4%, down from the 12.4% that the government of Poul Nyrup 
Rasmussen inherited from his predecessor (Hendeliowitz 2008).
There are other policies which have performed a similar role: 
Obamacare makes it easier for Americans to switch jobs because 
their healthcare is no longer dependent on their employer. And the 
French have invented important new ways of spreading access to 
education over a lifetime with the compte personnel d’activité (per-
sonal activity account) (Hofheinz 2017, see Weber this volume). 
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Systems based on income tax credits, which provide incentives to 
work by offering top ups for those whose earnings are beneath a liv-
ing wage, have proven enormously effective in the US and the UK. 
But these are merely the seeds of broader social changes that have 
yet to take hold. Put simply, in a rapidly globalising economy, it is 
no longer feasible to impose greater social commitments on com-
panies in the form of requiring them to offer only full-time labour 
contracts or mandating expensive restructuring charges. The state 
must step in with a comprehensive set of policies designed to pro-
tect and empower workers in an economy based on flexibility and 
change. It must become the guardian of a radically rewoven social 
fabric. Above all new and innovative measures are needed to fight 
social challenges that are different from the ones that existed when 
the current system was conceived and implemented.
PROVIDE GREATER ACCESS TO EDUCATION
Working life will unfold differently, too. Education is no longer 
something we can frontload; people will need access to it throughout 
their lives. Companies like General Assembly – with its short-term 
skills accreditation courses – and Udacity – with its ‘vocational 
courses for professionals’ – are showing the way. We must rethink 
the famous work–life balance as a triad of work–life–education 
balance, forever combining and recombining throughout what used 
to be called a person’s ‘working life’. The social system must sup-
port career patterns based on fast changing needs – that is what the 
world demands. And it would not require much more than a leap of 
imagination and a bit of education system retooling to provide it.11
A DYSTOPIAN VISION AND ITS ALTERNATIVE
There is another future – a dystopian one – where technol-
ogy becomes a weapon of oppression. The Chinese, with their 
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Communist Party-inspired social rating system, are dangerously 
close to this. And the Russians have shown a flair for mainstreaming 
their talent for ‘disinformation’, using it to disrupt their perceived 
enemies effectively, with unprecedented success. The Americans 
under Donald Trump are not far behind. In the US, efforts to fight 
inequality have been pushed radically backwards: an absurdly 
regressive tax reform, an internet where traffic is throttled, a blind 
eye towards police violence and the racial prejudice that remains 
America’s greatest shame (see Kalleberg this volume).
We must counter this with an alternative vision. One where 
European industry has the tools it needs to succeed so it can continue 
to serve as a pillar for the world’s most advanced social system. 
One where society itself feels that it is part of these exciting devel-
opments, with each of us making an important contribution. This 
outcome is not guaranteed. But it is not out of our reach, either.
NOTES
1. A good example of this thinking is Marianne Cooper’s very good 
study of family finances and risk management (Cooper 2014).
2. This is higher than in North America (where the equivalent figures 
are 76.9 and 81.6). The reasons for Europe’s better performance are beyond 
the scope of this essay, but it is a fact worth noting. The European social 
model is delivering longer, healthier lives (Eurostat 2017a).
3. Around 40% of Europeans died before reaching adulthood in the 
‘pre-industrial era’ (Eurostat 2017b).
4. Mr Myanganbayar was one of 350 of the 120,000 students who took 
the exam to make a perfect score (Pappano 2013).
5. The 58 million figure is for 2016 and comes from the very help-
ful ‘By the Numbers: MOOCs in 2016’ (Shah 2016). See also ‘Master’s 
Degree is New Frontier of Study Online’ (Lewin 2013).
6. The euro area itself maintains a healthy monthly trade surplus with 
the rest of the world of €18.9bn, though much of that success is attribut-
able to one country: Germany. As the global economy picked up steam, the 
trade balance with the rest of the world of the 28-member EU itself slid to 
a €0.3bn deficit in October 2017, down from a €2.4bn surplus a year before 
(Eurostat 2017c).
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7. See World Inequality Report 2018 (World Inequality Lab 2018) and 
‘Inequality is a Threat to Our Democracies’ (Wolf 2017a), a very good 
recent summary. The seminal work on this phenomenon is Capital in the 
21st Century (Piketty 2014).
8. For a very good, early discussion of the policy implications posed by 
rise of intangible assets in the economy, see ‘The Challenges of the Disem-
bodied Economy’ (Wolf 2017b).
9. The OECD tried to calculate the market value of individual data. 
The bottom line: the data people held about themselves was worth much 
less – companies were willing to pay much less for it – than the individuals 
themselves thought it was worth. Recent market-based transactions – such 
as the 2013 acquisition of Climate Corporation by Monsanto Corporation 
for $930 million – have demonstrated that the value of data rises consider-
ably when it is aggregated (OECD 2015).
10. See especially the highly instructive account of a community left 
behind by globalisation – and the poverty of the policy response – in ‘Are We 
Witnessing the Strange, Lingering Death of Labour England?’ (Engel 2017).
11. By implication, efforts to make higher education 100% state funded, 
as US Senator Bernie Sanders has proposed, would be a step in the wrong 
direction. The crisis of rising costs for higher education is a real one. But 
the solution must be better, more broadly funded, higher education, with 
more resources, and less reliance on personal debt. Turning the state into 
the single payer would create the wrong incentives, and would hamstring 
the broader development that still needs to take place: the education system 
needs to be opened up. And this will require truly innovative financing 
models in which individual payments will surely play some part.
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In recent years an idea has spread, repeated at countless conferences 
around the world and in op-eds, tweets, books and reports, that we 
are in a fourth industrial revolution, more transformative than any 
change in human history, that will, among other negative effects, 
lead to massive job losses and unemployment. Indeed, it seems you 
cannot attend Davos, a G20 summit, or a TED talk – one organ-
ised by the media organisation TED (Technology, Entertainment, 
Design) – without hearing the warnings. Robots and artificial intel-
ligence (AI) are coming to put most of us out of work, except for a 
growing number of ‘gig economy’ workers who cobble together a 
meagre income using internet platforms dominated by large US tech 
companies like Uber and Airbnb. 
The ‘fourth industrialists’ are wrong. This next wave of innova-
tion will be modest, but progressive, particularly by enabling an 
uptick in productivity that, with the right policies, will lift incomes 
for workers around the world. It is therefore time to think clearly 
and deflate the growing techno-panic before policymakers actually 
implement many progress-killing ideas like taxing robots and imple-
menting a universal basic income.
SHAPING STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN 
AN ERA OF NEW TECHNOLOGY
Robert D. Atkinson
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To think clearly about technological transformations in the labour 
market, it is important to examine two factors:
• What will be the nature and pace of the next technology wave? 
• What are its likely impacts on jobs, employment relationships, 
income inequality, job quality, firm disruption and labour market 
disruption? 
This essay examines these questions and concludes that policymak-
ers should ignore techno-Cassandras and instead embrace this next 
wave of innovation, while at the same time ensuring that workers are 
well equipped to prosper from it.
WE ARE NOT FACING A FOURTH 
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
Pundits use a variety of terms to refer to the supposed technological 
transformation that is currently under way: ‘the Second Machine 
Age’, ‘the Rise of the Robots’, ‘the Coming Singularity’ and others. 
But the term that has caught on the most is ‘the Fourth Industrial 
Revolution’, which was coined by K. Schwab, head of the World 
Economic Forum. He breathlessly writes, “We stand on the brink of 
a technological revolution that will fundamentally alter the way we 
live, work, and relate to one another. In its scale, scope, and com-
plexity, the transformation will be unlike anything humankind has 
experienced before” (Schwab 2016). 
If this were true, it might be cause for concern, for it suggests that 
history provides no guide to the present. But in fact, it is not true. 
First, the next innovation wave is not the fourth, it is the sixth. In 
Schwab’s sweeping but shallow historical telling, the first revolution 
of steam power was in the late 1700s and early 1800s. Then came 
electric power in the early 1900s. Then a few years ago digital tech-
nologies. Now the fourth is upon us. 
For historians of technology such periodisation makes little sense. 
Those who follow on the work of Joseph Schumpeter and who study 
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technological long waves generally agree that there have been in fact 
five waves to date: 
• the first industrial revolution of the steam engine in the 1780s and 
1790s
• the second revolution of iron in the 1840s and 1850s
• the third revolution of the 1890s and 1900s based on steel and 
electricity
• the fourth revolution in the 1950s and 1960s based on electrome-
chanical and chemical technologies
• the fifth of our present era based on information technology and 
communications technology (Atkinson 2005). 
According to this periodisation, a sixth wave will emerge, likely 
grounded in AI, robotics and perhaps nanotechnology and biotech-
nology, but not before an intervening period of relative stagnation 
of perhaps as long as 20 to 25 years, a period the global economy 
appears to be currently suffering through now. 
This more accurate periodisation points to several important con-
clusions. First, despite all the breathless talk about us being in the 
midst of a fourth industrial revolution, the next technology wave is 
not here yet and will not be for at least a decade. This, more than 
any other factor, explains the slowdown in global productivity over 
the last decade (Atkinson 2016). The current digital technology sys-
tem has reached a spot on the ‘S-curve’ where it is difficult for it to 
continue to drive productivity at a robust rate.
Second, there is no reason to believe that this coming technology 
wave will be any different in pace and magnitude than past waves. 
Each past wave led to improved technology in a few key areas (eg 
steam engines, railroads, steel, electricity, chemical processing and 
information technology) and these were then used by many sectors 
and processes. But none completely transformed all industries. Within 
manufacturing, for example, each wave led to important improve-
ments, but there were still many processes that required human labour. 
The next wave, grounded in AI and robotics, will be no different. 
While it will no doubt affect many industries and processes, many 
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will remain largely untouched: think of fireman, pre-school teach-
ers, massage therapists and trial lawyers. Moreover, this technology 
will replace some workers, as all pasts waves have done, but they 
will also augment others. AI, for example, will not replace doctors, 
but it will help them make better diagnoses and treatment decisions. 
This is why the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation 
(ITIF) estimated that only about 8% of jobs were at high risk of 
automation by 2024, and why the McKinsey Global Institute esti-
mated just 5% were at such risk (Atkinson 2017; Chui, Manyika and 
Miremadi 2015).
In response to this argument, ‘fourth industrialists’ tell us that 
computer systems with powerful artificial general intelligence 
(AGI) are just around the corner. For them AGI will eclipse the 
full range of human ability – not only in routine manual or cog-
nitive tasks, but also where more complex actions or decision-
making are involved. But there is about as much chance of AGI 
emerging in the next century as the earth being destroyed by an 
asteroid. As MIT computer science professor R. Brooks (2015, 
111) puts it: 
The fears of runaway AI systems either conquering humans or mak-
ing them irrelevant aren’t even remotely well grounded. Misled by 
suitcase words, people are making category errors in fungibility of 
capabilities – category errors comparable to seeing the rise of more 
efficient internal combustion engines and jumping to the conclusion 
that warp drives are just around the corner. 
To be sure, there is progress in AI, including in machine learning, 
but these are still and will remain discrete capabilities, not general 
(recognising fraud in financial transactions, for example).
This relates to the second important issue: the pace of change 
from the technologies. If the wave increased economy-wide produc-
tivity by 75%, but it took 30 years to do so, this would mean a mod-
est annual rate of growth of less than 3%, on a par with past periods 
in developed nations where labour force adjustment proceeded 
apace. But if this happens over 10 years, it surely would mean a 
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much faster rate of dislocation. And here again, without evidence, 
the ‘fourth industrialists’ assert that the coming pace of change will 
be unprecedented. 
But past long-wave transformations have taken at least 30 years 
to work their way through developed economies. There are three 
reasons for this relatively slow pace. First, new technology systems 
do not emerge fully formed. Early versions are less advanced than 
later ones. We say this with the electric motor in the early 1910s, 
where it took decades for improvements in power, price and qual-
ity to enable electric motors to be transformative. Going forward 
we will likely see this pattern in autonomous vehicles. The best 
(and quite expensive) current autonomy technology is at what is 
referred to as level 3, where drivers are still necessary for many 
functions. Level 5 cars that are affordable – where the human can 
go on a long, complicated trip asleep in the backseat – are decades 
away. Second, even though new technologies are better than old, 
old technologies are usually not completely scrapped, at least until 
their value is significantly depreciated. Trucking companies, for 
example, will not suddenly toss all their expensive semis in the junk 
yard. Third, not all organisations are first-adopters. Some adopt 
early, most adopt in the middle after the technology is de-risked, 
and the rest late.
So, yes, there will be a next wave of innovation, but it will not be 
an unprecedented tidal wave of transformation, but rather a moder-
ate increase in innovation that will hopefully kick in by at least the 
mid-part of the next decade and will likely take at least 20 years to 
diffuse through economies, leading to an increase in economy-wide 
labour productivity to at best 3–4% growth per year.
MAJOR ISSUES OF CONCERN
Notwithstanding that the next wave of innovation will not be 
unprecedented, there still could be negative impacts that policymak-
ers need to prepare for and seek to mitigate. However, there will 
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also be benefits, something ‘fourth industrialists’ usually ignore. 
Most importantly, the next wave will raise productivity growth 
rates. European productivity has been growing at anaemic rates for 
years, and in the UK it has virtually ceased. Without productivity 
growth to create a ‘bigger pie’ there is no way for European living 
standards to increase, especially given that the working age to old 
person ratio will drop from 3.5 today to 2.2 by 2040. But this does 
not mean that there may not be some negative impacts from the next 
wave of innovation. However, most of these fears are unwarranted 
and the main one, job dislocation, can and should be addressed by 
smart policies.
UNEMPLOYMENT
Let us start with unemployment. The ‘fourth industrialists’ claim 
that the next wave will lead to massive job losses. Yet academic 
studies, historical data and logic all suggest that increased rates of 
productivity growth will not lead to higher unemployment (Atkinson 
and Wu 2017; Miller and Atkinson 2013). If anything, higher pro-
ductivity growth in nations has been associated with lower rates of 
unemployment. The reason is simple and ignored by ‘fourth indus-
trialists’: companies invest in process innovation (innovations to 
boost productivity) to cut costs, and because of competitive markets, 
they pass the vast share of those savings on to consumers in the form 
of price cuts, and some to workers in the form of higher wages. This 
added purchasing power is not buried; it is spent, and that spending 
creates new jobs. This dynamic is the same if productivity grows 
at 1% a year or 5%. Moreover, higher productivity growth creates 
a ‘rational exuberance’ where consumers and businesses feel more 
confident, and spend and invest more, leading to even more growth 
and job creation. So, the bottom line, absent ill-advised policies 
such as universal basic income to pay people for not working, and 
higher unemployment from the next technology wave will not hap-
pen (Atkinson 2016).
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GOOD JOBS
Even if unemployment rates will not rise, many ask whether the new 
jobs from the next wave will be good ones. But for two reasons this 
is not the right question to ask. First, the new jobs created will be 
largely related to how people spend their new added income, which 
will likely be on things like education, personal services, hotels and 
other lodging, entertainment, insurance, air travel, new cars and 
trucks, and major appliances. Some of this will create good jobs (eg 
education), others not so good jobs (eg personal services).
Second, rather than fret about what industries and occupations are 
growing and shrinking, policymakers should focus on raising pro-
ductivity. That some jobs pay more than others is because they are 
more productive. A main reason janitors are paid less than software 
engineers is because the latter’s output per hour is much higher. 
Therefore, the most important question regarding the mix of jobs is 
whether the next innovation wave will raise productivity.
It will be even better if the next wave raises productivity more 
in lower-wage occupations. If it does, there will be relatively fewer 
workers employed in low-wage occupations and the wages of every-
one, including the remaining low-wage workers, will increase. To 
see how, imagine that the next technology wave boosts productivity 
by 25% only for the bottom 25% of wage earners. In the US this 
would allow the tasks these workers currently do to be performed by 
just 23.4 million workers, instead of the current 31.2 million. That 
means 7.8 million workers freed up, and as the savings from lower 
prices are spent, they could be employed doing other work. Because 
the prices of goods and services produced by low-wage workers 
would fall, this spending would be distributed in the same shares as 
it is currently, with 12.9% going on goods and services produced by 
workers in the first wage quartile, 17.6% in the second, 27.2% in the 
third, and 42.3% in the fourth.1 As a result, most of those 7.8 million 
workers would see a wage increase as they move to higher-wage 
jobs. So too would all other workers because the real prices of goods 
and services supplied by low-wage workers would now be lower.
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LABOUR MARKET STATUS
Even if most people will be working, ‘fourth industrialists’ warn 
that an increasing share of workers will be contingent workers, 
doing work through platforms of American tech giants. To be sure, 
such ‘gig economy’ work has grown in the last decade, but much 
of this has been a fall-out of the Great Recession, when full-time, 
permanent work was scarce compared with today. So even with the 
growth of Uber, Airbnb and other work-sharing platforms, in 2015 
only about 600,000 people were employed this way. Moreover, the 
share of the US workforce that is self-employed is at an all-time low 
of less than 7% (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2016). There is no 
reason to believe that self-employment will grow in the future (see 
Arnold et al. this volume).
INEQUALITY
‘Fourth industrialists’ warn that the next wave of innovation will 
bring massive growth in inequality. There is no doubt that income 
inequality has grown in Europe and the US, although by consider-
ably less than Thomas Piketty would have us believe (Rose 2014). 
But very little of this growth has been from occupational changes 
driven by technology. The Economic Policy Institute finds that 
inequality did not increase because jobs in middle-wage occupations 
were eliminated by productivity gains (Bivens and Mishel 2015). 
Rather, virtually all the increase was within occupations, with some 
individuals making winner-take-all incomes at the expense of other 
workers in the same occupation.
It is important to realise that this had nothing to do with techno-
logical productivity and everything to do with socio-political fac-
tors. To take an example from US pro basketball, income inequality 
in the National Basketball Association (NBA) did not grow because 
technology eliminated middle-skilled players, it grew because of 
political economy factors, such as the introduction of free agency 
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that allowed the LeBron J. and Steph Currys of the world to make 
vastly more money than the NBA stars of the 1970s. As J. Rothwell 
showed in a study for the Brookings Institution, the one-percenters 
are largely professionals and financiers: 6% of the top 1% of earners 
are in the financial services industry, 7% in law, 7% are doctors, 7% 
work in hospitals, and 4% are dentists (Rothwell 2016). This growth 
in earnings inequality has nothing to do with productivity.
Not convinced, ‘fourth industrialists’ will say the future will be 
different, especially if the next wave of innovation impacts lower-
wage occupations more than higher-wage ones. That indeed is likely 
to happen, as ITIF found that there was a modest (−0.38) correla-
tion between the risk of a US job being automated and the levels 
of education needed for the occupation (Atkinson 2017). But this 
pattern of automation would actually reduce, not increase, inequal-
ity. One reason is that 40% of adult European employees report that 
they have higher skills than are required to perform their current 
job. (European Commission Skills Panorama 2014; McGowan and 
Andrews 2015). These workers are in jobs that require fewer skills 
than they possess, presumably for most of them because there are 
not enough high-skilled jobs in the EU economy to employ them. If 
the next technology wave has a larger impact on eliminating low-
wage jobs, this would by definition mean that a greater share of 
jobs would be in middle and higher-wage employment. And many 
European workers now in low-wage jobs have more than enough 
skills to move into these jobs. More fundamentally, even with robust 
minimum-wage levels and tax-based redistribution measures, it is 
extremely difficult to raise significantly the after-tax income levels 
of people working in low-productivity, often low-skill-level, indus-
tries for the simple reason that wages cannot exceed the output of 
the worker. Automating low-wage jobs will lead to not only fewer 
low-wage jobs and more middle- and higher-wage jobs, but usually 
higher output per worker in the remaining workforce, so those work-
ers’ wages can more easily be increased.
This positive outcome depends on relative price declines from 
automating low-income jobs so that demand for goods and services 
112 ROBERT D. ATKINSON
grows. But ‘fourth industrialists’ say there will be no price reduc-
tions because all the savings will go to the increasingly fewer own-
ers. Owners of capital will somehow no longer have to compete 
on the basis of price and will be able to make exorbitant profits, 
immiserating the proletariat. But this scenario of a few ‘robot own-
ers’ making ‘trillions’ while the rest of us are unemployed strains 
credibility. The reality is that if one ‘robot owner’ jacked up prices 
and made massive profits, another robot owner would lower prices 
to gain market share, just as this process of competition has worked 
since the beginning of market economies (see discussion of competi-
tion and innovation in Atkinson and Lind 2018).
BUSINESS DISRUPTION
While unemployment will not increase from the next wave of inno-
vation that does not mean that there will not be modest or even 
significant rates of businesses disruption. Just as internet platforms 
today are disrupting a range of industries, including private transport, 
retail, lodging, and telephone and cable TV, one could imagine (and 
hope for) emerging technologies disrupting even more industries. 
For example, ‘fin-tech’ could disrupt the traditional banking industry. 
But progressives, more than people in other political camps, should 
understand that government’s role is not to protect businesses from 
risk; it is to protect consumers from business opposition to change. 
For-profit businesses, big or small, are more than happy to reap the 
profit upside of success, but are all too quick to run to government 
to protect them from the downside of competitive loss. Progressives 
should focus not on protecting companies from technology-based 
disruption, which fundamentally helps consumers, but on helping 
workers make transitions to new employment. Uber, Lyft and other 
car services are a case in point today. Too many governments want to 
protect incumbent taxi companies at the expense of consumers who 
benefit from better and cheaper car services.
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WORKER TRANSITION AND DISLOCATION
Of the concerns ‘fourth industrialists’ raise, the only valid and 
important one is how to help workers adjust to the inevitably, albeit 
modest, higher rates of labour market churn that will be coming. It 
is important to note, however, that – at least in the US – the rate of 
labour market churn (defined as jobs created in occupations plus 
jobs eliminated in other occupations) has been at an historic low 
over the last two decades (Atkinson and Wu 2017). But as the next 
wave of innovation boosts productivity that rate is sure to increase 
somewhat.
One proposal to address this is the introduction of a universal 
basic income (UBI). Under this widely touted scheme, the state 
would somehow take money from somewhere and write monthly 
cheques to all adults, whether they are working or not, poor or rich. 
This allegedly would establish a stable floor on which everyone 
would build their own brighter future. This, however, is one idea 
progressives should loudly decry. UBI would lead to the very thing 
its advocates warn us technology will bring: large-scale unemploy-
ment as the government incentivises workers to be idle instead of 
helping pave pathways for those displaced by technology to find 
success in new jobs.
To be sure, the alternative should not be a return to the Hobbesian 
world of the 1800s when if a worker lost his job he was on his own. 
Progressives need to ensure that there is temporary income support 
for workers who lose their jobs through no fault of their own. On 
this score Europe is both better and worse off than the US. It is better 
in that it provides laid-off workers with more income support. It is 
worse in that at least in some European nations workers are eligible 
for unemployment income support for far too long, which not only 
encourages them to stay out of the labour market and have their 
skills atrophy, but by reducing the purchasing power of employed 
workers (who bear higher taxes), it reduces the demand for workers, 
leading to higher unemployment.
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The lesson for Europe and the US is to copy the Nordic countries’ 
flexicurity model, which ties benefits to proving that workers are 
either actively looking for work or are in a certified training pro-
gramme. Progressives should also advocate for a system of lifelong-
learning accounts similar to what France recently introduced while 
Emmanuel Macron was economy minister and Myriam El Khomri 
was labour minister. These accounts can be drawn down to pay for 
retraining throughout the working life (see Weber this volume). 
Progressives should also push to disrupt the traditional higher edu-
cation system, which has become too expensive and too inflexible 
(Kennedy, Castro and Atkinson 2017).
These and other steps to ease transitions are important because 
if Europe is going to have any hope of its voters embracing change 
and innovation, governments needs to do more to reduce employ-
ment risk for workers. At the same time, if Europe is going to reap 
the benefits of the next innovation wave, the last thing progressives 
want to do is stoke people’s unwarranted fears that their jobs are 
on the fourth industrial wave chopping block from all powerful 
‘Terminator-like’ robots or support completely misguided policy 
proposals like taxing and regulating robots to slow their adoption. 
While slowing innovation runs counter to progressives’ policy goals 
of ensuring a growing standard of living for workers, it also runs 
counter to their political goals. When centre-left parties have suc-
ceeded in Europe or the US they have done so when they stood for 
a vision of growth, widely shared, not limited growth with massive 
redistribution.
In short, the vision should be innovation, widely shared. And with 
the right policies the vision can very well become the reality.
NOTE
1. This is based on the share of wage and salary income by quartile.
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Technological development, and in particular digitalisation, has 
major implications for labour markets. Assessing its impact will be 
crucial for developing policies that promote efficient labour markets 
for the benefit of workers, employers and societies as a whole.
Rapid technological progress and innovation can threaten employ-
ment. Such a concern is not new but dates back at least to the 
1930s, when John Maynard Keynes postulated his ‘technological 
unemployment theory’ – technological change causes loss of jobs 
(Keynes 1937).
Technological innovations can affect employment in two main 
ways:
• by directly displacing workers from tasks they were previously 
performing (displacement effect)
• by increasing the demand for labour in industries or jobs that arise 
or develop due to technological progress (productivity effect).
Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) stress that technology can 
replace human labour in routine tasks, whether manual or cognitive, 
but (as yet) cannot replace human labour in non-routine tasks. Goos 
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and Manning (2007) argue that the impact of technology leads to ris-
ing relative demand in well-paid skilled jobs, which typically require 
non-routine cognitive skills, and rising relative demand in low-paid, 
least-skilled jobs, which typically require non-routine manual skills.
At the same time, demand for ‘middling’ jobs, which have 
typically required routine manual and cognitive skills, will fall. 
The authors call this process job polarisation. Acemoglu and Autor 
(2011) found similar results for the US, while Darvas and Wolff 
(2016) report such developments for a selection of EU countries: 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK. In all these 
countries, the number of high-education jobs such as managers, 
engineers and health professionals is growing, while the number of 
middle-education jobs (clerks, machine operators, assemblers) is 
declining. By contrast, the number of low-education service occupa-
tions, such as shop workers, which are non-standard and difficult to 
replace by automation, is growing. A key conclusion is that technol-
ogy was incorporated into the subset of core job tasks previously 
performed by middle-skill workers, causing substantial change. 
The quality of human capital also plays a crucial role. The ability 
of individuals to use the technological advances for the benefit of 
their work requires developing particular digital skills through well-
designed policies. This underlines the importance of using appropri-
ate instruments to ensure that workers are well prepared to harness 
the disruptive forces of digital technologies.
In the last decade platforms emerged that contributed to increased 
connectivity between individuals. For example, using this connec-
tivity, peer providers of durable goods and services can trade online 
with individuals using collaborative economy platforms. A key 
common characteristic of collaborative economy models – despite a 
great deal of variety – is that they provide an economic opportunity 
for individuals and small enterprises to trade their under-used assets 
with other individuals through intermediaries that match supply and 
demand in an efficient way with the help of information technolo-
gies. In many cases, this opportunity to individual suppliers is only 
provided through collaborative platforms, as the supply of goods 
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and services through other channels is subject to licensing and other 
regulatory barriers. Automation in shopping through ecommerce 
is another example, with the sector experiencing annual growth of 
22% in Europe.2 The benefits of information technologies increase 
demand for online retail goods and this in turn leads to an increased 
overall employment in retail.
However, looking ahead, a new wave of automation and advanced 
machine-learning techniques is on its way, in which intelligent 
machines will be increasingly capable of carrying out high-skill 
and possibly non-routine tasks. Moving from the efficiency gains in 
online trading to the extensive use of artificial intelligent systems in 
our industrial production, concerns about the potential displacement 
of labour emerge. The real question then becomes: which of the two 
labour market effects – displacement or productivity – will dominate 
in the artificial intelligence (AI) era?3
A first approach to answer this question is to examine the 
impact of technological breakthroughs on labour markets in previ-
ous industrial revolutions (Soete this volume). For example, the 
introduction of automobiles in daily life led to a decline in horse-
related jobs, but new industries also emerged, with a net positive 
impact on employment. The automobile industry itself grew fast, 
creating many new jobs, but other sectors also grew because of 
the growing number of vehicles on the roads, and many new jobs 
in the motel and fast-food industries arose to serve motorists and 
truck drivers.
The Economist (2016) reports further case studies that show simi-
lar patterns. In general, past industrial revolutions suggest that in the 
short run the displacement effect may dominate. But in the longer 
run, when markets and society are fully adapted to major automa-
tion shocks, the productivity effect can dominate and have a positive 
impact on employment.
But how reliable is this approach? Researchers from the McKinsey 
Global Institute estimate that the disruption of society caused by 
AI is happening 10 times faster and at 300 times the scale of the 
industrial revolution of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, and is 
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therefore having roughly 3,000 times the impact (Dobbs, Manyika 
and Woetzel 2015).
Moreover, the main engine of technological progress in the AI era 
is the continuous development of deep machine-learning techniques 
that use the function and complexity of the human brain as a model 
for design (see Petropoulos 2017b); for relevant definitions and 
analysis see Box 1. Machines are trained to be intelligent, which can 
have additional implications for the workforce.
BOX 1. AN INTRODUCTION TO 
MACHINE LEARNING
Machine learning enables computer programs to acquire knowl-
edge and skills, and even improve their own performance. Big 
data provides the raw material for machine learning, and offers 
examples that computer programs can use for ‘practise’ in order 
to learn, exercise and ultimately perform their assigned tasks 
more efficiently.
The idea of intelligent machines arose in the early 20th century. 
From the beginning, the idea of ‘human-like’ intelligence was 
key. Following Vannevar Bush’s seminal work from 1945, where 
he proposed “a system which amplifies people’s own knowledge 
and understanding”, Alan Turing asked “Can a machine think?” 
In his famous 1950 imitation game, Turing proposed a test of a 
machine’s ability to exhibit intelligent behaviour equivalent to 
that of a human.
In principle, machine learning follows Turing’s recommenda-
tion of teaching a machine to perform specific tasks as if it were 
a child. By building a machine with sufficient computational 
resources, offering training examples from real world data and 
by designing specific algorithms and tools that define a learning 
process, rather than specific data manipulations, machines can 
improve their performance through learning by doing, inferring 
patterns and checking hypotheses.
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At the core of this learning process are artificial neural net-
works, inspired by the networks of neurons in the human brain. 
A simple artificial neural network is organised in layers. Data 
is introduced to the network through an input layer. Then come 
the hidden multiple layers in which information is processed and 
finally an output layer where results are released. Each neuron 
within the network is connected to many others, as both inputs 
and outputs, but the connections are not equal. They are weighted 
such that a neuron’s different outward connections fire at differ-
ent levels of input activation. A network with many hidden layers 
can combine, sort or divide signals by applying different weights 
to them and passing the result to the next layer. The number of 
hidden layers demonstrates the ability of the network to detect 
increasingly subtle features of the input data. The training of the 
network takes place by adjusting neurons’ connection weights, so 
that the network gives the desired response when presented with 
particular inputs.
The goal of the neural network is to solve problems in the same 
way that a hypothesised human brain would, albeit without any 
‘conscious’ codified awareness of the rules and patterns that have 
been inferred from the data. Modern neural network projects typi-
cally work with a few thousand to a few million neural units and 
millions of connections. They are called deep because of the mul-
tiple intermediate hidden layers they have. However, deep neural 
networks are still several orders of magnitude less complex than 
the human brain and closer to the computing power of a worm.
Deep neural networks have proven very effective. There are 
several examples of games and competitions in which machines 
can now beat humans. By now, machines have topped the best 
humans at most games traditionally held up as measures of human 
intellect, including chess (recall for example the 1997 game 
between IBM’s Deep Blue and the champion Garry Kasparov), 
Scrabble, Othello and Jeopardy! Even in more complex games, 
machines seem to be quickly improving their performance 
through their learning process. In March 2016, the AlphaGo 
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computer program from the AI start up DeepMind beat Lee Sedol 
at a five-game match of Go – the oldest board game, invented 
in China more than 2,500 years ago. However, many of these 
machines are programmed to perform specific tasks, narrowing 
the scope of their operation. Humans remain superior in perform-
ing general tasks and using experience acquired in one task to 
deliver another.
A second approach would be to assess the risk of occupations and 
tasks to be automated in the next decades because of AI systems. 
Here the literature has focused on the feasibility of automating exist-
ing jobs given current and presumed technological advances (Arnold 
et al. this volume). Frey and Osborne (2013, 2017) famously claimed 
that 47% of US occupations were at risk of being automated “over 
some unspecified number of years, perhaps a decade or two” (Frey 
and Osborne 2017, 265). Bowles (2014) repeated these calculations 
for the European labour market, and found that on average 54% of 
EU jobs are at risk of computerisation. By contrast, Arntz, Gregory 
and Zierahn (2016, 2017) argue that a major limitation of Frey and 
Osborne is that they focus on deriving predictions over occupations 
as being threatened by automation rather than tasks. Their criticism 
is that in this way Frey and Osborne overestimate the automation 
risks. By using information on task content of jobs at the indi-
vidual level they conclude that only 9% of US jobs are potentially 
automatable.
These studies can be viewed as feasibility tests on the potential 
impact of AI and focus on the displacement effect of automation. 
Assessing the impact of the productivity effect – the potential for 
new machines to increase employment – is much more challeng-
ing. Bessen’s (2017) empirical research found that computer tech-
nology is associated with job growth that is particularly observable 
in non-manufacturing industries. At the same time there are poten-
tial sector spillover effects: as Acemoglu and Restrepo (2016) 
illustrate in their theoretical model, the aggregate labour market 
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impacts of new technologies depend not only on the industries 
in which they operate, but also on adjustment in other parts of 
the economy. For example, other sectors and occupations might 
expand to absorb the labour freed from the tasks that are now per-
formed by machines.
That would require adopting an equilibrium approach because 
what is technologically feasible does not necessarily correspond to 
the equilibrium impact of automation on employment and wages. 
For example, we need to take into account that firms’ market strate-
gies and investments are endogenous to technology shocks: Even if 
the presumed technological advances materialise, there is no guar-
antee that firms would choose to automate; that would depend on 
the costs of substituting machines for labour and how much wages 
change in response to this threat.
That brings us to the third approach of assessing the impact of AI 
on employment. A common characteristic of most of research papers 
that are moving towards this equilibrium approach is that all focus 
on one automated technology, the industrial robots and their impact 
on employment. This is because of the existence of good quality data 
on the penetration of industrial robots in the main industries in major 
economies around the world.
An industrial robot is defined as “an automatically controlled, 
reprogrammable, multipurpose manipulator programmable in three 
or more axes, which can be either fixed in place or mobile for use 
in industrial automation applications” (International Federation of 
Robotics 2016). Following this definition, a classification test would 
have required a clear answer to the following three questions:
• Does it have multiple purposes?
• Can it be reprogrammed to perform another task?
• Does it require a human control for performing its task?
While our coffee machine or the elevator at our home building 
does not pass this classification test, fully autonomous machines 
that do not need a human operator and that can be programmed to 
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perform several manual tasks such as welding, painting, assem-
bling, handling materials or packaging are classified as industrial 
robots.
Figure 7.1 presents the number of operational industrial robots per 
thousands of workers in China, the EU and the US. The EU so far 
has been the region with the most robots in operation, followed by 
the US while China is behind.
Figure 7.2 shows how the operational industrial robots per thou-
sands of workers are distributed in different sectors in EU countries. 
So far, the EU automotive industry has introduced by far the most 
industrial robots in its production process, followed by the plastic 
and chemicals sector.
Graetz and Michaels (2015) estimate that between 1990 and 2005 
the price of industrial robots in six major developed economies fell 
by approximately one-half or one-fifth if we adjust for the quality of 
robots. Moreover, between 1993 and 2007, the stock of robots per 
million hours worked increased by more than 150%, from 0.58 to 
1.48, in 17 countries of the sample, leading to significant produc-
tivity gains. The study also finds that in these countries increased 
use of robots per hour worked from 1993 to 2007 raised the annual 
Figure 7.1 Robot density in China, EU and US. Source: Data from International 
Labor Organisation (2017), IFR (2016).
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growth of labour productivity by about 0.37 percentage points. 
When considering an industry-country panel specification, they 
find that robots appear to reduce the share of hours worked by low-
skilled workers relative to middle-skilled and high-skilled workers, 
they do not polarise the labour market, but appear to hurt the rela-
tive position of low-skilled workers rather than middle-skilled ones. 
Nevertheless, the use of robots per hour worked appears to boost 
total factor productivity and average wages. No significant impact 
on labour shares is found.
In a more recent study, Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017) used data 
in the post-1990 era to show that 1 additional robot per 1,000 workers 
reduces the US employment-to-population ratio by 0.18–0.34% and 
wages by 0.25–0.5%. When interpreting these results we should not 
forget that there are still few industrial robots in the US economy; if 
the spread of robots proceeds over the next two decades as expected 
by experts such as Brynjolfsson, McAfee and Ford, its aggregate 
implications for employment will be much larger (Brynjolfsson 
and McAfee 2012; Ford 2015). The novel element of their study is 
that they adopt a more regional approach than the industry-country 
panel approach of Graetz and Michaels (2015). As the labour force 
competes with robots for production, they exploit the heterogeneity 
Figure 7.2 Robot density in several industries in Europe. Source: Datafrom 
EUKLEMS (2017), IFR (2016).
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in both local labour distribution across industries and national 
change in the use of robots to refine their results. They can therefore 
estimate the impact of industrial robots’ penetration in local labour 
markets. Their negative result suggests that the displacement effect 
dominates the productivity effect of operation industrial robots. In 
addition, positive spillover effects are very modest. The employment 
effects of robots are most pronounced in manufacturing, particularly 
in industries most exposed to robots; in routine manual, blue-collar, 
assembly and related occupations; and for workers without a college 
education.
Dauth et al. (2017) repeat the empirical exercise of Acemoglu and 
Restrepo (2017) for Germany but they do not find any significant 
negative impact of robots. While industrial robots have a negative 
impact on employment in the German manufacturing sector, there 
is a positive and significant spillover effect as labour in the non-
manufacturing sectors increases and overall counterbalances the 
negative effect.
The focus of these studies is on the impact of industrial robots on 
employment so far, without making any predictions for the future. 
These predictions would require the imposition of specific assump-
tions whose validity cannot be assessed with certainty.
While this allows for a more reliable assessment of the impact, 
we should keep in mind that the era of AI is in its early stages and 
the penetration of robots in our economy and industrial production 
is expected to significantly rise as a consequent of the rapid, ongoing 
technological progress. This suggests that existing studies using this 
third approach are able to capture only the onset of the AI era and 
not its full deployment. If indeed short-run and long-run effects are 
not in the same direction, these studies may only be able to capture 
some parts of the short-run effects.
Industrial robots are just one of the AI technologies that have 
been developed. At the forefront of the fourth industrial revolu-
tion will be a connected framework of machines that communicate 
with each other. Such connectivity is expected to be a major step 
forward, increasing the efficiency gains in AI markets and services. 
Completing a full economic framework for the impact of AI on 
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labour markets before these new developments are deployed is a 
difficult task.
These future-facing studies do not reach a consensus over the 
potential impact of automation on labour markets. The fact that it 
is difficult to predict the exact impact of AI makes it complex to 
frame a policy response. But some society-level reaction is surely 
needed. It is therefore necessary to initiate an open consultation of 
all involved parties, to define our approach towards the AI era. This 
process should have several steps:
1. Ensure that society, and particularly policymakers, politicians 
and business leaders, understands what AI is and its potential for 
modern economies.
2. Define a framework of rules for the operation of machines and 
AI automated systems. These must go far beyond Asimov’s 
famous three laws of robotics. The Civil Law Rules on Robot-
ics proposed by the European Parliament can also motivate 
social dialogue about issues related to liability, safety, security 
and privacy in the coming AI era. Tegmark (2017) identi-
fies numerous challenges on these matters, which should be 
addressed adequately. Adopting clear rules based on a good 
understanding of this new era could make the transition 
easier and mitigate potential concerns. However, adopting 
rules without good understanding and knowledge of how this 
new technology will be implemented (first step) would be 
counterproductive.
3. Design and implement those policies that will help us to accom-
modate new technology possibilities. Education and training pro-
grammes should be carefully redesigned so that they provide the 
right qualifications for workers to interact and work efficiently 
alongside machines and boost relevant digital skills. This might 
reduce potential displacement concerns as jobs typically consist 
of a number of distinct but interrelated tasks. In most cases, only 
some of these tasks are likely to be suitable for automation. By 
preparing human labour to interact effectively and efficiently 
with machines, we can maximise the productivity gains from the 
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interrelated tasks. That could potentially lead to the development 
of new jobs or occupations that will result from this cooperation 
and the advancements of the technology. Initiatives to prepare 
effectively human labour for this new era will require the close 
interaction of authorities and institutions with major techno-
logical firms which have both the knowhow and the capacity to 
contribute to the training. Improved instruments for job search 
assistance and job reallocation could also be beneficial and would 
mitigate concerns associated with the displacement effect.
However, we should not rush into a response (see Atkinson this 
volume). The time for policy will come, but at the moment we are 
still in the early stages of understanding the potential of AI and the 
various ways it might impact our economy. To deepen this under-
standing, we should promote further social dialogue among all the 
involved parties (researchers, policymakers, industry representatives 
and trade unions, politicians and so on). This is a vital first step to 
better grasp the challenges and opportunities of this new industrial 
revolution. And although we should not rush to conclusions, we 
should not adopt a passive attitude. We must act swiftly to assess 
and understand the implications of AI. The speed with which tech-
nology advances may introduce disruptive forces in the market ear-
lier than some people expect.
NOTES
1. This chapter is an updated version of my article ‘Do We Understand 
the Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Employment?’ published by Brue-
gel (Petropoulos 2017a). The superb research assistance by Nicolas Moës 
is gratefully acknowledged.
2. See Marcus and Petropoulos (2016) for further statistics and discussion.
3. AI refers to intelligence exhibited by machines. Hence, the AI era 
refers to that period in time in which machines equipped with deep learn-
ing techniques that are based on neural network architecture (see Box 1) 
will be able to perform tasks that require some form of intelligence, in an 
automatic way and without requiring human intervention.
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The manufacturing sector has always been at the forefront of tech-
nical innovation. Since the industrial revolution, its development 
has been punctuated by leaps driven by the successive introduction 
of radical technological breakthroughs. As a result, the growth of 
productivity in manufacturing has been consistently above that of 
other sectors, creating the structural foundations of the abundance of 
material goods currently enjoyed in advanced economies. But such a 
process of creative destruction also has a profoundly disruptive side, 
as reflected in the socio-economic difficulties historically faced by 
workers whose skills became obsolete by the introduction of new 
technologies, or by the existence of entire geographic areas scarred 
by the effects of industrial restructuring.
It is therefore important to identify the potential effects of disrup-
tive technologies in the manufacturing sector at the earliest opportu-
nity. This will help us to nurture these technologies to maximise the 
potential benefits, but also to minimise the wider social disruptions 
that they may provoke.
With these objectives, Eurofound (2018) recently carried out 
a detailed qualitative study of five technological breakthroughs, 
all of which are still in their infancy but have the potential to 
GAME-CHANGING TECHNOLOGIES 
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fundamentally transform the future of manufacturing in Europe. 
For each of these five technologies an international research team2 
identified and interviewed a number of key informants (mostly 
scientists and entrepreneurs, but also social partners and govern-
ment representatives), and carried out regional and company case 
studies, in order to gather original information on the potential 
effects of these technologies on the production process, work and 
employment.
These were the five technologies studied:
• advanced industrial robotics (AIR) – involving machines designed 
to perform industrial tasks automatically, with high programmabil-
ity and the capacity to interact with their environment thanks to the 
use of digital sensors
• additive manufacturing (AM) – involving digitally controlled 
devices that add layer on layer of material(s) to create objects from 
3D digital models
• industrial internet of things (IIOT) – the use of connected sensors 
attached to different objects throughout the production process to 
feed live data to central computers
• electric vehicles (EVs) – vehicles whose main system of propul-
sion depends on (externally generated) electricity rather than fuel
• industrial biotech (IB) – the use of biological processes of living 
organisms for industrial purposes, drawing on recent scientific 
insights such as systems genomics and metabolomics.
The first three technologies (AIR, AM and IIOT) involve innova-
tions in the manufacturing production process, and have a very wide 
applicability across most manufacturing sectors. In contrast, the 
other two technologies (EV and IB) concern innovations of specific 
products (and related processes), and have a more narrow applicabil-
ity to particular sectors. All of them are in one way or another part of 
the ongoing digital revolution in manufacturing (sometimes labelled 
Industry 4.0), because they are either entirely driven by core digital 
technologies – microprocessors, internet, sensors, rendering devices 
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and digital algorithms (AIR, AM and IIOT) – or largely facilitated 
by them (EV and IB).
EFFECTS IN THE PRODUCTION PROCESS
If we visualise the typical value chain in manufacturing as a line 
going from research and development to (after-sales) services,3 the 
impact of each of the technologies studied can be associated with 
some particular stages:
• AIR would have the biggest impact on (inbound and outbound) 
logistics and production, the core activities within the manufac-
turing process. Decades (or even centuries) of automation have 
already reduced the amount of labour input (and contribution to 
value added) of these activities in manufacturing, which limits the 
potential further impact of AIR in this sector (in contrast with the 
service sector, where the degree of automation is still low).
• IIOT can have a significant impact on all downstream stages in 
the manufacturing process, from inbound logistics to after-sales 
services. In core production activities, it can boost efficiency by 
massively increasing the transparency and control of the system. 
In marketing and services, it can expand significantly the range 
of possibilities because it allows for the maintenance of a remote 
connection to the final product.
• AM would have a significant impact on the upstream stages, espe-
cially research and development and design, but also on logistics 
and production. In many ways AM can be considered the most 
radical of the technologies studied, since it could theoretically 
collapse the entire manufacturing process into a single step (that 
of physically rendering a 3D model).
Since the other two technologies (EV and IB) are product rather than 
process innovations, they cannot be linked to a particular stage of the 
manufacturing process.
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What are the potential effects of these technologies on the manu-
facturing production process? According to the interviews and case 
studies carried out, they can be summarised around four key concepts:
• the increasing centrality of (digital) information
• mass customisation
• servitisation
• increased labour efficiency.
THE INCREASING CENTRALITY OF 
(DIGITAL) INFORMATION
As previously mentioned, the five technologies studied are part of 
a broader trend of increasing diffusion and widespread application 
of digital technologies to all kinds of economic activity. As a result 
of these changes, information becomes the key source of value, 
with physical production itself becoming increasingly secondary. 
The clearest example of this effect is AM, which dematerialises the 
entire manufacturing process except for the final step of physically 
rendering a digital model. Similarly, it is the information provided 
by IIOT sensors (and the capacity to process that information) that 
can optimise manufacturing processes and add further services to the 
products, while AIR go beyond traditional robots because of their 
capacity to process autonomously information from their environ-
ment and interact with it.
MASS CUSTOMISATION
In contrast with (pre-digital) Fordist mass production (which was 
very cost-effective but inherently rigid), these technologies open up 
the possibility for much more flexible production processes – thanks 
to algorithmic control and artificial intelligence (AI) – without 
compromising on cost effectiveness or standardisation. AIR are 
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algorithmically controlled general-purpose machines that can be eas-
ily reprogrammed to carry out different tasks in production. In fact, 
with AI they can interact and respond autonomously to changes in 
their environment (see Petropoulos this volume). By interconnecting 
all objects of the production process under centralised algorithmic 
supervision, IIOT systems also increase the flexibility of the process 
without hampering standardisation. Real-time centralised control 
and interconnectivity allow a much faster reaction to problems, but 
also a relatively fast reprogramming of production in response to 
changes in demand or other factors. Finally, AM reduces the produc-
tion process to a simple step, the 3D printing of the digital model, 
with remarkably few restrictions in the physical configuration of the 
resulting object but a high consistency in quality.
SERVITISATION
The studied technologies tend to reduce the importance of produc-
tion and logistics in manufacturing value added, while increasing 
that of research and development and design on the one hand and 
marketing and services on the other. IIOT in particular allows com-
panies to maintain a line of communication and even control of the 
product after the sale, which facilitates the provision of after-sales 
services (the product can end up becoming just a platform for those 
services). In more general terms, these technologies involve the 
gradual replacement of manufacturing as traditionally understood 
(as the physical production of things) by a type of economic activity 
that is closer to the traditional concept of services. This process has 
become known as ‘servitisation’.
INCREASED RESOURCE EFFICIENCY
These technologies provide much richer information on every step 
and aspect of the industrial process as well as more precise control 
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over it, which is likely to lead to a considerably more efficient use of 
materials and energy in production. This has the potential to provide 
big environmental benefits, and was identified by several interview-
ees as a potential driver for the adoption of these technologies in the 
future in Europe, in the context of growing environmental concerns.
When combined, the benefits of these technologies on the produc-
tion process could multiply, so the use of any of these technologies 
in an industrial process makes the introduction of the others much 
more likely.
EFFECTS ON WORK AND EMPLOYMENT
In the course of interviews carried out for this study, scientists, 
entrepreneurs and social partners confirmed that these changes to 
the production process were also likely to have an impact on work 
and employment.
The prognosis for employment numbers seems relatively clear: 
these technologies – particularly AIR, IIOT and AM, which cut 
across different processes and sectors – would have labour-saving 
effects, and could thus contribute further to a structural decline 
of employment in manufacturing that has been observed in most 
European countries for decades. In addition, structural changes in 
employment can be expected (see Arnold et al. this volume).
First, we are likely to see an upgrading of occupations. These 
technologies tend to reduce the amount of labour input necessary 
in production line work, but increase the amount of labour input 
required in (higher-skilled) engineering, such as design or research 
and development, and business tasks such as marketing or services. 
Second, the skills requirements of those occupations are also likely 
to change, most obviously requiring a higher level of information 
and communications technology (ICT) competence. Data analy-
sis, network management and security are likely to become core 
skills for manufacturing occupations. In fact, several of the prac-
titioners interviewed mentioned that an important challenge for 
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the implementation of these new technologies in manufacturing is 
the difficulty of finding workers with the necessary hybrid skillset 
(combining mechanical engineering and ICT skills, for instance, or 
business management and big data analytics, etc.).
The typical working conditions of manufacturing are also likely 
to change as a result of the introduction of these technologies. It will 
probably contribute to a decline of repetitive and routine industrial 
work, as well as a reduction in the amount of hazardous industrial 
tasks (which could be increasingly performed by AIR, while the 
remaining risks can be minimised by the improved intelligence of 
IIOT). Industry 4.0 factories are likely to be safer, with more skilled 
workers carrying out less repetitive work.
But the experts interviewed also expressed concerns about the 
implications of these new technologies for the conditions of work 
in manufacturing, especially the degree of autonomy, privacy and 
control of future manufacturing workers (see Crouch his volume). 
Digital factories where all objects are equipped with connected 
sensors and where workers collaborate with advanced robots can 
easily become digital panopticons, where human operators feel per-
manently monitored and controlled. It seems difficult to maintain 
any sense of privacy at work if every object is observing you. And 
while management through algorithms and big data analytics can 
significantly improve the efficiency of manufacturing processes, it 
can also lead to work intensification and the stifling of any sense of 
autonomy for the remaining workers.
Therefore, as with the introduction of any other technological 
innovation in the economy in the past, there is some ambivalence 
over the potential consequences for work and employment of the 
five game-changing technologies studied. Within the European 
social model this can be addressed by social dialogue and collective 
bargaining at different levels, including the firms and establishments 
themselves where these technologies are introduced. As part of this 
study, information was also compiled on the role that social dialogue 
is having in this respect, and the results were not very encouraging. 
Social dialogue does not yet appear to be playing a major role – if 
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any – in the introduction of Industry 4.0 technologies in Europe. The 
notable exception is Germany, where there has been an important 
debate with engagement of social partners and policymakers on the 
implications of Industry 4.0 on work and employment, around the 
concept of ‘Arbeit 4.0’ (see Rahner and Schönstein this volume). 
A similar debate between social partners and policymakers across 
Europe is needed.
NOTES
1. This article summarises the Eurofound (2018) report Game-Changing 
Technologies in European Manufacturing – The Future of Manufactur-
ing in Europe, written by the author together with Eleonora Peruffo, John 
Hurley, Elisabeth Packalen and Martijn Poehl. This study can be down-
loaded from https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/report/2018/
game-changing-technologies-in-european-manufacturing.
2. The five technology studies were conducted by Technopolis Group 
between May 2016 and July 2017 under the coordination of Martijn Poehl 
from Technopolis and the Eurofound research team.
3. A typical value chain would start with R&D and design, continue with 
inbound logistics, production and outbound logistics, and end with market-
ing and after-sales services.
 141
Over recent years there has been a lively debate in the Netherlands 
about robots and the potential consequences of digitalisation for 
society. ‘Will robots ever take over our jobs?’ was the front-page 
headline in the newspaper Algemeen Dagblad on 15 September 
2015. ‘Scared of the robots? There’s good reason to be’, wrote the 
daily NRC Handelsblad in March 2015 (Noort 2015). And the title 
of an item on Telegraaf TV was: ‘Look out – the robots are com-
ing!’ In addition, the then minister for social affairs and employ-
ment, Lodewijk Asscher of the Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA), made a 
speech in which he expressed his concerns that robots and digitalisa-
tion could lead to a loss of employment opportunities.
There is a connection between the shrill headlines and recent 
research. The contentious study by Frey and Osborne (2013), which 
predicts that in 20 years’ time 47% of all jobs in the US could be 
taken over by computers, was reproduced in the Netherlands by 
Deloitte (2014), with exactly the same alarming results.
But robots can be seen as fascinating and valuable in certain 
contexts. Google’s self-driving cars have garnered innumerable 
television, newspaper and internet reports. Searches on the subject 
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(on Google, naturally) turn up some 900 million hits. The use 
of robots in healthcare has also generated a lot of interest in the 
Netherlands. According to reports, the therapeutic robot seal Paro 
is brightening the lives of elderly people with dementia. These 
media reports consistently put a more positive spin on the future of 
work. ‘Robot vacuum cleaner reduces workload’ was a headline in 
the Algemeen Dagblad on 16 June 2015. A robot can also make a 
person’s working life easier, and Minister Asscher gave examples 
of this, too.
At the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy 
(Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid; WRR), one 
of the key policy advising bodies to the Dutch government, we are 
working on a project that looks at the future of work. We have prin-
cipally been considering two major trends – automation to do with 
robots and artificial intelligence (AI) and the increasing flexibilisa-
tion of our labour market – which require analysis and policies to 
ensure that we will all benefit from the new technology, and that 
benefits do not merely accrue to those who own the robots (Freeman 
2015). In this chapter we present key elements of an ‘inclusive robot 
agenda’.
TECHNOLOGY WILL NOT SIMPLY HAPPEN TO US
Hardly a day goes by without news about professions that are in 
danger of being eliminated by ‘robots’ and algorithms, and by 
advancements in AI. There is a great deal of exaggeration and hype 
in such reports, because the development from a ‘proof of con-
cept’ to the roll-out and diffusion of a new application on a scale 
that would have an impact on society would take a considerable 
amount of time and would involve a large degree of uncertainty. 
Furthermore, there is a lot of over-simplification, for example in the 
above-mentioned studies that predict the destruction of 20–30% of 
extant jobs or more (Frey and Osborne 2013). Jobs are bundles of 
tasks and it is very unlikely that everything done by a person will be 
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taken over by a robot or an algorithm (see Arnold et al. this volume). 
In the near future, most workers will probably encounter changes 
in their work, to a greater or lesser extent. However, studies by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
and McKinsey & Company in which jobs were examined at the task 
level estimate that around 9% of jobs (10% in The Netherlands) may 
completely disappear in the next 20 years according to the OECD 
(Arntz, Gregory and Zierahn 2016, 33), and according to McKinsey 
& Company (MGI 2017) the figure may be less than 5%.
It is more important to note that the direction in which applica-
tions of new technology will develop is not set in stone, and is not 
necessarily predictable. Smarter machines can change our lives, but 
governments, companies, engineers, citizens and interest groups 
can influence such changes and help to determine how things may 
change. The impact of a technological innovation depends not only 
on a specific technology, but also more broadly on the way in which 
the introduction of any new technology is handled. Technology is 
a means to an end and not the end itself. In addition, new jobs will 
emerge and no one can predict with any accuracy what and where 
these new opportunities will be. McKinsey & Company (2017) has 
already presented a study positing that the Netherlands will be short 
of 100,000 people to do the new jobs created by the introduction 
of new technologies. For this reason, it is unnecessary and counter-
productive, and also not in keeping with the available evidence, to 
frighten people about the prospect of robots coming to take our jobs.
‘Too often technology is discussed as if it has come from another 
planet and has just arrived on Earth’, wrote the late LSE professor 
Anthony Atkinson (Atkinson 2015; see also Mazzucato 2013 and 
Rotman 2015). Markoff (2015) describes wonderfully how two dif-
ferent schools of thought arose in the engineering community of the 
1960s about the relationship between humans and computers and 
robots. In the AI school, the point is to replace people by machines, 
whereas in the intelligence augmentation school, the aim is to use 
computers to improve human learning and to drive human innova-
tion (see Petropoulos this volume). These two schools of thought 
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still exist alongside as well as opposite each other. Therefore, there 
is no predetermined path for the further development of robotics 
and AI.
Digital technology will not in itself transform the world. According 
to the World Bank (2016), for any major transformation to occur, 
it must be complemented by analogue factors such as legislation 
and regulation, institutions, skills and education. Technological 
revolutions reach deep into the social, political and cultural fabric of 
society, and put these under stress. They lead to conflict between dif-
ferent interests, visions and possibilities of how society might look 
and function. It is therefore necessary as well as possible to think 
about the opportunities that companies, engineers, trade unions, 
other interest groups, and citizens have to act, and about the role that 
governments should play in any putative technological revolution.
DIGITALISATION AS A DISTRIBUTION 
PROBLEM OF WORK AND MONEY
In this context, it is important also to see digitalisation and roboti-
sation as a distribution problem. There is evidence that digitalisa-
tion and its applications have had a different impact on the various 
segments of the labour market in the past few years. Graetz and 
Michaels (2015) studied the impact of industrial robots in 17 coun-
tries between 1993 and 2007, and concluded that in that period 
the introduction of robots (in the narrow sense of the word) was 
not reflected in a decline in employment. They state that there are 
distribution effects, with fewer opportunities for lower-skilled and 
intermediate-skilled workers.
The same observation can be found in research on the conse-
quences of digitalisation and offshoring. In an international com-
parative study, Goos, Manning and Salomons (2014) show that in 
the period 1993–2006 there was ‘job polarisation’ – a gradually con-
tracting middle segment in the labour market between x jobs and y 
jobs (see also Goos, Manning and Salomons 2009). This contraction 
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appears to have been relatively limited for the Netherlands. Research 
by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (van den 
Berge and ter Weel 2015a; 2015b) also shows that in the last 15 years 
digitalisation has led to changes in the Dutch labour market, although 
these changes are limited when compared with many other countries. 
Jobs at the lower end of the middle segment are disappearing in the 
Netherlands, and the people who become unemployed as a result 
often end up taking new jobs on an even lower rung of the ladder. 
Jobs are also disappearing at the upper end of the middle segment, 
and many employees end up in jobs on a higher rung. The research-
ers conclude that a new dividing line has opened up between mid-
level workers and those at the bottom and top of the income ladder.
Van den Berge and ter Weel also point out that job content and 
occupational activities are changing. Secretaries, who used to spend 
most of their working hours typing, answering the phone and dis-
tributing faxes, now have other duties, for example in relation to 
scheduling and project management. They conclude that the great-
est changes are taking place within jobs (see also Chui, Manyika 
and Miremadi 2015). Studies involving data analysis are, of course, 
retrospective by nature. They help us to understand what has already 
happened, and we can learn a great deal from history. But no one 
knows whether the trends and developments of the past will continue 
into the future. There is no way of predicting whether technological 
advances will continue to have an impact on the middle segment 
(see Arnold et al. this volume). Algorithms and smart machines 
could just as easily pose a growing threat to jobs at the higher end 
of the labour market. Autor (2015), an authority on computerisation 
and the division of labour, does not expect the job polarisation trend 
of recent years to continue endlessly. Many jobs in the middle seg-
ment involve a combination of specific professional skills and basic 
skills such as literacy, numeracy, adaptability, an ability to solve 
problems, and applied common sense. Autor conjectures that such 
jobs cannot easily be divided into mid-level activities for machines 
and lower-level activities for people without a loss of coherence and 
quality.
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It is not inconceivable that in the future a mismatch will arise 
between jobs and the skills and knowledge that many people pos-
sess. Therefore on the one hand workers must be allowed – and 
must want – to continue learning, including during work, in order 
to acquire new skills and knowledge so as to be able to remain in 
employment now and in the future. This requires space for, and 
the organisation of, ‘learning by doing’ and ‘learning while you 
earn’ (see Benhamou this volume). On the other hand, digitalisation 
should be adapted in favour of working people, and used to improve 
and simplify work. For example, care workers would have more 
time to talk to those they look after thanks to the role of robots and 
technological innovations in the home, and the hard physical work 
of road builders would be eased with the help of robots.
Throughout all these developments, digitalisation can increase 
economic inequality. ‘A widespread application of the technologies 
of the second machine age creates a real chance of inequality increas-
ing in the future’, write van Est and Kool (2015) for the Rathenau 
Instituut, an influential Dutch thinktank in the field of science and 
technology, in a report for the Dutch House of Representatives. The 
impact will be felt both in equality of opportunities and equality 
of income and capital. In its aforementioned policy brief on job 
polarisation, the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
stated that “the rise of ICT since the 1980s has led to growing wage 
inequality between high-skill and low-skill workers and, recently, to 
a decline in employment and pressure on wages in the middle seg-
ment” (van den Berge and ter Weel 2015b; see also Kremer et al. 
2014). What will happen to incomes in the future remains to be seen. 
What is certain, however, is that some people will benefit more from 
technological progress than others. In contrast, there will be people 
who will be worse off when new technologies are put into use.
Economists have been talking for some time about skill-biased 
technological change, which relates to technological innovations 
that benefit people with higher skills and education (see Aubrey 
this volume). A fairly recent discussion concerns capital-biased 
technological change, or technological innovation that is mainly 
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advantageous to those who own robots (Cohen-Setton 2012; 
Krugman 2012). Richard Freeman (2015) states that robots and 
related technologies are growing more and more capable of taking 
over all sorts of workers’ tasks, and that the economic position of 
labour versus that of capital is deteriorating as a result:
Unless workers earn income from capital as well as from labour, the 
trend toward a more unequal income distribution is likely to continue, 
and the world will increasingly turn into a new form of economic 
feudalism. We have to widen the ownership of business capital if we 
hope to prevent such a polarization of our economies.
MASTERING THE ROBOT: AN INCLUSIVE  
ROBOT AGENDA
In order to respond to the development of robots and AI, and to 
ensure that the associated benefits accrue to everyone in society, we 
need an ‘inclusive robot agenda’. In this regard, the key word for 
us is ‘complementarity’. This means that the aim should be not to 
try and replace as many people as possible with robots, but rather 
to make people more productive with the help of robotics. It is not 
a case of ‘man versus machine’, but ‘man with machine’. In this 
regard, it is important to strive for inclusiveness. Although robots 
and other machines are getting smarter, technological advances and 
applications often turn out differently than expected and can pro-
ceed more slowly than is often predicted, and the costs and benefits 
of new technology are not automatically shared equally. For this 
reason, it is desirable for the government to encourage different 
parties to come together to seek out opportunities for co-creation. 
New applications should no longer be thought up by technicians and 
investors for people who then have to work with them, but instead 
all parties should develop such applications together. This is the first 
item in our proposal for an ‘inclusive robot agenda’.
The second item in our robot agenda is that we must develop 
complementary expertise and skills at all levels of education. A good 
148 MONIQUE KREMER AND ROBERT WENT
education is not in itself enough to anticipate the rise of increas-
ingly intelligent machines. Accountants, physicians, lawyers and 
other highly educated professionals may see certain aspects of their 
work being taken over by robots some day in the future. Neither is 
technical training alone likely to be enough. The question that also 
concerns education should be: what aspects of work are typically 
human? Which tasks, relationships and responsibilities will continue 
to require the human touch, or will we specifically want to entrust 
(or continue to entrust) to people? That is why it is important to 
consider and identify complementary expertise and skills.
The third item relates to the ownership of work (see Crouch this 
volume). A common finding in studies about stress in the workplace, 
burnout and – on the positive side – work enjoyment and productiv-
ity is that autonomy or ‘ownership’ is good for productivity. The 
question we must ask is how we can get people and technology 
working together, and how people can become or continue to be 
masters of their own work (and of the robot). The emergence of 
‘digital Taylorism’ and ‘algorithmic management’ increases the pos-
sibilities for tightly controlling and regulating work, thereby turning 
people into ‘meat robots’. In a literature study for our WRR report, 
Mastering the Robot, economist Anna Salomons (2015) concluded:
In summary, therefore, the digital revolution does not mean that 
our existing labour organisations and institutions, such as collective 
labour agreements, will become surplus to requirements. On the con-
trary, if employees are treated like robots, this will stand in the way of 
the productivity gains from the introduction of real robots.
The final item on the agenda that we are advocating concerns 
(new) distribution problems that can come into play if more robots 
and AI are used at work. Differences in income can increase if, as a 
result of further automation, large numbers of workers lose their jobs 
and either remain unemployed or find a new job at a lower level with 
lower income. Wealth gaps can widen if all the profits made from 
robots end up in the hands of the robots’ owners. It will then become 
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important to consider whether it is possible (and desirable) to make 
workers co-owners of robots and other machines, for example by 
means of a ‘robot dividend’ for all through a social wealth fund. 
And, finally, there will be people who cannot keep up in the robot 
society and who cannot be helped with an extra course or additional 
studies. It is impossible to predict who they will be. We do not 
know who will find themselves without work or who will need to be 
assisted from one job to the next. For this reason, we are in favour 
of a portfolio of several policy instruments for these groups (eg early 
retirement schemes, a form of basic income, government jobs), in 
order to help and support these people where necessary.
With these four agenda items, we can welcome robotisation 
and digitalisation with open arms, without a widening of the gaps 
between social groups. In this way, the workers can continue to 
master the robots.
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Most European welfare systems have evolved from 20th-century 
origins. They have been modified over the decades to deal with 
changing circumstances such as the entry of many more women into 
the labour market, the growth of part-time working and the sorts of 
structural unemployment that require a reskilling of the labour force. 
But in essence they are grounded in a normative model of work 
that presupposes some more or less stable binary distinctions in the 
workforce. Workers, it is assumed, are either economically active 
or not (for example because of sickness or disability). If they are 
economically active, they are either in work or unemployed. If they 
are employed they are either self-employed or employees. Welfare 
systems are designed largely to provide benefits to those who are 
economically inactive (depending on circumstances) or unem-
ployed. The unemployed are expected to engage in an active process 
of seeking work. A range of institutional arrangements have been 
designed to fit with these normative assumptions, including tax and 
national insurance regulations, employment legislation, education 
and training systems and the delivery of services. In an ideal world, 
in which all members of the adult population fit into these simple, 
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mutually exclusive categories, there is a ‘place’ and an appropriate 
welfare package for everybody.
Unfortunately, in the 21st century, labour markets are diverging 
ever more sharply from this model, with growing numbers of work-
ers falling into the cracks between these categories. On the one hand, 
they lack the kind of stable, long-term employment that is linked 
to solid benefits, such as pensions contributions, national insurance 
and (in some countries) rights to services such as health care and 
childcare. On the other, they are not actually unemployed and cannot 
claim unemployment benefit. They are neither ‘genuinely seeking 
work’ nor ‘permanently employed’ but occupying a precarious no 
man’s land between the two, not knowing from one hour, day or 
week to the next if or when the next ‘task’ will come along to pro-
vide them with some income.
This chapter draws on evidence from surveys in the Austria, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK 
that illustrate the extent of this kind of ‘just-in-time’ working (Huws 
et al. 2017) and discusses the implications of these developments for 
work and welfare in Europe in the future.
CROWD WORK: SURVEYS IN KEY 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
These surveys were carried out at the University of Hertfordshire in 
collaboration with the European Foundation for Progressive Studies, 
UNI Europa and Ipsos MORI. Approximately 2,000 working-age 
adults were interviewed in each of the seven countries between 
January 2016 and April 2017.1 The national surveys were comple-
mented by in-depth interviews with crowd workers as part of an 
ongoing programme of research.
The context of the research was the strong policy interest in what 
is variously known as the ‘sharing economy’, ‘gig economy’, ‘plat-
form economy’ or ‘crowd work’. There had been an exponential 
growth of online platforms for managing work across Europe, but 
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surprisingly little was known about the realities of gig work. Was it 
a liberating new form of self-employment or a new form of exploita-
tion? How many workers were doing it? Who were they? What was 
the reality of their working lives? And what are the implications of 
these new realities for public policy in Europe?
These questions are important because crowd work is seen by 
policymakers as having strong positive potential, as well as carrying 
some risks. On the positive side, it has the potential to make a strong 
contribution to economic development and growth, especially in 
regions that are still recovering from the impact of the 2007–8 global 
financial crisis. It may also contribute positively to social innovation 
and entrepreneurship, allowing non-governmental organisations, 
individuals and small- and medium-enterprises to take advantage 
of the opportunities opened up by new technologies and the digital 
single market. On the negative side, trade unions, consumer groups 
and government bodies have expressed concerns about new risks to 
workers’ rights, occupational safety and health and consumer safety. 
There are also concerns about how to apply existing regulations, 
such as those concerning tax and insurance and professional certi-
fication, in this new volatile context. More broadly, questions have 
been raised about the sustainability of new ‘gig’ work models, for 
example their ability to support a good work–life balance, long-term 
career development and income in retirement.
THE EXTENT OF CROWD WORK
The research found that in each of the seven countries studied a high 
proportion of the population was using the internet as a means of 
gaining an extra income. In this context, the sale of labour was less 
important than some other form of income generation, such as sell-
ing or reselling goods online and only slightly more important than 
letting rooms to paying guests via online platforms. Nevertheless, a 
high proportion of the population reported having done some paid 
work found via an online platform (working ‘virtually’ from their 
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own homes via an online platform such as Upwork or Clickworker; 
providing driving services via a platform like Uber, or working in 
somebody else’s home for a platform like Helpling, MyHammer 
or TaskRabbit). The proportion reporting doing some crowd work 
was 9% in the UK and the Netherlands, 10% in Sweden, 12% in 
Germany, 18% in Switzerland, 19% in Austria and 22% in Italy. 
However the crowd work constituted a small proportion of total 
income for most respondents. It constituted more than half of all 
personal income for only 2.3% of the total sample in Austria, 
3.5% in Switzerland, 2.5% in Germany, 5.1% in Italy, 1.6% in the 
Netherlands and 2.7% in Sweden and the UK – forming the main 
source of income for an average of 2.9% of the samples across all 
seven countries.
The majority of crowd workers combine ‘new’ forms of work 
for online platforms with more traditional types of casual work, 
such as working in bars or coffee shops, as well as using it to top 
up income from more regular full-time or part-time employment. In 
some cases, it is combined with other activities, such as studying or 
artistic work.
Crowd work must therefore be regarded as part of a broader spec-
trum of casual work, carried out, by and large, by the working poor, 
seeking any form of income they can find.
EMPLOYMENT STATUS
In the policy debates about crowd work there is perhaps no ques-
tion more vexed than that of their employment status. Many plat-
forms insist that their workers are ‘independent contractors’, with 
the role of the platform simply being to mediate between workers 
and their clients. However legal experts frequently argue that the 
relationship of workers to the platforms is often a dependent one, 
and that the status of the workers should reflect this subordination 
(De Stefano 2016). Some recent legal judgments have supported 
this opinion, awarding ‘worker’ status to crowd workers but falling 
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short of regarding them as ‘employees’. Meanwhile, there have been 
proposals to create a new kind of legal status for crowd workers as 
‘independent workers’ (Harris and Krueger 2015) or ‘dependent 
contractors’ (Taylor 2017).
Somewhat surprisingly, crowd workers in our surveys were most 
likely to describe themselves as employed full time, a status claimed 
by between 41% (in Italy) and 58% (in Germany) crowd workers. 
The proportion describing themselves as self-employed was rather 
low, ranging from 7% (in Italy) to 13% (in the UK). Follow-up 
interviews with crowd workers provided some insights into their 
working conditions.
While they typically valued the flexibility of crowd work, there 
were complaints about difficulty in communicating with platform 
personnel, the frequency with which changes were made, and the 
way that work was allocated and pay calculated. There were also 
complaints about unilateral arbitrary deactivations, whereby crowd 
workers suddenly found themselves unable to register for work, 
often with no explanation or warning and with no means to discuss 
the reasons with the platform personnel. Another major source of 
stress concerned customer ratings and the impossibility of challeng-
ing negative ratings.
The interviews with crowd workers also revealed a range of 
physical and psycho-social health hazards, some linked to working 
long and unpredictable hours, and reluctance to refuse work known 
to be dangerous for fear of receiving a negative customer rating. In 
some cases, crowd workers also reported social and criminal risks 
including sexual harassment, assault and tasks that involved errands 
relating to drug dealing and handling stolen goods.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
We can conclude that crowd work cannot be regarded as a clearly 
defined and distinctive form of labour but forms part of a spec-
trum of rapidly changing and overlapping forms of just-in-time 
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work, which draw to varying degrees on digital media for their 
management.
There is no clear definition of an online crowd work platform, 
with a fuzzy line between those websites that have developed spe-
cific applications for managing the interface between workers and 
clients (including the transfer of funds), platforms that advertise 
freelance postings, online directories and commercial listings sites. 
Similarly, workers shift constantly between different forms of casual 
work regardless of whether it is digitally managed.
It is thus almost impossible to isolate ‘crowd workers’ as a special 
category of worker. Rather, their existence draws attention to the 
inadequacy of the existing categorisations of work in the fluid and 
rapidly evolving labour markets of the digital age. This mismatch 
has introduced inconsistencies and ambiguities into the coverage of 
the accompanying regulations. While creating new opportunities for 
some, the resulting gaps in coverage have also left other workers 
unprotected and at risk.
One solution that is sometimes proposed is to develop new typolo-
gies: of companies, business models, patterns of work organisation, 
employment contract and labour; and new regulations to fit these 
typologies. This is a risky strategy for the following reasons:
• It may create rigidities that halt innovation in its tracks and give a 
permanent character to what may be transient forms.
• New regulations may be difficult to interpret, causing confusion 
and uncertainty for both employers and workers.
• There is a risk that the creation of new enterprise categories, 
employment categories or thresholds will have unintended con-
sequences, for example encourage the development of contracts 
that skirt the boundaries of definitions (see Doellgast this volume). 
And if new employment categories are created, they may be used 
not just to provide some protection for workers who are currently 
unprotected but also to substitute for better existing provisions for 
regular employees.
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For these reasons, we prefer a broader approach, which goes back 
to the underlying principles of the current regulations and legal 
frameworks in order to establish a clear basis for future regulation. 
This may imply creating new legal definitions of self-employment 
on the one hand and of subordinate worker status on the other.
There is also need for a fundamental rethink of welfare systems 
to make them compatible with the way labour markets work in a 
digitalised, globalised economy (see Palier this volume). In other 
words, a double-pronged approach is required, involving a recon-
ceptualisation of employment regulation on the one hand, and of 
welfare systems on the other.
On the employment side, guidelines on the definition of self-
employment for tax, national insurance and social protection 
purposes, as well as for determining employment status, must be 
clarified. This should take into account, among other things, whether 
workers have the right to:
• determine the price of the goods or services produced
• specify how the work will be done
• employ others to do the work
• retain intellectual property rights in their work outputs
• work for multiple clients and/or normally do so.
In cases where workers do not meet the above criteria, one solution 
would be to require that they are deemed to be subordinate workers 
as the default position. The onus of proof that this is not the case 
should rest with the employer rather than the worker.
Subordinate workers should be entitled to the same rights as other 
comparable temporary and/or part-time employees. Where they 
have another main job, the same rules should be applied as in any 
other secondary employment according to national regulations.
The status of platforms must also be assessed. If they are deter-
mining the wages and working conditions of subordinate workers 
are they not then employers? If they are putting workers in touch 
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with other organisations who will then determine their wages and 
working conditions are they not employment agencies? It seems 
likely that some, if not all, online platforms that match subordinate 
workers with clients may fall within existing definitions of tempo-
rary work agencies or private employment agencies.
There is also a need to clarify workers’ rights. These include a 
statutory minimum wage (in countries where this exists) and estab-
lishing a method to ensure equivalence with hourly rates for workers 
who are paid by the task, as well as a formula for including travel 
time, waiting time, preparation time and time spent bidding for 
new work. Other existing rights include paid holidays, sick leave, 
parental leave and compassionate leave, rights in the case of suspen-
sion or termination, and rights to call in labour inspectors, refuse 
dangerous work or other health and safety rights. New rights for 
workers should also be considered, for example in relation to data 
protection, the ability to challenge customer ratings and to bypass 
standardised app interfaces to engage in meaningful communication 
with employers and clients.
Reform of welfare systems may be even more challenging than 
the reform of employment regulation in the context of widespread 
‘just-in-time’ working. Once it is accepted that the simple binary 
categorisation of jobseekers into those ‘in work’ and those ‘seeking 
work’ no longer fits the reality of flexible labour markets it becomes 
necessary to design a system that provides a minimum level of 
income security to prevent people falling into destitution while 
avoiding the creation of disincentives to work.
Given the diversity of welfare systems in Europe, there is no uni-
versal recipe for achieving this. The challenges will differ accord-
ing to whether the existing welfare system is individually based (as 
in the Nordic countries) or household based; whether benefits are 
means tested; whether services such as health are provided univer-
sally as a right of citizenship or linked to sectoral, occupational or 
company-level collective agreements; whether care for the elderly 
and disabled is provided as a public service or by means of monetary 
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assistance to individuals who buy these services in the market; and 
a host of other variables.
There is an urgent need for research on the ways in which each 
national welfare system addresses the needs of casual workers and 
their dependants, and the feasibility of alternative models. One 
idea which is increasingly proposed in this area is that of a basic 
minimum income. This idea is attractive to those who want to see 
a labour market in which workers can be moved from job to job 
unhindered by bureaucratic obstacles or costs to the employer and in 
which workers are free to move in and out of education and change 
their working hours flexibly to accommodate changing domestic 
caring demands. However critics point out that if such a scheme 
were to be paid for out of general taxation this would undo the 
principle that employers should contribute towards the cost of social 
welfare and could undermine the negotiation of benefits through col-
lective bargaining. It could also raise difficult questions about who 
is entitled to such benefits, in the context of free movement of EU 
citizens and large-scale immigration from outside Europe. Clearly 
there is much to be done to redesign Europe’s welfare systems to 
make them fit for the 21st century.
NOTE
1. Additional funding was provided at a national level by Unionen in 
Sweden, the TNO Research Institute in the Netherlands, the Chamber of 
Labour (AK) in Austria, Ver.di and IG Metall in Germany, Syndicom in 
Switzerland and the Fondazione EYU in Italy.
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The current moment is a fateful one for the global community. We 
are witnessing a rise of authoritarian populism and the growth of 
anti-immigrant sentiment in many countries. Global temperatures 
are accelerating rapidly, bringing an intensification of dangerous 
impacts, such as melting permafrost, storms, wildfires and heat 
waves. Financialisation and the growth of extreme income and 
wealth concentration are destabilising societies that had relied on 
reasonable distributions of economic benefits. Democratic and 
other social institutions are under attack from these factors. Nuclear 
aggression is in the air.
In the midst of these perilous trends, studies of the ‘sharing 
economy’ may seem a bit beside the point. Companies such as Uber 
or Airbnb employ only very small fractions of the global workforce, 
and the sector as a whole only boasts a few real success stories. Yet 
the larger platform economy is but one part of another tidal wave 
that will be occurring around the world – rapid labour-displacing 
technological change. While the technological determinists who pre-
dict that artificial intelligence (AI) will wipe out massive numbers of 
the world’s jobs in a short time are surely overstating future impacts 
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(see Arnold et al. this volume), it is undeniable that technological 
advances in digitisation and AI are proceeding quickly, and that 
they will have far-reaching consequences, even if we do not fully 
understand them yet. There will be big changes in labour markets, 
and it is likely that technological displacement will contribute to 
the growth of extreme inequality. Societies that shift to large scale 
use of AI are likely to experience significant social pressures and 
even dislocation. Perhaps most importantly, the historic safety valve 
for absorbing displaced labour – GDP growth – is much harder to 
achieve in wealthy societies now.
While economists do not fully understand why, low growth 
appears to be a new but persistent feature of the global north. 
Furthermore, even if rapid growth were magically to reappear, 
meeting the massive emissions reductions that are now necessary to 
address climate change will be very difficult, if not impossible, in 
that context. Some scientists have been forthright enough to argue 
that rich countries need 10% annual reductions in emissions, a num-
ber that is far beyond the range of current experience, and one that 
is nearly impossible to square with continued growth (Anderson 
2012). Thus, the fourth industrial revolution is likely to collide with 
political instability, threats to democratic institutions, and climate 
change. The platform economy, which represents a large-scale reor-
ganisation of many kinds of work, is at the cutting edge of one type 
of technological transformation.
What exactly is this sector? Broadly, it represents a set of plat-
forms that use algorithms to match buyers and sellers in a range of 
goods and labour services. There are both consumer and business-
oriented platforms. Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and Upwork are 
examples of the latter. This paper is concerned with the consumer-
facing firms – in areas such as lodging, errands and tasks, durable 
goods rental and transportation.1 These are the key features of these 
platforms:
• They use sophisticated logistics software (or algorithms) for 
matching and payment.
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• Providers on the platforms are independent contractors (rather 
than employees).
• There are very low barriers to entry for providers on most 
platforms.
• Trust is achieved via crowdsourcing of ratings and reputational 
data, typically on both sides of the market.
There’s a great deal of terminological dispute about the sec-
tor – with alternatives being collaborative consumption, sharing 
economy, on-demand economy and the gig economy. For reasons 
of space I will leave aside these disputes, which we have discussed 
elsewhere (Frenken and Schor 2017; Schor and Attwood-Charles 
2017; Schor and Fitzmaurice 2015). There has also been a great deal 
of controversy about the sector, with supporters touting its efficiency 
and low cost and detractors claiming the platforms are exploiting 
workers, destabilising neighbourhoods, and acting illegally (Schor 
and Attwood-Charles 2017). While it is difficult to predict exactly 
how the sector will evolve, after conducting seven years of research 
(2011–2018), using a variety of methods, I am prepared to offer a 
number of findings, centring on three main issues.2
First, in contrast to frequent claims, platforms are less disruptors 
than reproducers of ongoing trends in labour markets. In particular, 
their impacts appear to be inequality-enhancing, rather than reduc-
ing, and racism appears to be endemic to their operation. Second, 
the growth of platforms is likely to be associated with rising carbon 
footprints, although this prediction awaits empirical testing. Finally, 
we ask whether the sector is sustainable, or whether its continued 
growth is contingent on a parasitic relationship to conventional 
unemployment.
DISRUPTION OR REPRODUCTION?
Platform companies and many observers claim that this form of 
economic organisation represents a disruptive and novel way to 
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organise economic activity. Others emphasise continuities with 
ongoing trends. For example, the de-institutionalisation of labour 
markets is a decades-long trend across OECD countries. In the US 
the trend towards what has been called precarious, or non-standard, 
labour has been observed since the 1980s. As noted above, platform 
work is nearly always organised via independent contracting. Does 
the emergence of the platform economy signal ‘the end of employ-
ment’, as some would have it (Sundararajan 2016), or is it an unsus-
tainable way to organise labour markets, as others suggest? Our 
research on the everyday functioning of platforms provides insight 
into this question, and supports the latter interpretation (Schor et al. 
2017). A main finding is that the model of independent contracting 
is difficult to sustain on its own terms because to achieve a viable 
model of labour management, platforms are ‘free-riding’ on conven-
tional employment. Indeed, they have yet to show that their model 
works as a stand-alone. While the platforms claim that their provid-
ers prefer the independent contractor model, with the flexibility and 
autonomy that it provides, we find that this is true only for those who 
use the platform for supplemental earnings, rather than to pay their 
basic expenses.
It is important to remember that platforms have very low barriers 
to entry and attract a wide array of earners. While the companies 
do not release much data on their workforces, national surveys in 
the US, for example, find that less than 30% rely on their platform 
earnings as their means of subsistence. The vast majority have 
other sources of income. While this varies by platform, it remains 
a general rule almost everywhere (see Huws et al. this volume). 
Many in the supplemental earner category already have full-time 
jobs. Those in the partial-dependence category (some reliance on 
platforms to pay basic expenses) have significant alternative income. 
What we have termed ‘dependent’ workers rely solely on the plat-
form. However, few in this group earn more than poverty wages. 
They experience extreme precarity, have less job satisfaction and 
autonomy, and are unlikely to persist if viable alternatives appear for 
them. If AI reduces conventional employment, we cannot expect the 
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platform model to be a successful alternative without major changes 
to its methods of managing labour (see Petropoulos this volume).
REPRODUCING INEQUALITY
Another main theme in the disruption–reproduction debate concerns 
inequality. Are platforms reducing wage inequality by providing 
new opportunities, particularly for less advantaged workers, as some 
claim (Fraiberger and Sundararajan 2015)? Or are they exacerbat-
ing existing patterns of privilege? While there is little question that 
platforms are offering new opportunities to the middle class, our 
research on the US suggests that these are mainly being taken advan-
tage of by more privileged members (Schor 2017). We have argued 
that they are fostering an upward redistribution of opportunity and 
income within the top 80%; platform workers are disproportion-
ately well educated, with majorities of college-educated providers 
on most platforms (Schor et al. 2017). In our qualitative work, we 
find that manual, often ‘dirty’ work, like housecleaning and driving, 
is being done by college-educated providers, who are displacing 
less educated workers. For example, TaskRabbit, Airbnb and Uber 
substitute for traditional housecleaning, hotel chambermaids and 
taxi drivers: as demand for the former expands, this has a negative 
impact on the latter. Chambermaids are unlikely to have apartments 
to rent on Airbnb. Although some taxi drivers have switched to ride-
hailing apps, anecdotal evidence suggests their incomes plummet 
with the switch. Furthermore, many taxi drivers lack access to the 
latest vehicle models necessary for driving on platforms. Overall, we 
suspect that the additional income earned by high educated platform 
providers worsens the distribution between them and lower educated 
persons at the bottom of the income scale.
A second dimension of inequality is around race. In the US there 
is growing evidence that the platform economy is fostering racial 
discrimination, via the peer-to-peer structure of the exchanges. 
Every study we have seen confirms the existence of racially based 
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discrimination. It is taking place on both sides of these platforms 
– customers are discriminating against providers and providers 
are discriminating against customers. In our research we find that 
in areas with high proportions of non-white residents, prices are 
lower, revenue is less and ratings are reduced (Schor et al. 2017). 
In an audit study, Harvard researchers found that Airbnb hosts were 
16% more likely to refuse to rent to guests with African-American 
sounding names (Edelman, Luca and Svirsky 2017). This research 
received wide press coverage, a series of responses by the company, 
and attempts to create a new, ‘noir’ Airbnb for people of colour. 
Similarly, a field experiment of Uber and Lyft found that drivers 
cancelled on riders with African-American sounding names twice 
as often as riders with white sounding names and that African-
American named customers had to wait longer. This study also 
found women were cheated more on these apps (Ge et al. 2016). A 
study of TaskRabbit found that Taskers were unwilling to provide 
services in areas with heavy concentrations of non-white residents 
(Thebault-Spieker, Terveen and Hecht 2015). Thus, on balance, it 
appears that rather than eliminating, or ‘disrupting’, racial inequali-
ties, they are being transported into the ‘sharing economy’.
CHANGING CONSUMER PATTERNS
While there has been considerable criticism of platforms’ labour 
practices, and of the impacts of Airbnb on the availability of hous-
ing and neighbourhood quality, there has been less debate about 
how these companies are affecting consumers. But here too there are 
worrisome impacts, especially over the longer run.
A key part of the appeal of the platforms is new services and 
low prices.3 The benefits vary by platform: on Airbnb, much lower 
prices, local neighbourhoods and personalisation are key to con-
sumer satisfaction. On Uber, factors include low prices, convenient 
payment, availability and ease of use. On TaskRabbit, middle-class 
consumers get middle-class providers, in contrast to the informal 
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‘errands and tasks’ market. For other services, such as the delivery 
of food or consumer goods, the platforms make ‘servant labour’ 
available at relatively low cost. These platforms allow middle-class 
and upper-middle-class consumers to access services previously 
reserved for the wealthy.
What of the worrisome trends? The most serious is environmental 
impacts. A major theme in the early years of the sharing economy 
was that these new services were more environmentally beneficial 
than existing businesses, in part because they were using ‘idle 
resources’; Airbnb claimed it would reduce new hotel construction. 
Ride-sharing apps like Uber and Lyft were expected by many to 
reduce car ownership, increase the number of passengers per ride, 
and reduce carbon emissions. However, it has been difficult to assess 
these claims because the companies will not provide their data to 
independent researchers. But there are strong reasons to believe 
that platforms are increasing, rather than reducing environmental 
impacts, and especially climate emissions.
The evidence is hiding in plain sight: lower prices lead to more 
demand. In the lodging sector, cheap accommodation increases miles 
travelled and trips taken. Furthermore, Airbnb enables hosts to rent 
out their homes when they travel, so that lodging is essentially free. 
(We also find some hosts travel specifically to rent, to take advan-
tage of price arbitrage – they can rent out their homes at a higher 
rate than the places they stay at.) Similarly, in the US ride-hailing 
apps appear to be taking people away from lower-carbon modes of 
transport. A recent study based on survey data finds that had there 
been no transportation app, 49–61% of ride-hailing trips would have 
either not been made at all, or been taken via walking, biking or tran-
sit (Clewlow and Mishra 2017). Furthermore, this study finds that 
there is no reduction in car ownership as a result of ride-hailing. The 
authors conclude that these services are likely to increase rather than 
reduce vehicle miles travelled. In the US, at least, if the transporta-
tion apps continue to grow it seems likely that they will further strain 
public transportation budgets by reducing ridership and weakening 
public support. This would have disastrous carbon consequences, as 
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transportation is already the largest source of greenhouse gas emis-
sions in the US and is a major contributor in many countries.
HAS THE SHARING ECONOMY PEAKED?
In 2017, a research report suggested that growth in the US sharing 
sector had peaked (Farrell and Greig 2017). The torrid expansion of 
the previous few years appeared to be over. Platform incomes were 
even falling in some cities, labour turnover was extremely high (with 
more than half of all participants dropping out after a year), and the 
strengthening of the conventional labour market was reducing the pool 
of interested workers. While our research has found that employed 
workers are more likely to be satisfied on the platforms, this data also 
shows that they are less likely to stay. These findings suggest an obvi-
ous point that much of the discourse has failed to recognise: the plat-
form economy remains tethered to the conventional labour market. 
The precarious model of independent contracting without benefits, 
protections or guaranteed income is unlikely to be preferred, except 
for those who can command superior market positions.
A number of other developments also suggest that the ‘end of 
employment’ future may be little more than fantasy. They concern 
the only two very large platforms in this sector: Airbnb and Uber. 
San Francisco recently enacted strong regulations to curtail Airbnb 
hosting, which has dramatically reduced the number of hosts who 
are eligible and registered. One report found that only 15% of hosts 
have registered (Brinklow 2017). Stricter regulations are being 
debated and enacted in cities around the world, and they will predict-
ably reduce the growth of lodging platforms, particularly Airbnb. In 
the case of Uber, whose valuation recently dropped by one-third, the 
lack of a viable business model may be a more serious constraint than 
regulation. Independent analysis suggests that Uber will have lost $5 
billion in 2017 and that passengers are paying only 41% of the cost 
of their rides, with Uber’s investors subsidising the remainder in 
the hopes of achieving market domination (Smith 2016). However, 
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competition in this market may be increasing. Furthermore, even if 
Uber were to best its competition, there is reason to believe consum-
ers will balk at a more than doubling of fares, particularly since so 
many trips would not otherwise be taken.
POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE
Our findings, at least to date, suggest that letting algorithms drive 
economic activity will further privilege the privileged. Furthermore, 
the platform sector fails to provide adequately for those without 
secure alternative sources of income, and exacerbates existing forms 
of social inequality. If we want to reap the benefits of platforms (and 
there are many) without this dark side, higher levels of regulation 
and new patterns of governance will certainly be necessary. Our 
research finds that platforms work best when workers have alterna-
tive means of support, and participate freely and without compul-
sion. One option is to reduce workers’ dependency through broad 
social measures: stronger welfare support for the unemployed, a 
basic income, or more collective provisioning of basic needs could 
reduce desperation for platform providers with no other sources of 
income (see Palier this volume). Alternatively, platforms could be 
required to provide regular benefits and protections for workers who 
are essentially full-timers, who work over a certain number of hours 
a week. In that scenario, the independent contractor status would be 
reserved only for those who work below that threshold.
A second issue is that platforms must begin to monitor and take 
responsibility for their carbon impacts. The world cannot afford a 
dynamic new sector with a high carbon footprint. Commitments to 
data transparency are essential, in order to craft environmentally 
positive policies. Possibilities include carbon taxes on lodging (eg 
Airbnb) stays and ride-hailing services (eg Uber, Lyft and others). In 
many localities, platform companies are getting preferential regula-
tory treatment. In return they should commit to a strong sustainabil-
ity agenda to control and reduce their environmental impacts.
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Finally, platforms must tackle discrimination head-on. Racial 
discrimination in public accommodation has been outlawed in many 
societies. Consumers have legal rights to access to lodging, trans-
portation and labour services. While the rise of a person-to-person 
alternative means of exchange has many beneficial aspects, it must 
not be allowed to re-inscribe racial and other forms of discrimina-
tion. Here what is required is a combination of legislation outlawing 
discrimination and new policies by the companies. Solutions include 
eliminating or de-emphasising pictures that show skin colour and 
company monitoring and punishment of discriminatory behaviour.
The ‘sharing’ or consumer-facing portion of the platform econ-
omy has proven to be an attractive option for consumers and many 
providers. To date, it has proven to be neither the earth-shattering 
innovation its proponents claim nor the absolute dystopia its 
detractors have asserted. However, negative impacts are already 
significant, and if it continues to grow, these harms will as well. 
To preserve the potential benefits, it will behove government at all 
levels to craft legislation and regulation that controls the impacts it 
is already having on labour, climate and public goods.
NOTES
1. This is the portion of the platform sector typically referred to as the 
‘sharing economy’.
2. For more detail on our project, and copies of our papers, see: https://
www.bc.edu/bc-web/schools/mcas/departments/sociology/connected.html.
3. There are also ideological, or ‘moral’ appeals that matter to users, as 
we detail in Domesticating the Market: Moral Exchange and the Sharing 
Economy (Fitzmaurice et al. 2018).
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The aim of labour regulation is not only to protect workers from an 
unequal relationship of economic exchange (Deakin and Wilkinson 
2005) but to grant employers managerial prerogatives to organise 
and direct their workers. Labour law ensures, however, that these 
prerogatives are not exerted in a way that is incompatible with 
workers’ human dignity (Supiot 2011; see also Crouch this volume). 
Though the world of work has changed since the passage of the first 
labour laws over 100 years ago, the fundamental functions of this 
regulation – to provide minimum protections to working time regu-
lations and earnings, to enable ‘workplace democracy’ by allowing 
workers’ voice, as well as to protect health and safety – remain valid 
today.
It is often wrongly assumed that these regulations do not apply to 
work on platforms in the so-called gig economy, including to ‘click-
workers’ (Aloisi 2016). This is partly because the work is novel and, 
as a result, lawmakers, labour administration bodies and employers’ 
associations and unions have failed to keep pace with this innovation 
(Dagnino 2016). But it is also the consequence of a business-driven 
narrative that, by overemphasising the allegedly new features of 
these forms of work, presents work on platforms as not suitable for 
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existing labour regulations. An important element of this rhetoric is 
the use of buzzwords such as ‘favours’, ‘rides’ and ‘tasks’, rather 
than acknowledging that it is labour carried out by workers (De 
Stefano 2015). This rhetoric goes hand in hand with the practice 
common to many platforms of classifying workers as independent 
contractors (Prassl 2018).
Work on online labour platforms is diverse and includes those 
who perform ‘clickwork’ on ‘crowdworking’ sites as well as work 
undertaken locally through “work on demand via apps” (De Stefano 
2015). On crowdworking sites, workers may complete small jobs 
or tasks (‘micro-tasks’ or ‘clickwork’) through online platforms, 
such as Amazon Mechanical Turk, CrowdFlower and Clickworker, 
or they may take on longer assignments in graphic design or data 
analysis from sites such as Upwork or Freelancer (Berg 2016). 
‘Crowdworkers’ may access these platforms from anywhere in the 
world, so long as they have reliable internet connection, giving rise 
to a global competition for jobs in a sort of individualised interna-
tional value chain. In work on demand via apps, workers perform 
duties such as providing transport, cleaning and home repairs, or 
running errands, but these activities are channelled and organised 
through mobile apps by companies such as Uber, TaskRabbit and 
Deliveroo (De Stefano 2015). The work is performed locally, despite 
the international presence of many of these companies (Aloisi 2016).
Representing platform-based work as a mere ‘sharing of favours’ 
conveys an image of the platform economy as a sort of parallel 
dimension, where chores are amateurishly carried out as a form 
of leisure or to earn ‘pin money’, and where labour protection and 
employment regulation are assumed not to be necessary. To give an 
example, when the bikers of foodora, a food delivery service, went 
on strike in Italy the managers of the company stated that work-
ing for foodora is only a means of earning some extra money ‘for 
those who like to ride the bike’ rather than a real job (Aloisi and 
De Stefano 2017). The reality, however, is different. For many of 
the people involved who labour on or through these sites, platform-
based work is an indispensable source of income (see Huws et al. this 
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volume; Schor this volume). In late 2015, the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) surveyed ‘clickworkers’ on two important click-
working platforms: Amazon Mechanical Turk and CrowdFlower. 
More than one-third (40%) of the survey respondents indicated that 
crowdwork was their principal source of income, while the average 
time spent weekly on the platform was 30 hours. Half of the work-
ers stated that they had crowdworked for more than 10 hours during 
at least one day in the previous month, and an impressive 40% of 
them also reported that they regularly worked seven days per week 
(Berg 2016).
Another common assumption driven by the mainstream narra-
tive of platform-based work is that the workers are genuinely self 
employed. While there are some platforms that merely connect 
demand and supply of tasks between clients and independent service 
providers, there are many other instances where platforms do more 
than this, actively intervening in key elements of the work being 
provided (De Stefano 2015). Platforms often fix the price of the task 
and define its principal terms and conditions (Prassl 2018). In other 
cases, they enable the clients to determine these terms unilaterally, 
leaving workers unable to negotiate over them. The platform may 
define the details of the work, including instructing workers to wear 
uniforms, to use specific tools, or to treat customers in a particular 
way (Aloisi 2016).
Some platforms prohibit crowdworkers from subcontracting the 
completion of the task to other people. The general terms and condi-
tions of Clickworker (2012) state:
With respect to any project, Clickworker will exclusively mandate 
the clickworker who has submitted an offer to perform services relat-
ing thereto to consummate such project. Clickworkers are expressly 
prohibited from subcontracting or outsourcing projects to third parties 
unless this is expressly permitted by the terms of a project description.
Other platforms, such as CrowdFlower (2015), instead prevent the 
use of IT tools to complete tasks by banning the performance of
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any task with the use of Internet bots, web robots, bots, scripts, or 
any other form of artificial intelligence or otherwise attempt to obtain 
rewards from CrowdFlower without completing tasks as they are 
described.
Dictating how the work should be executed, including prohibit-
ing the help of specific IT tools, is arguably a way of directing the 
performance of the work in a way that is not compatible with the 
purported self-employment status of workers. This is particularly 
the case when these ways of directing work are accompanied by 
stringent means of monitoring the execution of the work (see Crouch 
this volume). These forms of control vary greatly, spanning from the 
possibility of unilaterally determining the time required to complete 
a job to the use of technologies such as GPS or, in the case of virtual 
work, taking screenshots of the worker’s screen to verify at any time 
their attendance to the given task.
In addition to these ways of interfering with the jobs done, many 
platforms have performance review systems that enable custom-
ers to rate the worker’s performance. Ratings, in turn, are used to 
discipline the work, by limiting the ability of lower-rated workers 
to access jobs or excluding these workers from the platform (De 
Stefano 2015).
In platform work, therefore, practices are widespread that result 
in directing and controlling the performance of platform workers in 
fashions similar or even more stringent to what traditional employ-
ers would do. The management may be done through the terms of 
service, or it may be through an algorithm – so-called ‘algorithmic 
management’ – but it is still management. Indeed, it has been argued 
that “this often results in a determination of work that is so pro-
nounced that it equals ‘classical’ personal dependency necessary for 
an employment relationship” (Risak and Warter 2015). Accordingly, 
when the platforms undertake these practices – or when they allow 
clients to take part in these forms of work management – the tradi-
tional legal tests used to determine the existence of an employment 
relationship could be met in platform work (Davidov 2016).
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The arguments above call into question the mainstream rhetoric 
depicting platform work as a virtuous example of entrepreneurship, 
enabling people to ‘be their own bosses’ and freeing them from the 
control and hierarchy present in traditional employment or ‘nine-
to-five jobs’ (using the ‘straw-man’ stereotypical term often used 
by platform-supporters to designate employment status). Presenting 
platform workers as a new class of independent micro-businesses 
and entrepreneurs could not be more misleading.
A convincing rebuttal of this rhetoric is provided in the landmark 
UK judgement that found two Uber drivers to be ‘workers’ under 
UK law. The tribunal dismissed as “faintly ridiculous” the notion 
that “Uber in London is a mosaic of 30,000 small businesses linked 
by a common ‘platform’”. Nor, according to the tribunal, does the 
company merely assist the drivers to ‘grow’ their businesses, since 
“no driver is in a position to do anything of the kind, unless growing 
[their] business simply means spending more hours at the wheel”. 
The judge also found that, through the rating system, the platform 
subjected drivers to “what amounts to a performance management/
disciplinary procedure”, going beyond what is allowed in coordinat-
ing independent self-employed workers who act in the performance 
of their own business.1 This is also perfectly coherent with the late-
2017 judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU observing,
Uber determines at least the maximum fare by means of the epony-
mous application, that the company receives that amount from the 
client before paying part of it to the non-professional driver of the 
vehicle, and that it exercises a certain control over the quality of the 
vehicles, the drivers and their conduct, which can, in some circum-
stances, result in their exclusion.2
At a closer look, therefore, it is evident that rather than the ‘new’ 
fourth digital revolution, platform work is simply 21st-century 
casual work rebranded. New technologies may be used to channel 
and organise work activities, but it is still about work executed by 
human beings and under the control of other people, in exchange for 
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compensation. Indeed, ‘gig work’ needs to be considered along with 
broader trends of casualisation of the labour market in developed 
countries such as the spread of zero-hour contracts and on-call work 
(Freedland and Prassl 2017). These forms of work – in turn – closely 
resemble casual labour arrangements that were typical at the outset 
of industrialisation and are still a prominent feature of labour mar-
kets in developing countries (De Stefano 2016a).
As most platform work is currently unregulated – or rather self-
regulated by the platform – it is characterised by a lack of job 
security and few, if any, labour protections. Moreover, while those 
in traditional casual work arrangements – such as day labourers, 
dock workers and agricultural farmhands – are at least paid by the 
day, those working in the platform economy are paid by the task at 
hand, be it riding a client from one place to another, delivering food 
around the city or translating texts on the internet. The Uber driver, 
the ‘Turker’ on the Amazon Mechanical Turk or the foodora worker 
must continuously search for work, monitoring their computer 
screens or smartphones for work opportunities. Indeed, the ILO 
survey shows how crowdworkers averaged 18 minutes looking for 
work for every hour working (Berg 2016).
Even when jobs span a few hours or a few days, the worker needs 
to be continually searching for new jobs; 90% of workers in the 
survey reported that they would like to be doing more work than 
they are currently doing, citing insufficient work and low pay as the 
reasons they were not (Berg 2016).
The lack of protection for workers, the casual nature of the 
work and the management and control practices put in place by 
the platforms all demonstrate the need to regulate platform work. 
The current model of platforms’ self-regulation does not guarantee 
decent working conditions and risks putting responsible businesses 
out of the market. Indeed, unless the authorities acknowledge that 
workers should not be denied protection just because they work for 
platforms, they will continue to have an advantage over traditional 
business. There is therefore a risk of a deterioration in working 
conditions going much beyond platform-based work (Prassl 2018).
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Opportunities for regulation are not scarce, as platforms purport. 
To begin with, the technology that has allowed parcelling and dis-
tributing work to ‘the crowd’ can also be used to regulate the work 
and provide protection to workers. Technology can monitor when 
workers are working, when they are searching for work, and when 
they are taking breaks. For example, Upwork, the online freelance 
marketplace, offers its clients the option of paying by the hour, as 
it can monitor the workers by recording their keyboard strokes and 
mouse clicks and taking random screen shots. Uber expects drivers 
always to have the app on, which can track drivers’ whereabouts 
including their downtime.
This same technology can thus also be used to ensure that work-
ers earn at least the minimum wage or ideally to regulate the wage 
agreed collectively by the workers and the platform. If labour 
protections are put in place, then platforms will have the incentive 
to re-organise work to limit search time. Technology and better 
organisational design can help to minimise search time, improving 
efficiency for all (Berg 2016). The technology can also be used to 
facilitate payment of social security contributions.
In addition, technology could be put in place to allow workers’ 
contributions to be recognised outside the platform. Currently, if a 
young Indian college graduate works on Amazon Mechanical Turk 
after leaving university, but then after a few years decides she would 
prefer a job in a physical office, she has no way of showing that she 
did the work for Amazon Mechanical Turk, or taking her star rat-
ing with her. This is true of other platforms as well – whether Uber, 
Upwork or TaskRabbit. Certainly there are technological fixes that 
can be instituted, allowing for more open markets and free mobility 
of labour.
Needless to say, a strong push towards better regulation and 
policies to support platform work would also be provided by union 
action (see Doellgast this volume). Platform workers have shown 
the will to organise collectively through either grassroots organisa-
tions or traditional labour unions (Aloisi and De Stefano 2017). 
These efforts, however, may be materially hurdled by current 
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regulatory limits banning self-employed workers from joining 
unions or engaging in collective bargaining, lest they be in breach 
of antitrust law and risk heavy sanctions (De Stefano 2016b). For 
instance, very recently an ordinance passed by the city of Seattle 
allowing collective bargaining for ride-hailing platforms such as 
Uber was challenged in court by businesses groups, and the Federal 
Trade Commission, the US antitrust authority, officially expressed 
the view that the ordinance should be nullified and collective 
bargaining banned for these workers (Miller 2017). Recognising 
freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining as fun-
damental and universal rights applying to all workers, as mandated 
under the international standards of the ILO (1998), would already 
represent an enormous step forward in giving protection to platform 
workers.
Another important step forward would be to include platform 
workers in strategies aimed at bettering the conditions of casual 
workers, with whom they share important dimensions of risk, as 
argued above (Aloisi, De Stefano and Silberman 2017). In par-
ticular, extending the regulation aimed at guaranteeing a minimum 
number of hours of work to be paid, taking into account the average 
number of hours worked over a reference period, as it is the case 
for zero-hour workers in the Netherlands, could be considered (ILO 
2016). The same can be said for the regulation banning exclusivity 
clauses for these types of work, as it is currently mandated under the 
UK regulation of zero-hour work.
While it is easy to become enamoured by the glitz and conve-
nience of apps and the myth that we have broken from our past, 
we need to remember that these platforms are merely providing 
another way of mediating work – driving and running errands, or 
carrying out data entry or audio transcription online are not ‘new’. 
Technology is key for progress, we need good regulation to ensure 
that the technology is used responsibly and contributes to social 
wellbeing and not used to unravel the gains from the hard-fought 
battles to improve worker’s rights. Otherwise, technology will not 
take us into the future, but instead return us to the past.
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NOTES
Janine Berg is senior economist at the ILO in Geneva, Switzerland. The 
views in this article are her own and do not necessarily reflect those of the 
ILO. Valerio De Stefano is BOF-ZAP research professor in the faculty of 
law at Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
1. For further information see the Employment Tribunal Mr Y Aslam, Mr 
J Farrar and Others v Uber, case numbers 2202551/2015, from 28 October 
2016. This judgment was appealed by Uber, but in November 2017 the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal upheld the decision given in the first instance. 
For further information on the appeal, see Employment Appeal Tribunal, 
Uber B.V. and Others v Mr Y Aslam and Others, UKEAT/0056/17/DA, 10 
November 2017.
2. For further information see the case file C-434/15, Asociación Profe-
sional Elite Taxi v Uber Systems Spain (2017).
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Some observers argue that artificial intelligence (AI) and other 
forms of extreme automation will make most human labour redun-
dant; and – more chillingly for the kind of people likely to read 
what they say – they suggest that it will be many highly skilled jobs 
that will be most threatened by this process. Were these predic-
tions to be true, the first negative consequence would be a collapse 
in demand, since, if there are no (or few) skilled workers, there is 
little labour income, and therefore no demand for all those products 
that AI is eager to make for us to buy. There could be two alterna-
tive responses to this, precedents for both of which exist. First, and 
likely to be favoured by banks, is a vast growth in consumer credit 
to enable all these redundant people to carry on spending, unsecured 
credit funded by a near infinite regress of secondary markets. We 
had an experiment in this approach, mainly to deal with the stagna-
tion of US labour incomes over the turn of the century. The regress 
turned out to be considerably short of infinite, leading to the crisis of 
2008. This does not mean that the experiment will not be repeated; 
to some extent the British economy is repeating it at the time of writ-
ing. Its sustainability will always be highly doubtful, but unsecured 
credit is likely to remain an important, dangerous element of any 
REDEFINING LABOUR RELATIONS 
AND CAPITAL IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Colin Crouch
188 COLIN CROUCH
rich capitalist society experiencing difficulty in sustaining a high 
volume of employment income.
The alternative approach is for workers, or rather non-workers, to 
be paid an income funded by taxation. Proposals for this, and even 
some experiments, exist in the increasingly popular idea of a basic 
or citizen’s income. Again we have some real experience of this, as 
unemployed, disabled, the elderly and other people unable to work 
have long received non-work incomes of this kind. As they might 
tell basic income advocates, such incomes are at the mercy of politi-
cal opinion, and can become the target of considerable criticism 
from those who do work and pay the taxes that fund those who can-
not or do not. This vulnerability would become even more severe if 
a shrinking number of working people was being called on to pay 
the taxes needed to fund them. This approach to the problem is not 
likely to be as popular with business and politics as extended unse-
cured credit, as the latter at least brings short-term banking profit; 
it is also likely to be no more sustainable, though considerably less 
dangerous.
In the circumstances it is probably more constructive to share 
the assumption that economists usually make: that human beings 
will always find things to do for each other; and that if technology 
replaces some activities, they move on to find other things to do, 
usually making use of those very technologies. This is the history 
in the longue durée of the relationship between human work and 
technology. It is objected that this time is different, because now 
it is highly skilled work that is affected. That is however at least in 
part a result of how we retrospectively view those skills that tech-
nology replaces. The art of making highly elaborate copies of reli-
gious texts that dominated the work of many monks in the centuries 
before printing seems to us now to have been a laborious process 
of copying. But at the time it was one of the most skilled activities 
in a society where very few could read and write, let alone produce 
beautiful texts with primitive implements. Much the same could be 
said of the skills of medieval architects, who had to work out cal-
culations of stresses and strains in materials with extraordinary skill 
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and ad hoc judgement, with none of the established knowledge that 
enabled such tasks to become routine, first by using textbooks, and 
then in the late 20th century by using computers. Technology did not 
make architects redundant, but enabled them to move on to different 
activities. The list of examples can be extended across the centuries 
and sectors of the economy.
Rather than skill levels, it is types of work that are affected dif-
ferentially by technology. In general, people working in professions 
that require some quality of human interaction to be performed, 
whether psychiatrists or waiters, are likely to be more robust in the 
face of the digital challenge than those requiring either repeated 
manual operations or those forms of intellectual effort that have little 
need for human interaction.
If this starting point is accepted, we can address the question of 
labour and capital relations in the digital age by making the follow-
ing assumptions:
1. There will be considerable upheaval as old jobs are destroyed by 
technology and new ones created. There is nothing new about 
this, but previous historical episodes – such as the initial indus-
trial revolution – were accompanied by considerable distress 
and conflict. That will be repeated. Also, the speed of change 
and therefore the repetition of successive waves of shock and 
responses to it can be expected to intensify.
2. Digitalisation will continue the present trend for information 
technology to place increasing powers of monitoring, surveil-
lance and control into the hands of the managers of labour. The 
character of jobs, how they are performed, and with what skills, 
will increasingly be defined by these managements.
3. This shift of ever more discretion over the conduct of work tasks 
from practitioners to managers will apply even if the workforces 
involved have the appearance of being independent contractors. 
Indeed, it is intensified control that facilitates the current trend 
to self-employment, the so-called gig economy and other forms 
of precarious work relations. Until the growth of contemporary 
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information technology, workers could be most effectively 
controlled by bringing them together in one observable space; 
employers had little choice but to make them employees. If they 
can be managed at vast distances, there is little reason to do that.
4. Even though we should expect new jobs to replace old ones, there 
will be prolonged intermediate periods of adjustment, when old 
jobs are disappearing, but entrepreneurs have not yet discovered 
new ways of taking advantage of the labour that is available. 
While this is occurring, unemployment among certain kinds of 
workers and their skills must be expected to rise. During these 
periods there will be surpluses of labour. This will shift the bal-
ance of power in the employment relationship towards employers 
and capital. We have been observing a similar process, resulting 
from globalisation, for some decades now.
5. This last point will lead to intervals of deficient mass demand, 
which will also be negative for capital. However, in the early 
stages a shift to capital’s advantage will produce more income 
inequality between capital and most forms of labour apart from 
senior management, producing increased dependence of produc-
ers on markets for luxury rather than mass-consumption goods 
and services. These may themselves be quite labour-intensive, 
as luxury products are usually characterised by high labour 
inputs, partially reversing the overall trend to the replacement of 
labour. This process is likely in turn to stimulate increased labour 
demand. We are already to some extent living in an economy of 
this kind, with employment in important luxury niches accompa-
nying otherwise growing mass production (Khan 2015; Silver-
stein and Fiske 2003).
6. Finally, we should assume that employers in sectors where IT is 
part of the core business will continue their current practice of 
locating themselves fiscally in the most benign jurisdictions. As 
IT spreads to more activities and sectors, ever more firms will 
be able to do this. Indeed, many firms now claim that they do 
not have a geographical location. Taken together with point 3, 
digitalisation is producing a world of firms that have no location 
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and do not employ the people who work for them. This breaks 
long-established assumptions of public policy, especially over 
taxation, firms’ responsibilities towards workers, and the financ-
ing of non-wage labour costs.
Digitalisation therefore seems set to continue certain recent 
trends: a growth in various kinds of precarious jobs, rising inequal-
ity, and increasing managerial surveillance power, with employers 
increasingly able to avoid making any contribution to workers’ 
various employment risks (from health and safety to social insur-
ance). This combination has two particular sets of implications for 
employment relations: the erosion and perhaps collapse of the con-
cept of the employee as a figure with associated rights and duties, 
and growing power asymmetries between those who control work 
and those who carry it out.
REDEFINING THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
From the point of view of economic theory, labour is just another 
commodity; when it is unemployed it is no different from any other 
piece of unsold stock waiting on a shelf. Thus, the main reason that 
firms give for using various forms of non-employees is the flexibility 
it gives them to match labour supply to demand; it is inefficient to 
have workers hanging around with nothing to do while being paid. 
They therefore want to take advantage of the control possibilities 
afforded by digitalisation to dispense with the idea of the standard 
employee, to whom they have responsibilities to provide ongoing 
work. They are therefore inventing (sometimes re-inventing) such 
categories as the gig economy, temporary work, casual work, jobs 
with highly flexible hours (at their extreme, zero-hour contracts), 
and false self-employment. We shall here use the general term 
‘non-employees’ to bring together all these categories. Being a non-
employee might work well for workers having no need for stability, 
such as students, actors between roles, people just wanting a few 
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hours of paid work from time to time. However, if people can find 
only such work when they are trying to buy, or pay high rent for, 
a home, or build a family, or equip a house, unpredictability and 
extreme fluctuation in income brings high negative externalities of 
flexibility. The commodity ‘labour’ needs to reproduce, to restore 
itself and to consume. When it gets angry it can be troublesome. 
The more that employers insist on labour being flexible, the more 
difficult they make it for workers to achieve the stability that much 
non-working adult life requires. No matter how neoliberal they 
want to be in their economic policies, governments, even undemo-
cratic ones, cannot ignore these irritating characteristics of human 
labour. In the last analysis they pick up many of the costs of these 
externalities.
The changes being wrought by digitalisation are intensifying the 
degree of disturbance that people face in their working lives, produc-
ing a crisis of stability at least as important as that of the depressions 
of the 1920s and 1930s. It will however be increasingly difficult 
to tackle these problems through social insurance systems funded 
partly by employers’ contributions – a reasonable approach, requir-
ing firms to bear the costs of the externalities they generate, along 
with workers themselves and government. How can this be done 
when firms have no fiscal location in the country where the work 
takes place, and where the workers are not their employees?
There is also a growing imbalance between the fiscal position of 
those firms and sectors that can choose their physical location, and 
those that simply cannot. Taxation is distorting investment patterns 
across sectors and across sizes of firms. For these and other reasons, 
corporate taxation will have to shift from an employment or head-
office location base to a sales base. A firm might threaten to de-locate 
from a country because of its high taxes on the locus of production, 
but it will not refuse to sell goods to a country with high sales taxes. 
This raises important issues, because sales taxes are regressive. On 
the other hand, if economists are right to argue that most corporate 
taxes are eventually reflected in prices, then the overall effect might 
not be much different. The issue requires detailed investigation and 
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goes beyond our current concerns, but we can here signal a need 
for action if the security needs of an increasingly unsettled working 
population are not to be neglected.
Because digitalisation greatly increases companies’ ability to use 
non-employees, firms like Uber complain that critics of its employ-
ment practices are standing in the way of technological advance, 
but there is nothing new about these work forms in themselves. In 
the early industrial revolution a very common form of employment 
in the textile and clothing industry was the ‘putting out system’. 
Women worked in their own homes producing items, with the 
finished goods being collected on behalf of the entrepreneur from 
time to time. The reappearance of this primitive employment forms 
is partly driven by IT and AI, because remote and digitalised com-
munications systems make it possible to control large numbers of 
people without giving them employee status. But technology neither 
determines nor originates the form of work contract; it could be 
deployed to make life more, not less, secure for the workforce.
If firms are using non-employment in order to evade obligations 
owed to employees, then by making a sharp distinction between 
dependent employment and self-employment the legal system is 
accidentally giving them bad incentives. The key concept needs to 
become the use that an organisation makes of labour, rather than its 
formal relationship to it. There are already precedents for this. If 
one employs an independent contractor to carry out tasks on one’s 
premises, one has certain obligations, for example to maintain a safe 
working area. The range of these provisions should be extended so 
that, for example, if a so-called self-employed restaurant-food deliv-
ery worker falls off her bike, the firm that had contracted her to make 
the delivery should be legally responsible for any unreasonable risks 
they imposed on her (eg excessively heavy loads, insufficient time 
to make journeys safely) and for subsequent sick pay – though of 
course if it was her own bike she would still be responsible for any 
defects in it that led to the accident.
Often firms’ search for extreme labour flexibility conflicts with 
the most efficient use of labour. Workers’ productivity is enhanced 
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if firms have an incentive to invest in their skills and prolonged 
experience. This is unlikely to be done for non-employees, who are 
usually seen as having no long-term future with the firm. The best 
approach to this problem would be a per capita tax on the ‘use of 
labour’, additional to social insurance taxes. Firms providing true 
formal employment contracts to the workers they use would be com-
pletely exempt from this tax. This would reverse current negative 
fiscal and regulatory incentives. Also exempt would be firms that 
use non-employment contracts, but accept various liabilities towards 
the workers concerned: health and safety, guarantees of working 
hours, provision of training, payment of social-security contribu-
tions. To provide flexibility, there could be a tariff of tax reductions 
for different items in such a list. There would also be exemptions 
for firms below a certain size and for contracts for very small num-
bers of hours. The tax needs to be set at a rate such that those firms 
using non-employment primarily to avoid responsibilities have an 
incentive to use at least certain elements of a formal employment 
relationship. If, with extreme digitalisation of managerial control, 
non-employment before long becomes the norm for work relations, 
the fiscal and labour law obligations needed to accommodate it 
would already be in place.
SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL
The second major way in which digitalisation will change employ-
ment relations is through the intensified control it offers to managers 
to control workers in their performance of tasks. One can hypoth-
esise two extreme forms of management–worker relationship. In the 
first scenario, management has complete confidence in the profes-
sional skill and ethic of the workers, such that it allows them com-
plete discretion in their performance of tasks, a discretion removed 
only when there is evidence of poor practice. This is obviously 
the preferred system for workers; for employers it also represents 
a prime facie efficient system, as monitoring costs are kept very 
 195REDEFINING LABOUR RELATIONS AND CAPITAL
low. However, the employer faces considerable moral hazard, as it 
has little chance to check on avoidance of tasks, inefficient use of 
time and poor quality work. The other extreme is one of zero trust. 
Management assumes that workers will cheat, waste time and work 
inefficiently at every opportunity. They are therefore constantly 
monitored and allowed little discretion in how they perform their 
tasks. Workers do not like such a system, but employers avoid moral 
hazard. Monitoring is costly, but they may believe that these costs 
are recouped by the efficiency gains. There is however another cost 
to both employer and workers: workers who are not trained to use 
discretion are incapable of responding to deviations from routine, 
and likely to work without commitment.
AI and IT make possible cheaper and more extensive monitoring, 
increasing employers’ incentives to shift to the zero trust model, 
including its extension to so-called ‘professional’ forms of employ-
ment, in particular in education, health and care services. This has 
been accompanied by a major increase in the ratio of managers to 
professional staff, but digitalisation can be expected to automate 
much of the monitoring task itself: managers are themselves workers 
likely to present moral hazards to the owner. Professional athletes 
already have their heart rate, food intake, etc. constantly monitored. 
We should expect this kind of activity to expand to secure more 
managerial control over the movements and behaviour of work-
ers, not just while they are at work, but all the time. Some of these 
extensions might be generally welcomed; we should all appreciate 
having the alcohol levels of surgeons and airline pilots monitored. 
But others might be experienced as very irksome with little benefit 
for customers or the general public.
It is impossible to imagine that workers would ever have equiva-
lent means to monitor the conduct of managers. The overall result 
of digitalisation will therefore be a major increase in the power of 
the latter over the former. This intensifies a need, already developing 
over recent years of relative labour surplus, for workers at all levels 
to have easy access to trade union representation. This is something 
that unions and workers need to fight for themselves, or it would 
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not be authentic, though governments should certainly be expected 
to create a level playing field for unions, for example, by making 
it illegal for employers to take measures to impede their activities.
This will need to be unionism with a different emphasis from that 
to which we have become accustomed. Unions are usually perceived 
to be mainly concerned with securing wage rises, but individual 
and collective grievance handling, an important but less prominent 
aspect of their work, will become increasingly important with inten-
sified managerial control and the growth of non-employment. They 
will also have to learn how to represent the interests and attract the 
membership of non-employees; like labour law, unions need to dis-
card the distinction between employees and other kinds of worker. 
To represent the disaggregated workers of the digitalised economy, 
they will have to abandon the tendencies of decades to base their 
local organisations in large workplaces, partly returning to old 
methods of town organisation, but mainly using social media and 
websites. Much of this already happens, but a major extension of it is 
desperately needed. Groups like the Independent Workers’ Union of 
Great Britain, representing growing numbers of gig economy work-
ers, need to be brought fully into the union fold.
Another old practice that will need reviving is for unions to see 
themselves as interested and expert in their members’ professional 
capacities. This was fundamental to the original craft unions, and 
even more so to the ‘professional associations’ representing the 
highly skilled non-manual occupations. These latter used to stand 
aloof from the trade union movement; today they are more fully 
integrated, but in the process have lost much of that earlier profes-
sional role. If workers of various kinds are to combat the spiral into 
low-trust, low-discretion total monitoring, they will need representa-
tives trying to push the border back, regaining the ability of work-
ers to win trust through respect for their skills. Unions can do this 
by participating in training, and by themselves winning increased 
discretion for the majority of workers by exercising various forms 
of professional discipline over the poorly performing. Critics of the 
concept of ‘post-Fordism’ have long pointed out that Fordism, in the 
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sense of detailed managerial control over workers’ movements, has 
only just arrived for teachers, medical practitioners, care workers, 
lawyers and others in similarly skilled occupations (Crowley et al. 
2010). There are today considerable grounds for solidarity, or at 
least for sharing a joint priority, on the balance between control and 
merited trust among working people at all levels of the occupational 
structure, including managers themselves.
How we establish the right to be trusted and therefore not have 
our every movement under permanent surveillance will become a 
major theme of politics in a digital age, applying to citizens’ rela-
tions with police and security services as much as employees’ and 
non-employees’ relations with management. Governments and 
employers will be completely seduced by the possibilities of total 
surveillance. But they may become sensitive to arguments about the 
importance of discretion to efficiency, the bad morale and resent-
ment produced by monitoring, and the serious trade-off that exists 
between it and trust, saving us from the digital age finally bringing 
reality to all those mid-20th-century dystopias of totally monitored 
lives.
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Inequality is on the rise across the global north. Pay for top earners is 
growing at a much faster rate than for middle- or low-income work-
ers, and in-work poverty rates are increasing as more new jobs are 
low-wage and insecure. Meanwhile, welfare states are being rolled 
back and labour unions are losing members and influence, widening 
the gap in access to social rights and voice at work. These two sets 
of trends are weakening democratic institutions via the concentra-
tion of economic and political power. Democracies are sustained by 
checks and balances to prevent the interests of a small group from 
taking priority over those of the majority. They progress through 
debate and compromise to identify and advance common interests. 
The challenges of combating inequality and extending democracy 
are thus tightly linked, and at root about returning a larger share of 
power and voice to workers.
In this chapter I will argue that strong labour unions are crucially 
important for promoting more equal distribution of power within 
economies being reshaped by the fourth industrial revolution, and 
REBALANCING WORKER POWER IN 
THE NETWORKED ECONOMY
Toward collective regulation of outsourced 
and precarious work
Virginia L. Doellgast
200 VIRGINIA L. DOELLGAST
by extension are central to saving the democratic institutions that are 
threatened by extreme inequality. I propose two broad policy solu-
tions aimed at rebalancing union power vis-à-vis employers: estab-
lishing more encompassing forms of social and collective regulation 
that close existing legal loopholes; and supporting union organising 
and bargaining across companies linked through contracting rela-
tionships. In the following sections I review evidence from three 
sources that support these proposals. The first is a comparative inter-
national study of call centre work, the Global Call Center Project, 
based on surveys and case studies in 17 countries (Batt, Holman and 
Holtgrewe 2009). The second is a 10-country study of restructur-
ing and job quality in European and US telecommunications firms 
(Doellgast, Sarmiento-Mirwaldt and Benassi 2016). The third is the 
edited book Reconstructing Solidarity, which analyses comparative 
case study findings from nine industries and occupations across 15 
European countries (Doellgast, Lillie and Pulignano 2018).
HOW OUTSOURCING UNDERMINES WORKER 
POWER AND DRIVES GROWING INEQUALITY
The example of call centres shows how a combination of technologi-
cal change, market liberalisation and firms’ changing organisational 
strategies have weakened unions and driven growing inequality. In 
the 1990s and early 2000s, it became easier and cheaper to answer 
calls far from the customer, distribute calls to different locations and 
workers, and more accurately predict how many calls would come 
in at any particular time. At the same time, new technologies have 
been used to intensify performance monitoring through continuous 
capture of key strokes, screen shots and voice recordings. Call cen-
tres today are extremely efficient and the work they perform is easily 
moved to regions and countries with lower wages and higher unem-
ployment than the areas and countries they service. Meanwhile, a 
multinational industry of subcontractors has taken over a growing 
share of call centre work from banking, telecommunications and 
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retail firms facing a cost squeeze from liberalisation and globalisa-
tion of once protected markets. These subcontractors route calls 
across locations worldwide, with centres serving customers in the 
global north from both domestic and lower cost locations in the 
global south – for example, in India and the Philippines (English), 
Northern Africa (French) and Latin America (Spanish, Portuguese).
Call centres thus show in an extreme form trends we can observe 
across the economy: jobs are highly mobile and easily offshored, 
worker performance can be intensively monitored and tightly con-
trolled, and employers outsource a large portion of work to often 
non-union subcontractors expected to compete on low cost and high 
flexibility. What are the effects of these trends on workers? First, 
we found that call centre subcontractors had significantly lower pay 
and worse conditions than those working in call centres in other 
industries. Studies based on the Global Call Center survey showed 
that typical wages of subcontractors were on average 18% lower 
than for in-house (non-subcontracted) call centres, a gap that shrunk 
only marginally when controlling for skills, size and other variables 
(Batt, Nohara and Kwon 2010). In our 10-country study, we found 
even larger gaps in pay between nearly identical call centre jobs in 
telecommunications firms and in their subcontractors, with 20–50% 
lower pay in some countries (Doellgast, Sarmiento-Mirwaldt and 
Benassi 2016). Subcontractors also had worse working conditions: 
they used more part-time and temporary workers, had higher turn-
over rates, monitored workers more intensively, and invested less in 
training (Batt, Holman and Holtgrewe 2009; Doellgast, Holtgrewe 
and Deery 2009). Thus, as a growing number of call centre jobs 
move out of traditional industries like banking and utilities and into 
independent subcontractors, they are becoming lower quality and 
lower paid.
A second, more indirect, effect of outsourcing is to make it more 
difficult for workers in unionised workplaces to hold on to past 
gains. Companies often compare costs and flexibility between their 
own workers and their subcontractors’ workforce or with conditions 
or collective agreements in the call centre industry. Managers can 
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easily threaten to outsource more jobs if unions or works councils do 
not agree to lower wages, more monitoring, or more flexible work-
ing practices. We found that these kinds of threats led to major con-
cessions aimed at stopping or reversing outsourcing in 4 of our 10 
telco company cases (Doellgast, Sarmiento-Mirwaldt and Benassi 
2016). Not coincidentally, these were all cases with large pay differ-
ences between internal and outsourced call centre workers, and with 
low union coverage of subcontractors.
Outsourcing thus drives down job quality not only through 
market-based competition but also through the effects of this com-
petition on workers’ bargaining power. Studies looking at other 
industries show similar political dynamics and outcomes associated 
with outsourcing: in low-wage service jobs, among higher skilled 
professionals, such as government workers, as well as in manufac-
turing and construction (for a review of this research, see Doellgast, 
Lillie and Pulignano 2018, 7–10 and 18–21). Worker representatives 
are more restricted in the kinds of strategies they can use to repre-
sent their members’ interests in better pay and improved working 
conditions when they are told the only option is to be as cheap and 
flexible as subcontractors. These challenges are most severe, how-
ever, where subcontractors are able to bypass the stronger collective 
agreements or minimum legal conditions covering in-house workers 
in traditional industries.
THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF EXPANDING 
PRECARIOUS WORK
Outsourcing is one kind of strategy that can reduce costs and 
increase flexibility through moving work to a separate firm with 
different pay and conditions. Firms can also adopt non-standard 
arrangements such as agency, freelance and marginal part-time 
contracts. These often have similar effects in making work more 
short term and unpredictable, as well as less likely to be covered 
by collective bargaining or benefits – for example, unemployment 
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insurance, parental leave, pensions and further training. In our book 
Reconstructing Solidarity we argue that the expansion of these dif-
ferent forms of precarious work can be traced to a negative feedback 
dynamic or vicious circle linking growing gaps in union agreements 
and employment protections with the breakdown of broad, inclusive 
forms of worker solidarity – both of which shape employer and 
union strategies (Doellgast, Lillie and Pulignano 2018).
After the second world war, western European countries had the 
most success in extending decent conditions and pay across the 
workforce. First, inclusive institutions were critical for stopping the 
spread of precarious work. These institutions include welfare state 
protections, labour market legislation and collective agreements that 
cover all workers. Workers with weaker bargaining power are less 
likely to be precarious where they are covered by the same protec-
tions and benefits as those workers with stronger bargaining power. 
These institutions have to be built, and typically that has happened 
through social and labour movements grounded in inclusive solidar-
ity – based on forming common cause across workers with differ-
ent identities (eg based on gender, ethnicity and class) and labour 
market power (eg based on skills and collective organisation). This 
kind of inclusive solidarity is necessary for workers and citizens to 
support inclusive institutions such as solidaristic welfare states; and 
encourages unions to take into account diverse worker groups in its 
organising and bargaining strategies. Meanwhile, where there is less 
precarity in a labour market, inclusive solidarity is easier to build 
and sustain. It is less likely one group of workers will scapegoat 
another group of workers or want to deny them benefits when they 
are all under the same collective agreement and social safety net.
Today, it is becoming easier and cheaper across Europe to avoid 
legal and negotiated protections by outsourcing work or hiring 
workers on more precarious, short-term contracts. This has two 
effects: employers find creative ways to escape from past obligations 
to their workers, making work feel more insecure for those in both 
permanent and non-standard jobs; these employer strategies have a 
further effect of undermining solidarity across the workforce. It is 
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difficult to build collective action where workers are on different 
contracts or based in different subsidiaries or subcontractors. These 
divisions are often heightened where more precarious workers are 
also from different racial or ethnic groups. The call centre and tele-
communications studies cited above found evidence of both kinds 
of effects, which were most severe in countries like the UK, the US, 
Germany and Denmark, where management could easily escape col-
lective bargaining or introduce different terms and conditions across 
the workforce.
POLICY SOLUTIONS TO PRECARIOUS WORK
How do we reverse the vicious circle of expanding precarity to 
rebalance political and economic power within our increasingly 
unequal societies? Across the country and industry case studies in 
Reconstructing Solidarity we found many examples of union cam-
paigns focused on organising precarious workers and improving 
pay and conditions across the workforce. Those that were successful 
shared a common focus on sustaining or building inclusive institu-
tions and mobilising inclusive forms of worker solidarity – including 
solidarity within the labour movement itself. Our research findings 
across the three projects suggest two sets of policies at the national 
or European level that provide some measure of support for union 
efforts in both areas.
First, more encompassing social and collective regulation are 
needed to close existing legal loopholes. The most obvious thing 
that governments can do to level the playing field is to make it more 
difficult for companies to exit social arrangements. It seems that the 
opposite trend is more common, with the EU and its member states 
including a widening array of potential loopholes to give compa-
nies flexibility in how they apply social protections. For example, 
the UK’s legislation requiring equal treatment of agency workers 
included a clause known as the ‘Swedish Derogation’, which allowed 
temporary staffing agencies to be exempted from the requirement of 
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equal treatment on pay provisions if they offered an agency worker 
a permanent contract of employment and paid the worker between 
assignments. When the legislation was first introduced, the UK’s 
incumbent telecommunications firm BT (formerly British Telecom) 
was employing 4,000 agency employees, who began earning up to 
20% more pay. However, its staffing agencies immediately began 
to exploit the pay-between-assignments loophole in the legislation, 
and by 2013 this had become the default contract for this group of 
workers, allowing agencies to pay their workers between £2 and £4 
less per hour than similar permanent workers (for more detail, see 
Doellgast, Sarmiento-Mirwaldt and Benassi 2015).
There are several examples in our book of successful campaigns 
to close these kinds of loopholes, often led by unions. Chiara 
Benassi and Lisa Dorigatti (2018) compared union campaigns to 
fight precarious agency work in the German and Italian metal sec-
tors. In Germany, agency work was substantially deregulated in the 
early 2000s, making it easy and cheap for metalworking companies 
to hire large numbers of lower-wage agency workers. Works coun-
cils first cooperated with these changes to save their companies 
money. However, they soon noticed that their members were being 
replaced by this cheaper workforce, and were forced to make local 
concessions on pay and conditions to protect their jobs. IG Metal 
responded with the campaign Besser Statt Billiger [Better Not 
Cheaper] – which sought to encourage works councils to regulate 
agency work in similar ways at the local level. Meanwhile, they used 
the campaign to build a stronger sectoral agreement on agency work 
and to push for stronger national regulations, both of which took 
the pressure off local works councils for concessions. Today agency 
jobs in the German metal sector are better paid, there are more path-
ways to permanent jobs, and these workers are more integrated into 
local works councils.
An important lesson from IG Metal’s experience is that collec-
tive action was most successful when it targeted both legal reforms 
and building more solidaristic bargaining within existing collective 
agreements. This leads to our second point.
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Collective agreements should be extended not only within tra-
ditional industries, but across companies and their subcontractors 
and staffing agencies. This is an important complement to legisla-
tion that closes exit options and loopholes – to counter the negative 
effects that outsourcing and agency work often have in breaking 
apart coordinated bargaining. Here I can give an example from 
my comparative research on European telecommunication firms. 
In a paper with Chiara Benassi and Katja Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, 
we asked why after telecommunications markets were liberalised, 
Austria and Sweden developed coordinated collective bargaining 
across large employers and their subcontractors, while Germany 
and Denmark experienced increasingly disorganised bargain-
ing. We also asked what effects these different paths had for pay 
and working conditions in the sector (Benassi, Doellgast and 
Sarmiento-Mirwaldt 2016). Findings showed that inequality across 
in-house and subcontracted jobs were lower in the Austrian and 
Swedish cases in large part because bargaining structures brought 
together different groups of workers linked together across firms’ 
networks of subcontractors and staffing agencies. For example, I 
interviewed a network technician who had worked for TeliaSonera 
in Sweden. She had been transferred to a subcontractor as part of 
a major outsourcing of all of TeliaSonera’s technician services in 
the 2000s. She was then laid off and rehired through a temporary 
agency. However, she remained a member of the same union, and 
continued to be covered by strong collective agreements. Her pay 
had stayed largely at the same level throughout these moves and 
her agency paid her 90% of her normal salary when she was not 
placed on an assignment. In contrast, workers outsourced from 
Denmark’s former state-owned telco provider, TDC, experienced 
dramatic downgrading of pay and conditions as they were moved 
to firms with weaker union agreements covered by often competing 
labour unions.
This example suggests that countries differ significantly in how 
well existing collective bargaining institutions are able to adjust to 
the challenges of more fragmented, networked production models 
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that link workplaces across organisational boundaries. Governments 
in Austria, Finland and France, to give only three examples, are 
considering legislation (at the time of writing in early 2018) that 
would give firms more flexibility to exit industry-level agreements 
or to further decentralise bargaining to the workplace level. This 
would weaken unions’ capacity to continue to coordinate bargaining 
even at industry level, much less to extend these institutions across 
firms linked together in subcontracting relationships but formally 
located in different industries. Public policy instead should seek to 
strengthen supports for inclusive institutions that help to establish 
increased bargaining coordination at the level of these production 
networks. These would be most effective at the European level, 
given the growing integration of firms across European markets.
CONCLUSIONS
Growing inequality undermines solidarity and makes it more dif-
ficult to use our political institutions to engage in meaningful 
debate about the goals that firms and governments should pursue. 
Growing support for far-right political parties in Europe is evidence 
that inclusive forms of solidarity are breaking down, replaced by 
more exclusive group identities often based on a narrowly defined 
nationalism. Taking measures to support increased collective worker 
voice within firms and industries is central to combating inequality 
and its associated social problems. History suggests that proposals 
for strengthening collective regulation are unlikely to be advanced 
unilaterally by governments without significant pressure from social 
and labour movements. There is a certain Catch-22 to propos-
ing reforms to strengthen unions when the political will for those 
reforms requires strong unions in the first place. But the point is still 
worth making: effective democracies need mechanisms for workers 
to participate in decisionmaking within firms and industries, and 
unions are the actors with the most obvious capacity and experience 
to take on this role. If we are serious about sustaining our democratic 
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institutions, we should seek to strengthen collective bargaining insti-
tutions through extending them across our economies.
REFERENCES
Batt, R., D. Holman and U. Holtgrewe (2009), ‘The Globalization of 
Service Work: Comparative Institutional Perspectives on Call Centers, 
Introduction to a Special Issue of ILRR’, ILR Review, 62(4): 453–88.
Batt, R., H. Nohara and H. Kwon (2010), ‘Employer Strategies and Wages 
in New Service Activities: a Comparison of Co-ordinated and Liberal 
Market Economies’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 48(2): 
400–35.
Benassi, C., V. Doellgast and K. Sarmiento-Mirwaldt (2016), ‘Institutions 
and Inequality in Liberalizing Markets: Explaining Different Trajecto-
ries of Institutional Change in Social Europe’, Politics & Society, 44(1): 
117–42.
Benassi, C. and L. Dorigatti (2018), ‘The Political Economy of Agency 
Work in Italy and Germany: Explaining Diverging Trajectories in Col-
lective Bargaining Outcomes’, in V. Doellgast, N. Lillie and V. Pulig-
nano (eds), Reconstructing Solidarity: Labour Unions, Precarious Work, 
and the Politics of Institutional Change in Europe, 124–43, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Doellgast, V., U. Holtgrewe and S. Deery (2009), ‘The Effects of National 
Institutions and Collective Bargaining Arrangements on Job Quality in 
Front-Line Service Workplaces’, ILR Review, 62(4): 489–509.
Doellgast, V., K. Sarmiento-Mirwaldt and C. Benassi (2015), ‘Union 
Campaigns to Organize Across Production Networks in the European 
Telecommunications Industry: Lessons from the UK, Italy, Sweden, and 
Poland’, in J. Drahokoupil (ed.), The Outsourcing Challenge: Organiz-
ing Workers Across Fragmented Production Networks, 177–98, Brus-
sels: ETUI.
Doellgast, V., K. Sarmiento-Mirwaldt and C. Benassi (2016), ‘Contesting 
Firm Boundaries: Institutions, Cost Structures, and the Politics of Exter-
nalization’, ILR Review, 69(3): 551–78.
Doellgast, V., N. Lillie and V. Pulignano (eds) (2018), Reconstructing Soli-
darity: Labour Unions, Precarious Work, and the Politics of Institutional 
Change in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 209
Digitalisation is transforming the nature of work in Europe and 
around the globe. On the one hand digitalisation could provide new 
and less arduous job opportunities, increased autonomy for workers, 
greater scope for collaborative working between people in different 
countries, and the dissemination of greater levels of skills develop-
ment and training. On the other hand, digitalisation could threaten 
existing jobs, increase the extent of precarious work with little social 
protection, blur the boundary between work and family, and weaken 
collective labour relations.
These changes present a major challenge for actors including 
trade unions, employers’ organisations and governments, in collec-
tive bargaining, forming and implementing labour regulations, and 
reforming social insurance coverage for the new, emerging forms 
of employment. Since the invention of the microprocessor in 1971 
computing capacity has exponentially transformed work and society, 
but as Carlota Perez (2004) has pointed out the socio-institutional 
framework has been slower to adapt to the pace of innovation, and 
political actors are still ‘catching up’. Labour relations are one of 
the pillars of the post-war socio-institutional framework, but how is 
social dialogue adapting to the new conditions of growth and work? 
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND 
BARGAINING IN THE DIGITAL ERA
Cécile Jolly
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Drawing on a number of recent embryonic initiatives to regulate 
these changes collectively and by examining the growth of non-
standard and gig employment I argue that the digital transformation 
requires a new form of social dialogue that is yet to be designed.
THE EMERGING TRANSFORMATION OF 
SOCIAL DIALOGUE IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Technological change in the workplace is occurring across many 
types of industries. The trend is not new for trade, finance and tele-
communication but the pace is accelerating, and platforms are now 
disrupting sectors that are traditionally less exposed to international 
competition such as transport and hotels. These changes are difficult 
to manage when jobs are at risk and when changing skill require-
ments are unclear. For employers’ representatives and unions, fear 
and uncertainty for the future do not augur well for the establish-
ment of a constructive dialogue; in many cases neither managers 
nor employees are fully aware of the impending consequences. 
Although 7 in 10 Europeans agree that robots and artificial intelli-
gence can ‘steal people’s jobs’, a majority (53%) say their job could 
not be done at all by a robot or artificial intelligence while more than 
4 in 10 (44% ) think that it could (European Commission 2017).
Established channels of social dialogue and institutional frame-
works of labour relations inside companies or at the sectoral level 
are not well adapted to addressing these topics. The subject of 
negotiations, as well as the bargaining timeline, do not match the 
reality of technological change, as the impact of digitalisation on 
jobs and skills is not easy to anticipate, and their impact can be 
highly varied depending on the sector in question. The dialogue 
needs to be conducted continually across a number of cross-cutting 
issues such as jobs, skills, quality of working life and personal data 
protection. However, social dialogue is more often organised on a 
regulated fixed timeline, and considers a limited range of specific 
topics. Traditionally working hours and wages formed the pillars 
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of collective bargaining, while today working conditions, organisa-
tional and skill transformations are key. But there is no such thing 
as a mandatory social negotiation about the digital transformation in 
collective bargaining.
Nevertheless, some recent initiatives developed at company level 
illustrate the growing awareness of the negative effects of telework 
and information-and-communication-technology-facilitated mobile 
work (Messenger et al., 2017). To address the problems of ‘hyper 
connectivity’ some recent radical initiatives can be found. For exam-
ple, in Germany, Volkswagen blocks email sent outside working 
hours and Daimler-Benz sends automated ‘out of office’ messages 
on behalf of those on holiday who receive emails, with the contact 
details of an alternative staff member. These measures are intended 
to protect employee’s work–life balance (BBC 2014). In France 
reforms to labour law introduced in 2016 established a new ‘right to 
disconnect’ from out-of-hours work emails or phone calls. The spe-
cific terms and conditions whereby employees can ‘switch off’ have 
to be negotiated by the social partners at company level (BBC 2016). 
Similar initiatives have been identified in Spain in a company-level 
collective agreement between union and employer representatives at 
the insurance company AXA, which recognised the right to turn off 
company phones or not to answer work-related calls out of working 
hours in 2017 (EurWORK 2017a).
A number of collective agreements have been implemented on 
the insecurity associated with teleworkers in Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, Greece, France, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain 
(see Doellgast this volume). These company-, industry- or national-
level agreements are derived from the European framework agree-
ment on telework in 2002 (Welz and Wolf, 2010). However, such 
achievements, along with a number of collective agreements that 
deal specifically with the overall effects of digitalisation on the 
labour market, are relatively rare. Many social partner represen-
tatives are engaged in informal dialogue on the social impact of 
digitalisation at national level (eg in Germany, France, Netherland, 
Luxemburg and Sweden), and these issues are discussed through 
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formal negotiations (on working conditions and restructuring plans, 
for example) or informal ones, essentially at company level. But 
they have rarely led to mutual commitments or framework agree-
ments at the company, industry, national or European levels.
The first company-level agreement on digital transformation 
signed at Orange constitutes an exception to this, and is an example 
worth considering in some detail. Orange, one of the most promi-
nent French multinational telecommunication companies, signed 
an agreement with social partners to prevent ‘over-consumption’ 
of digital tools, foster digital skills, develop new collaborative 
way of working, and protect the personal data of workers. As 
another example, the former public railway company Deutsche 
Bahn and the Railway and Transport Union (Eisenbahn- und 
Verkehrsgewerkschaft; EVG) announced in 2016 the start of nego-
tiations for a new collective agreement in order to address mobile 
work issues and how digitalisation is affecting occupational profiles 
in the sector (see Rahner and Schönstein this volume).
Despite some progress, much remains to be done to address the 
social impact of digital technology in the collective bargaining pro-
cess. Employers and employees need each other: employers need 
technological change to be accepted, employees have to adapt their 
skills and working conditions to be protected to avoid marginalisa-
tion or job loss. But to manage this change collectively requires 
explanation and assessment of the likely consequences, some 
experimentation and a new framework on the cross-cutting issues 
that require more protracted dialogue, but this new form of dialogue 
is yet to be designed and comprehensively implemented.
INTEGRATING NON-STANDARD FORMS OF 
EMPLOYMENT INTO EXISTING COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING FRAMEWORKS
Collective action and bargaining is also needed, not only inside 
the boundaries of companies that hire employees on open-ended 
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contracts, but also for more vulnerable workers including part-
timers, those on fixed-term contracts or those in self-employment, 
who receive a relatively low income, and casual workers. Not all 
self-employed workers are in a precarious employment situation, 
for example lawyers. Nevertheless, Vermeylen et al. (2017) esti-
mate that almost a quarter of European self-employed workers are 
vulnerable or are in ‘concealed’, bogus, self-employment. Many 
self-employed workers do not have the same levels of social pro-
tection as salaried employees. Technology is not the only driver of 
change, but has indeed facilitated the growth of non-standard forms 
of employment as automation and product standardisation permits a 
fragmentation of jobs into tasks that can be outsourced. As a conse-
quence intermittent salaried and self-employed workers are not eas-
ily subsumed into the established institutional framework of labour 
relations and social protection.
First, the development of non-standard forms of employment 
undermines the ability of trade unions to organise and represent the 
most vulnerable workers. Created to be the voice of salaried blue-
collar workers – the proletariat – trade unions are often reluctant or 
ill-adapted to defend the new proletariat of temporary workers and 
the precariously self-employed (see Kanjuo-Mrčela this volume). 
Their presence inside the boundaries of companies is counterbal-
anced by the trend to use teleworkers or to employ non-standard 
forms of employment outside the core workforce. Faced with this 
trend a growing number of European trade unions are offering ser-
vices and support to self-employed workers to help them deal with 
the contractors and to protect themselves (for example when dealing 
with legal issues, occupational health and insurance) (EurWORK 
2017b).
This commitment is relatively new and growing steadily. It can 
ultimately lead to negotiating pay or late payments on behalf of a 
particular group of self-employed workers, for example musicians, 
actors or freelance journalists. But in these cases the arrangements 
may be scrutinised by competition authorities that are concerned 
with preventing price-fixing cartels. Trade unions are also often 
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engaged in a struggle to limit the extent of temporary contracts or 
bogus self-employment. However, this kind of commitment may 
give the impression of disregarding self-employed or temporary 
workers whose interests are not well represented by the traditional 
trade unions. For some young people working in sectors with a dis-
proportion number of casual workers, trade unions may be seen as 
‘old-fashioned’ and out of date, so that many unions yet have a lot to 
learn about engaging with young people (Vandaele 2017).
Second, self-employed workers may not identify with the 
employers’ organisations that are part of the system of labour 
relations. As subcontractors to larger firms, they may in fact share 
more similarities with an employee. Most of the new self-employed 
workers are not in traditional self-employed occupations that are 
regulated by strong professional associations such as craftsmen, 
doctors or lawyers. Instead, they often have jobs related to com-
munication, design, corporate consulting, homecare and other 
services, and they may not even regard themselves as a manager 
or an employer.
NEW FORMS OF UNIONISM FOR 
NEW TYPES OF WORKERS
Two kinds of new organisations dedicated to non-standard forms 
of employment are emerging: associations or unions dealing spe-
cifically with a legal status on the one hand, and specialised trade 
unions that exclusively organise the self-employed on the other.
Labour law has indeed encouraged, or minimised, the risks of 
non-standard forms of employment by creating new legal forms of 
employment status. For example, ‘casual entertainment workers’ 
in France, ‘economically dependent self-employed’ in Spain, and 
‘para-subordinates workers’ in Italy. However, this has raised con-
troversy as it was seen as undermining prevailing pay and working 
conditions. At the same time, new forms of organisation dedicated to 
these non-standard forms of employment have been created.
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‘Casual entertainment workers’ in France are salaried employ-
ees who have more social benefits than other casual or temporary 
workers. This category was created to foster domestic production. 
However, employers’ representatives have opposed this because the 
special unemployment scheme for entertainment workers is paid by 
general social insurance contributions1 (Coquet 2010), while trade 
unions have opposed it because it discourages the hiring of employ-
ees on an open-ended contract. A temporary workers’ collective 
(collectif des intermittents) has organised demonstrations and advo-
cacy to defend workers’ interests (Sinigaglia 2012).
A new legal status for ‘the economically dependent self-employed’ 
and ‘para-subordinated workers’ has been introduced in Spain 
and Italy to transform undeclared work into formal employment. 
This kind of worker is self-employed but has access to some of 
the employees’ social rights such as severance pay or unemploy-
ment insurance, and costs are met by the main employer or buyer. 
Alongside this development an association of autonomous work-
ers, affiliated with the biggest unions, has been established and is 
dedicated exclusively to defending these new types of ‘economically 
dependent self-employed’ workers, and the ‘para-subordinated’ 
workers’.
In countries where unions and social protection are weak, other 
organisations are dealing with these new forms of self-employment. 
Freelance associations have been created in the US (2001), Canada 
(2008) and the UK (2017). Their schemes to protect freelancers 
focus on issues such as late payments, with ambitions to offer sti-
pends for sick pay or other social protection, including healthcare, 
income security and insurance.
Neither the self-employed branches of trade unions, for example, the 
United Services Trade Union (Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft; 
ver.di) in Germany, nor the self-employed organisations and tempo-
rary workers’ collectives, are able to negotiate collective agreements 
that deal specifically with the self-employed or employees with 
fixed-term contracts. In the majority of EU member states, collec-
tive bargaining is reserved for the regulation of the employment 
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relationship between employers and trade unions, and it takes place 
either at sector or industry level. There is sometimes collective 
bargaining for specific occupations in certain sectors including con-
struction, broadcasting and journalism, where self-employed trade 
union members have shaped their respective industries for decades, 
as they have done for example in the UK. But this is not usually the 
case in sectors where there have been new forms of employment 
created by the fourth industrial revolution. Exceptions to this are 
workers who find employment through temporary work agencies. 
Most EU15 countries have sector-level bargaining for temporary 
agency work, with the UK constituting the exceptional case, where 
this does not occur. At the European level this ‘triangular’ form of 
employment itself is recognised as an industry, for which sectoral 
social dialogue has taken place since 2000. But the lack of a trade 
union organisation for agency workers remains a key problem in the 
regulation of the sector by the social partners.
CONCERNS RAISED BY THE 
ON-DEMAND AND GIG ECONOMY
Although changes in labour relations have been relatively slow, 
the rise of the on-demand and gig economy has given birth to new 
forms of collective action and bargaining at a rapid pace because it 
increases flexibility for workers at the risk of creating greater job 
insecurity. It raises questions about the definition of employment 
status and employment rights (Gierten 2016), and ultimately chal-
lenges the suitability of the current employment law framework 
in addressing the needs of people working outside the traditional 
employment model.
Technology has facilitated new business models that are based on 
matching sellers and buyers of goods and services: even if the latter 
are delivered by workers (physically or digitally), the platform is 
not formally the employer, although it may control the production 
process or prices, as happens for example with Uber or Deliveroo. 
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The employer’s accountability for securing decent working condi-
tions and social rights is in fact transferred to platform workers 
themselves, who perform their tasks as independent contractors. 
Online platforms have allowed often casual and unstable work to 
be parcelled and distributed to ‘the crowd’, breaking it into micro-
tasks, with relatively low pay. As pointed out by Berg (2016) and 
the ILO (2016), gig work needs to be considered along with broader 
trends in the casualisation of the labour market, such as the spread of 
zero-hour contracts and the growth of bogus self-employment (see 
Berg and De Stefano this volume). Last but not least, the on-demand 
economy challenges existing welfare models. Platforms pay low 
contributions for social protection and corporate tax, which in turn 
affects the social insurance coverage of the people who do this work.
The spread of labour platforms, as opposed to other market 
places where assets are traded, has involved considerable opposi-
tion in European countries, ranging from an Uber ban2 to taxation 
or regulation, court cases at the national or European level (relating 
to worker status or the license to operate) and strikes of workers or 
contractors. The platforms that intermediate taxi or delivery services 
(for example, Uber or Deliveroo) and crowdsourcing micro-tasking 
platforms like Mechanical Turk and CrowdFlower have attracted 
the most attention. The workers who perform these types of tasks 
are mostly low skilled, and though platforms are offering them 
opportunities to work, the pay is often relatively low. But there is 
also evidence that platform work may increase inequality rather 
than reduce it as higher-skilled push lower-skilled workers out of 
jobs (see Schor this volume). They have been backed strongly by 
European trade unions, fulfilling their traditional role of defending 
the most vulnerable and securing better working conditions. First, 
drivers and deliverers using apps and crowdworkers have been fed-
erated, despite their distance from each other, with the help of trade 
unions, citizens and technology. The sharing of common interests 
and experiences has thus encouraged crowdworkers to join together. 
In the same way, high-skilled workers, such as freelancers, tend to 
be federated professionally.
218 CÉCILE JOLLY
Second, new forms of collective action have emerged. Protest 
movements among the platform’s workers have used technology to 
gather and inform other workers on a large scale, as smartphones 
and the internet are their professional tools. Crowdworkers are 
using the rating system of platforms to assess the contractors’ con-
ditions of payment and report bad payers. In business-to-customer 
services, workers call on consumers and citizens to support their 
claims. The support of the potential client in protest campaigns has 
been seen in the US in the Walmart workers’ campaign (Hocquelet 
2014) and in the UK recently in the McDonald’s zero-hour con-
tracts campaign.
Third, trade unions do not only support the claim of the work-
ers’ platforms, they also create unionised groups in the transport 
industry and are beginning to negotiate directly with the platforms. 
However, it is difficult to establish labour relations with platform 
organisations as they are not recognised as an employer, and are 
not part of an industry and therefore have no collective representa-
tion. Thus the workers’ platform has no legal representation through 
formal channels. Trade unions can mediate conflict, however, as 
seen for example in France. While unions were part of the initial 
protest against Uber, they then participated in mediation that finally 
contributed to establishing a dialogue with the company to protect 
vulnerable drivers. In Germany, IG Metall has signed a voluntary 
agreement with German platforms to provide standard wages and 
working conditions, and German, Austrian and Swedish unions have 
launched an online review platform Fair Crowd Work, which pro-
vides reviews and ratings on working conditions at different online 
labour platforms based on surveys with workers. These examples 
clearly illustrate how the gig economy can provide an opportunity 
to reshape labour relations and modes of action.
Safeguards are needed to accompany the transformation of work 
in order to maximise opportunities for all workers while minimis-
ing risks (see Palier this volume). Collective bargaining, alongside 
labour law and welfare state provisions, is one of the tools to protect 
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against the negative effects of the casualisation of labour. To that 
end, collective bargaining needs to be adapted to the accelerated 
pace of technological change, non-standard forms of employment 
and the gig economy. As work is taking place in many non-stan-
dard locations, and not only inside the boundaries of companies, 
social dialogue cannot be limited to selective groups of standard 
employees. Furthermore, new business models such as platforms 
and the large-scale use of outsourcing have significantly disrupted 
established business models, industries, activities and occupations. 
Yet collective agreements are still based on traditional concepts 
of the firm and the standard worker. The question that needs to be 
addressed is whether it is necessary to rethink how industry-level 
negotiations can cope with new economic realities or whether, on 
the contrary, new activities should be incorporated into existing 
communication channels. Furthermore, is it necessary to go beyond 
the scope of the occupation to negotiate pay and working condi-
tions by tasks, or do we need to reassess the combination of tasks 
and skills that are performed by workers? Obviously there is no 
one-size-fits-all solution. Recent initiatives to regulate labour rela-
tions collectively can be seen as a source of renewing and updating 
existing arrangements, while maintaining the core principles and 
functions of social dialogue – to promote better conditions of work 
and economic growth through consensus-building in the world of 
work.
NOTES
1. ‘Casual entertainment workers’ account for 0.8% of the employees 
covered by the French social security system, 3.4% of the employees 
indemnified by the social security and 5.9% of unemployment benefits.
2. UberPop, a version of Uber that lets people give rides without holding 
a licence, has been suspended in France, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden 
and Hungary. Transport authorities in London have revoked Uber’s licence 
and threatened to ban the service.
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We should go into those [EU] renegotiations with a clear agenda: 
to root out the nonsense of the social chapter – the working time 
directive and the atypical work directive and other job-destroy-
ing regulations.
—Boris Johnson, May 2014
Almost four long years ago, as David Cameron was attempting to 
negotiate concessions that might persuade Britain to stay within the 
EU, Boris Johnson felt free to rail from the backbenches against the 
EU’s provisions that protect working rights. Johnson is now on the 
front bench, and the negotiations are about the terms on which we 
will leave. But the rhetoric has not changed. Just before Christmas 
2017 Boris Johnson was back briefing papers that Britain would 
aim to scrap the directive that has given British workers more paid 
holidays, more paid breaks and safe limits on their working hours 
(Moore 2017).
Scrapping the working time directive is a convenient shorthand 
for a deregulatory agenda in which Britain would compete on an 
ultra-flexible model, with fewer rights for working people, and 
a freer hand for business. Proponents of this approach argue that 
Britain’s economic problems – a vicious cycle of low investment, 
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low productivity and falling wages – stem from a social model, 
imposed by Europe, that is holding back competitiveness.
But as Britain has edged closer to the deregulators’ dream over 
the past few years, with the rise of hyper-flexible contracts, poor 
enforcement of rights, and a seemingly permanent wage freeze, 
the weaknesses of this model have become clear. And there is now 
increasing evidence to suggest that a more successful economy rests 
not on embracing insecurity, but in tackling it.
THE UK IN CONTEXT
Before looking at what lies behind the failings of the British eco-
nomic model, and how these failings might be addressed in a 
post-Brexit world, it is worth placing the UK’s performance in its 
international context.
First, the good news – the UK remains pretty good at delivering 
jobs, with the employment rate at its highest level since 1975. The 
importance of that should not be underestimated, but unfortunately it 
is a small bright spot in an otherwise gloomy landscape. For working 
people, the gloom is most evident in their pay packets. Real wages in 
the UK fell for eight consecutive months last year, and are still well 
below the level they reached before the start of the financial crisis 
of 2008. UK real pay growth in 2018 is expected to be the lowest 
of any country in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD).1
Wage falls are having a real impact on living standards; in recent 
polling for the Trades Union Congress (TUC), one in eight workers 
said they had to skip meals to make ends meet (TUC 2017b). This 
year, household unsecured debt is set to be higher than ever before 
– with TUC analysis of the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) 
figures showing a rise to a record £13,900 per household in 2017 
(TUC 2017c). And while consumer demand has been the mainstay 
of the British economy in recent years, the Bank of England predicts 
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that “consumption growth is projected to remain subdued in the near 
term, reflecting continued slow real income growth and the ongo-
ing adjustment to the past squeeze in real income growth” (Bank of 
England 2017, 10).
The failure of the UK to deliver on the quantity of reward for work 
is reflected in the decline in job quality within many parts of the 
labour market. Key risks associated with work have been increas-
ingly transferred to working people, while any financial rewards 
from flexibility have been accrued by employers.
Too many employers have sought to manage the financial risk 
that comes from the inability to guarantee a constant demand for 
a product or service by employing workers on contracts in forms 
of employment – whether ‘zero hours’, casual or agency work, or 
bogus self-employment – that offer flexibility for the employer at the 
expense of pay and certainty for the employee. And because these 
contracts often come with lower pay and fewer rights and protec-
tions, the risk of being unable to work because of sickness or caring 
responsibilities is also transferred to working people.
These trends are not unique to the UK, but they are exacerbated 
here. Research for the TUC carried out by the National Institute for 
Economic and Social Research found that the UK had the largest 
increase in the number of self-employed workers for any EU country 
from 2008 to 2015, and the third largest increase in the number of 
temporary workers for any EU country over the same period. The 
research also pointed out that temporary workers elsewhere in the 
EU tend to have stronger protections and greater job security than in 
the UK (Hudson and Runge 2017).
It is important to note that the rise of greater job insecurity is not all 
about technology. Online platforms have reduced the transaction costs 
associated with breaking work up into smaller tasks, and contracting 
workers on a piece work basis – as high-profile employment rights 
cases taken by unions, including at Uber, have shown. But we found 
that it is in traditional professions, including hospitality, residential 
care, and education, that insecurity is rising fastest (TUC 2017d).
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And while ‘automation’, ‘the gig economy’ and ‘job insecurity’ 
are often linked together, if we were relying on robots to explain 
the rise of insecurity at work we should expect UK jobs to be more 
secure than our neighbours, not less. As the OECD recently pointed 
out, automation in the UK is lagging; the UK came last in an inter-
national league table of ‘industrial robot density’. France, a country 
with a similar level of industry to the UK, has 80% more robots 
(OECD 2017).
In the deregulators’ version of Britain’s economic woes the rela-
tively lax labour market regulation, and lack of labour market insti-
tutions that help explain our weak wage growth and high level of 
job insecurity, should be helping Britain to out-produce and outgrow 
our European neighbours. But Britain’s productivity problem is well 
known; the amount we produce per hour of work has flatlined for a 
decade. And Britain’s performance is not just bad in historical terms 
but when placed in its international context; output per hour worked 
in the UK in 2016 was 15.1% below the average for the rest of the 
G7 advanced economies.2
This is already feeding through into lower growth. The OECD 
forecast UK GDP growth in 2017 at 1.5% compared with 2.4% in 
the euro area, and in 2018 these figures are expected to be 1.2% 
and 2.1% respectively (OECD 2018). Analysis of the UK’s poor 
performance over the last year has focused on the impact of the vote 
to leave the EU. But many of these trends were in place before the 
referendum. The trend since 2010 was already for weaker growth, 
with average GDP growth averaging 2.0% in the last seven years, 
well below the longer-term average of 2.7%.3 It is hard to look at 
those figures and not think that something is going wrong with the 
UK economy.
REVERSING THE TELESCOPE
In the deregulatory model of the world, it is the hyper-flexible nature 
of Britain’s labour market that needs to be extended, and will power 
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us to a better future outside the EU. But there is increasing evidence 
that it is this very flexibility – and the insecurity that comes with it – 
that helps explain at least part of Britain’s productivity problem, and 
the slow growth and low wages that accompany it.
In one sense the link between insecurity and poor productivity is 
pretty intuitive: people who know when they will be working, that 
their rights will be respected, and that they do not have to show up 
for work when they are ill, are more likely to be able to work effec-
tively and efficiently when at work. But the quantitative evidence 
also suggests that there is a link between insecurity and productivity. 
Research commissioned by the TUC from the Learning and Work 
Institute found a reasonably strong correlation between those sectors 
where there has been a rise in insecure work, and those which had 
lower productivity (Bivand and Melville 2017).
Correlation of course does not necessarily imply causation, but 
the findings chime with a range of other evidence, which shows that 
businesses that demonstrate they value their staff are more produc-
tive. This also links closely to another longstanding British problem 
– the lack of investment in workplace training.
A recent report from the Institute for Public Policy Research 
showed that employer investment in continuing vocational training 
per employee in the UK is half the EU average and investment in 
training and learning per UK employee fell by 13.6% per employee 
in real terms between 2007 and 2015 (IPPR 2017). Government 
spending on adult skills and further education has also been cut 
sharply – a recent analysis by the House of Commons Library iden-
tified a cut of 41% in the adult skills budget between 2010/11 and 
2015/16 (Foster 2017).
The OECD draws a clear link between Britain’s poor skills per-
formance and the level of insecure work, by highlighting the fact 
that in the case of zero hours contracts “there is less incentive for 
training participation by the worker and training provision by the 
employer, given the lower attachment and temporary nature of the 
contract, [and] hindering the productivity of low-skilled workers” 
(Zwart and Baker 2017, 27). Recent TUC research confirmed that 
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far from forming a stepping stone into a better paid job, workers in 
casual employment were almost five times more likely to drop out of 
work altogether as those in permanent jobs (Newsome et al. 2018).
We can see more evidence that the British model’s failure to value 
the workforce may lie at the heart of some of our productivity prob-
lems when considering workplace voice. Here yet again the UK lags 
behind. In a recent poll of 3,000 workers conducted for the TUC, 
over two-fifths of workers said that big changes at their workplaces 
are undertaken without consultation. A fifth said that staff sugges-
tions for how to do things differently were routinely ignored. A 
recent survey of nearly 7,500 workers found that while 87% agreed 
with the statement “I am keen to embrace technology and maximise 
its benefits”, 73% agreed that technology would improve productiv-
ity, and less than 1 in 4 (24%) said that their employer gave them a 
say in how technology effects their work.4 In a league table of work-
force participation across Europe, the UK comes second from last.5
Again, it is intuitive why voice at work might be associated with 
higher productivity. There are numerous instances of suggestions for 
product and process innovation that have come from the workforce; 
for example, a suggestion from a British Airways employee is saving 
the airline £600,000 in fuel (as well as reducing the company’s emis-
sions). The suggestion was to make the planes lighter by descaling the 
toilet pipes; it is easy to see why this suggestion was more likely to 
come from the shop (or in this case plane) floor than the boardroom.
The OECD highlights skills mismatches as a critical problem 
for the UK (see Aubrey this volume), stating that “a misalignment 
between the skills that workers possess and those that are used in their 
work can constrain innovation, limit the adoption of new technologies 
and ultimately restrict productivity improvements” (Zwart and Baker 
2017, 20). If no one asks the workforce about how their skills are 
being used, it is hard to identify where these mismatches can exist.
And at an economy-wide level, we know that collective voice 
is critical in maintaining workers’ ability to convert productivity 
improvements into wage growth, and to protect their wages and con-
ditions at times of industrial or technological change. As evidence 
 229BRITISH WORKER’S RIGHTS AFTER BREXIT
from the International Monetary Fund to the International Labour 
Organization shows, countries with higher levels of collective bar-
gaining coverage have had higher levels of wage growth (IMF 2017) 
and lower levels of wage inequality (Hayter 2015).
POST-BREXIT INSECURITY?
What does this mean for the UK’s economic model when we finally 
leave the EU? For a start, it suggests that a race to the bottom in 
workers’ rights is unlikely to deliver the results – higher growth and 
productivity – that its advocates profess to want. That is one of the 
reasons why the TUC has consistently advocated staying inside the 
single market as the best way to protect workers’ rights, as well as 
to protect the many jobs of our members that are linked to ‘friction-
less trade’ with the EU. While we know that the single market and 
customs union are not perfect, the TUC’s analysis (2017f) clearly 
shows that they are far better for workers’ jobs and rights than any 
other trade models that exist.
Getting the right Brexit deal is vital for securing workers’ rights 
and jobs. But delivering a more productive economy, with greater 
security and pay for working people, involves looking at where the 
UK model is going wrong now. It may come as no surprise that the 
TUC believes that starts with ensuring that working people have 
more of a say in the decisions that affect their lives. Unions have 
been critical to stemming the tide of insecure work in the UK, fight-
ing for the rights of workers from Sports Direct to Pimlico Plumbers. 
And recent research from Norway seems to support the intuition that 
union membership – and the greater job security that comes with 
it – can raise productivity. Looking at a sample of Norwegian firms 
between 2001 and 2012, this research found that increases in union 
density led to substantial increases in firm level productivity, as well 
as in wages (Barth, Bryson and Dale-Olson 2017).
Achieving similar increases in union density in the UK requires 
unions to innovate, reaching out to more young workers, particularly 
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in the private sector. Turning round the decline in union member-
ship in recent years is a significant challenge. But legislation could 
help too – in particular, by giving unions access to workplaces to 
tell people about the benefits of joining a trade union. And it is 
welcome that there’s an increasing debate starting – at international 
and national level – about how to extend the benefits of collective 
bargaining more widely, with the recognition that workers’ collec-
tive power provides a bulwark against increasing inequality.
The importance of worker voice in raising productivity, encour-
aging workplaces to develop the skills of their staff, and ensuring 
that working people get a fair share of the rewards from business, 
is likely to increase as we face the challenges that are posed by 
changes in technology. The questions asked by those encountering 
new forms of work and employment are often ones of distribution, 
including the distribution of risk when platform companies seek to 
fragment the employment relationship, the distribution of rewards 
when increasingly large technological monopolies are able to mop 
up consumer markets, and the distribution of work itself if robots are 
able to fulfil more of the tasks that employers are currently willing 
to pay workers to undertake. Ensuring that that distribution is fair 
requires workers to have a source of collective power and represen-
tation – exactly what unions aim to provide.
That does not mean that we do not need government action as 
well. The TUC’s Great Jobs Agenda sets out the legal changes we 
need to provide a higher floor for employment rights in the UK, 
including new rights for workers not currently considered to be 
‘employees’, and new rules to ensure that employers who need to 
offer variable shifts are required to give their workers fair notice, or 
face a penalty if they fail to do so. Even the most fervent advocates 
of flexibility cannot think that it is right that over half of workers 
on zero hours contracts say that they have had their shifts cancelled 
with just 24 hours’ notice (TUC 2017e).
And we know that the long period of spending restraint in the UK 
has restrained growth. Philip Hammond’s autumn 2017 budget got 
the rhetoric right when he stated that the “key to raising the wages of 
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British workers is raising investment – public and private” (Financial 
Times 2017). But his plans were disappointing. The average spend 
across the OECD on investment is 3.5% of GDP. The budget 
announced an extra £7bn spread across the life of this parliament. But 
that gets us to just 2.9% of GDP (in 2020 and 2021) – just a notch 
up from the 2.6% in 2016 (going back down to 2.8% in 2022). It 
may come as no surprise that the OBR described the boost to growth 
provided in this as ‘modest’, and it is clear that a more ambitious 
strategy – aiming for the OECD average of 3.5%, at least – is needed.
At present, the UK’s economic model is failing to deliver on what 
most people want – for people to be able to hold on to a decent job, 
with wages that you can expect to increase at least in line with the 
cost of living, and to receive fair treatment from your boss. The chal-
lenges of Brexit and changing technology provide a chance to think 
again about how those expectations can be met. But while providing 
collective voice may be an old response it is not an outdated one. In 
the TUC’s 150th year, we will be working hard to prove that trade 
unions have as much to offer workers in the 21st century as they did 
those in the 19th.
NOTES
1. See TUC analysis of OECD data (TUC 2017a).
2. See the Office for National Statistics (ONS) statistical bulletins on 
international comparisons of UK productivity (ONS 2017).
3. This average is taken from 1956, when the ONS series of quarterly 
figures begins.
4. See the Smith Institute report on employees’ perspectives on produc-
tivity jointly commissioned by Prospect; the Union of Shop, Distributive 
and Allied Workers (USDAW); the Broadcasting, Entertainment, Com-
munications and Theatre Union (BECTU); Community; the Association of 
Teachers and Lecturers; the First Division Association, formerly Associa-
tion of First Division Civil Servants (FDA); and the Society of Radiogra-
phers (Smith Institute 2016).
5. See the UK’s position in the European Trade Union Institute’s Euro-
pean Participation Index (Vitols 2010).
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As governments try to work out how best to respond to the pend-
ing technological revolution, countries with adaptive and localised 
technical skills systems are more likely to be able to capitalise on 
the opportunities ahead. For the UK, this poses a number of chal-
lenges as its underdeveloped technical skills system has been one 
of the reasons behind the persistent productivity lag since the early 
20th century.
Analysis by the Centre for Progressive Capitalism across the UK 
indicates that the technical skills system is already failing to meet 
current demand from employers: hundreds of thousands of well-
paid technical roles are proving extremely difficult to fill because 
of the lack of appropriate technical qualifications. This inability 
to meet current demand indicates that the UK is not well placed 
to adapt to future demand as a result of the pending technological 
revolution.
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HEADLINES VS REALITY
The technological improvements that machines have helped intro-
duce have been central to the long-term rise in living standards, as 
evidenced by the near doubling of average life expectancy since the 
late 19th century in advanced economies. Improvements in produc-
tivity as a result of digitisation and machine learning are expected 
to continue to bring down the cost of manufactured goods. But they 
could also result in falling costs for legal and financial services as 
basic data processing functions become automated and outsourced. 
Such productivity improvements could provide huge benefits to 
society as legal and financial products become affordable to many 
people for the first time.
But these improvements will disrupt the workplace, leading to 
concerns about the future of jobs. Predictions that the machines are 
coming for everyone’s job are as old as the development of technol-
ogy itself. The Abbot Johannes Trithemius wrote a tract in praise of 
scribes highlighting concern that the printing press would put monks 
out of the business of writing books. Such stark warnings make great 
headlines, but often the reality is less dramatic.
Despite the concerns raised by Trithemius on the future of scribes, 
the scribal industry continued to prosper for decades, which was 
long enough for the existing scribes to make a living while enabling 
young apprentices to learn a new trade. Some scribes also made a 
successful transition to become printers, while others found new 
jobs as type designers.
According to the consultancy McKinsey & Co, in the next phase 
of expected technological development less than 5% of all jobs are 
likely to become redundant as a result of new technology over the 
next few decades (Manyika et al. 2017). Some functions will be 
automated in most jobs, though, with around a half of the activities 
currently performed by people being automated. More than 60% of 
the tasks involved in data collection, data processing and predictable 
physical work are expected to be automated.
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So how should governments respond to the potential upheaval in 
the workplace arising from increased automation, digitalisation and 
artificial intelligence?
Central to such a response should be ensuring that a technical 
skills system can adapt to changing technology and the associated 
technical skills. There will be a challenge to ensure that workers 
whose time is freed up from undertaking repetitive processes will 
have the skill sets to provide greater value added. It is critical that 
young people entering the workforce are provided with training 
that continues to have value in the work place. And an appropriate 
retraining system will be needed for the few who will lose their jobs 
outright to enable them to return to the workplace with more up to 
date and relevant technical skills. Hence, getting the skills system 
right and ensuring it can adapt to changing technology is the founda-
tion of future productivity growth.
For countries such as Austria and Germany, which have strong 
and local technical skills institutions with employer engagement, 
this is likely to be somewhat easier than for countries like the UK, 
which has a more centralised and weaker technical skills systems 
and is likely to face significant challenges as a result.
TECHNICAL SKILLS AND PRODUCTIVITY
Productivity can be thought to grow as a result of two distinct forces: 
capital deepening and total factor productivity (TFP). Capital deep-
ening occurs when the flow of physical capital services rises faster 
than hours. TFP is the residual which reflects technical change, 
improvements in the delivery of services, the organisation of pro-
duction, and the rise in skill levels.
The general approach to growth accounting from Robert Solow’s 
pioneering work is that labour augmenting technological progress 
leads to capital deepening because it enhances the marginal produc-
tivity of capital. This implies that rises in TFP are largely responsible 
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for rises in capital deepening. Some recent estimates suggest that 
TFP growth explains three-quarters of all capital intensity (Madsen 
2010), so a more technically sophisticated workforce applies innova-
tions to their production processes, thus driving new capital invest-
ment and increased output per employee (see Soete in this volume).
Long-run data analyses suggest that the UK has floundered on 
both TFP and capital deepening (Broadberry and O’Mahony 2004). 
As capital deepening and TFP are both partly related to the capabil-
ity of a firm’s workforce, understanding the technical skills base of 
the UK economy may shed some light on this.
During the postwar period Britain suffered from its inability to 
implement a technical skills system. Too few students attained an 
upper secondary level of education and pupils had a lower average 
length of time in school than those in other countries (De la Fuente 
and Doménech 2012; Hansen and Vignoles 2005). In addition, the 
UK has a lower level of ongoing training conducted in the work-
place than other economies.
Although Britain has finally caught up in the years of schooling 
it provides, the level of upper secondary attainment1 – a reasonable 
proxy of a technical skills base – still remains low compared with 
other countries. Even today this issue can be seen in the OECD data 
education attainment figures (Figure 17.1).
In recent years, British governments have begun to realise the 
scale of the issue. For example, Alison Wolf, author of the Wolf 
Report commissioned by the government, stated that “as a society 
we are failing at least 350,000 of our 16- to 18-year-olds, year on 
year” (Wolf 2011, 52). A society and a skills system that is failing 
for so many will struggle to deal with the threats and opportunities 
brought on by the pending technological revolution.
UKCES 2015 EMPLOYER SKILLS SURVEY
According to the UKCES 2015 Employer Skills Survey, 32% of 
all vacancies for jobs requiring core technical skills were difficult 
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to fill because the employer could not find applicants with the 
appropriate skills, qualifications or experience (UKCES 2016). 
This is significantly more than for other types of vacancies. Core 
technical skills are defined as those skills needed to perform 
roles that typically require a minimum of level 3 qualifications 
from a further education college linked to a specific technical 
profession.
The Centre for Progressive Capitalism estimates that in 2016 there 
were around 320,000 core technical job vacancies in the UK that 
were difficult to fill because of skills shortages, including in firms 
having access to the pan-European labour market. Crucially, those 
in these roles are well paid with salaries of £35,300 – more than two 
and a half times the living wage of £13,100.
Tackling this shortfall for technical skills will not only bring 
significant benefits for productivity, but it is also crucial for rais-
ing living standards. The centre estimates that if the UK addressed 
these shortages, workers would get an aggregate wage increase of 
over £7bn. Furthermore, it would start to reduce the large numbers 
of people on the living wage, which is estimated to be around 2.3 
million employees.
Figure 17.1 Percentage share of attainment of upper secondary education in 
seven EU countries and the US, 2016. Source: OECD (2018).
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Given the expectation that the freedom of movement of labour 
into the UK from the EU will be curtailed as a result of Brexit, 
resolving this issue should be an even higher priority. In particular, 
plugging the gap for technical skills would particularly help manu-
facturers and the construction sector, which are most affected by the 
lack of technical skills.
CHALLENGES WITH TECHNICAL EDUCATION
The key challenge with the UK skills system is to stabilise the con-
stant flux it has suffered from over decades. This has led to a system 
with more than 21,000 qualifications, many of which have limited 
value for employers. Only 17% are at level 3 – equivalent to A level 
– and above.2
Moreover, there has been a lack of consistency of institutional 
development at the local level between firms, colleges and local gov-
ernment to facilitate adaptive processes. Such institutions have gone 
through constant upheaval compared with other countries, which have 
maintained some level of stability through time. This has been set 
against a culture of over-centralisation with many, if not most, deci-
sions related to local economic development taken at the centre rather 
than in the regions. In addition, too few students are taking courses that 
lead to well-paid, technical roles, and in some cases too many students 
are taking courses leading to less well-paid, self-employed roles.3
The positive news is that there is now a consensus in the UK 
across both major political parties that there needs to be a greater 
focus on technical education. The government is introducing a 
streamlined set of 15 technical routes, which aims to strengthen the 
quality of qualifications and link courses to potential careers.
The immediate challenge for these nascent local institutions is 
that there remain significant technical skills shortages right across 
the economy. Not only are these shortages constraining the ability 
of British businesses to expand and increase productivity, but they 
are also leaving too many people on low wages.
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SUPPORTING LOCAL ECONOMIES TO 
RESOLVE SKILLS MISMATCH
In order to support local economies to resolve this skills mismatch, 
the Centre for Progressive Capitalism has developed a skills map-
ping system to provide local economies with a detailed mismatch 
of the supply and demand for technical skills. This analysis has 
already highlighted some major issues that will need to be resolved 
if local economies are to be able to capitalise on current and future 
opportunities. Figure 17.2 shows the core technical job vacancies 
that employers struggle to fill by sector.
The centre has also undertaken a number of detailed regional anal-
yses, which have highlighted some specific mismatches. One area in 
the Midlands faces an annual undersupply of close to 1,000 electri-
cians. Conversely there remains an oversupply of fitness instructors 
of more than 1,200. Another fast-growing technology region had 
a potential undersupply of nearly 1,500 non-graduate digital roles, 
preventing firms from expanding. And one local economy, which 
Figure 17.2 The percentage share of UK core technical job vacancies difficult 
to fill because of skills shortages, 2016. Source: Centre for Progressive Capitalism 
estimates based on analysis of UKCES Employer Skills Survey 2015 data (Norman 
2017).
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still has a manufacturing base, had a shortfall of over 3,000 techni-
cal engineering and manufacturing roles. Again, there remains an 
oversupply of courses in areas such as sports and fitness instructors 
as well as beauticians.
One major challenge with the current skills system is that there 
is insufficient information for school leavers to understand whether 
demand is increasing or decreasing for certain occupations to help 
them make an informed career decision. This information and coor-
dination failure too often results in school leavers opting for courses 
that do not lead to well-paid jobs or a viable career.
Central government needs to devolve skills policy and support 
the development of local institutions to ascertain the local mismatch 
between supply and demand for individual technical skills. This 
information needs to become central to the local careers advisory 
service to make clear to students where the opportunities are in the 
local economy. In addition, each devolved area needs to be able to 
measure how well it is doing to resolve these shortfalls through time.
GREATER CO-OPERATION ACROSS 
THE KEY STAKEHOLDERS
The UK government appears to understand that this will require 
greater cooperation across the key stakeholders, hence the announce-
ment of its intention to work closely with the Confederation of 
British Industry and the Trades Union Congress is to be welcomed. 
But for this to truly work, it needs to be implemented at the local 
level, and for a highly centralised country like the UK, this remains 
a significant challenge.
Although devolution is now making greater cooperation a real 
possibility, particularly with the development of metro mayors and 
combined authorities, many parts of the country still have not devel-
oped robust local structures that are coterminous with a functional 
economic area.
The British government needs to ensure that local enterprise 
partnerships working jointly with local authorities and colleges 
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have sufficient resources to analyse and measure technical skills 
mismatches. The government in its industrial strategy white paper 
announced its intention to introduce skills advisory panels to pro-
duce rigorous analysis of the current and future supply and demand 
for skills (HM Government 2017). These panels will be rolled out 
and integrated into mayoral combined authorities and local enter-
prise partnerships to inform the analysis that feeds into local indus-
trial strategies.
As long as these panels are sufficiently funded and are able to provide 
a continuous update of potential skills shortages this will be a major 
step forward, particularly if this information really is able to have a 
meaningful influence over the provision of local education and training.
As devolution proceeds, central government must take care not to 
overburden these new institutions. For example, further education 
colleges have to not only provide a world-class technical education 
but also pick up the pieces for students who were unable to get a 
basic education at school. This dual purpose is likely to remain a 
major hindrance if the objective is to create a world-class, adaptable 
technical education system.
POLICY FOCUS AND ADAPTABILITY
Trying to forecast the technical skills of the future is mostly unhelp-
ful. Technology changes in unpredictable ways. Furthermore, even 
if the technology develops as expected, businesses may decide 
not to use it if it is still cheaper to use labour. Hence the policy 
focus needs to be on adaptability and responsiveness to changing 
employer demand, rather than on second guessing what employers 
might want.
As firms begin to introduce new technology it will become clearer 
to companies what kind of skills they will have a greater need for. 
This information needs to be provided to colleges to help them with 
course design. Furthermore, local government needs to ensure it is 
investing in courses to build on these technological shifts and con-
tinually assess the capacity of existing courses. This in turn is likely 
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to require more investment, as technical courses tend to be more 
expensive to run. Crucially, the growth in these new opportunities 
needs to be clearly signposted to students.
The UK government needs to prioritise supporting the develop-
ment of robust and mature local skills systems across the country 
over the course of this parliament. If this is achieved, then not only 
will the economy be far more productive following an improvement 
in the technical skills mismatch, but it will be better able to support 
those already in the workforce looking to upskill, and those whose 
jobs may be displaced.
As the UK embarks on leaving the EU, the pressure to get this 
right is critical given the increasingly subdued economic outlook, 
and the curtailment of the freedom of movement of labour. The 
key to success is in adaptation. Local economies that have built up 
robust, mature skills ecosystems will be in a far better position to 
adapt and respond to the opportunities that technological change 
brings. This is critical if a society is to provide individuals with good 
jobs and fulfilling careers.
NOTES
1. Upper secondary education typically follows completion of lower 
secondary schooling.
2. See Lord Sainsbury’s Post-16 Skills Plan and independent report on 
technical education (Department for Education and Department for Busi-
ness, Innovation and Skills 2016).
3. Results of Centre for Progressive Capitalism private reports are 
summarised in various skills articles at http://progressive-capitalism.net/
category/skills/.
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When looking at the economic changes and technological revolu-
tion under way throughout much of Europe, many debates focus 
on the fragmentation of the labour force and the ‘Uberisation’ of 
employment: traditional forms of employment giving way to forms 
of working where there are armies of independent workers who 
are detached from any work contract and often paid on the basis of 
tasks performed. For many, this has marked the demise of traditional 
labour relations and stable work contracts. Our economies and soci-
eties are confronted with a long-term dualisation trajectory, which is 
being exacerbated by the processes of digitalisation. Not all forms of 
employment will be subject to ‘Uberisation’, but this process is part 
of the movement towards dualisation, which is forcing apart labour 
market insiders and outsiders in an ongoing process that amplifies 
trends that have been detectable since the 1980s.
To address the challenges posed by increased dualisation and a 
more fragmented labour market, policymakers and researchers need 
to identify the nature of these trends, and consider whether they 
create new social needs and at-risk groups. One can identify new 
economic cleavages between the winners in the knowledge economy 
THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL RISKS 
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(the productive and ‘creative’ types) and the losers, whose purpose 
is increasingly to provide low-paid services to the winners.
These challenges emphasise the need to build a new social con-
tract between these two groups. Winners need to understand the 
need to protect losers by sharing the profits that are generated by 
both groups. Such a social contract requires renewed forms of social 
protection that must be embedded in the different types of welfare 
state regimes that prevail in Europe.
NEW RISKS?
Social insurance systems in the 20th century were designed to 
address the needs of people working, for the most part, in a mass 
industrialised economy that was responsible for generating millions 
of permanent jobs in Europe after the second world war, until the 
mid-1970s. In the 21st century, employment is becoming less rou-
tine, less stable and for many less well paid, in part because of the 
process of digitalisation that is under way.
On the employers’ side, digital platforms do not act like tradi-
tional employers, and do not bear any collective responsibility for 
the protection of employees, as they had done in the 20st century. 
However, the erosion of this erstwhile responsibility of employers 
towards their employees is not due to, nor specific to, ‘platform 
capitalism’. Employers are increasingly relying on atypical jobs, 
and governments tend to favour the development of atypical jobs in 
order to fight unemployment (Palier and Thelen 2010), for example 
by promoting zero-hour contracts.
In most Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries since the early 1970s average unemployment lev-
els have increased by 5–10 percentage points, stabilising at 5–15% 
since the 1980s. The share of atypical employment (part-time and 
fixed-term combined) in the overall OECD workforce has grown 
to around 10%, and in some countries to as high as 25–35%, of all 
employment today (Emmenegger et al. 2012).
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Contemporary labour markets are characterised by an increase 
in precarious employment; this is particularly evident in what 
has happened to the youth labour market in the decade following 
the economic crisis of 2008. This increase in precariousness is 
particularly important in the platform economy. Stable long-term 
employment with a single employer is no longer the norm for many 
workers, and unemployment or underemployment is far from being 
a rare or exceptional situation for workers. The ‘norm’ on these 
platforms is a form of ‘pseudo-independence’ (‘dependent self-
employed’), where freelancers and ‘auto-entrepreneurs’ are paid 
by performing a series of fragmented tasks at different stages of 
their working life.
These labour market trends are not specific to the platform 
economy, nor anything new. There have always been indepen-
dent workers and self-employed people. Specific social protection 
schemes have been developed over centuries for such social groups, 
for example in the agricultural sector, and among shopkeepers, 
architects and notaries. In labour markets, outsiders such as low-
paid workers, part-timers, temporary workers or the unemployed 
are traditionally badly covered by existing social protection schemes 
even if they are not based in the platform economy. However, 
since the 1990s, in some countries (eg the Nordic countries and the 
Netherlands) a number of measures have given women and part-
time workers basic social-security coverage, rather than excluding 
them as was often the case in the past. However, young workers, 
especially in southern Europe, have often been excluded from social 
protection and entitlements, or – especially in recent years – the age 
thresholds for qualifying for such protection have increased.
Workers in four types of atypical employment situations are 
poorly covered by traditional social insurance systems:
• women, who in general are more likely to be in part-time employ-
ment, have staggered hours and earn lower wages than men
• ‘precarious’, often unskilled, workers who move between very 
short-term contracts
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• independent workers, sometimes with erratic incomes, often con-
sidered micro-entrepreneurs
• those living partly on ‘supplementary’ income by performing 
micro-tasks, on-demand services or offering services through 
Airbnb or other platforms.
Many of these workers are far more insecure than people with 
open-ended contracts and access to full social insurance. There is an 
increasing dualism between individuals who have comprehensive 
social protection coverage, and those who rely on modest (largely 
means-tested) public provision, merely designed to tackle poverty, 
if any.
Some societal groups are overrepresented as outsiders in all coun-
tries studied, including Belgium, France and Germany: women, 
young people, the low-skilled, immigrants and second generation 
migrant workers, in particular if they are employed in the services 
sector. These groups have higher unemployment rates than average, 
are more likely to be in atypical employment, and more likely to be 
poor and to suffer from the insufficient social rights outlined above 
(Emmenegger et al. 2012).
Automation and digitalisation are expected to disrupt the organ-
isation of employment. This is likely to aggravate some problems 
and inequalities that already exist, which leaves many workers 
worse off than before. Some traditional social policy challenges 
will persist, such as healthcare, pension provision and care for the 
elderly, but at a new level. Other challenges will also emerge. For 
example, housing in many big cities is becoming increasingly unaf-
fordable for large proportions of the population. Paradoxically, dig-
italisation is also associated with some large platform companies 
such as Airbnb putting major pressure on the limited housing stock 
in some major cities.1 Such platforms can also increase pressure 
on the availability of long-term affordable housing, as landlords 
prefer to rent property as short-term lets. The extent of this trend 
has resulted in attempts to regulate and ban some of these develop-
ments (Oltermann 2016). The greatest challenge, however, will be 
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to deal with the consequences of increasing intermittent forms of 
employment.2
NEW POLITICAL CONFLICTS AND CLEAVAGES
Structurally, the transformation of the labour market is creating new 
social and economic divides that may in turn give rise to new politi-
cal cleavages. It is well established by many labour market econo-
mists that during the 1990s and 2000s there was a polarisation of 
employment in western labour markets (Autor and Dorn 2013; Goos 
and Manning 2007). Goos and Manning (2007), among others, argue 
that this has been due to technological changes rather than to glo-
balisation. Job polarisation correlates with technological progress.
What is striking about these changes is the number of middle-
class, especially lower-middle-class, jobs that have been disappear-
ing. This is because routinised tasks can be replaced by machines. 
Those most targeted by this transformation are therefore not merely 
those in the least qualified jobs (already having low pay, and weak 
levels of social protection), but those having mid-skilled, middle-
class jobs as well.
This trend is likely to have profound social and political conse-
quences, as our democracies and welfare states are made for and rely 
on the middle class. First, these trends undermine the fiscal basis of 
the traditional welfare state (since most of its contributors and ben-
eficiaries belong to the middle class). Second, this polarisation of 
jobs is constructing a new form of class divide, and the emergence of 
a widening gap between winners and losers in the knowledge-based 
economy.
The widening gap in incomes and job quality is evident with 
knowledge-based jobs, and interpersonal services that are on the rise 
in the digitalised, knowledge-based economy.
Literature on labour market polarisation identifies an increase of 
badly paid, so-called ‘unskilled’ or ‘non-productive’ jobs. These 
are interpersonal, face-to-face jobs whose development is partly 
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linked to intermediation platforms, in fields such as logistics (eg 
Amazon, Deliveroo), transportation (eg Uber), restaurant, hotels (eg 
Booking.com, TripAdvisor), home helpers and personal services 
(eg Yoopala, TaskRabbit). These jobs are associated with low pay, 
bogus self-employment, short-term contracts, part-time work and 
low levels of social protection (Peugny 2016).
The economic literature on the polarisation of the labour market 
does not question the fact that they are bad jobs because they are 
regarded as low-productivity jobs occupied by low-skilled people. 
The only indicator of the low productivity of jobs is the fact that they 
are low paid, which – according to orthodox neoclassical economic 
theory – reflects the fact that the productivity is low. However, it 
might be that more and more people have to compete for these low-
paid interpersonal services jobs as a consequence of the displace-
ment of mid-skilled employment.
Against the backdrop of a polarised labour market a new form of 
social polarisation is forming, with the emergence on the one hand 
of an internationalised ‘creative class’, with global connections, 
living in the heart of global urban centres (Andreotti, le Galès and 
Fuentes 2015), and on the hand a class of people at their service 
(Morel 2015) – to take care of their children, to care for them, to 
serve them in restaurants, to transport them (by taxi or Uber), to 
build or renovate their homes, to educate their children, and to pro-
vide healthcare to them and elderly relatives.
This becomes clear by taking into account professions where 
employees are paid less than 1.5 times the French minimum wage 
that developed over the 1990s and 2000s in France, according to 
Catherine, Landier and Thesmar (2015, Table 8). Many of these jobs 
are in the services sector. They are more frequently held by women, 
and include maternal assistants, family workers, nurses, self-service 
workers, nursing aides, restaurant staff and domestic workers.
Along with the polarisation of the labour market another new 
social cleavage is taking shape between so-called ‘productive’ 
people with very high wages and ‘non-productive’ people whose 
jobs are concentrated in the services sector. This brings with it new 
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forms of social domination in the knowledge economy. This rela-
tionship of domination depends not so much on owning the means 
of production but rather on possessing human capital, knowledge 
and creativity.
This cleavage partly overlaps with a gender divide, insofar as 
many low-paid services jobs are mainly occupied by women. 
Feminist studies have shown that the specific competences asso-
ciated with these jobs were traditionally regarded as ‘inferior’ or 
‘feminine’ skills (Howcroft and Rubery this volume). This phe-
nomenon of social polarisation stemming from these changes in the 
labour market and in gender relations is further reinforced by the 
increasing phenomenon of homogamy, where people from the same 
educational and social milieu are increasingly likely to be in contact 
to work together and to marry each other. As a result there has been 
a concomitant polarisation of household types between the work-
poor, where no member of the household works, and the work-rich, 
where at least two members are employed, alongside a decline in the 
traditional breadwinner model (Esping-Andersen 2009).
CONCLUSION: A NEW CLASS ALLIANCE 
FOR RENEWED SOCIAL PROTECTION?
If one wants to renew social protection for the fourth industrial 
revolution one needs first to overcome the new cleavage that has 
emerged between those working in highly paid sectors, and those 
working in low-paid services. This cleavage is growing with a dis-
proportionate increase in resources and security concentrated on one 
side of modern society, and a growth of low-paid, precariousness 
and new social risks concentrated on the other.
Instead of trying to take advantage of the increasing gaps, the win-
ners could perhaps realise that there is a need to share out the ben-
efits of the knowledge-based economy better, and to expand social 
protection to precarious workers. Improving social conditions today 
is not necessarily about increasing the level of existing protection 
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for typical jobs (and thus reversing the trend towards retrenchment), 
but about including and protecting better those people working in 
so-called ‘atypical’ employment, as this form of employment has 
become more and more common in the lower-paid sectors. For 
instance, one should provide improved social protection for part-
time and temporary workers, and promote equal pay (as women are 
more frequently in low-paid, part-time and short-term employment 
than men). Imposing equal pay rules would improve the fate of these 
outsiders (Rubery and Grimshaw 2014).
These new social situations might be covered by existing and 
adjusted codes, statuses, reformed assistance benefits and existing 
and improved social protection schemes. Three main families of 
solutions are currently contemplated to face these challenges, which 
may correspond to the three types of welfare regimes: 
• implement a universal unconditional basic income
• improve existing social protection schemes for independent 
workers
• introduce the flexicurity model, which guarantees high levels of 
minimum income and universal rights to social services and pub-
licly financed training to all.
A UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME: A 
GENUINELY LIBERAL SOLUTION
In the US and Europe there is a renewed debate on the development 
of a universal basic income. From Milton Friedman to Philip Van 
Parijs, there has long been a great variety of reasons put forward to 
justify introducing an unconditional basic income: to fight poverty, 
to simplify social protection systems by providing a single benefit 
for all, to increase access to social benefits, to remove unnecessary 
bureaucratic elements of the welfare state, to fight non take-up of 
benefits due to complex procedure and stigmatisation, and to guar-
antee freedom to choose to work or not.
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The rise of the platform economy and the ensuing precariousness 
of work with intermittent income provides another source of argu-
ment. More and more luminaries from the digital economy (such 
as Elon Musk) argue in favour of implementing a universal basic 
income. As yet there has been no systematic enquiry into how the 
promotion of a basic income scheme can be linked with the emer-
gence and development of the platform economy, but one source 
of development of this debate is the ‘digital’ community. See for 
instance My Basic Income (www.mybasicincome.org).
Recently, there have been various experiments in introducing a 
basic income (in Finland and the Netherlands, for instance). When 
hearing the arguments put forward in favour of these experiments 
one is struck by the fact that ‘liberal’ arguments (in the European 
sense – those of Milton Friedman) largely predominate. Financial 
constraints, and the desire to replace existing social benefits (and 
their associated bureaucracies), have led to the proposal that a rela-
tively low basic income should be handed out to everyone, financed 
mostly through income tax. Hence, an expansion of a simple negative 
income tax credit is the most widely discussed proposal. Since this 
has already been developed in many countries, especially the US and 
the UK, one does not see how it could change the current problems 
of poverty and precariousness that are developing in these countries.
IMPROVING THE SITUATION OF INDEPENDENT 
WORKERS: A BISMARCKIAN SOLUTION
The growth of independent work with new forms of self-employ-
ment and dependent contractor status presents a challenge in many 
jurisdictions with regard to how this employment relationship is 
governed and what forms of social protection accrue to this sta-
tus.3 The main concern is to improve the access and level of social 
protection for these ‘independent’ workers. Countries usually base 
independent workers’ social protection on a mix of universal rights 
(such as access to basic healthcare or a minimum income) and 
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professional protection to be associated with specific schemes and 
social contributions. The challenge for governments and policymak-
ers is to provide a specific scheme with relatively low protection 
(proportional to the contribution capacity of the new independent 
workers, which is usually relatively low). Notably, this new scheme 
would not protect against the risks associated with intermittence – 
successive periods of activity and inactivity.
DEVELOP AND FINANCE SOCIAL 
RIGHTS AND SOCIAL SERVICES FOR 
ALL: THE FLEXICURITY MODEL
Flexicurity is a popular model for social policy in the Nordic coun-
tries (particularly in Denmark) and the Netherlands. Flexicurity is the 
separation of the provision of benefits from work. If the government 
can guarantee citizens’ access to healthcare, housing, education and 
training, and a universal basic income without regard to employ-
ment status, those citizens will be protected, even though they are 
not necessarily typically salaried workers. This should allow the 
government to deregulate labour markets, leaving decisions about 
hiring and firing employees to firms and employers in accordance 
with economic logic. In this way, government social policy does not 
just compensate for occasional market failures, but works alongside 
markets to help sustain a flexible, well-trained, highly productive 
workforce. Such a framework provides good protection for working 
people whatever their status.4 The challenge is to guarantee there 
are sufficient resources to finance these policies, to ensure that new 
independent workers and platforms pay their taxes.
Further research is needed to understand the content and politics 
of such diverse proposals, and their differing capacity to address the 
main challenges that have been created by the digital revolution in 
the realm of work. One can however already observe that amid the 
various proposals encountered in all countries, these three types of 
solutions to the challenges created by the digital revolution echo the 
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existing three types of welfare regimes – the liberal, conservative 
and social democratic variants (Esping-Andersen 1990). The provi-
sion of a (low) universal basic income could be the 21st century 
form of a liberal welfare regime. The improved social insurance for 
independent workers aimed at including the workers of the platform 
economy is closely connected to the conservative corporatist type of 
welfare regime. Guaranteeing universal access to childcare, educa-
tion, training and social services to all, including atypical workers, is 
typical of the social democratic way of providing welfare.
NOTES
1. There is a paradox that although the digital economy should enable 
people to work from anywhere, there is ever more aggregation of resources 
and people in ‘global cities’ (see Moretti 2013).
2. For a detailed analyses of these trends see OECD Employment Out-
look and yearly European Commission: Employment, Social Affairs and 
Inclusion review (especially 2016 and 2017).
3. For France see a very detailed report on these issues by Haut Conseil 
du financement de la protection sociale (2016).
4. Analyses of quality of jobs or income inequalities continue to place 
the Nordic countries in the group of best performing countries, even in the 
category of ‘polarisation’ of work (Peugny 2016).
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In setting out how the organisation of work might evolve by 2030, 
this chapter outlines four potential scenarios. The aim of these four 
scenarios is not to predict trends, but rather through extrapolating 
from existing organisational paradigms to identify some of the 
key challenges for policymakers arising from the future of work 
(Benhamou 2017).
Drawing on a significant body of management and employment 
research we distinguish between two traditional models capturing 
the organisation of work, referred to as ‘Taylorian’ and ‘simple’, 
and two modern models, which emerged during the mid-1980s, 
referred to as ‘learning’ and ‘lean’ organisations (Valeyre et al. 
2009). Each one has a different set of impacts on the quality of jobs, 
work contracts, working conditions, management, income levels and 
the capability of firms to maintain a good rank in the global market 
(European Commission 2015).
Traditional organisations referred to as Taylorian and simple 
have in common a very limited degree of worker autonomy. Jobs 
involve repetitive and highly fragmented tasks, there is a low level 
of learning on the job and strong, hierarchical supervision. The work 
process is less formalised in the simple model.
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In more modern learning organisations workers are often multi-
tasking and autonomous, and can influence the decisionmaking pro-
cess of the firm. They receive regular training within and outside the 
firm and use technology to improve work processes. This model is 
very well developed in Scandinavian countries and is progressing in 
Germany and Austria. Learning organisations seem to offer more job 
stability and better quality employment (permanent contracts, higher 
skills development, better work conditions and better relationships 
with hierarchy) than other organisations. They also have a high level 
of performance in innovation and productivity due to highly partici-
pative management practices (Lorenz and Valeyre 2006).
In lean production, workers are more controlled by machines 
or customer needs than in learning organisations. This ‘controlled 
autonomy’ is due to a stronger process of work standardisation 
and high norms of quality imposed by the firms or expected by the 
clients. Lean production is also characterised by a high diffusion 
of high performance working practices (just-in-time, zero waste, 
deadline compliance and quality circles) oriented mainly towards 
high quality of products and high rationalisation of production 
costs. The Japanese carmaker Toyota is seen as a pioneer in intro-
ducing this mode of organisation, which also ‘revolutionized’ the 
automotive industry (Womack and al. 1991). Lean production can 
lead to significant productivity gains by optimising the production 
process. However, these gains are often obtained at the expense of 
deteriorating working conditions, for example stress caused by work 
intensification. The main differences between lean production and 
learning models are the learning dynamic at work and the degree 
of autonomy that are stronger in learning organisations than in lean 
ones.
Using these four organisational paradigms as a guide to inform 
our prospective consideration of imagining the organisation of work 
in 2030 we identify four scenarios:
• greater development of learning organisations
• new virtual learning organisations
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• the super-interim model
• a new age Taylorism.
Each is outlined and discussed in turn, with the aim of identifying 
key policy challenges for the future.
SCENARIO 1: TOWARDS A GREATER DEVELOPMENT 
OF LEARNING ORGANISATIONS
Will learning organisations progress in 2030 and replace the low 
performance organisations? And will high-quality jobs be acces-
sible to the majority or limited to a minority of workers? France has 
a relatively low proportion of employees working in private-sector 
modern learning and lean organisations – around half compared with 
over two-thirds of employees in Europe (European Commission 
2015). Only 30% of French employees work in learning organisa-
tions, with France ranked 17th among the EU 28, and very far behind 
the Nordic countries, where 55–60% work in these organisations. 
Although the learning model offers a number of advantages for both 
workers and firms, it has not been so easy to put into practice.
In this scenario, we can imagine a massive diffusion of learn-
ing organisations in France and across Europe. For example, the 
health care sector is projected to grow considerably due to longer 
life expectancy (Blanpain and Buisson 2016), and this will generate 
demand for more care assistants. Domestic care givers who tend to 
work in rather simple organisations could in the future be integrated 
into learning organisations. Through a process of collecting infor-
mation about the people they care for this could contribute to the 
whole value chain optimisation process and potentially improve the 
quality of these low status jobs.
The switch from simple to learning organisation in health is 
already well documented in many advanced economies such as 
Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden and the US, with the recent emer-
gence of high performance health organisations, commonly known 
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as the learning healthcare system (NHS Confederation 2016; Savitz 
et al. 2014). These structures are based on multidisciplinary care 
provided to patients. All the staff are integrated within one organ-
isation and involved in maintaining patients’ health and wellbeing. 
They combine an intensive use of information technology and have 
an approach that emphasises lifestyle and prevention. It is easy to 
imagine that the likes of domestic assistants, physical training or 
health mental coaches, social workers, cleaning staff and clerical 
healthcare professionals will play a crucial role in maintaining the 
general health of the population. They will be integrated into a com-
mon training programme with the administrative executives and 
medical and nursing staff, in order to develop and share an organ-
isational culture based on the idea that each member plays a key 
role and that global performance relies on the interdependence of all 
jobs. Their integration into learning organisations will give them a 
higher value in the job market (better job stability, skills develop-
ment, mobility), which would be promising for a sector that will be 
one of the main source of jobs in France by 2030 (France Stratégie 
and Dares 2015).
SCENARIO 2: NEW VIRTUAL 
LEARNING ORGANISATIONS
Global competition is set to intensify by 2030, particularly in 
goods and services with high added value (ESPAS 2015). Faced 
with a more complex and unstable environment, firms should 
become more reactive and adaptable. Such a context favours flex-
ible organisations that are able to rationalise labour, equipment 
and infrastructure costs. Firms will prioritise organisational models 
that allow them to generate innovative goods and services rapidly 
in order to differentiate themselves from their main competitors 
in the global market. Other important trends are already at work: 
the emergence of big data with a capacity for analysing and col-
lecting data, the development of robotisation and automation, and 
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the spread of information and communication technology. These 
will radically change work organisations by facilitating collabora-
tive work between people located in all four corners of world. The 
possibility of rapidly connecting non-physical resources could be 
a major challenge for firms by 2030, maybe more so than building 
up in-house skills.
Collaborative virtual platforms based on computer systems give 
workers access to resources and tools that facilitate collaborative 
and remote working. They can be used to manage projects, organ-
ise knowledge (methods, problems solving, information data) and 
improve innovation processes. They have important organisational 
consequences because they lead to a ‘burst’ into different services: 
research and development, management, marketing, production, 
while connecting them to virtual working places. Firms can then 
minimise the costs of infrastructure, skills acquisition and informa-
tion collection. They facilitate interactions between workers and 
clients around a specific project and allow greater externalisation at 
an unprecedented level, with few transaction costs. If necessary, it 
is easier to draw on external skills or on small teams within the firm, 
which constitute an important source of flexibility for businesses (eg 
Local Motors Labs, Lego or Nike).
The collaborative virtual platform shares some organisational 
characteristics with the learning organisation, especially the mode of 
coordination where information and communication are decentral-
ised. In these virtual working places, the ‘workers’ and the enlarged 
community do not communicate through the hierarchy anymore 
but with those who possess the information. Just as with the learn-
ing organisation model, the collective working community requires 
strong autonomy and flexibility. Roles involve a higher level of 
cognitive tasks and require more sophisticated individual and col-
lective training. Firms are emerging that are entirely dematerialised 
and deterritorialised (eg InnoCentive). Workers do not need a desk, 
because the platform follows them wherever they are. By 2030, 
this model could spread across a great number of sectors, with high 
value-added tasks. More generally, this mode of work shared can 
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amplify the diffusion of new forms of learning organisation in the 
economy.
SCENARIO 3: THE SUPER-INTERIM MODEL
In this scenario, which we refer to as ‘super-interim’, technological 
and organisational progress could improve working conditions for 
low-skilled workers by integrating them within highly skilled teams. 
Conversely, these factors could increase the prevalence of simple 
models in the form of an ultra-flexible ‘super-interim’. Based on 
powerful and very rapid communication networks, this model would 
become widespread within sectors that have peaks of very short dura-
tion demand; as a result we might see the end of the single employer, 
single contract model, which is already being eroded (UKCES 2014).
This scenario would lead to a two-tier society, with a well-
integrated techno-elite and a techno-proletariat assigned to low 
value-added jobs. The organisational choice depends largely on the 
available workforce: if social inequalities increase, firms could adapt 
their work organisation to an abundant and low-skilled workforce, 
as with digital platform models such as Uber. The conditions associ-
ated with the standard employment contract involve recruitment pro-
cesses and are regulated by employment law. In an ‘Uberised’ world 
of platform employment workers are considered to be independent 
contractors, although this is being legally disputed. These forms of 
employment call into question the functioning of the labour market 
as we know it today. During the same day, an individual could spend 
two hours gardening for a first employer, then two hours as a waiter 
in a restaurant for a second employer, then an hour as a taxi-driver, 
and so on (The Economist 2015). In this scenario, workers would 
not be linked to a single employer but to several employers. They 
would not need to limit their availability to a single company. From 
an optimistic perspective flexibility would be a two-way process: 
every individual could choose the most suitable employer, working 
schedule and attractive offer.
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This scenario would lead to parts of the labour market undermin-
ing established forms of employment status and the creation of ultra-
simple organisational forms. Each individual would be their own 
subcontracting firm and would sell their own work on these plat-
forms. Competition between individual ‘subcontractors’ would be 
strong. The training and mobility opportunities in this context would 
be very limited. This platform model could expand rapidly insofar as 
it can be replicated in many low-skilled jobs subjected to peak hours 
of activity. Joining a platform does not require any knowledge or 
specific skills, all you need is a computer or a smartphone.
SCENARIO 4: A NEW AGE TAYLORISM
The fourth possible scenario explores a new age of Taylorism, in 
which the revolution in automation and technology could radically 
change the method of production, disrupting the world of manu-
facturing as we know it (see Fernández-Macías this volume). For 
example, each worker would perform tasks at home. This is com-
parable to the ‘putting out system’ used in the early stages of the 
industrial revolution, when workers produced goods in their own 
homes (Thelen 2004).
Key trends point in this direction: increasing digital diffusion, 
increased competition, the gap between a minority of high-skilled 
workers and a majority of low-skilled workers. Against the back-
ground of these trends a new type of ‘collaborative’ platform is 
emerging where people can find work remotely making relatively 
simple micro-tasks with low added value. This is a ‘production 
platform’ rather than a ‘super-interim’ service platform. One of the 
first was created by Amazon.com’s subsidiary in 2005: Mechanical 
Turk. ‘Little hands’ are connected to make micro-tasks that the more 
advanced computer programs cannot make, like identifying objects 
in pictures, translating text fragments and classifying pictures by 
categories. The principle is always the same: producing ‘peripheral’ 
tasks achievable remotely by low-skilled individuals. The model is 
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reminiscent of the scientific management conceptualised by Taylor, 
based on fragmented and repetitive tasks but with one difference: 
hierarchical control does not exist in the same way anymore (see 
Crouch this volume), and surveillance and control become virtual 
through algorithms.
This model may affect young people, the unemployed or retirees, 
who can work at anytime and anywhere, if they possess a computer. 
These ‘neo-workers’ are just ‘contributors’ spending a few minutes 
or hours performing tasks for firms that outsource their services 
through simple production platforms. Workers could use these plat-
forms as their main source of income or to supplement it (see Huws 
this volume). If this model of work organisation were to become 
widespread, a sub-proletariat could emerge, exacerbating social 
divisions within the labour market and society more generally. On 
the one hand there would be individuals doing jobs with high added 
value, capable of taking advantage of the new technology; on the 
other hand, the rest would execute low-value tasks remotely, without 
social rights or the prospect of career development, unless policy-
makers design policies to prevent this happening.
DIVIDED OR INCLUSIVE SOCIETY? CHOOSE  
YOUR MODEL WISELY
The evolution of these four organisational models are illustra-
tive scenarios. It is likely that these models will coexist by 2030, 
as they currently do. Firms and industries will not adopt a single 
work organisation model but will choose a combination or range 
of models that suits them best according to their competitors, busi-
ness environment and supply chains. Some changes are positive. 
For example, some low-skilled jobs in the personal services sector 
(domestic health workers) that are not highly valued today could be 
better paid in the future. Simple platforms could, paradoxically, be 
used in the fight against tax evasion and fraud, which is currently 
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common in low-skilled work sectors. These platforms allow us to 
know who does what, when and at what rate.
In any event, these scenarios raise important challenges. Many 
scenarios mentioned here point to a high risk of social polarisation. 
Countries that will benefit most from these changes will be those 
that are best able to promote high performance models. Countries 
that have the most developed learning organisations achieve more 
desirable socio-economic outcomes. Nordic countries are examples 
to follow in this field. There two main issues at play here: on one 
hand, education and constant training; on the other, mitigating the 
risks of social fragmentation and the lack of guarantees of funda-
mental workers’ rights, especially in social protection.
In the future, the job market will demand a high level of adapt-
ability and autonomy from each person (see Aubrey this volume). 
The keys to success will have less to do with mastering basic skills 
than with the ability to integrate and create new technical and soft 
skills. Teamwork and collecting information regardless of where 
it comes from, sharing it and coordinating different skills will be 
crucial. Countries with an inclusive education system also tend 
to have the most learning organisations and are more innovative 
and competitive than other countries, with strong socio-economic 
outcomes. The scenarios described here show that more inclusive 
structures can lead to better performing organisations. In contrast, 
the scenarios that point to highly polarised organisations rely on the 
presence of a highly qualified elite alongside a much larger group 
of workers with no or low qualifications. Where there is a massive 
spread of learning organisations, one might imagine companies 
being encouraged to invest in professional training. In spite of this, 
in the new age Taylorism and ultra-flexible organisations, there is a 
risk that firms will pull out from training or will only invest in ultra-
specialised training, which leaves little chance of mobility for work-
ers. In this case, the state will have to provide a flexible system of 
training for a large number of workers. The main goal is to facilitate 
the development of learning skills that make it easier for workers 
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to change fields and apply for higher qualified jobs than those they 
currently hold.
Another major challenge for the state is to mitigate the risk of 
social fragmentation. The social security system is based funda-
mentally on the notion of the status of salaried workers with stable 
jobs. Today, employers and employees contribute during a given 
period and employees (or ex-employees for jobs seekers and retired 
workers) can access social security. These scenarios suggest that 
the status of salaried workers could gradually diminish. A trend 
in this direction has been pointed out by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO 2015). We also know that people with non-
standard jobs (with interim, independent, part-time and short-term 
contracts) receive the lowest income. The current model was valu-
able in a world where long-term contracts were the norm and not the 
exception (see Doellgast this volume).
Several institutions need to redefine their role and missions. 
Trade unions, for instance, have played a major role ensuring social 
cohesion and improving working conditions. But this ‘model’ was 
conceived in a context where the Taylorian model was predominant 
in which workers, gathered in a same place, shared the same condi-
tions. How will trade unions adapt to a new context marked by a 
dispersed work environment (see Jolly this volume)?
To address these challenges, we need trade unions, the state and 
civil society to engage in a dialogue, engaging with one another in 
order to anticipate the risks and opportunities for the workers of 
tomorrow. Changes of an unprecedented scale may transform soci-
ety as much as the industrial revolution did in its own time. Today, 
the debate about the future of work seems to be principally focused 
on disruptive technology, robotisation or artificial intelligence. 
But organisational transformations could have more impact on the 
future, and these are, of course, directly influenced by disruptive 
technologies, but not necessary determined by them. These evolu-
tions will provide new opportunities but also present substantial 
challenges. Depending on whether these changes are ignored or 
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well anticipated, they could foster social and political instability, or 
construct a better and more inclusive future.
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With a digitally connected population and heavy public investment 
in digitising government services, Denmark is considered a ‘digital 
frontrunner’ (McKinsey & Company 2017), and well prepared for 
economic and labour market changes associated with the fourth 
industrial revolution (Eurostat 2015a, 2015b). It is estimated that 
job content and skill requirements could change for up to 40% of the 
current workforce (McKinsey & Company 2017), and non-standard 
employment and self-employment is on the rise (Ilsøe 2017). Jobs 
will change in form and content – how fast is still unclear.
The Danish labour market is mainly regulated via collective agree-
ments negotiated between member based organisations – labour 
unions and employers’ organisations (Due et al. 1994). This volun-
tarist approach still stands at the core of the system, with legislation 
playing only a limited role. Reform is primarily initiated through 
union–employer negotiations, but it can also occur through one side 
taking unilateral action, or tripartite cooperation, with government 
typically taking a leading role (Ebbinghaus 2002; Mailand 2008).
Therefore adjustments to the evolving digital economy depend 
on initiatives by Danish social partners – especially trade unions 
and employers’ organisations. However, whether this will work in 
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practice is the subject of debate. Some scholars believe the volunta-
rist model has potential for governing the digital economy in a sus-
tainable way (eg Söderqvist 2017): changes resulting from the fourth 
industrial revolution call for rapid and incremental adjustment close 
to the individual company and worker – something that regulation 
via legislation does very poorly. Regulation via negotiated agree-
ments often results in more flexible and efficient rules.
Others highlight that it will be much more difficult for workers 
and companies to organise in the digital economy. If unions and 
employers’ organisations have fewer members and less bargaining 
power, how can they negotiate agreements (De Stefano 2016)? The 
share of solo self-employed (self-employed without employees) and 
marginal part-timers has been increasing in the Danish labour mar-
ket, now respectively accounting for 5% and 10% of the workforce 
(Ilsøe et al. 2017; Larsen and Ilsøe 2016). It is difficult for unions to 
organise these workers, and new digital platform companies are less 
likely to join employers’ organisations because they often rely more 
on the self-employed than employees, so their total wage bill is low 
(Ilsøe and Madsen 2017).
In this chapter I will argue that it is possible to adjust to the fourth 
industrial revolution in Denmark via the voluntarist model of labour 
market regulation, but that it will be necessary to develop a Danish 
model 2.0, where unilateral and tripartite initiatives play a larger role 
alongside traditional bipartite negotiations.
MEASURING THE SIZE OF THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION – WHERE, WHAT AND WHOM
The two main trends in the fourth industrial revolution – automa-
tion and the rise of digital platforms – have been debated among 
social partners in Denmark and in the media, especially since 
autumn 2016. Reports of automation leading to job losses and loss 
of job functions in the US have received increasing attention dur-
ing this period (Chui, Manyika and Miremadi 2015, 2016; Farrell 
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and Greig 2016). Furthermore, international digital platforms like 
Airbnb, Uber and Upwork have become very active in Denmark, 
while Danish-owned digital platforms such as GoMore, meploy and 
Worksome have also emerged.
Digital automation is a reality for many working Danes, but there 
are major variations across sectors, documented in a large 2017 
study on the digitisation of work conducted by Statistics Denmark, 
involving 18,000 Danes (Ilsøe and Madsen 2017).
Half of all working Danes experience what can be characterised 
as office automation: they use computers or devices at work and said 
‘yes’ in answer to at least two of the following three questions:
• Do you use computers most of your working hours?
• Do you use programs to handle large amounts of data?
• Do you use the internet or an intranet?
In the information, communication, finance and insurance indus-
tries more than 8 in 10 working Danes, including clerical support 
staff, report that they work in automated offices.
In addition, 1 in 5 working Danes experience machine automa-
tion: they rely on computerised machines such as robots or scanners 
at work. In the industry, mining, quarrying, energy, supply, agri-
culture, forestry and fishing sectors this number increases to 1 in 3. 
Those reporting that their working environment has been automated 
are particularly likely to have been given new types of tasks in their 
job within the last year. Therefore, these groups might be in particu-
lar need of education or further training due to digital automation.
The use of digital platforms for work is still relatively lim-
ited in Denmark (Ilsøe and Madsen 2017). 2.4% of Danes aged 
15–74 – equivalent to 100,000 people – earned money via digital 
platforms in 2016/2017. Just 1% earned money through a labour 
platform such as Upwork or Worksome, and 1.5% earned money 
via a capital platform such as Airbnb or GoMore. The majority of 
those who obtained an income via digital platforms earned less than 
DKK25,000 (€3,330) annually before taxes. Earnings via platforms 
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are therefore primarily a supplement to other sources of income 
such as salaried work, student allowances, pensions, unemployment 
benefits or social assistance.
Different groups of Danes earn money via labour platforms and 
capital platforms – very few have earnings from both types of plat-
forms. Of the Danes supplementing their income with earnings from 
labour platforms, there is an overrepresentation of young, low-paid, 
low-skilled, unemployed immigrants and workers with temporary 
contracts. They are typically either newcomers to the labour market 
or are having difficulty gaining a foothold in it. They might consider 
digital labour platforms as a stepping stone to regular employment, 
but there have been several cases demonstrating that it can be dif-
ficult for these groups to combine such work with government sup-
port. The main problem seems to be that they work and earn too little 
as self-employed people to be entitled to various forms of support 
from the welfare state.
By contrast, high-skilled and high-earners across different age 
groups are overrepresented among Danes supplementing their 
income with earnings from capital platforms. This may be because 
you have to own something before you can rent it out via a capital 
platform. Those who are well established with educational creden-
tials and jobs are more likely to be home and car owners. The main 
challenge regarding capital platforms in Denmark is tax collection. 
Normally, Danish tax authorities receive information on various 
sources of income automatically, but capital platform users must 
report income themselves, and the rules on this are not completely 
clear – especially regarding car rental.
SOCIAL PARTNERS: UNILATERAL OR  
TRIPARTITE RESPONSES?
While social partners in Germany and Sweden had participated 
in at least eight large tripartite commissions on digitalisation and 
labour market issues by 2016 (including ‘Industrie 4.0’ and Digitale 
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Plattformen in Germany as well as Digitaliseringskommissionen 
and Taxiutredningen in Sweden), such initiatives arrived later 
in Denmark but many finally took off in 2017 (Ilsøe 2017); see 
Table 20.1.
The government initiated a disruption council called Partnership 
for Denmark’s Future, with 32 members from Danish social part-
ners, chief executive officers from a number of larger companies, 
entrepreneurs, academics and representatives from other areas of 
society.1 It meets bimonthly from spring 2017 to summer 2018 at 
one-day conferences, with talks, presentations of new analyses and 
company visits.
The most important tripartite initiatives in 2017 have been the 
negotiation and conclusion of two agreements – one on further 
training and one on unemployment benefits (see Table 20.1). The 
purpose of the former, concluded in October 2017, was to adjust 
training to the needs of an increasingly digitalised workplace, par-
ticularly for those in the secondary sector. However, trade unions 
organising high-skilled workers have been critical of the agreement 
(Danish Confederation of Professional Associations 2017). As our 
survey demonstrated, workers in knowledge-based services experi-
ence a high degree of office automation and are often confronted 
with new tasks at work. These groups might need further training to 
maintain their employability on the labour market.
The government also initiated a working group to examine the 
Danish unemployment insurance system. It currently differentiates 
sharply between self-employed and wage earners, but more and more 
Danes are combining the two forms of employment. In May 2017, 
a new agreement was reached drawn from some of the recommen-
dations from the working group. It allows both sources of income 
to be reported at the same time and to be combined when calculat-
ing entitlement to benefits, and individuals can decide whether an 
income is reported from self-employment or a job. It is expected to 
be implemented on 1 July 2018, and many observers have empha-
sised the potential the agreement holds for platform workers. As our 
survey showed, these workers often combine different sources of 
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income, and income received via the labour platforms is often too 
little to bring an entitlement to unemployment benefits in itself.
There have been unilateral innovative responses to the digitalisa-
tion of the labour market (see Table 20.1). The largest Danish pen-
sion company, PFA Pension, has created a pension scheme called 
PFA MedlemsPlus for members of 15 different unions representing 
Table 20.1 Social partner responses to digitalisation of the labour market in 
Denmark.
Arena Unions Employers’organisations
Unilateral 
arena
Analyses and reports, media 
appearance
Political project
Dialogue with government 
departments and political 
parties
Responses to EU strategies
Pension scheme for union 
members (PFA, PKA) – 
including freelancers, 2016
Freelancer networks
Dialogue with European and 
international unions
Analyses and reports, media 
appearance
Political project
Dialogue with government 
departments and political 
parties
Dialogue with European 
forums and employers’ 
organisations
Tripartite 
arena
Tripartite cooperation on 
education and further 
training
Roundtable at Copenhagen 
municipality
Government strategy on 
sharing economy, 2017
Disruption council, 2017–2018
Union-led conference on 
platform economy
Union-led expert panel on 
platform economy, 2017
Tripartite cooperation on 
education and further 
training
Roundtable at Copenhagen 
municipality company 
forum
Debates at Denmark’s 
political festival on 
Bornholm 2016–2017
New tripartite agreement on 
unemployment benefits, 
2017
New tripartite agreement on 
further training, 2017
Bipartite 
arena
Informal contacts to employers’ 
organisations
Contacts to new digital 
employers
Informal contacts to unions
Source: Ilsøe (2017); table updated in November 2017 via additional interviews.
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workers in both the private and public sectors who are not covered 
by collective agreements. The pension scheme is very attractive 
for groups such as the solo self-employed as it includes many of 
the same elements and benefits (eg insurance and low administra-
tive costs) as the labour market pension schemes that form part of 
most collective agreements in Denmark. The pension fund PKA has 
created a similar scheme (PKA Privat) together with nine unions 
mainly representing workers in the public sector.
There have been no significant bipartite responses to the most 
recent developments in digitalisation of the labour market. This is 
perhaps not surprising: many of the adjustments required as a result 
of automation, such as in training, include many actors like further 
training centres, which are governed by tripartite cooperation in 
Denmark (Mailand 2008).
Those finding work on digital platforms are often solo self-
employed, rarely unionised and difficult to organise. Unions often 
struggle to negotiate bipartite agreements for these groups as 
competition laws prevent fixed prices across companies. There 
are exceptions – for instance the Albany judgement, where the EU 
court approved the negotiation of a collective agreement on pen-
sions for independent workers (ECJ 1999). However, it seems that 
negotiations on topics like pay will be much more difficult for such 
workers. Therefore, unilateral initiatives like the pension scheme for 
union members not covered by collective agreements seems to be a 
more realistic first avenue to attract, organise and protect solo self-
employed – including platform workers. If these or similar schemes 
encourage them to organise, perhaps this can ultimately lead to col-
lective agreements for solo self-employed.
CLOSING REMARKS
When creating voluntarist responses and solutions to the challenges 
and opportunities that digitalisation brings to labour markets in the 
western world, a change in the balance between unilateral, bipartite 
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and tripartite initiatives may be required within the Danish model. In 
other words, we need to accept the gradual development of a Danish 
model 2.0.
The Danish model of labour market regulation is founded on 
bipartite initiatives, and negotiations and collective agreements are 
still the core instrument in this voluntarist model of labour market 
regulation. However, the nature of digitalisation might require 
additional emphasis on both unilateral and tripartite initiatives. The 
former can mobilise and organise the solo self-employed, while 
the latter can help coordinate adjustments to the education system. 
Without union members, a voluntarist model cannot exist, and 
without necessary adjustments to the education system a voluntarist 
model can lose its legitimacy. This emphasises the responsibility 
of individual organisations to consider adequate initiatives on their 
own and the responsibility of the government to consider necessary 
tripartite processes and initiate them in time. Whether or not this will 
ultimately prepare the foundations for further bipartite responses it is 
too early to say, but the potential is there.
NOTE
1. For more information see Disruptionrådet at https://www.regeringen.
dk/partnerskab/.
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The fourth industrial revolution has created a big buzz in Finland 
and elsewhere and digitalisation, in particular, has become the new 
phrase for renewal in politics and public policy. Still, technology 
is only one of many transformations changing modern economies. 
We are living in an era where economy and societies are in constant 
motion: markets, jobs, technology, climate, geopolitics, personal 
relationships and the way in which people communicate and inter-
link. There is no way of stopping change, nor should we neglect it.
Adapting to this change has been easier for conservative parties 
because the fourth industrial revolution offers vast opportunities for 
businesses. Governments are exploring how to best attract young tal-
ents and the most thriving businesses to boost their own nation state. 
Consequently, the solution of the centre-right in Europe is straight-
forward: ever more deregulation, more flexible labour markets and a 
more favourable business environment.
For progressive parties the digital transformation has been challeng-
ing greater challenge. They do not want to stop change or become the 
luddites of the 21st century, but at the same time struggle to provide 
solutions that would embrace this tech revolution while mitigating 
social risks of people and workers and the more vulnerable of society.
FINLAND
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In this article, I will discuss Finnish labour market policies and 
develop ideas about how the system can better adapt to the change 
at hand. My main argument is that upskilling, training and educa-
tion have to be taken far more seriously. I also present solutions on 
how Finland can make use of its long tradition of tripartite labour 
market cooperation. On the one hand, my argumentation rests on 
economic foundations: without a skilled workforce there will be no 
innovations, no growth and no tools to preserve the welfare state. 
On the other hand, I see upskilling as the most prominent tool to 
keep society together. Without a workforce fit for the digital trans-
formation our democratic institutions are at risk of failure because 
the populist surge has proven what it might mean when progres-
sives do not adapt to new realities but fail to manage and shape 
change.
THE LONG TRADITION OF TRIPARTITE 
CO-OPERATION AND CONSENSUS
Since the end of the second world war, tripartite cooperation and 
consensus have been at the forefront of the Finnish labour market 
policy credo. For decades, Finns have believed that giving organised 
employer and employee organisations great power means that they 
will also bear great responsibility. Tripartism has not merely been 
seen as a labour market policy, but a key factor in building Finland’s 
competitiveness and innovation landscape.
A high organisation rate on both the employee and employer sides 
of the table has long been a cornerstone of the Finnish labour market 
system.1 Framework agreements on income were most often made 
on a national scale between employees, employers and the govern-
ment. These national agreements covered not only pay rises, but also 
social security reforms and taxation.
Society was developed through close cooperation between 
employers’ organisations, trade union confederations and the gov-
ernment, regardless of its political colour.
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The Finnish system worked surprisingly well even when the world 
outside changed. First came the free flow of capital that coincided 
with the fall of the Soviet Union. Then came globalisation, outsourc-
ing and so-called atypical forms of employment. The Finnish model 
struggled, but survived. The latest grand social reform negotiated by 
the social partners was the pension reform of 2014 that came into 
force in 2017. It rose the retirement age linking it to life expectancy 
and stabilising employers’ and employees’ insurance contributions 
far into the future.
Even though the Finnish labour market system has been challenged 
before, it is now faced with the deepest crisis in its history. There are 
many voices questioning the democratic foundations of ‘cabinet 
decisionmaking’ by social partners. For many employers’ organisa-
tions, profitmaking and influencing decisionmaking have become 
more than negotiating terms of employment with trade unions.
In Finland the current government took office in May 2015 with 
an agenda that showed a drastic change of course in labour market 
policy. Already after the elections, before his actual nomination, the 
prime minister, Juha Sipilä, had called for a ‘social contract’ with 
employer and employee organisations, aiming at moderate wage 
formation and more flexible labour markets. The first attempt did not 
pay off and in the early fall of 2015 the idea of the social contract in 
its original form was abandoned.
In September 2015, the Sipilä government announced that it 
would one-sidedly push through a legislative package that would 
lengthen working time, cut sick leave payments and the length of 
annual leave and holiday bonuses, and weaken workers’ status in 
local agreements. The government was to introduce binding legisla-
tion that reduced the social partners’ right to collective bargaining. 
In the Finnish consensus-oriented tradition, the manoeuvre was 
completely unheard of; it was an aggressive offensive against work-
ers and their rights. Trade unions were quick to point out that the 
proposed restrictions to free collective bargaining went against not 
only the national tradition, but also the conventions and regulations 
of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and EU.
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After months of uproar, the government was forced to step back. 
Employers seemed to acknowledge that the government would not 
be able to pull its grandiose initiative through and therefore quickly 
switched their orientation back into negotiation mode.
The end result of this process was the exceptional ‘competi-
tiveness pact’ signed by national social partners and the govern-
ment in February 2016. It included a wage freeze for 2017, a 
24-hour extension in annual working time without remuneration, 
reduced holiday pay for public sector employees, and a transfer 
of a part of employers’ social security liabilities to employees. 
Once again, Finnish trade union confederations showed great 
responsibility, negotiating instead of striking – only this time 
by signing an historical agreement that weakened employee 
conditions.
This turmoil came with a high price in form of labour market 
relations. Hardline employers’ organisations took advantage of the 
disorder. For example, Forest Industries, the organisation of highly 
profitable forestry companies, abandoned its central organisation, 
the Confederation of Finnish Industries. The Federation of Finnish 
Enterprises, a small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) lobby and 
an outsider to the traditional social dialogue, started aggressively 
pushing forward its own initiatives for further labour market liber-
alisation. Also on the trade union side, radical tones gained ground. 
In the aftermath of the labour market dispute, the Confederation of 
Finnish Industries changed its statute to restrict its mandate on wage 
negotiations so that in the future organised Finnish employers could 
only negotiate social reforms at the national level – leading to cuts 
in social security.
The biggest price was paid in lost trust between the social partners 
and the government. Employers, for their part, have started to play 
with two sets of cards. When the government is acting according 
to their will, they support it. But if the government is unable or not 
willing to follow employers’ will, they turn to negotiate with trade 
unions. Mistrust is palpable, and the situation far from good for 
society as a whole.
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Now the unions are starting a labour market round without the 
support of confederations. The latest uncoordinated wage nego-
tiation round in Finland took place in 2007/08 and resulted in very 
large across-the-board wage increases, largely unrelated to individ-
ual firm productivity performance. Time will tell whether upcoming 
rounds will provide better results.
THE EMERGING LABOUR MARKET MODEL
Finland has historically been competitive in manufacturing, espe-
cially in forest, metal, engineering and ICT industries. New sectors, 
making use of new technologies, are currently emerging, such as 
gaming, clean-tech and biotechnology. The changing industrial 
landscape is also reflected in labour market relations. Whereas work-
ers used to be, and still are, highly organised in factories, trade union 
membership in SMEs and services is declining. Modern sectors, 
such as programming and the gaming industry, have largely chosen 
to stay outside the traditional labour market pattern.
Traditional labour market policy has started to lose its appeal: all 
the old golden rules of negotiation, wage-setting mechanisms and 
tripartite cooperation are increasingly perceived as being out of date. 
National industrial policy has become almost nonexistent. In the 
belief that free markets will provide the best results, all governments 
since the 1990s have avoided making clear decisions or strategies on 
industrial policy.
The fourth industrial revolution shapes production and societal 
processes: networks replace closed corporative blocks, value chains 
become increasingly complex and big data is the key resource in the 
internet age. From the labour market point of view, digitalisation 
reflects globalisation in many important ways. They are both bor-
derless phenomena that affect all aspects of human life everywhere 
– and are therefore very difficult to manage. Collective agreements 
and regulations are mainly agreed on at the national level, while 
businesses are increasingly global.
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For a long time national labour market politics have mainly 
focused on wage formation, purchasing power and earning-based 
social security. In the emerging new world these are all still impor-
tant, but not enough to tackle the new challenges. Education and 
training, throughout a career, are becoming even more central than 
they have been so far.
For years, Finland has been aiming for a 72% employment rate. 
We are only now starting to understand that this goal might be 
impossible to reach if we do not take education and (re)training far 
more seriously.
The current government has at least tried to find some solutions to 
the changing nature of industrial landscape and work, however. The 
most prominent effort is led by Mika Lintilä, minister of economic 
affairs, who took office in early 2017 and promised to work out an 
action plan for renewing industry – something that industrial trade 
unions have long been asking for.
The original plan on industrial strategy soon transformed into one 
concentrating on artificial intelligence. The minister reasoned that 
AI has become a core element of digitalisation and that therefore 
Finland needs to be at the forefront in developing its own national 
programme. The objectives set out for the steering group, nominated 
in May 2017, were to find new key measures that best support the 
use of AI and robotics in companies in Finland to survey the changes 
AI and robotics will bring to workplaces, and to support the possi-
bilities in the use of data.
The interim report published by the ministry of economic affairs 
and employment and the steering group in October 2017 lists eight 
“key principles for taking Finland towards the age of AI” (Finnish 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment 2017):
• enhancing business competitiveness with artificial intelligence 
(AI)
• using data in all sectors effectively
• safeguarding quick and easy AI adoption
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• ensuring top-level expertise and attracting top-experts
• making “bold decisions and investments”
• building the world’s best public services
• establishing new models of collaboration
• making Finland a frontrunner in AI.
As the above list shows, one key principle level, working life issues 
and especially themes that would have given anything tangible to 
workers or the people, were conspicuously absent. The steering 
group, and more importantly the subgroup on working life operating 
under the steering group, is however still continuing its work. Some 
of the preliminary information on the group’s work looks promis-
ing and will hopefully provide a pathway for the next government 
programme.
First, the working group does not think that the current industrial 
revolution is as big a rupture as is often seen. This notion bridges the 
gap between digi-evangelists and end-of-work doomsdayers. The 
group has listed several filters that tone down technological change 
on a societal level: ethical, social, institutional, economic and legal, 
and administrative. Earlier it has been estimated that in Finland 
some one-third of workplaces might vanish with digitalisation 
(Pajarinen and Rouvinen 2014). Now it seems that these numbers 
were overestimated. The transformation will affect more tasks that 
are possible to automate, and the number of complete occupations 
at risk of disappearing could be approximately 9% (Arntz, Gregory 
and Zierahn 2016; see also Arnold et al. this volume).
Second, the group has been brave enough to touch on delicate 
issues such as earnings-related social security, which it sees on the 
one hand as a guarantee for greater labour market mobility, but on 
the other hand as a system that causes negative incentives.2
Third, and most importantly, the working group has paid attention 
to lifelong learning, training and upskilling. It has also acknowl-
edged that responsibility and costs need to be shared between gov-
ernment, worker and employer.
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THE WAY AHEAD FOR POLICYMAKERS
The Finnish labour market model has been called both rigid and 
stabilising. Both points of view ring true. In the emerging new 
labour market model, we have to create a model that combines both 
features: a labour market that is resilient and supportive of retraining 
opportunities. In order to succeed in this process industrial policy is 
essential.
More and more often we hear stories of companies laying off 
employees because of outdated skill sets. When a specific technol-
ogy is driven out of markets, the same happens to workers using this 
technology.
The skills challenge is huge even among employees with higher 
education. In June 2016, the Finnish Union of Professional Engineers 
published a survey conducted among its unemployed members. The 
results were shocking: 24% of unemployed engineers, all with 
higher education and many with long careers, did not believe that 
they would find a job again. For those over 60 years, it was 60%. 
The main reason for unemployment, according to respondents, was 
an inadequate skill set, one that was either outdated or ill-suited to 
the employment opportunities in their area of residence.
The situation is more difficult for people with inadequate literacy, 
numeracy and digital skills. Musset (2015) estimates that in Finland 
600,000 adults lack these skills. If skills development is not up to 
date with technological change, the result will be growing inequal-
ity. Without an effective education framework we are not able to 
foster innovations nor wealth.
What we would need is a complete revolution in education, result-
ing in the equivalent of universal education. A degree is not enough: 
reskilling and upskilling is needed throughout the whole career (see 
Aubrey this volume).
Schwartz et al. (2017) have studied different actors’ capabil-
ity to live up to technological change. In technology, the rate of 
change is extremely high, and some individuals are able to cope 
with it. Businesses are slower adapters than individuals. The lowest 
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capability to live up to the change seems to be in the field of public 
policy.
The complex interaction of globalisation, technology and welfare 
means that alleviating poverty on the political left or boosting busi-
ness on the right is not enough. We have to be able to see change and 
be bold enough to use our political imagination for ways to tackle it.
Finnish decisionmakers should use the old Finnish tripartite 
labour market system to work together on the future world of work. 
Even The Economist, a business magazine, has pointed out that 
trade unions should have a significant role in shaping the education 
system (Palmer 2017).
The reasoning for this is straightforward. First, trade unions have 
an industry-wide view of themes that may not be available to smaller 
employers. Second, skills will accompany people throughout their 
working lives, which may become increasingly important in a 
world of rising self-employment. This is exactly what the Union of 
Professional Engineers in Finland, among several other unions, is 
intending to do. We provide members with career counselling and 
organise workshops with issues ranging from ‘CV clinics’ to negoti-
ating techniques and labour law. At the same time we constantly col-
lect data of our members trying to improve inform policymaking in 
the areas of employment and industrial strategy in the digital future.
Lifelong learning needs to become a reality instead of a mere 
slogan. Especially educational structures must be completely trans-
formed to support genuine lifelong learning. To succeed in this task, 
we need coordinated efforts to bring together employees, employers 
and providers of education.
NOTES
1. Finland’s organisation rate has been in decline for some 20 years. 
Estimates for the current organisation rate differ between 60% and 75%.
2. Negative incentives of unemployment benefits are a widely discussed 
and often a very politicised theme. The political right often sees it as passiv-
ising, while the left stands firmly against the weakening of unemployment 
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benefits. In Finland employees are entitled to an earnings-related unem-
ployment benefit that lasts for 400 days, if the unemployed person has been 
working for eight months or more before becoming unemployed.
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The digitalisation debate in Sweden has become a debate over the 
future of the ‘Swedish model’. Given the current trajectory in most 
developed countries, the future of work looks bleak. As large sec-
tions of the labour market look set to be displaced by automation, the 
workforce must either reskill in order to keep up with the quickening 
pace of structural change, or face a future of precarious work, per-
haps by finding that work via low-paid digital labour platforms. For 
a country with ambitions of inclusive growth and a generous welfare 
state, much is at risk. If the bleakest scenario materialises, Swedish 
institutions, developed and guarded by the country’s trade union 
movement, will have failed to maintain a long-standing tradition of 
successfully mitigating the adverse effects of creative destruction on 
the labour market.
The challenges ahead will require action from Sweden’s trade 
union movement and its counterparts. Job polarisation, as described 
by Acemoglu and Autor (2011), will need to be met with reforms 
to enable workers to upskill, so the labour market can keep up with 
demand for new skillsets in an increasingly digital economy. The 
growing importance of digital platforms and their algorithms in 
SWEDEN
Will history lead the way in the age 
of robots and platforms?
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our societies may become a challenge as platform business mod-
els spread across sectors, resulting in the partial automation of the 
employer. For a country with 90% collective bargaining coverage, 
if labour platforms are to be regulated successfully it will be neces-
sary to integrate existing collective agreements into these digital 
platforms.
In this essay I will briefly discuss these two challenges and how 
they might be met by Swedish trade unions. Given Sweden’s high 
rate of collective bargaining coverage, and the strength of the coun-
try’s unions and labour market institutions, finding solutions to these 
problems may ‘only’ require tweaks and adaptations of existing 
systems. The ideas presented below may appear overly optimis-
tic. However, as Sweden’s labour traditions and institutions may 
be severely disrupted by the challenges ahead, solution-oriented 
approaches are perhaps the only option.
A TRADE UNION MOVEMENT RESILIENT 
TO STRUCTURAL CHANGE1
Swedish (and Nordic) trade unions are possibly the greatest pro-
ponents of structural change in the world. This may be explained 
through the institutional history of Sweden’s labour market, which 
developed in the wake of the conflict-ridden early 20th century, into 
the largely codetermined labour market regime of today.
During the ‘golden era’ of Swedish labour relations (or 
Saltsjöbadsandan stretching from the mid-1930s to the early 1970s) 
many of the institutions on which union acceptance of Schumpeterian 
creative destruction depend were developed. These were modelled 
on the ideas of the economists Gösta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner of 
the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions (Landsorganisationen 
i Sverige) (LO 1951). The Rhen–Meidner model combined active 
labour market policies, a general welfare state, solidary centralised 
wage bargaining, and restrictive macroeconomic policy, in order 
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to achieve full employment, price stability, fair wages and high 
economic growth. In practice sectors dependent on low-cost labour 
became unprofitable as centralised wage bargaining increased pay 
across all sectors. Instead of protecting low-paid, labour- intensive 
industries, the trade unions proposed supporting displaced workers 
to migrate to more productive sectors through active labour market 
policies. The embrace of creative destruction, by promoting labour 
market mobility, was conditional on the safety-net institutions set up 
in order to mitigate the adverse effects of structural change to their 
members.
Institutions mitigating structural change were further developed 
in the 1970s when white-collar trade unions and employers’ asso-
ciations signed the first structural change mitigation agreements, or 
omställningsavtal. These agreements formalised the trade unions’ 
positive stance on technology-driven rationalisations, as long as 
employers helped finance mitigation efforts. At the time, there was 
a sense that the state-run active labour market regimes were not 
sufficiently oriented towards white-collar professionals. The mitiga-
tion agreements created the first job security councils – essentially 
private unemployment offices owned by employers’ associations 
and trade unions, with a focus on white-collar professionals. Similar 
mitigation agreements have since been added to cover most of the 
labour force, and the job security councils have become very suc-
cessful in helping redundant workers retrain and find new employ-
ment (OECD 2015).
Although many aspects of the original Rhen–Meidner model have 
been altered, abandoned or later revived over the past 60 years, 
central aspects pertaining to reskilling remain. The ‘Swedish model’ 
is not a static or stable concept, but one that is constantly evolv-
ing and adapting to prevailing conditions in the labour market. As 
most of the Swedish labour market regime is regulated by contracts, 
collective bargaining parties are relatively unconstrained to solve 
challenges deemed important for a well-functioning and competitive 
labour market.
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INCORPORATING LIFELONG LEARNING 
INTO THE SWEDISH MODEL
Reports on the number of jobs displaced by the ongoing process 
of digitalisation range from somewhat alarming – 7% of Swedish 
workers are at high risk of being automated according to Arntz, 
Gregory and Zierahn (2016) (see also Arnold et al. this volume) – 
to utterly dismal – half of all jobs in Sweden according to Fölster 
(2014). The debate seems to have created a consensus that further 
reforms are needed to reduce the skills gap caused by this structural 
change. For a trade union movement that has spent decades trying 
to convince legislators to invest in lifelong learning, the challenge of 
digitalisation has finally pushed the issue higher up the agenda (see 
Karjalainen this volume).
As in most countries, institutions that mitigate the effects of struc-
tural change for the individual are reactive. Access to unemployment 
insurance and job security councils is normally granted after redun-
dancy has taken place. Successful lifelong learning reforms will 
need to push existing institutions to take proactive measures.
Given the growing complexity and specialisation of the labour 
market, efforts will need to be focused on the individual. First, tak-
ing time off to retrain or upgrade skills will need to be financially 
viable for working people. Second, if the financial barrier is over-
come, for example through the creation of individual competence 
accounts or funds, institutions must support individuals to make 
sound investments in their human capital. Here, the state will need 
to play a pivotal role in a number of areas, such as giving univer-
sities a mandate to include skill upgrading in their educational 
offerings, and provide skill validation, so that work–life experience 
is better taken into account in completing academic courses or 
programmes.
Successful lifelong learning reform would result in a higher pro-
portion of workers making regular investments in their human capital 
to keep up with demand within the labour market. If the adaptations 
made by these institutions are successful in changing attitudes and 
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behaviour, upskilling may become more career-oriented, rather 
than geared towards an individual’s current job. Opportunity-based 
labour turnover may therefore increase, creating upward pressure on 
wages, to the benefit of union members, and improving matching in 
the labour market over time, benefiting firms.
There have already been attempts to incorporate lifelong learn-
ing into existing mitigation agreements, but these have failed in 
negotiations because of disagreements over costs (employers have 
wanted significantly reduced employment protection in exchange). 
However, given the increased prominence of the digitalisation 
debate, there are likely to be further attempts in the near future.
PLATFORM WORK AND THE 
ALGORITHM-BASED EMPLOYER
Related to the challenges presented by automation is the sudden rise 
of digital labour platforms, which may complement or replace the 
traditional role of the employer in leading and directing work within 
a firm (see Schor this volume). Examples also show that technology 
may be used to circumvent regulation, including those related to the 
labour market.
The economic literature on digital platforms (including labour 
platforms) mainly focuses on the economic opportunities and effi-
ciency gains made possible with platform-based business models. 
Platforms are economic agents that facilitate transactions and 
interactions between its users. In order to be successful in these 
functions, platforms must gain a critical mass of users. If a platform 
attains a sufficient base network, this may help attract even more 
users, so platforms display significant economies of scale. If the 
users give away data when using the platform, the data may be used 
to further improve the functions of the platform. As a consequence, 
inter-platform competition is often oligopolistic in developed plat-
form markets, with high barriers to entry (see Hagiu and Wright 
2015; Rochet and Tirole 2003; The Economist 2016).
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If platforms are marketplaces “where people and businesses trade 
under a set of rules set by the owner or operator” (The Economist 
2016), what happens when the actions of a platform owner or opera-
tor have an adverse impact on its users? If a platform market is char-
acterised by duopolistic competition, for example, there may be few 
alternatives for labour suppliers. If a handful of platforms become 
the de facto marketplaces for large parts of the economy, and thus 
critical infrastructure in market economies, how should regulators 
act in order to promote fair competition?
Digital platforms play a critical role in an increasingly con-
nected society. When ranking the world’s highest valued publicly 
traded companies we often see Apple, Alphabet (formerly Google), 
Microsoft, Facebook and Amazon at the top – firms that own and 
operate multi-sided platforms. The highest valued privately owned 
company is Uber, a labour platform.
Since its founding in 2009, Uber has quickly become the larg-
est facilitator of taxi services in the world. As of June 2017, Uber 
had facilitated over 5 billion trips (Holt, Macdonald and Gore-Coty 
2017). Apart from disrupting the taxi industry, the company’s 
advanced digital platform has shown that the traditional role of the 
employer to lead and coordinate work can now be undertaken by 
an algorithm, capable of organising work for a highly decentralised 
workforce.
Uber has been particularly influential in that it has created a highly 
imitable model, which entrepreneurs have attempted to apply across 
various industries, and it may prove to be the first incarnation of an 
advanced, algorithm-based employer.
However, in the past year, a cascade of scandals has tarnished 
Uber’s tech-glossy reputation. Among the labour-related scandals, 
we have seen hire-and-fire practices parallel to day labour (one-
sided price setting and driver terminations through an opaque rat-
ing system), blacklisting (‘blackballing’), the misclassification of 
labour, and company stores (dysfunctional car leasing schemes). 
It appears to be corporate culture built on purposefully breaking 
rules and regulations in order to gain competitive advantages over 
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its competitors, with the end goal of reaching an international (self-
driving) taxi monopoly (Thiel 2014).2
Platforms imitating Uber’s business model often adapt a similar 
attitude towards their labour force (misclassification). Getting to 
grips with the undesirable aspects of these platforms involves deal-
ing with the preconception that platform labour must be bogus self-
employed, precarious, gig work.
A labour platform may be seen as an organisational tool that 
employers can use to connect its service providers with customers 
more efficiently. If the platform dictates the terms and conditions 
of the transactions it facilitates sufficiently, then the platform is not 
a free market consisting of independent contractors, and should be 
classified as an employer. The boundaries considered in Coase’s 
(1937) firm, regarding whether one is working in a free market or 
within the confines of a firm’s planned economy, are pertinent not 
only in discussing the shortcomings of platform economies, but in 
most labour markets where precarious work and bogus self-employ-
ment cause social and economic inequality.
In Söderqvist (2016, 2017), I present a so-called Nordic approach 
to regulating labour platforms. It first involves integrating platforms 
into existing sectoral collective bargaining regimes. Here, defining 
employer status is key; this has not yet been a major issue in Sweden, 
where most service platforms have accepted employer status within 
our existing labour standards.3 Second, we are exploring ways to 
make collective agreements easier to integrate and more compatible 
with the platform firms’ software, in essence developing digitalised 
versions of existing collective agreements. This may sound com-
plicated, but needn’t be in practice if the process is carried out at a 
small scale. Sitting down with platform programmers and discussing 
how best to incorporate important aspects of collective agreements 
or labour codes is one way of doing this. From such talks, standards 
or best practices can be developed that may be used by other firms 
under the same or similar agreements.
This concept can be taken further by making similar adaptations 
outside the regulatory reach of traditional collective bargaining. The 
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idea is that the social partners take a more active role in adapting 
and creating new standards in areas of relevant regulation, in order 
to make them better able to integrate into digital business models. To 
accomplish this, we propose the creation of a social-partner-owned 
institution where digital regulatory standards can be developed with 
a more holistic perspective, closer to market forces, so platforms, 
unions and national regulators develop novel digital regulatory 
standards in cooperation. The hope is to provide better digital regu-
latory standards, closer to market forces than would be possible if 
regulators take a piecemeal approach to adapting to the rise of labour 
platforms.
Recognising that such platforms could make a significant positive 
contribution to the Swedish economy if regulated properly, these 
proposals would have unions take a proactive approach, focusing 
on migrating existing regulation rather than attempting to stall the 
implementation of productivity-enhancing technology. If playing 
by the rules is made easy for firms with platform-based business 
models, then the often-heard arguments lambasting the sclerotic 
regulations of ‘the old economy’ will ring hollow. If, as Lawrence 
Lessig (1999) eloquently stated, “code is law”, regulators will need 
to gain influence over the code. To do so efficiently firms may need 
to devote more resources towards building sustainable and competi-
tive business models.
CONCLUSION
I have presented solution-oriented approaches to dealing with 
some of the challenges faced by the Swedish trade union move-
ment in the years ahead. Although the proposals may seem overly 
optimistic, our tradition, and the long-term survival of our institu-
tions, leave Swedish trade unions with little choice other than to 
act. The approaches proposed here depend on the ability of capital, 
labour and politics to engage in constructive dialogue over com-
mon challenges. Such a commonsense approach may be difficult in 
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a political discourse where trade unions are not seen as legitimate 
representatives of the labour force. Getting to grips with the rise in 
income inequality, democratic polarisation and capital gains captur-
ing an ever-increasing share of economic surpluses, involves fixing 
fundamental shortcomings of capitalism pertaining to bargaining 
power. The Swedish example shows that complicated issues within 
the labour market may be solved at the bargaining table, given that 
bargaining power between labour and capital is relatively equal. If 
more countries recognise the key role of trade unionism in solving 
the challenges ahead, then the transition to the new digital economy 
may prove less turbulent.
NOTES
1. For more on the history and development of Swedish labour market 
institutions see for example Erixon (2010) and Swenson (2002).
2. Continual updates about Uber controversies can be found on the web-
site http://www.uberscandals.org.
3. However, there are unresolved complications as to who should be seen 
as the employer.
REFERENCES
Acemoglu, D. and D. Autor (2011), ‘Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Impli-
cations for Employment and Earnings’, in Handbook of Labor Econom-
ics, vol. 4, 1043–171, Elsevier.
Arntz, M., T. Gregory and U. Zierahn (2016), ‘The Risk of Automation 
for Jobs in OECD Countries: a Comparative Analysis’, OECD Social, 
Employment and Migration Working Paper 189, Paris: OECD Publishing.
Coase, R. (1937), ‘The Nature of the Firm’, Economica, 4(16), 386–405.
Erixon, L. (2010), ‘The Rehn-Meidner Model in Sweden: its Rise, Chal-
lenges and Survival’, Journal of Economic Issues, 44(3), 677–715.
Fölster, S. (2014), Vartannatt Jobb Automatiseras, Stockholm: Stiftelsen 
för Strategisk Forskning.
Hagiu, A. and J. Wright (2015), ‘Multi-sided Platforms’, International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, 43, 162–74.
304 FREDERIK SÖDERQVIST
Holt, R., A. Macdonald and P.-D. Gore-Coty (2017), ‘5 Billion Trips’, press 
release, Uber, 29 June, https://www.uber.com/newsroom/5billion-2/.
Lessig, L. (1999), ‘Code is Law’, in L. Lessing, Code and Other Laws of 
Cyberspace, 3–8, New York: Basic Books.
LO (1951), Fackföreningsrörelsen och den Fulla Sysselsättningen, report 
to the Landsorganisationen i Sverige Congress, Malmö: translated by 
A.-B. Framtiden.
OECD (2015), Back to Work: Sweden – Improving the Re-employment 
Prospects of Displaced Workers, report by the Directorate for Employ-
ment, Labour and Social Affairs, Paris: OECD Publishing.
Rochet, J.-C. and J. Tirole (2003), ‘Platform Competition in Two‐Sided 
Markets’, Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(4), 990–
1029.
Söderqvist, F. (2016), Plattformsekonomin och den Svenska Partsmodel-
len, Stockholm: Unionen.
Söderqvist, F. (2017), ‘A Nordic Approach to Regulating Intermediary 
Online Labour Platforms’, Transfer: European Review of Labour and 
Research, 23(3), 349–52.
Swenson, P. (2002), Capitalists Against Markets: the Making of Labor 
Markets and Welfare States in the United States and Sweden, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
The Economist (2016), ‘The Emporium Strikes Back: Platforms Are the 
Future – but Not for Everyone’, The Economist, 21 May, https://www.
economist.com/news/business/21699103-platforms-are-futurebut-not-
everyone-emporium-strikes-back.
Thiel, P. (2014), ‘Competition is for Losers’, The Wall Street Journal, 12 
September, https://www.wsj.com/articles/peter-thiel-competition-is-for-
losers-1410535536.
 305
In the Netherlands, as in the rest of the world, an energetic debate 
is under way on the potential impact of digitalisation on the labour 
market and welfare state. The importance of digitalisation in the 
Dutch public debate is demonstrated, among other things, by the 
heightened attention it has received in the key Dutch advisory bod-
ies. At the end of 2016, the Socio-Economic Council, the key insti-
tution of the Dutch neo-corporatist model, published its study Mens 
en Technologie: Samen aan het Werk (Humans and Technology: 
Working Together) (SER 2016a). A year earlier the Scientific 
Council for Government Policy published De Robot de Baas: de 
Toekomst van Werk in het Tweede Machinetijdperk (The Robots in 
Command: The Future of Work in the Second Machine Age) (Went, 
Kremer and Knottnerus 2015). In the same year, the Rathenau 
Institute published a report commissioned by the parliament titled 
Werken aan de Robotsamenleving (Working on the Robot Society) 
(van Est and Kool 2015).
Digitalisation has also become a major subject at the collective 
bargaining tables across the labour market. On the one hand, this 
heightened attention reflects the impact digitalisation has been 
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having on the Dutch economy and labour market in recent years 
and the need to deal with its economic and social implications. 
On the other hand, it reflects worries about the possible negative 
outcomes digitalisation may have on the number and quality of 
jobs, inequality and welfare, and the desire to influence this process 
through public and private policy. Although the new Dutch govern-
ment is trying to reap the benefits of the fourth industrial revolution 
by investing in digital technologies and cybersecurity (VVD et al. 
2017), there is no explicit policy agenda centred on technological 
innovation.
In this essay we will discuss the impact of digital technologies in 
the Netherlands, with a focus on its varied effects in the different 
sectors of the economy, and point out how new social policies and 
related interventions can overcome some of the possible negative 
consequences brought by technology.
WORK IN THE DIGITAL AGE
New technologies, including physical and social robots, artificial 
intelligence, driverless cars, cloud computing and data analytics, 
have a big impact on employment in Europe. Well-known com-
mentators like Elon Musk, Bill Gates and Stephen Hawking as well 
as policymakers are worried that intelligent and more powerful 
machines will eventually take over most of the existing jobs (see 
also Frey and Osborne 2013). The most routinisable jobs are most 
at risk of automation (Acemoglu and Autor 2011; see also Arnold 
et al. this volume). However, most studies and scenarios largely 
neglect the creation of new jobs, goods and services brought about 
by new technology. Furthermore, most jobs are a so-called ‘bundle 
of tasks’ that can’t all be automated that easily. For example, con-
sider the work of mental health workers which depends considerably 
on complex problem solving and social skills. Only humans have the 
power of social empathy, which is extremely difficult to automate 
(Colvin 2015). Notwithstanding these limitations, new technology 
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is fundamentally altering the nature of work. We will briefly reflect 
on what technology means for job markets, with a focus in particu-
lar on the Netherlands as an example of an open economy with a 
rapid increase in information and communications technology (ICT) 
investments since 2000 (OECD 2016).
New technologies, such as ICT and the adoption of computers, 
have triggered a process of job polarisation across many European 
labour markets (Goos, Manning and Salomons 2014; van Est and 
Kool 2015). Many jobs, mostly routine and middle-skilled but also 
certain low-skilled jobs, are being replaced by ICT and other tech-
nologies. This trend can be seen in many European countries (see 
Figure 23.1). The Netherlands has also experienced automation of 
many routine middle-skilled jobs, such as in banking, insurance and 
other financial service providers, or low-skilled jobs in warehous-
ing, though less than most other EU countries. Jobs at the lower end 
of the labour market distribution remain relatively stable, however, 
due to a growing demand for new services and a declining number 
of low-skilled workers, while high-skilled jobs can more easily 
complement the introduction of new technology (Dekker and van 
der Veen 2017).
Figure 23.1 Percentage decline in occupational employment shares in middle-
wage occupations (16 EU countries, 1993–2010). Source: Author.
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While new technology sometimes substitutes (middle-skilled) 
employees and sometimes complements (high-skilled) employees, 
it may also affect the nature of the employer–employee relationship. 
Online platforms, such as Uber, Airbnb and TaskRabbit, already 
disrupt existing business models and enable companies quickly to 
adjust the size of their (flexible) workforce. In the Netherlands, 12% 
of all adults report that they have earned money through the plat-
form economy as a self-employed worker at some point (see Huws 
et al. this volume). The rise of this so-called ‘gig economy’ poses 
important questions and challenges concerning the protection and 
regulation of new groups of ‘crowdworkers’ (TNO 2016). These 
concern, above all, the often high insecurity and low quality of jobs 
and limited access to social security, particular for the rapidly grow-
ing group of (dependent) self-employed (see Schor this volume). 
Various types of flexible employment already accounting for 35% 
of the Dutch labour market, and this is likely to increase further as 
the platform economy grows.
New technology is fundamentally changing labour markets, but 
the future extent of possible job losses, labour market polarisation 
and the rise of the ‘gig economy’ is still unclear. The same is true 
for the quality of jobs, which may deteriorate if the present trend 
continues but which can also be safeguarded through public or col-
lective interventions (Went, Kremer and Knottnerus 2015). Indeed, 
the future development of the labour market is not an autonomous 
process and can be steered by politics and collective labour market 
actors. At the moment, unemployment in the Netherlands is low and 
the Dutch labour market is getting tighter, with labour shortages 
emerging for a number of medium- and high-skilled occupations 
(IT, healthcare, engineers, technicians, teachers, etc.). How this will 
develop in the future is an open question. What is clear is that the 
demand for skills in the economy is changing, with digital skills 
becoming ever more important across occupations.
The next section focuses on an important but less studied dimen-
sion of digitalisation, which is key to understanding its immediate 
impact: how the process varies across sectors.
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A SECTORAL PERSPECTIVE
The complex and diverse effects of digitalisation are underlined 
when we take a sectoral perspective. Here we will provide some 
examples of the impacts of digitalisation on the number and qual-
ity of jobs in different sectors in the short and medium term. In 
some sectors, such as banking, digitalisation leads mainly to jobs 
losses. Automation and the increased use of internet banking have 
destroyed many mid-level jobs at both headquarters and clos-
ing bank branches. Employment in the three largest banks in the 
Netherlands has declined by some 40,000 jobs and further cuts are 
foreseen for the immediate future.
Another example is the graphic design industry. Here digitalisa-
tion has reduced the demand for printed materials and improved the 
capacity of companies and individuals to do their own design work, 
mainly hitting printing personnel and low- and medium-skilled 
graphic designers. As a result, employment in the sector declined 
from 45,000 jobs in 2004 to 24,000 jobs in 2014 (UWV 2016a). At 
the same time, graphic design is providing more opportunities for 
highly skilled designers (UWV 2016a), which is in line with the 
skill-biased technological change hypothesis.
In other sectors digitalisation leads to employment growth, 
although with varying levels of quality. One example is the IT sector, 
where employment has increased following growing demand for IT 
services throughout the economy. According to the UWV (2016b), 
the sector has created some 25,000 additional jobs since 2013. 
Moreover, these are generally high-quality jobs, making a positive 
contribution to the labour market. Employment has also grown in 
various types of distribution activities related to e-commerce and the 
platform economy, including parcel delivery and food delivery (like 
Deliveroo, foodora or ThuisBerzOrgd.nl). Here, though, jobs are 
often of low quality, characterised by high insecurity, low earnings 
and lack of social protection and disability insurance. Employers in 
this sector follow a low-cost, high-flexibility strategy to the detri-
ment of the workers. They often want only self-employed workers to 
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cut costs by avoiding, among other things, contributions to the social 
security system, and to transfer much of the employer risk onto the 
shoulders of these workers. A case in point here is Deliveroo, which 
recently announced that it wants to transform all 1,750 employ-
ment contracts into self-employment arrangements. This led to the 
first protest march of Deliveroo workers; they objected to this plan, 
demanding permanent contracts and the establishment of a works 
council to give employees influence on company policy.
In other sectors, digitalisation does not necessarily have an effect 
on the number of jobs but rather on the quality of jobs. A key 
example here is the health sector. A recent study on digitalisation in 
Dutch healthcare shows that digitalisation is a priority policy area 
in the sector, but not with the objective to reduce costs or employ-
ment (Het Digitale Landschap 2016). A survey among care profes-
sionals shows that the three major objectives of digitalisation in 
health are to provide tailor-made care, to reduce the administrative 
burden for healthcare workers, and to be able to react quicker and 
more accurately to care demands. Such forms of digitalisation then 
allow healthcare workers to dedicate more of their time to patients 
and to provide better care. It is also likely to improve the quality of 
their jobs. Similar observations can be made in the education sector 
(Onderwijsraad 2017).
These sector-by-sector perspectives demonstrate that in the short 
and medium term digitalisation can lead to job creation as well as 
job losses, and to increases as well as decreases in job quality. An 
effective response to digitalisation would therefore include a strong 
sectoral component. In the Dutch context, where most sectors are 
covered by collective agreements, discussions between trade unions 
and employers’ organisations should play a key role.
A LONGER-TERM POLICY PERSPECTIVE
What long-term role should policymakers play in the context of 
digitalisation? With future developments so uncertain, they should 
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define a set of principles and goals concerning the process of digi-
talisation. For example, digitalisation should be at the service of 
society; it is not an end in itself and should therefore abide to certain 
conditions. Most importantly, it should not result in declining job 
quality and increased inequality. It should only take place in a con-
text in which workers’ rights are protected for everyone who works, 
income distribution is fair and social protection is available to all. 
Following such principles, politicians can monitor this process and, 
where needed, adjust it.
Translating such principles into policy first of all involves 
guaranteeing workers’ rights, including decent wages and secure 
employment for platform workers, including the self-employed. 
This requires an adjusted definition of what a worker is and of the 
relationship between platform workers and their employers. This 
issue is currently being debated in the Netherlands but has not yet 
been resolved. Platform workers, and all others confronted with 
digitalisation, should get a say in company policy through works 
councils and/or collective bargaining.
Second, the welfare state will also need reform to adapt to these 
challenges (see Palier this volume). Many self-employed people 
lack access to unemployment benefits, disability insurance and pen-
sions. For many this is a choice, but there is a growing group of the 
self-employed, including those involved in the platform economy, 
for whom it is a matter of prohibitive costs. The welfare state should 
be adapted to include the self-employed in these three areas of social 
security. The respective costs could be carried by the companies 
through social contributions, as with employees. This will prevent 
self-employment leading to precarious work and high-income inse-
curity. An alternative approach is reforming the tax system. For 
example, all generic fiscal incentives and tax allowances for the 
self-employed in the Netherlands could be used for social security 
coverage instead.
Third, education and training will be crucial components of the 
policy response (see De Franceschi this volume). Digital skills 
should become part and parcel of educational programmes where this 
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is not yet the case, to prepare students properly for the future. For 
those already in work, the lifelong learning principle should be taken 
much more seriously than it is today. Dutch enterprises and public 
organisations pay lip service to the issue but only provide limited 
training and retraining efforts (SER 2016b). Training is organised 
along sectoral lines, through specific training funds, making it more 
difficult for workers to get training for new occupations (Dekker and 
van der Veen 2017). This is especially problematic for workers in 
sectors where employment is declining because of digitalisation, for 
workers on flexible contracts, who need more but get less training 
than workers on permanent contracts, and for the (dependent) self-
employed, who do not have access to collectively organised training 
at all. In light of this, increasing training efforts for all workers and 
overcoming the sectoral division of the funding and delivery of train-
ing should be a priority in a rapidly evolving labour market.
Finally, there is the issue of inequality and income distribution. 
According to some predictions, digitalisation may lead to strongly 
increasing inequality because of the concentration of ownership of 
algorithms, platforms and robots, and strong negative employment 
effects (see Crouch this volume). If this is the case, questions should 
be asked about private ownership of the means of production and the 
extent to which income generated by private enterprises corresponds 
to their owners. Collective ownership or technology taxes may be a 
way out of such dilemmas. Some of these issues may not be solvable 
within national borders and may require a coordinated effort in the 
context of the EU or the World Trade Organization.
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The academic debate on the Belgian platform economy is still only 
at its very beginnings. Scientific interest is slowly emerging from 
an intermittent yet increasing debate on the platform economy – 
more often called the ‘sharing’, ‘collaborative’, ‘peer-to-peer’ or 
‘on-demand’ economy (Drahokoupil and Fabo 2016) in the press 
– mainly reporting cases of conflicts between large, international, 
platform-organised companies such as Uber, Airbnb and Deliveroo 
and trade unions or public authorities. At the time of writing 
(January 2018), Deliveroo bike couriers are striking in Brussels 
against the company’s imposition that they work as self-employed 
for €5 gross per delivery, after Deliveroo’s recent unilateral termina-
tion of the contract with SMart, a platform-based organisation which 
had negotiated a collective deal for its members working as bike 
couriers (Kilhoffer and Lenaerts 2017).2 Only a few weeks ago, taxi 
drivers were taking to the streets against the Taxi Plan of the social-
ist minister of mobility of the Brussels region, redrawing existing 
legislation to ‘modernise’ the taxi sector, which is expected to lead 
to the regularisation of Uber.
BELGIUM
Reinvigorating the self-regulated 
labour market model1
Patrizia Zanoni
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The media coverage suggests that existing Belgian federal law 
regulating the ‘sharing or collaborative economy’ – ‘deeleconomie’ 
in Dutch and ‘économie collaborative’ in French, which entered into 
force on 1 March 2017, has not resolved the controversy. Introduced 
to “support and give more freedom to a growing group of mini-
entrepreneurs” (De Croo 2016), this legislation sets a fixed taxation 
rate of 10% for individuals working on a registered platform of up 
to €5,000 per annum. Previously the tax rate was 33% on activities 
in the sharing economy. The law foresees that the tax, which will 
be levied by the platform itself, only applies to individuals offering 
services occasionally, as opposed to those offering them profession-
ally. These individuals will still need to register as self-employed. 
It thus creates a third employment status, in addition to employee 
and self-employed. The law was passed only a few days after the 
European commission’s plea for national legislation that would aim 
at eliminating barriers in the sharing economy, yet at the same time 
avoiding the imposition of “cumbersome legislation on platforms” 
(European Commission 2016). This latter point had been advocated 
by 11 EU member states in an open letter to the commission a few 
months earlier (UK et al. 2016).
The law clearly echoes the main arguments of the EU communica-
tion that the economic growth potential, estimated between €160bn 
and €572bn(!) depending on the sources, can be attained only by tak-
ing the sharing economy out of the ‘grey’ legal zone in which it is cur-
rently operating. At a historical time of stagnating economic growth, 
a sector whose revenues doubled between 2014 and 2015 (Vaughan 
and Daverio 2016), the sharing economy is presented as a unique 
opportunity to enhance Europe’s competitiveness. Accordingly, the 
platform economy is seen as an occasion to “simplify and modernise 
market access requirements. [. . .] to relieve operators from unneces-
sary regulatory burden [. . .] and to avoid fragmentation of the Single 
Market” (European Commission 2016: 7).
The language of both Belgian law and the EU communication 
obscures what is at stake with the platform economy. It is not only 
the organisation of work in specific sectors but the entire institutional 
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tradition of labour market self-regulation between social partners 
that historically stands at the core of the Belgian labour market and 
society as a whole. Although the platform economy still represents 
only a small share of the total economy, it has rapidly become the 
dominant business model in specific sectors, indicating that this is 
only the start of what is to become a fourth industrial revolution. If 
this were the case, then the key question is, as stressed by Söderqvist 
(2016, 2017a, 2017b), how do we integrate the platform economy 
into our social welfare model, a self-regulated labour market model 
collectively negotiated between employers and trade unions?
This chapter links the challenges posed today by the platform 
economy to the long-term debate on the flexibility of the Belgian 
labour market to foster inclusion. Flexibility has been increased 
through the direct intervention of the state therefore breaking the 
tradition of self-regulation. I argue that the platform economy, while 
posing a great challenge, might paradoxically offer a historical occa-
sion for capital and labour to (partially) realign their interests and 
reinvigorate self-regulation. I will conclude by proposing policy 
actions to strengthen workers’ rights in the platform economy.
THE PLATFORM ECONOMY DEBATE 
AS A SHOWCASE OF THE CRISIS OF 
BELGIAN SELF-REGULATION
Belgium is a European country with strong collective bargaining 
institutions at the national, sectoral and company levels, and with 
one of the highest collective bargaining coverage rates in the EU 
(96%), a high and stable union density of over 50% (ETUI 2017), 
and 76% of employees work for an employer that is organised 
(European Commission 2011). The self-regulating Belgian system 
has increasingly come under pressure because of technological 
changes, European enlargement, the global financial and eco-
nomic crisis and, more recently, the shift of national politics to the 
right. Since the mid-1990s, various governments have intervened 
320 PATRICIA ZANONI
to ‘modernise’ labour market institution. In July 1996, the law 
on the promotion of employment and preventative measures to 
safeguard competitiveness was adopted. The law sets a ceiling 
– the so-called ‘wage norm’ – for collectively negotiated wage 
growth based on the expected average increase of the labour cost 
in France, Germany and the Netherlands, Belgium’s main trading 
partners (Van Oycke and Van Gyes 2017). The government inter-
vened directly setting maximum wage increases in 1997–1998, 
2005–2006 and 2011–2012, and froze all salaries between 2013 
and 2015. Next to wage moderation, the legislator has changed the 
labour law to increase flexibility. The last initiative is the law on 
feasible and agile work passed on 5 March 2017, which foresees 
among others the calculation of working hours annually (maxi-
mum nine hours per day and 45 hours per week), the possibility for 
temporary agencies to employ workers with contracts for an indef-
inite period, and changes in the regulation of joint employment 
of workers by small companies through an ‘employers’ grouping 
plan’. Of particular importance in this context is article 79, which 
allows night work for logistical and support services linked to 
e-commerce (Federal Public Service Employment, Labour and 
Social Dialogue 2017).
A key argument used in support of containing labour cost 
increases and enhanced flexibility is the argument of inclusion: this 
‘modernisation’ of the labour law would allow historically excluded 
groups to enter the Belgian labour market. The following statement 
by Jan Denys, the director corporate communications and public 
affairs of Randstad Belgium, a prominent voice in the public debate 
about labour market issues, is instructive:
To answer the question where we have to go with our labour market 
policy, we should start from the current performance of the Belgian 
labour market. Overall, it is not good relative to the European context, 
and certainly not if we want to brand ourselves as a ‘top region’. In 
this country, too few people work, above all those above 50, the youth, 
people with a migration background and low-skilled women. The 
transition between unemployment to work is one of the lowest in the 
 321BELGIUM
EU. A stronger proof of a malfunctioning labour market cannot be 
given. At the same time, job security is one of the highest. This points 
to a strong insider-outsider labour market model. [. . .] The big chal-
lenge for our policy-makers is to adapt our labour market institutions 
to the changing conditions with as baseline: from job security to work 
security. This can be achieved through more flexibility (deregulation) 
but also re-regulation for instance concerning training (Denys 2013, 
emphasis added).
An analogous, if more explicit, reasoning was formulated by 
Hein Knaapen, global director of human resource management at 
ING [Internationale Nederlanden Groep], who in the wake of an 
announced lay off of 3,500 employees in the Belgian branch, pub-
licly lamented the ‘petrified’ nature of the Belgian (and the Dutch) 
labour market(s):
[The] open-end employment contract is increasingly protected. And 
then you achieve the opposite of what you want to. It boils down to 
the fact that young people and minorities get less and less hired. As in 
the current system, you cannot lay anyone off (Tanghe 2016).
Also scholars pleading for deregulation commonly argue that cur-
rent workers’ rights are incompatible with the inclusion of young 
and elderly in the labour market. Ive Marx, one of the leading 
Belgian experts on poverty, recently stated:
There is a too large group of low-educated people, often with a migra-
tion background, without a job now [. . .] This is a key main cause of 
poverty. Therefore, we have to get rid of the rigid regulation of our 
labour market (Wauters 2016).
The discursive mobilisation of inclusion unveils the continuity 
between the current debate on platform-based work and the long-
standing debate on labour costs and flexibilisation. Indeed, the 
inclusion potential of platform-based work does not only feature 
prominently in the EU communication but is also acknowledged in 
recent trade union initiatives:
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The collaborative economy generates new employment opportunities, 
generating revenues beyond traditional linear employment relation-
ships, and it enables people to work according to flexible arrange-
ments (European Commission 2016, 11).
Platforms for work that can be completed remotely and delivered 
online (such as Upwork, Freelancer.com, Amazon Mechanical Turk, 
CrowdFlower, and 99designs) offer economic opportunities that 
might not otherwise be available to some workers. They allow, for 
example, workers with responsibilities that prevent them from leaving 
home, workers in rural areas, workers with disabilities, and workers in 
‘developing’ countries the potential to earn income by working online 
(ETUI and IGM 2017).
THE PLATFORM ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL  
OPPORTUNITY TO REINVIGORATE 
SELF-REGULATION?
While trade unions and employers typically hold contrasting views 
on whether labour cost moderation and labour flexibilisation repre-
sent an adequate recipe to create a more inclusive labour market, 
their analysis of digitalisation and the sharing economy appears 
more aligned, as suggested by a recent report of the National 
Labour Council and the Central Council for the Economy (CNT and 
NAR 2017). Focusing on commercial digital platforms the report 
emphasises that a level playing field is a necessary condition for 
fair competition. It also criticises the optimistic rhetoric leading to 
insufficient control of fiscal fraud and expresses serious reserva-
tions about the provisions of the law on the sharing or collaborative 
economy, including the raise of tax-free annual income to €6,000. 
The text points to the many risks regarding unfair competition, 
equal treatment, work organisation, social protection, fiscal income 
and social security balance. Significantly, the social partners unani-
mously invite the government to consult the inter-professional and 
directly concerned sectoral social partners to assess the involved 
risks before working out the implementation, reaffirming their own 
role in the regulation of the Belgian labour market.
 323BELGIUM
A few days after the report’s release, the president of the Neutraal 
Syndicaat voor Zelstandigen [Syndicat Neutre pour Indépendants], 
Christine Mattheuws, called the rise to €6,000 per year “a poisoned 
chalice” for Christmas, warning that unfair competition will drive a 
number of self-employed out of business. It would also lead to an 
estimated loss for the social security fund of about €200mn a year 
(Mattheeuws and Nouten 2017). This reaction reveals that interests 
of ‘classical’ employers might not necessarily overlap with firms 
operating a digital platform model, especially in the eventuality 
that the former get the bill of those that are unwilling to pay. This 
possibility is also highlighted by the question provocatively asked 
by Chris Serroyen, the head of the research unit of the Christian-
democratic trade union ACV: “Why should people keep working 
full-time if they can make as much as €500 a month without any 
social security contribution?” (Trends 2017). Pulling individuals 
outside the formal labour market represents an alarming scenario 
for both employers’ and employees’ representatives, at a time of 
economic recovery and increasing labour shortage due to the mas-
sive retirement of the baby-boomers and an enduring skill mismatch.
These statements point to the predatory nature of platform-based 
firms, which extract value from labour whose cost of social repro-
duction they do not pay (Bhattacharya 2013). Therefore the organ-
isation of work through algorithms coordinating spatially dispersed 
labour does not only posit huge organisational challenges to trade 
unions, which have historically organised workers territorially, from 
workplaces, sectors and, in some cases, communities. It also poses 
important problems to other firms and the state. When a platform-
based business model enables a firm to circumvent existing collec-
tively negotiated rules, it builds a competitive advantage based on 
the evasion of institutional accountability towards the community of 
firms and of citizens. In particular, it externalises the cost of social 
reproduction of labour to individual workers, their families, other 
firms operating within existing institutions, and the state providing 
services to endow individuals with the skills that make them produc-
tive. The diffusion of platform-based firms is likely to accelerate the 
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tendency towards an ever more fundamental crisis of social repro-
duction characterising contemporary global capitalism (Leonard and 
Fraser 2016).
The spectre of predatory capital taking over ever larger shares 
of the economy could represent a motivation for social partners to 
recover and innovate the Belgian tradition of self-regulation. Various 
actors, ranging from trade unionists to academics and representatives 
of the cooperative world, are today calling for ‘a new deal’ (Graceffa 
and de Heusch 2017). Whatever that deal might look like, there 
should be awareness that workers’ inclusion without protection is no 
option, as it will induce an ever more deep crisis of social reproduc-
tion, undermining the Belgian economy in the longer term.
WHERE TO GO FROM HERE?
There is ample agreement on the union front that platform-based 
work should at once allow a larger amount of workers not only to 
access paid work, but also entitle them to analogous rights as those 
associated with ‘traditional’ employment. The Frankfurt paper on 
platform-based work launched about a year ago by nine trade unions 
notes that the first International Workshop on Union Strategies in the 
Platform Economy was convened to discuss, among other matters:
the role of unions and other worker organizations in realizing the 
promise of platform-based work to provide labor market access to 
large groups of previously excluded people, including workers in 
‘developing’ countries, and to offer all workers unprecedented free-
dom and flexibility in their working lives – while retaining elements 
of the ‘traditional’ employment relationship hard won in the last two 
centuries of labor struggle, such as:
• minimum wage
• the reasonable expectation to earn a living in a 35- to 40-hour work 
week
• affordable access to health care
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• compensation in case of injury on the job
• integration into national social protection systems such as social 
security
• legal protection from discrimination, abuse, and wrongful dis-
missal, and, crucially
• the right to organise, take collective action, and negotiate collective 
agreements;
that is, in summary, the role of worker organisations in realizing the 
promise of online labor platforms to make ‘good work’ available to 
many more people (Arbeiterkammer et al. 2016, 2–3).
Granting platform-based workers these rights would enable them 
to have access to sufficient means – directly and indirectly, through 
higher wages, insurance, but also access to welfare services – to 
ensure their own social reproduction. Primarily, this is in their own 
interest, but also, importantly, in the interest of capital, which cru-
cially relies on labour for capital accumulation.
Many politically meaningful initiatives surrounding platform-
based work are emerging. Here, I focus on three types of action that 
I believe are important for Belgium: fostering collective organisation 
of platform workers through inclusive union strategies, leveraging 
platform technology to foster firm compliance, and performing 
counter-narratives of firm accountability towards society (Crouch 
this volume).
FOSTERING THE COLLECTIVE ORGANISATION 
OF PLATFORM WORKERS THROUGH 
INCLUSIVE UNION STRATEGIES
Platform-based workers should be allowed to organise and conduct 
collective bargaining, independent of their status as employees or 
self-employed. Belgian trade unions should consider diversify-
ing their strategy to stimulate the collective organisation of plat-
form workers. At the international level clickworkers establish 
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internet-based forums, such as turkernation.com, to exchange infor-
mation and network across borders. In Belgium, the platform-based 
SMart has in the past negotiated an agreement for platform workers 
for Deliveroo. In Vienna, bike couriers for the app-based restaurant 
delivery service foodora recently formed a work council with the 
support of the Austrian transport and services union Vida (Kuba 
2017). These different experiences should be considered as potential 
complementary strategies by the Belgian unions, such as the trans-
port union Belgische Transportarbeiderbond (BTB), to organise bike 
couriers to get better working conditions. An algorithm that offers 
better working conditions and does not discriminate needs to be 
negotiated, to echo De Stefano (2017).
More fundamentally, the platform economy offers the opportunity 
to rethink the modalities of union action, tackling in novel ways 
issues of representativeness, internal democracy in decisionmak-
ing, and ‘network syndicalism’. These issues have been on the 
trade union agenda since the early 1990s, when the first references 
of ‘diversity’ – in terms of the socio-cultural, socio-economic and 
political shifts – and challenge of keeping internal cohesion were 
included in congress documents (Martens et al. 2001). To the extent 
that historically subordinated groups in the labour market and in 
society at large are overrepresented in the platform economy, and 
this latter’s potential to include them represents a key ideological 
argument, as I have argued above, trade unions should attempt to 
envision new modalities of operating to increase their own inclusion. 
The inclusion of the most vulnerable groups is in no way ancillary 
to trade unions, but rather of strategic importance in order to be able 
to defend the labour class as a whole.
LEVERAGING DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES 
TO ENFORCE FIRMS’ COMPLIANCE
It has been observed that platforms cannot only be used to control 
workers, but also, potentially, to enhance law enforcement. For 
 327BELGIUM
instance, if platform-based companies were forced to share the data 
they hold about their workers with labour inspectorates and trade 
unions, the application of labour laws could be greatly facilitated 
(Fabo, Karanovic and Dukova 2017). The Swedish Unionen analo-
gously proposes to embrace an algorithm to foster firms’ compliance 
with the law. Söderqvist argues that trade unions should switch to 
a ‘facilitation’ mode: “If we want platforms to play by the rule, we 
have to make the rules more easily available to them” (Söderqvist 
2016, 2017b). This entails in the first place requiring algorithms to 
become more transparent, so that they can be programmed accord-
ing to the provisions stipulated through collective agreements, rather 
than to bypass the rules (UNI Global Union 2017). Second, union 
action should thus further be directed at making these firms com-
ply more easily by incorporating the collective agreements in their 
algorithm, such as a taxation code. If controlled externally, platform 
mediation has the potential to actually lead to increased, rather than 
lower compliance.
FOSTERING A COUNTER NARRATIVE 
OF FIRM ACCOUNTABILITY
Last, but certainly not least, at a historical moment of crisis of the 
Belgian social model, the solid grip of the centre-right parties in 
Belgian politics, and the complete disarray of the left, I believe 
there is a need for the unions to promote strong counter-narratives 
to the dominant neoliberal, celebratory discourse of the ‘sharing, 
collaborative economy’. The recovering economy and the short-
age of key skills present opportunities to improve the weakened 
image of the Belgian trade unions in the eyes of public opinion 
(especially in the north of the country). This one condition that that 
they become proponents of an alternative discourse emphasises firm 
responsibility and accountability for labour’s social reproduction 
and towards society at large. Reflecting the diversity of workers’ 
socio-demographic and work status constituencies, this narrative 
328 PATRICIA ZANONI
can no longer be centred on the re-affirmation of existing workers’ 
rights (for those workers who have them), but necessarily needs to 
prefigure novel arrangements that extend rights and protections to 
workers who have historically been left outside and now risk being 
included as the cheapest labour (Schor this volume).
NOTES
1. I would like to thank Marco Rocca for his feedback on an early draft 
of this text.
2. Following a parliamentary inquiry by a socialist MP, the Christian-
democratic federal minister of employment is currently conducting an 
investigation into the legality of this unilateral decision by the employer to 
change the terms of employment.
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One hundred years ago the British Labour party described itself 
as ‘the party of the producers’ in its first ever constitution (Webb 
1918). It was founded to fight for good jobs, full employment, and 
a strong welfare state. Over the past century the party has had to 
find new ways to achieve those goals as the nature of work has 
changed. In particular, from the 1960s onwards, helping to build 
a skilled workforce and to create opportunities for workers have 
become as important for the Labour party as protecting workers 
from exploitation.
Today, globalisation, demographic change and the advent of 
transformative new technologies all mean that the British labour 
movement must once again find new ways to fulfil its founding 
purpose. It must renew collectivism in an era of fragmentation and 
insecurity, and ensure there is widespread access to the opportunities 
that new technological advances can provide.
The political consequences of inaction are plain to see. The Brexit 
vote was, at least in part, a roar of anger from parts of the UK that 
felt left behind by the pace of change, and Labour’s popularity 
among working-class voters has been on a downward trajectory over 
the last two decades (Evans and Tilley 2017).
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Technological change could provide the opportunity for a trans-
formation of our labour market. It could grow productivity, raise 
wages and create more rewarding employment opportunities for 
people. But it could also lead to unemployment, insecurity and 
increasing numbers of workers stuck in low-paid, low-skilled jobs. 
The UK’s path is not in the hands of the markets or the gods; it is a 
matter of political choice.
THREE KEY TRENDS
Experts have warned that the fourth industrial revolution could bring 
the ‘rise of the robots’ and a precipitous collapse in employment. 
But this stark prognosis has not yet materialised and it is far from 
clear that it will. The UK employment rate is at an all-time high, and 
while flexible work is on the rise the number of people in full-time 
work has not shrunk. Most people in the UK are satisfied with their 
work, with a recent Fabian Society study showing that 8 out of 10 
workers in the UK find their work to be “interesting and enjoyable” 
(Tait 2016). The overall volume of jobs may not be a concern, but 
there are three key trends which must be addressed for the challenges 
of technological change to be met effectively: low productivity and 
stagnant pay, growing inequalities, and the changing labour market.
LOW PRODUCTIVITY AND STAGNANT PAY
The most stubborn challenge for the future of work is low productiv-
ity: productivity growth in the UK has consistently been ranked the 
second slowest in the G7 group of rich countries since 2010 (PWC 
2017). Wages have stagnated because of this low productivity, with 
real wages still below their pre-crisis peak. Far from the pace of 
innovation and technological change being too fast, as many have 
predicted, the UK’s record on productivity suggests that it is actually 
far too slow, with the exception of a small minority of firms.
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In the absence of rising productivity, the most important policy 
driver for pay increases is the statutory wage floor. This fell in value 
after the financial crisis in 2008, but since 2015 the Conservative 
government has been steadily raising the minimum wage for work-
ers over 25 towards 60% of median hourly earnings. The Low Pay 
Commission has predicted that the proportion of the workforce 
who will be covered by the national minimum wage and national 
living wage will rise from 5% in 2015 to 14% in 2020 (Low Pay 
Commission 2016). This has led some commentators to discuss 
the adoption of ‘one wage’ towns and sectors, where employers 
benchmark pay against the minimum wage and often remove differ-
entials between different types of worker (Bell 2016). The Office for 
Budget Responsibility (OBR) expects that the higher wage floor will 
modestly reduce employment, but it is hoped that it may also push 
employers to invest in skills and new business processes.
INEQUALITY
Over the last 20 years overall income inequality in the UK has 
remained high but stable, with all but the very rich fairing equally 
well before the crisis and equally poorly ever since. The last Labour 
government (2007–2010) succeeded in helping low-income house-
holds to keep up with middle and upper-middle income groups 
through three main policies: a welfare to work programme, the 
introduction of the statutory minimum wage and the expansion of 
in-work benefits. Together this led to a significant fall in child pov-
erty (Joyce and Sibieta 2013). In 2010/11, 18% of children in the 
UK – some 2.3 million in total – came from households that had 
incomes that were lower than 60% of the median rate of disposable 
household income before housing costs, and 27% – some 3.6 million 
children – came from households that had incomes that were lower 
than 60% of the median rate of disposable income after housing 
costs. Compared with 2009/10, this is a fall of two percentage points 
in before housing costs – affecting some 300,000 children, and a 
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fall of two percentage points in after housing costs – affecting some 
200,000 children (DWP 2012). Since 2010 the Conservative-led 
governments have steadily eroded social security for working-age 
families and a significant increase in child poverty is now expected 
over the next five years (DWP 2017, Table 4.1).
In the UK economy there have been growing inequalities in 
household wealth, male earnings, regionally and for generational 
cohorts (Blundell et al. 2017). One of the most pronounced inequali-
ties is the uneven geographical distribution of new opportunities, 
with House of Commons Library analysis suggesting that cities 
have recovered twice as fast as towns following the economic crisis 
(Harari and Ward 2018). A recent report from Future Advocacy, 
a research institute, found that the UK’s former industrial towns, 
which are still struggling with the previous period of industrial 
change since the 1970s, are likely to be disproportionately affected 
by the increasing digitisation of jobs, given the nature of employ-
ment that dominates in these areas (Future Advocacy 2017).
Significant demographic shifts have been brought about by inter-
nal migration throughout the UK, with small towns and villages 
losing more than a million young people to cities and urban centres 
in search of work and education over the past three decades (Hurst 
2017). This divide is in danger of becoming even more pronounced, 
with the new, skilled and creative jobs that are arriving being con-
centrated in cites, and low-paid, low-productivity jobs being the 
primary option for long-term employment everywhere else.
A CHANGING LABOUR MARKET
While the robots are not yet at our door, far-reaching changes can be 
observed in the UK labour market. The number of people worried 
about losing their jobs has been rising steadily since the turn of the 
century, and there has been an upturn in insecure work (Gallie et al. 
2013). The number of people on zero hours contracts has risen nearly 
five-fold since the turn of the millennium, and the number of agency 
workers is approaching 1 million, accounting for nearly 3% of the 
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overall UK workforce in 2016 (Harrop and Tait 2017). There has 
also been a significant rise in the number of the self-employed, who 
now make up a record 15% of the UK workforce, and in the share of 
workers who are employed part-time, up by 1.2% since 1997. This 
rise in part-time employment has been accompanied by an increase in 
the number of people who say that they want to work more hours than 
they currently do – up by almost 1 million since 2007 (Taylor 2017).
But what might the future hold? Is a collapse in UK employment 
just over the horizon? Studies have certainly warned that automation 
is likely to affect a significant number of jobs in the UK. The OECD 
estimates that 9% of jobs are directly at risk. Although Osborne and 
Frey (2013) put the figure at an alarming 47% for the US labour mar-
ket, most economists seem to think that the lower end of this range 
is more likely (see Arnold et al. this volume). Studies suggest that 
workers with low and middle incomes are at the greatest risk of dis-
placement through automation, with Deloitte estimating that UK jobs 
that pay less than £30,000 a year are five times more vulnerable to dis-
placement than jobs paying over £100,000 annually (Dellot 2017a).
We can already see the impact of the new wave of automation 
in some parts of the UK economy, with machines and automated 
systems replacing humans in the delivery of a wide range of routine 
tasks. Even if enough jobs are generated to replace all those lost, 
it seems likely that technological advancement will bring about a 
significant dislocation of jobs and skills. There are still clear skills 
shortages in the UK economy, particularly in high-skill occupations, 
but there is also a problem of excess skills capacity in other areas 
(see Aubrey this volume). This dislocation could further increase 
earnings inequality if intermediate occupations are replaced by more 
high- and low-skill jobs.
THREE CHALLENGES FOR POLICYMAKERS
The British labour market is changing, and the labour movement 
must change with it. Without a strong, progressive policy agenda, 
technological change could result in a rise in insecurity and 
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inequality. There are three priorities that policymakers must tackle 
in order to obviate the worst effects of these challenges: create more 
good jobs, take concerted action to prevent exploitation at work, and 
renew the social security system.
CREATE MORE GOOD JOBS
The first challenge for progressives is to ensure that the opportuni-
ties of the fourth industrial revolution are available to everyone. A 
new strategy must focus on geographic inequality in the UK, fair 
pay and skills, and creating an environment in which productive new 
businesses can grow.
To ensure that people in towns and rural areas have access to good 
jobs, the left must develop a place-based industrial strategy that 
builds on the strengths of local economies. This should have demo-
cratic accountability at its heart, with decisions about investment and 
skills taken by local people. Government investment should focus 
on ‘left behind’ areas in order to level the playing field, and the left 
must put flesh on the bones of the Labour party’s plan to establish 
a network of regional investment banks. The government must also 
focus on transport connectivity to help bring opportunities to places 
that have been overlooked.
Fair pay and skills are also central to a good jobs strategy. 
Alongside measures to strengthen trade unions (discussed below), 
the left must support sectoral pay bargaining and establish rules that 
place workers on company boards. A Labour government should 
also drive up low pay by continuing to raise the rate of the national 
minimum wage, for younger workers as well as the over-25s, until 
there is clear evidence that it has reached a level where it risks being 
a significant drag on employment. Sustained action is also needed to 
improve skills. For example, the apprenticeship levy could evolve 
into a wider training levy that funds training opportunities for all 
employees, and not just apprentices.
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Good jobs are only possible if business is able to grow, and if 
businesses are supported to invest in their workforce. The first step 
that must be taken in this regard is to support businesses to invest in 
the technology of the future. While we have a few world-leaders, in 
every region and every sector, most businesses are not catching up 
with their most innovative peers (Haldane 2017). For example, just 
14% of UK firms are investing in artificial intelligence and the UK is 
falling behind other countries in research investment (Dellot 2017b). 
The development of sectoral and local networks of coordination, 
collaboration and support are essential, something that has been 
alien to British business culture for too long. The government must 
also transform investment in digital infrastructure to ensure there 
is widespread access to technological opportunities and to provide 
greatly enhanced support for firms entering export markets.
END EXPLOITATION AT WORK
Precarious, insecure work could increase as the world of work 
changes, but this is not a technological inevitability. Labour market 
regulation can shape the future of work without being a bar to inno-
vation. As a start the government should take robust steps to drive 
out exploitive working practices and ensure that everyone in work 
has minimum job security. It should prohibit zero-hour contracts, 
and provide a right for workers to obtain a contract that reflects 
hours regularly worked.
The left should also consider what it can do to substantially 
increase the reach and impact of trade unions, which are proven 
to improve wages and working conditions where they are strong 
(Freeman and Medoff 1983), but are struggling with a dwindling 
membership (see Doellgast this volume; BEIS 2017). In Britain trade 
union density is particularly low in the private sector, and especially 
in the fastest growing private-sector industries; private-sector mem-
bership has fallen from 45% in 1979 to 13% in 2016 (Tait 2017).
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To reverse this decline and help workers achieve better terms 
and conditions of employment, and more productive jobs, a future 
Labour government should build a new partnership with the trade 
union movement. Worker voice should be at the heart of all plans 
to boost productivity and to improve the quality of work, as it is in 
other jurisdictions, for example in Finland (see Karjalainen this vol-
ume). The recent Fabian Society report Future Unions calls for this 
partnership to include new requirements for employers to halt all 
union-busting practices and to allow unions into their workplaces, 
for the creation of sector level forums for employers and unions, 
and a seat at the table for workers in discussions about the impact of 
the changing world of work (Tait 2017). These steps could provide 
the basis for a new deal between unions and a future Labour-led 
government.
RENEW THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
These labour market policies will not be able to tackle the risk of 
rising poverty and inequality on their own. The UK also needs to 
reinvent its welfare state to provide investment and insurance for 
the rapidly changing labour market. During the years of austerity 
meted out by the Conservative-led governments, spending on pen-
sions and healthcare was protected, so the balance of expenditure 
has drifted towards the latter half of life. Meanwhile spending on 
lifelong learning and working-age social security has plummeted as 
a share of GDP (HMT 2017, 68). These trends need to be reversed, 
with new entitlements for skills across adult life and a reinvention 
of social insurance before pension age. People should be able to 
obtain economically valuable qualifications at any stage of life – for 
free when they have not trained to the same level previously, and 
on a heavily subsidised basis to retrain in a new field at the same 
level, as in Germany. And meaningful social security supports for 
training should also exist so that people can take time out of work 
to reskill.
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Social security also needs to provide more for families to ensure 
that every child lives in a home with the resources they need to 
develop and thrive. The present government’s universal credit sys-
tem can provide a platform for the reforms that are needed, although 
the new benefit will need to be a lot more generous than the current 
design would allow for. If it can be made to work, universal credit 
should suit the volatility of the modern labour market. Payments 
are intended to rise and fall automatically each month as people’s 
earnings change or they move in and out of work, so universal credit 
should be effective at providing a floor if household incomes fall.
The flip-side of this is that universal credit provides only very 
weak incentives for people to work longer hours or to seek higher 
pay. Families would have better incentives to increase their earnings 
if more in-work social security was provided universally rather than 
being means tested. There is therefore a debate to be had as to how 
best to strike the balance between a more generous means-tested 
system and any expansion to the universal child benefit system, 
perhaps by turning it into a universal basic income for children. But 
in either case there is a ready source of funding in the tax allowance 
system, which could be gradually made less generous. Substituting 
tax-free allowances for children’s benefits would divert money from 
higher earners without dependants to families with children.
Overall the share of national income spent on education and 
working-age social security should rise, after years of austerity cuts. 
And since spending on pensions and health is also likely to increase, 
new sources of revenue will be needed to gradually expand the wel-
fare state as a share of GDP. This will require a fundamental debate 
on taxation, in the context of the changing economy. First there is 
a case to be made for the greater use of earmarked taxes and social 
insurance to legitimise new revenue raising. An expanded role for 
national insurance and new health taxes are both good options. The 
UK could even consider ringfenced funds, of the sort common else-
where in Europe (eg France). Everyone will need to pay a bit more 
(which will only be acceptable once living standards are rising). But 
the top third and particularly the top 1% in society should expect the 
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highest tax increases, as currently they pay no more as a share of 
their income than people with middle incomes.
The balance of tax will also need to be reviewed to ensure that, 
as the tax share rises, it also raises revenue efficiently and fairly. 
At present the UK levies relatively heavy taxes on conventional 
employee labour and business premises. A rebalancing of taxation 
is needed that might include a shift towards taxing wealth, non-
employment income and harmful externalities.
In the long term perhaps the labour share of GDP will decline 
significantly and a whole new approach to taxation will be needed. 
But for the foreseeable future the priority of government should be 
to achieve tax neutrality between similar economic activities that are 
conducted in different ways. The tax gap between self-employment 
and employee labour should be greatly reduced and more neutral 
ways to raise revenue from business are also needed. In particular, 
technology-heavy businesses that deploy less labour and property 
need to be appropriately taxed in the places where their sales and 
profits are generated.
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Ireland is profoundly shaped by the factors that make up the core of 
contemporary capitalism – including globalisation, financialisation, 
new technologies and new forms of workplace and labour market 
flexibilities. Perhaps most fundamentally, Ireland has been moving 
decisively towards a post-industrial occupational structure, albeit 
in an uneven manner with rapid digitalisation in technology, mar-
ket services, and places within the public service that lie alongside 
other sectors where there has been relatively low adoption of new 
technologies. The crisis of 2008 hit Ireland particularly hard, with 
very rapid increases in unemployment combined with government 
indebtedness. The combination of structural changes and the shock 
to welfare and public finances since 2008 makes the intersection of 
work and welfare a vital policy issue, and Ireland an exceptionally 
apposite case study for examining this interplay.
The Republic of Ireland occupies an interesting place in the world 
of welfare capitalisms. Economically, it shares significant features 
with the ‘liberal’ economies – including relatively low levels of 
product and labour market regulation, high rates of foreign invest-
ment and other capital flows, high levels of market inequality, and 
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volatile business cycles. Nonetheless, we also see significant public 
efforts to enhance welfare, particularly through benefits and other 
social transfers. Between these market-centred and welfarist poles is 
a varied institutional landscape, which has included neo-corporatist 
social partnership agreements between 1987 and 2009, followed 
by loose employer–union coordination, alongside a central role for 
industrial development agencies that are focused on domestic as 
well as foreign firms (Ó Riain 2014).
How well is Ireland managing to combine the headlong rush into 
an uncertain future of new technologies, relationships and activities 
with a social contract, of whatever kind? To examine this we focus 
on the intersection between the welfare state and the lower-wage 
end of the labour market, where the challenges are greatest. We first 
provide an overview of the key features of Ireland’s welfare state; 
we then examine the character of jobs at this lower end of the labour 
market, and how they are shaped by the use of new technologies; 
and finally we briefly return to the implications for the welfare sys-
tem and Irish economic and social development in the future.
THE IRISH WELFARE SYSTEM
We can think about the Irish welfare system as being simultaneously 
strong, weak and vulnerable. First, the strength of the Irish welfare 
system is the transfer system. Figure 26.1 shows the level of inequal-
ity within the market, and after taxes and transfers, in a selection of 
countries, and the percentage reduction in market inequality by those 
transfers and taxes. Ireland is the only country listed in this table that 
has both high market inequality and a high proportional reduction in 
that inequality through the transfer system. That pattern remained 
fairly consistent throughout the boom of the 2000s, the bust from 
2008 until around 2013, and the growth in more recent years. The 
transfer system faces a major challenge with persistently high levels 
of market income inequality, but the system also does significant 
work to reduce that inequality. However, it is telling that market 
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incomes have not become more equal over these years, regardless of 
the welfare effort being expended to address this inequality.
Ireland’s weaknesses are the flip-side of its strengths as it has long 
been recognised in welfare policy circles that the Irish welfare sys-
tem is much more effective at redistributing income through benefits 
and other cash transfers than it is at delivering widely used social 
services (NESC 2005). In some key areas, particularly childcare, 
the system is almost entirely private or familial. Training and care 
supports are crucial in tackling questions of labour market participa-
tion and also for reducing market inequality – but after a reasonable 
performance in the 1990s, Irish efforts in these areas decreased 
markedly in the 2000s (Ó Riain 2014). These missing services are 
all the more significant as a ‘runaway labour market’ increasingly 
provides medium- to high-skill jobs (OECD 2016) that are out of 
reach of those at the lower end of the job market. While the overall 
trend is towards an upgrading of the occupational structure, driven 
by the growth of professional employment and partly shaped by 
digital technologies, the distance from those jobs becomes greater, 
Figure 26.1 Inequality in selected European countries: market inequality (Gini), 
inequality after taxes and transfers (Gini) and reduction in inequality due to taxes 
and transfers (%). Source: OECD (2014).
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especially as education levels rise. Again, the challenge to welfare 
increases as the labour market changes – but the welfare system 
relating to services is often found lacking.
Finally, despite the improvement in Ireland’s public finances in 
recent years, the financing of the welfare system remains quite vul-
nerable. While the transfer system is making a significant financial 
difference, it depends on a very narrow tax base. This has been built 
into public policies for at least two decades as the Irish state tries 
to protect incomes at the lower end by linking tax thresholds to the 
minimum wage and similar measures. Meanwhile, public policy has 
created a relatively small tax wedge for employers, particularly in 
social security contributions such as pay-related social insurance, 
which are very low compared with other small European countries. 
Put together, these policies ensure a very small tax effect on costs 
in labour-intensive, relatively low-productivity firms – but they also 
weaken the tax base, and do little to encourage firms to enhance 
learning and upgrade business activities.
Ireland’s welfare system is based on using transfers to tackle 
low incomes in an unequal market. This combines with tax policies 
designed to support a low-wage labour market, while as services are 
comparatively poorly resourced (and the enterprise policy histori-
cally favoured larger, often foreign, firms over the domestic sector) 
the gap from the bottom to the top of the labour market remains as 
difficult to bridge as ever.
THE IRISH LABOUR MARKET
The welfare system and the labour market appear to combine to 
continually reproduce a system that generates significant welfare 
transfer efforts, while also reproducing the conditions that make that 
effort necessary – even as high-tech sectors have continued to grow 
steadily and professional employment has consistently expanded. A 
full understanding of this process requires that we look more closely 
at the jobs and workplaces that are typical within this segment of the 
labour market.
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These workplaces are shaped by three of the significant trends 
of the day. First, there is currently major concern regarding the 
introduction of new technologies, and particularly automation. New 
technology does not seem to challenge employment levels, which 
have grown significantly in each of Ireland’s post-crisis recoveries – 
largely following the dynamics outlined in Arnold et al. (this vol-
ume). In keeping with their argument, we can see that technology 
will, at a minimum, significantly restructure work – not just the level 
of employment, but the kinds of work and how they are carried out. 
As we will see, this is reflected in the ways that work is organised 
and how these are changing.
Somewhat separate from this is a second major debate around the 
nature of employment. Despite the pervasive sense of employment 
insecurity that many people now feel, many of the statistical indica-
tors do not show a huge increase in the conventional measures of 
precarious employment. Therefore, we have to dig a little deeper into 
what precarity means for different workers in different situations.
Finally, the third theme relates to how work itself has been re-
organised, not just in the technologies that are used, or the nature 
of the employment relationship, but in how the work itself is being 
done, particularly in the emergence and consolidation of systems of 
work that involve various forms of flexibility.
Table 26.1 and Figures 26.2 and 26.3 summarise some analyses 
of the European Working Conditions Surveys from 1995 to 2015, 
which examine each of these issues. We start by examining the typi-
cal forms that work organisation takes in Europe today, based on 
a latent class analysis of these surveys. We can identify three key 
clusters, defined along two dimensions:
• learning – whether there is an opportunity for learning and whether 
the job involves complex tasks
• autonomy – how much scope people have at work to make deci-
sions about their own work and how it is done.
Where there is little complexity and little autonomy, we find ‘sim-
ple’ jobs (Holm et al. 2010). Where there is a lot of learning but 
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relatively low autonomy, we find the now classic model of lean pro-
duction that has been much debated in recent decades, with the influ-
ence of Japanese production methods in particular. This involves a 
lot of pressure being pulled through the system, with many complex 
tasks but relatively little autonomy. Typically, this is most common 
in large-scale services and manufacturing. Finally, there is a learning 
system where workers have a lot of complexity to face, but also a 
high degree of autonomy.
We can also identify sub-categories. For example, tight control at 
work creates a pressurised version of the work, and if workers carry 
out extended (and often unflexible) hours around that pressurised 
work, this constitutes a more extreme category. Table 26.1 outlines 
these nine kinds of work (we also include a tenth kind, Taylorism, 
which is in many respects a mix of simple extreme and lean extreme 
forms of work organisation). Table 26.1 also shows the change in 
the proportion of EU15 workers in each of these forms of work from 
1995 to 2015.
The Simple and Taylorist regimes in the column on the left are 
most common in Mediterranean economies. The learning forms of 
work on the right are strongest in the Nordics and Lean is gener-
ally strongest in the UK, Ireland and continental countries such as 
Germany, France and Austria. Overall, there is a shift towards more 
pressurised work, but also a growth in the complexity of work. Thus, 
work is often more interesting, but also more demanding.
How does this relate to new technologies? One well-documented 
possibility is that when people work with new technologies their 
Table 26.1 Forms of work organisation and change in the proportion of EU15 
workers in each, 1995–2015.
Simple (−1.3%) Lean (+0.8%) Learn (−3.9%)
Simple Pressure (−1.8%) Lean Pressure (+2.2%) Learn Pressure (+2.4%)
Simple Extreme (+0.4%)
Taylor (−0.7%)
Lean Extreme (+2.2%) Learn Extreme (−0.3%)
Source: Author’s calculations, based on the European Surveys of Working Conditions (Eurofound 
2015).
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work becomes deskilled. However, Figure 26.2 shows that people 
who do not use a computer very much (or not at all) in their jobs 
tend to work in ‘simple’ kinds of job organisation. They do not have 
access to either technology or learning in the workplace. Higher 
levels of computer use are associated with more learning at work, 
Figure 26.2 The proportion of technology used in each major form of work 
organisation, Ireland, 2015. Source: OECD (2014).
Figure 26.3 The percentage of pressured or extreme forms of work in each work-
place type, by level of technology use. Source: Eurofound (2015).
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and greater technology use is attached to more complex, more inter-
esting work.
However, the picture becomes more complex when we look within 
the forms of work – Simple, Lean and Learn. Figure 26.3 shows that 
within each broad form of work organisation, the general tendency 
is that the more workers use computers the more pressurised they 
are (more likely to be in Pressure or Extreme forms of work). Again 
we find this important tension between upgrading work (with more 
complexity, learning and often autonomy) and at the same time sig-
nificant control pressures and challenges of flexibility.
The third dimension we outlined is labour market precarity. We 
draw here on an interesting measure in the European Working 
Conditions Survey, which includes various kinds of employment 
contract status. This measure defines workers with a contract of 
indefinite duration as a permanent contract. There are a series of 
non-permanent options, including fixed-term temporary contracts, 
working for an agency, or working without a contract. A fuller 
discussion would be needed to explain what ‘no contract’ means in 
different countries, but Ireland consistently has high levels of people 
working with no contract – 12.8% in 2015. The only countries with 
similar levels are the UK and Mediterranean economies like Greece, 
Spain and Portugal (see Grande this volume). This is also supported 
by data from the European Social Survey (Eurofound 2015) where 
the proportion of people stating they are working without a contract 
is even higher than in the European Working Conditions Survey – 
and again is significantly higher in Ireland than in most of the rest 
of Europe.
When we looked more closely at this data we found that a lot 
of the people in this category in Ireland may think of themselves 
as permanent workers, but are working without a contract. That is 
quite different from the nature of precarity in France or Denmark 
(see Ilsøe this volume, for example). Furthermore, over the last 10 
years those workers without a contract are young, work in service 
or production jobs, in relatively simple forms of work organisation 
with rare access to learning and little autonomy, with short hours, 
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and likely to be in very small firms with under 10 employees. While 
some might expect the ‘no contract’ workers to be freelance port-
folio workers, the primary group is in fact workers who we would 
think of as typically at risk in the labour market.
The interaction of these trends shape the kind of labour market 
facing people in Ireland coming straight from being welfare recipi-
ents. These workers are often in jobs where they are unlikely to use 
computers, unlikely to be involved in decisionmaking, have little 
access to learning, and are exposed to different forms of precarious 
employment. In Ireland today, even as the overall labour market is 
upgrading in many respects, this part of the labour market is caught 
in a low learning trap. Many people enter the labour market from 
education or unemployment with gaps in education, networks, 
experience and other resources – but the labour market itself is not 
enabling them to bridge those gaps. Indeed, it is reinforcing them.
WELFARE’S FUTURE
We conclude by returning briefly to the welfare system and its 
prospects for meeting the challenges of a world that combines the 
restructuring of work activities (often increasing worker learning 
and participation) with new pressures and uncertainties. A policy 
accommodation around how the labour market and welfare intersect 
has emerged in Ireland over the last 25–30 years. The Irish polity 
has implicitly agreed that not much will be done to tackle market 
inequalities directly, but that support will be provided to make the 
lower end of the labour market work. This is done partly with trans-
fers, and through the tax system. Governments have pitched the tax 
thresholds around the minimum wage. Furthermore, policymakers 
tend to try to avoid imposing too many costs on small employers, 
especially via a low social security tax wedge and other measures. 
Those arrangements work – at least in the sense that they achieve the 
kinds of reductions of inequality we outlined at the beginning, where 
Ireland carries out a huge amount of work to achieve a medium level 
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of inequality. However, significant challenges remain, which could 
bring significant financing pressures. ‘Work first’ policies tend to 
use the conditions of welfare benefit programmes and entitlements 
to push people into the labour market, but the Irish labour market 
does not provide a ladder to learning and sustainable work.
Therefore, it becomes crucial to think about enhancing services – 
and this should serve to upgrade labour, boost learning, education, 
care and so on, and also boost employers. Indeed, the Irish state 
already acts in significant ways to support enterprise – most particu-
larly in high technology sectors. The most well known of these poli-
cies are the various tax incentives offered to foreign firms to locate 
in Ireland, with the low corporate tax rate of 12.5% attracting both 
major technology firms and political criticism within Europe and the 
OECD. Even more controversial have been a variety of tax arrange-
ments that enable firms to re-allocate profits, sometimes paying 
almost no tax in the process – as in the much publicised dispute over 
the potential payment of a €13bn tax bill by Apple, due in Ireland 
but enforced by the European Commission. While these extremely 
low tax arrangements attract some public criticism in Ireland, the 
low tax regime is firmly instutionalised and supported by almost all 
political parties. Irish governments have supported international cor-
porate tax coordination in principle, while generally insisting on all 
changes to take place internationally before any changes are made 
in Ireland – as is seen for example in the current debates regarding 
a digital tax. The effect of tax changes on the decisions of the tech-
nology giants about where to locate their operations is somewhat 
unclear; the Irish polity would, in general, prefer not to find out, but 
would rather delay making any changes for as long as possible.
There are issues of relevance to this debate other than the cor-
porate tax debate, however. Central to these is a persistent dualism 
within the Irish economy. Historically, the foreign-owned technol-
ogy sector operated within a broader economy that had a relatively 
weak uptake of technology – diffusion from the foreign-investment-
led enterprise policy into the economy as a whole was very limited. 
While there have been significant improvements, this pattern still 
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persists. For example, while Ireland has a higher percentage of 
graduates in science, technology, engineering and maths (STEM) 
subjects than other EU countries, it lags well behind in overall 
levels of technological literacy (European Commission 2016). 
Similarly, while firms’ use of social media and related technologies 
is high, investment in more complex customer and supplier software 
systems is around the EU27 average (CSO 2017). Nonetheless, 
questions about the digital economy have moved to centre stage 
in Ireland’s enterprise policy. In the government’s encyclopaedic 
Action Plan for Jobs 2017, five areas are mentioned under the topic 
‘competitiveness’ (DBEI 2017). Workplace innovation, the digital 
economy and investment in infrastructure are among them – along-
side the transition to a low carbon economy, and the ease of doing 
business. This is a significant change from the Action Plans for Jobs 
issued by government earlier this decade, where the link between 
work, technology and enterprise was much less prominent. While 
the recent action plan includes measures aimed at smaller firms and 
worker and citizen skills, it remains to be seen how significant the 
commitment to these initiatives will be in practice – and whether 
they will suffice to shift Ireland in a serious way to disseminate prac-
tices that promote learning in the workplace. There is some promise 
here, nonetheless, as the public organisational infrastructure exists to 
begin to develop and extend such an agenda, through local enterprise 
and employment offices.
Ideally, efforts to upgrade and support development for both firms 
and workers in the segment of the labour market subject to a ‘low 
learning trap’ should also enhance the tax base by giving scope 
for increased social insurance and a wider income tax base. It is 
clear that Ireland’s combination of a low learning trap in the labour 
market with a significant welfare effect in transfers and taxes is 
potentially highly vulnerable, and will remain so as long as welfare 
and other policies fail to tackle the market inequalities that are at the 
root of these difficulties. Without policy and political action in this 
regard, technological change alone will only increase the speed of 
the runaway labour market without tackling the low learning trap.
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Austria, a small country at the heart of Europe, has a highly 
developed welfare state and a long tradition of social partnership. 
The economy is highly integrated with the German and European 
production and trade regimes. Since 1990, Austria has also been 
especially oriented towards central and eastern Europe (CEE). To 
the Austrian economy manufacturing, financial services and tourism 
are more important than they are in other EU member states. While 
the labour market is regulated by law and sectoral level collective 
agreements, it is also highly flexible and deeply segmented. Thus, 
the quality of work varies considerably, yet the low-wage sector in 
Austria has remained relatively smaller than the very large one in 
Germany. After the period of full employment up to the early 1980s, 
for many years Austria used to have lower unemployment rates than 
nearly all other EU member states (Eurostat 2017a). This changed 
after 2010, when unemployment steadily increased in the aftermath 
of the financial and economic crisis, which led to the highest number 
of people out of work since the 1950s (Statistik Austria 2017). The 
number of people in employment increased at an equal rate, due to 
a growing population caused partly by immigration.
AUSTRIA
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Trade unions in Austria have been relatively strong by European 
standards, and have enjoyed comparably high levels of influence on 
state policy within the country’s social partnership arrangements. 
Yet, the labour movement has been considerably weakened of late 
by economic structural changes, rising unemployment, reduced 
membership levels, enforced liberalisation of the labour market, the 
privatisation of public companies, and intensified economic transna-
tionalisation (Astleithner and Flecker 2017). Inequality has grown 
substantially, with lower-wage groups facing a loss of real income 
since the late 1990s and those in higher wage brackets only enjoying 
moderate gains (Rechnungshof 2016). Simultaneously, the distribu-
tion of wealth has become even more unequal, reaching the highest 
level of inequality within the Eurozone on a par with Germany 
(Schnetzer and Rehm 2017, 7).
THE DEBATE IN AUSTRIA
It is against this background that the so-called fourth industrial revo-
lution has triggered debate and now poses challenges to the Austrian 
social model. Since the term Industry 4.0 was coined in Germany in 
2011 (Pfeiffer 2017), labour market actors and research institutions, 
partly transnational ones, started to promote it in Austria too. The 
main thrust of their argument was that intensified automation using 
cyber-physical systems – systems in which physical and software 
components are deeply intertwined and integrated with the internet 
– provided the opportunity to further strengthen the economic posi-
tion of export-oriented companies and to win back manufacturing 
jobs that had moved abroad (Höhrhan 2016). By way of creating a 
catchy label to designate diverse and incremental innovations, the 
‘fourth industrialists’ managed to make it a matter of national impor-
tance. What is more, some of the most active research institutions, 
consultancies and companies in Austria called on the whole country 
to pull together in order not to miss out on these crucial develop-
ments. These calls were reminiscent of ‘competitive nationalism’ 
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(Butterwegge 1999), which called on the population to pull together 
no longer for the sake of the nation but for the country as a business 
location.
While the debate on Industry 4.0 focuses mainly on the important 
export-oriented manufacturing sector, aspects of digitalisation and 
of the fourth industrial revolution will also have consequences for 
a wide range of other sectors, companies and jobs. ICT-based self-
service technology and facilities will be further developed in areas 
such as the banking, retail, travel and public sectors, which will raise 
concerns about the numbers of people employed in them. However, 
the new business models based on internet platforms and the gig 
economy still draw more attention from commentators and policy-
makers. These applications of ICT, combined with the new forms of 
employment, have added fuel to the debate on the future of work, 
which is often referred to as ‘Work 4.0’. Overall, digitalisation has 
become a topical issue again not only because of its labour-saving 
potential and the ensuing fears of job loss, but also as a process that 
is set to disrupt economic structures, labour relations and ways of 
working. In the remainder of this brief essay I will focus on the par-
ticular challenges of employment policy, precariousness and quality 
of work in Austria.
EMPLOYMENT
In previous debates on automation and in other countries, one ques-
tion has been particularly important in the public debate: Will robots 
take our jobs? There have been strongly divergent assessments 
of the employment effects both of Industry 4.0 and of the wider 
processes of digitalisation. While in the beginning horror scenarios 
heralding massive job loss that were based on studies such as the one 
by Frey and Osborne (2013) prevailed, more recently researchers 
have predicted a weaker impact on employment. Nagl, Titelbach and 
Valkova (2017) argue that 9% of workers in Austria undertake tasks 
which have a high potential of being substituted by machines. The 
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authors posit that for 80% of all people employed there is a 30–70% 
risk that their job will be automated. This estimate is lower than the 
one by Arntz, Gregory and Zierahn (2016), who find that on average 
9% of jobs in a selection of Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries, and as many as 12% of jobs in 
Austria, may be automated in future.
It would be mistaken, however, to deduce future employment 
based primarily on the potential rates of automation associated with 
Industry 4.0, and how this may play out at workplace level (see 
Arnold et al. this volume). In the past, assessments of the potential 
effects on employment of automation have rarely turned out to be 
accurate. One reason for this has been the emergence of new jobs, 
business models and whole sectors, which had not been foreseen in 
the debates, but this should not lead us to give the all-clear prema-
turely. First, the starting point differs from how things were in the 
1980s or the 2000s, when similar discussions regarding the disrup-
tive potential of new technologies on jobs also took place. In Austria, 
according to the national employment data (Statistik Austria 2017), 
more than 9% of all workers are currently unemployed or in training 
courses offered by the public employment service. This high level 
of unemployment, which is the highest rate since the aftermath of 
second world war, means that the country desperately needs more 
jobs and cannot afford to lose more of them – be it 9%, 12% or more.
Second, to compensate for job losses, emerging new products and 
services and higher growth rates than current levels are required. 
The record levels of inequality reduce demand and stifle job cre-
ation. Today, the richest 1% in Austria own 41% of all assets, while 
the poorer 50% own only 2.5% of all assets (Ferschli et al. 2017). 
The distribution of income has also become more unequal. In 2015, 
men in the lowest quartile earned less than 75% and women some 
80% of what these groups had earned in 1998, taking inflation into 
account (Rechnungshof 2016, 38). Thus, real income has fallen 
considerably for those who have low wages and a high propensity 
to consume. As a consequence, people’s purchasing power is lower, 
leading to weaker private demand for new products and services.
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Third, the automation of tasks is only one factor that can poten-
tially lead to job losses. In addition, digitisation makes it easier to 
relocate jobs to lower-cost economies. While Austrian labour costs 
are lower than those in some EU member states, there is a large 
wage differential between Austria and neighbouring CEE-countries, 
and an even wider wage differential between Austria and countries 
in Asia (see Saxer this volume). We have observed the movement of 
jobs from Austria to countries with lower-cost bases in the IT sec-
tor, in clerical work and in customer service services since the mid-
1990s. Restructuring within transnational corporations, business 
process outsourcing or, more recently, crowdsourcing may have 
further and considerable effects on Austrian employment.
Fourth, we are witnessing a blurring of the boundaries between 
paid and unpaid work. Self-service is no longer limited to the retail 
sector but, given the new opportunities afforded by the internet, has 
gained currency in sectors as diverse as finance, travel and public 
administration. What is more, ‘prosumption’ – where consumers of 
a good or service also help to produce it – is an important trend that 
draws consumers or amateurs such as bloggers into value creation in 
new ways, which thereby reduces the costs of certain jobs in fields 
such as data entry, design and journalism.
There has been no attempt to reduce weekly working hours in 
Austria since the 1980s. In view of further potential automation 
of jobs, the relocation of jobs and the replacement of some paid 
work by unpaid work, Austrian employment policy needs to bet-
ter distribute available work among those who want it. One way of 
doing this is to introduce a 35- or 30-hour working week. While any 
substantial reduction in working hours would require harmonisa-
tion at EU level, possibly through reforming the existing working 
time directive, Austria may well take a first step as it is among the 
countries with the longest weekly working hours in the EU (Eurostat 
2017b). There is a second opportunity to create jobs in the public 
sector where employment has been stifled by austerity policies in 
recent years. Digitisation makes it possible to run public services 
more efficiently, for example by implementing ‘egovernment’ 
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applications. At the same time, jobs could be created in areas of the 
public services where there is a great need for improved provision, 
such as the health, care and education sectors.
PRECARITY
From a global perspective, the Austrian labour market is highly 
regulated. Nevertheless, more and more employment relationships 
fail to meet social and legal standards deemed to be the norm in 
the country. Some 8% of workers are now considered to belong to 
the ‘working poor’ (Lamei and Heuberger 2017, 5). While forms of 
employment that deviate from the standard employment relation-
ship are not necessarily precarious, atypical forms of employment 
still have a greater potential of being precarious – falling short of 
established standards of job security, minimum income and social 
security. Digitisation is being used to restructure organisations, for 
example, as a result of outsourcing work to freelancers that had 
hitherto been undertaken by employees. Whole business functions 
including IT and bookkeeping are increasingly being outsourced by 
service-providing companies.
While these trends have been with us for decades, intensified 
digitisation increases opportunities for external restructuring, which 
leads in turn to a fragmentation of employment, where people are 
increasingly employed under different sorts of contracts and have 
different employers, although they carry out the same tasks and 
functions. In some instances, including the aforementioned gig 
economy, it is increasingly difficult to discern the existence of a 
traditional employment relationship at all, as workers increasingly 
find themselves being self-employed when undertaking tasks that 
were traditionally rendered under a contract of employment, seen 
most conspicuously in the case of delivery workers with the likes of 
Deliveroo (Herr 2017).
The quality of employment varies considerably within the ser-
vice value chains that have emerged (Flecker and Meil 2010). At 
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the bottom end, jobs are often precarious. Call centres that were 
increasingly outsourced in the 1990s and 2000s are a good example 
of this (Shire et al. 2009; see also Doellgast this volume). The firms 
that provide outsourced customer services on behalf of their cli-
ent companies not only pay lower wages on average, but also tend 
to use different forms of atypical employment (Flecker 2009). In 
Austria, the introduction of a ‘contract of freelance services’ (Freier 
Dienstvertrag) has proven particularly popular, as it has allowed high 
levels of temporal flexibility at company level while still allowing 
using external freelancers. Still, when applying this type of contract, 
companies can circumvent some of the rules, for example those on 
minimum wages. Stricter enforcement and higher social-security 
contributions from employers for using Freie Dienstverträge have 
reduced the frequency of such contracts.
In the context of ICT-based restructuring, crowdsourcing (see 
Berg and De Stefano this volume) involves particularly high levels 
of ‘precarity’. One form of crowdsourcing involves outsourcing 
tasks over the internet to an undefined group of potential contrac-
tors. This type of outsourcing can be facilitated by internet platforms 
that provide services to both clients and workers. Workers are self-
employed but still depend to a large extent on the platform that for-
mally acts only as an intermediary between clients and workers. In 
practice, however, platform providers bind workers to the platform 
by setting the rules for their online reputation, by instigating and 
facilitating competition between ‘crowdworkers’, and by hindering 
clients and workers from circumventing the platform. Researching 
‘crowdworking’ in Austria we discovered high levels of precarity 
in creative industries, in particular among those workers who used 
the platforms to get access to the relevant markets and to gain an 
occupational identity. Being formally self-employed, their income 
is insecure, their working hours are unpredictable and can get out of 
hand, and they often have to be prepared to undertake unpaid work in 
order to enhance their online reputation, which they desperately need 
to procure in order to attract paying clients (Schörpf et al. 2017). The 
potential for exploitation in these circumstances are clear.
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While Austria has a coverage rate of industry-wide collective 
agreements of nearly 100%, workers can still earn less than the 
minimum wage if they are self-employed, or indeed have bogus self-
employment status – self-employment under conditions for which 
the law requires an employment contract. It is a major challenge for 
governments to maintain crucial labour market regulations for work-
ers, in the face of the potentially disruptive impact of digitalisation, 
which could result in far-reaching restructuring of organisations and 
jobs. The dynamics of value chains, not only in manufacturing but 
also relating to digital work, and the proliferation of location-inde-
pendent jobs considerably widens opportunities for companies and 
employers regarding organisational choices and forms of employ-
ment. To safeguard decent work and to avoid insecure low-wage 
employment, restructuring processes and new business models need 
to be evaluated and closely regulated. The chosen forms of employ-
ment, the foreseen contributions to social security and so on, need 
to be inspected before new businesses such as internet platforms for 
digital work and local personal services such as Uber are authorised. 
The fact that businesses can now use new forms of flexible employ-
ment that can undermine the social rights of workers is not due 
solely to technological progress, but can also be explained by the 
turn to neoliberalism, especially since the 1980s.
QUALITY OF WORK
Societal challenges stemming from digitalisation do not only relate 
to the number of jobs and the quality of employment, but innova-
tion and restructuring processes may also improve (or degrade) 
the quality of work. This includes the content of work that is 
undertaken, the learning opportunities for workers, the stress levels 
experienced, and the organisation of working hours. It is highly 
surprising that this issue does not play a more prominent role in the 
debate in Austria. It was partly used in the promotion of Industry 
4.0, where research organisations and companies often sweepingly 
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envisaged a general improvement of working conditions for all as a 
result, claiming that “people become free for more creative tasks”. 
This argument has been used in all the waves of automation debates 
since the 1950s, but is no more accurate now than it was before 
(Flecker 2017).
Digitalisation in general, too, is often assumed to lead to upskilling 
and higher levels of autonomy at work – as ascribed to the ‘knowl-
edge society’ in previous decades because work to a large extent 
consists in producing, distributing and reproducing knowledge. 
While such a trend can indeed be observed in some areas, increased 
autonomy may be limited to particular aspects of the labour process, 
such as temporal or spatial ones, the content of works and the skills 
associated with it, the dimension of cooperation, and the need for 
emotional labour (Lohr 2013, 431). And there are persistent tenden-
cies to the contrary, seen for example in the standardisation of work 
practices. Research on call centres, public administration and shared 
service centres have provided examples of the standardisation of 
work in the context of its digitisation (Carter et al. 2011; Howcroft 
and Richardson 2012; Schönauer 2009).
A further aspect of socio-economic change that is brought about 
by digitisation is the acceleration of production and communication, 
which paradoxically does not lead to more free time and leisure for 
workers, but rather goes hand in hand with an acceleration of the 
pace of life (Wajcman 2015). While complex societal and cultural 
developments have contributed to this outcome, it is obvious that 
people’s sense of time has changed in an environment of instant 
communication. The internet and mobile ICT devices are often seen 
as contributing to information overload and to increasing levels of 
stress and burnout. On the other hand, new information and commu-
nication technologies are also said to facilitate work–life balance as 
they make tele-work possible, for example. Although research on the 
subject is not conclusive, observers tend to agree that the internet and 
mobile ICT devices can be seen as enabling factors that are contrib-
uting to the societal trend of blurred boundaries between work and 
private life (Jurczyk et al. 2009), which is not only a major challenge 
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for workers and trade unions, but also increasingly shifts the onus of 
drawing boundaries and limiting work on to the individual.
The debate on digitalisation and Industry 4.0 focuses on tech-
nological developments and the consequences these may have on 
work and employment. It also addresses the skills that are needed 
and often puts further pressures on workers, for example, those 
relating to increasing demands from employers for flexibility. 
Technological determinism assumes a science-driven path of devel-
opment, and denies the social shaping of technology; this results in 
technology being designed according to the interests of particular 
societal groups (Mackenzie and Wajcman 1985). What is more, 
competitiveness is the main, if not the only, goal of innovation. In 
fact, economic ‘exigencies’, as defined by economic elites, were 
the actual starting point and are what led to the legitimisation of the 
whole debate around Industry 4.0 (Pfeiffer 2017). The humanisa-
tion of work in the context of Industry 4.0 is only being addressed 
at a rather late stage of the development processes. As digitalisa-
tion is currently being used both to enhance work and to degrade 
it, policies are needed to increase the prevalence of high-quality 
jobs. At the organisational level, the improvement of the quality of 
work needs to be a deliberate aim of the development, adoption and 
application of new technologies, and of the ways that workplaces 
are organised. Workers and trade unions need to have a greater say 
in decisionmaking at work, and in the use of technology and work 
design. Participatory development processes that involve users in 
the development of technology may also be appropriate to mobilise 
the knowledge required to create more humane workplaces (see 
Kenny and Zysman this volume).
There seems to be a double challenge for governments and poli-
cymakers. Before it is possible to humanise work through digitalisa-
tion, there is a need to perceive technology as socially constructed, 
and to democratise technology-related decisionmaking. The pro-
gramme of the new Austrian federal government for the years 2017 
to 2022 does not reflect this challenge at all. It sets the goal of turn-
ing the country into a trailblazer of digitalisation without stating 
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clearly what should exactly be achieved through digitalisation, apart 
from ‘increased competitiveness’ and the vague formula of ‘seizing 
opportunities and avoiding dangers’. It neither specifies directions 
for the development of technology, nor does it address issues of 
work and employment. In the past, the far-right Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs (FPÖ), which is now part of the coalition government, 
presented itself as a ‘social homeland party’. However, the new 
government programme pursues a clearly neoliberal agenda that 
cannot be expected to contribute to the humanisation of work. On 
the contrary, the desired deregulation and weakening of labour stan-
dards outlined in the programme will likely pave the way for further 
degradation of work and employment.
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The views and opinions expressed in this chapter are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or posi-
tion of any agency of the German federal government.
Germany takes a prominent place in the global debate on the future 
of work. This debate has been triggered by the widely held belief 
in Anglo-Saxon countries and Germany that digitalisation could 
lead to a massive loss of jobs (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014; 
Ford 2015). Domestically, the discourse evolved from a technol-
ogy-focused debate around Industry 4.0 or the fourth industrial 
revolution to a much wider societal debate on Work 4.0. This was 
to a significant extent driven by a large public consultation process 
run by the German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
(Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales; BMAS) from 2014 to 
2016, culminating in a white paper Work 4.0 (BMAS 2016). A key 
element of this white paper is the suggestion of a more responsive 
labour and social policy system that fosters decentralised innovation, 
based on targeted labour market intelligence and wide stakeholder 
participation in iterative policymaking processes. Elements of this 
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debate also made their way into international processes, such as the 
G20 (2017), the ILO Future of Work Initiative (2017) and the revised 
version of the OECD Jobs Strategy (OECD 2018, forthcoming).
The German debate on the future of work points to a moder-
ate overall impact of the digital transformation on employment in 
Germany (see Arnold et al. this volume). Nevertheless, many ana-
lysts wonder whether the significant structural shift in the German 
economy and the labour market could potentially erode the founda-
tions of German social policy. Beyond questions about the magnitude 
of employment effects, evolving employment and labour relations as 
well as resulting inequalities are front and centre in this debate. The 
fear of a ‘social problem’ posed by an army of ‘digital day labourers’ 
is connected to the international discourse on the risks of reaching a 
level of social inequality that it is socially and economically dysfunc-
tional (Atkinson 2015; Fratzscher 2016). Digitalisation could further 
aggravate the already existing divide within society and accelerate 
the momentum towards widening inequality. This involves a growing 
inequality in the distribution of wealth, a widening gap in incomes, 
a reduction in the number of jobs subject to social security contribu-
tions, and more precarious job conditions right up to the emergence 
of a new lower class at a greater risk of poverty and of certain groups 
that have inadequate access to social security. At the same time, in 
a ‘society of singularities’ a small elite is benefiting from the advan-
tages of digitalisation, such as greater personal freedom in structuring 
work as well as cultural distinction (Reckwitz 2017).
This chapter summarises the challenges to the German model of 
differentiated quality production apparent in this debate, and subse-
quently outlines the three key conflicts that determine the ongoing 
debate. The final section sets out policy options for the future.
CHALLENGES TO THE GERMAN MODEL
Germany’s coordinated market economy (Hall and Soskice 2001) is 
characterised by companies focusing on a fixed set of high-quality 
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products, a sufficient number of skilled labourers, a long-term 
relationship between companies and employees, and a strong rela-
tionship to a certain place of production. As Kirchner and Beyer 
(2016) point out, the very logic of digital platforms is losing these 
traditionally tight couplings. Germany’s diversified quality produc-
tion (Streeck 1997) and the disruptive, growth-obsessed world of 
digital platforms are far from a natural fit. Nonetheless, major play-
ers of the platform economy try to penetrate the German market and 
German costumers ask for the convenience they provide. Therefore, 
the progressing digitalisation of the economy and the world of work 
are putting the German economic and social model to the test. This 
has already been affected by an increasing degradation since the 
early 1990s. Besides the domestic (endogenous) factors, like the 
consequences of the German reunification and demographic change 
as well as trends towards knowledge intensive services, international 
(exogenous) change processes, like deeper European integration and 
globalisation, have a sustainable impact on successful productivity 
constellations. Shortages of skilled labour, the decrease in the num-
ber of companies and employees covered by collective agreements, 
and the increase of atypical forms of employment are symptoms of 
this development. The digital structural change is boosting the prob-
lem of the necessary skilled labour supplier and threatens to further 
erode the social market economy’s promise of social balance.
A central structural component of Germany’s coordinated market 
economy is a functionally networked state that operates incremen-
tally and through negotiation (Czada 2000), and employs initiatives 
to steer the adjustment of the overall political and economic system 
so as to stay in step with political and social change. Its policy space 
is restricted by institutional factors, such as the close political coor-
dination between individual states and between states and the fed-
eral government, as well as international factors such as European 
integration and economic globalisation. Schmidt (2006) speaks of 
“the policy of the middle way”, which features an institutional order 
that tends towards the middle as a characteristic of German domes-
tic government activity and as a reflection of the necessity for the 
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government and the opposition in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat 
to cooperate on major legislative proposals.
In this context, the question arises in particular to what extent 
the political forms of cooperation and coordination in the German 
model can pave the way towards achieving social balance in the 
process of transformation. A further question is what “institutional 
complementarities” (Hall and Gingerich 2004) can be identified 
between the traditional structures of the German model that have 
grown through time and the new parameters set by the evolution 
of a digital economy, and if “synergy effects between the different 
institutions” can be observed (Vitols 2006, 50).
The ongoing digitalisation in the German labour market changes 
sectors, jobs and tasks. Overall, the German labour market is in good 
shape. Labour market forecasts look mostly at a period until 2030 
and agree that the number of workers is going to remain roughly 
stable until then, with a slight increase considered likely by some. 
However, there will be profound structural changes in supply and 
demand of labour behind this apparent stability.
On the demand side, we see the following:
• Employment will shift across sectors. There will be between 
750,000 and 1 million jobs lost in some sectors and a similar num-
ber of new jobs created in others. We will see significant employ-
ment growth in sectors like business services, health and social 
care, while the number of jobs will decrease in sectors like public 
administration, retail or gastronomy. Automation plays a role in 
this – the OECD forecasts that about 12% of jobs in Germany are 
likely to be automated over the coming years (Arntz, Gregory and 
Zierahn 2016; see also Arnold et al. this volume).
• The same OECD study estimates that another 31% of jobs will see 
significant change because of digitalisation. In addition to employ-
ment shifts, job profiles across all sectors and qualification levels 
are evolving as a result of technological change. This will require 
skills adaptation across the whole spectrum of qualification 
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levels and sectors. Whereas technical skills will remain important, 
increasingly socio-emotional and creative skills will be in demand 
(Patscha et al. 2017).
Demographic change continues to be a crucial challenge to labour 
supply:
• A key difference is between rural and urban regions. At an aggre-
gate level, we see that federal states (Länder) with more rural 
areas, like those in the east of Germany, are projected to lose 
10–15% of their active population by 2030, while the urban cen-
tres will remain stable, and some city states (eg Berlin, Hamburg) 
will continue to grow.
• In addition, as a result of demographic change, workers are older 
than in the past, on average, almost everywhere. The average age 
of the population in Germany today is 43 years, and it will rise to 
47 years by 2030 – in large parts of eastern Germany it will be 50 
years by then. Crucially, the diversity of workforces will increase 
not just through the different ethnic backgrounds of workers – in 
2016 the number of people with a migration background living in 
Germany peaked at 18.6 million overall or 22.5% of the popula-
tion (Statistisches Bundesamt 2017) – but also through having 
older and younger workers collaborating in teams with the older 
ones in the majority. The dynamics are also interesting because 
our younger cohorts tend to enter the labour market at a higher 
level of formal qualification than earlier ones.
In essence, what we see is an increasingly dynamic labour demand 
meeting an increasingly diverse and older workforce. Therefore 
labour market policies need to aim much more at preventing mis-
matches arising from the disparate development in labour supply 
and demand than they did in the last decades and be based on a 
deeper understanding of the underlying mechanisms of work and 
society in the years to come.
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DICHOTOMIES IN THE GERMAN DEBATE
Against the backdrop of these challenges, three interrelated dichoto-
mies, if not conflicts, characterise the current debate on the future of 
work and welfare in Germany. They comprise the relation of jobs 
and incomes, the relationship between humans and machines, and 
the relationship between work and leisure.
THE INCREASING DICHOTOMY 
BETWEEN JOBS AND INCOME
There is an increasing dichotomy of jobs versus income, resulting in 
technology-driven inequalities. Most analyses of the German labour 
market find an ongoing polarisation of the labour market (OECD 
2017; Spitz-Oehner 2006), though to a slightly smaller extent than 
that in the US or the UK (Autor, Katz and Kearney 2010; Goos and 
Manning 2007). Whatever the take on polarisation, all labour mar-
ket forecasts expect a strong structural shift in employment towards 
more jobs in services, in particular human services, whose produc-
tivity is limited and/or difficult to measure, and a continued but 
much smaller growth of highly productive jobs in information and 
communications technologies, professional services and industry. In 
other words, there will be many jobs, with relatively little income, 
for example in healthcare, education or social work, and few jobs 
with relatively high incomes for IT engineers and consultants. 
Middle-skilled, above-average-income jobs that today are the finan-
cial basis of the German corporatist social security system through 
payroll-based contribution are projected to decrease markedly.
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN HUMANS AND MACHINES
A second conflict that shapes the German debate is between humans 
and machines. Though related, the issues arising from this dichotomy 
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are distinct from the often-cited spectre of automation. This con-
flict plays out, crucially, in dimensions such as skills and health. 
Machines, such as assistance systems, may augment and complement 
human skills in many workplaces, ranging from production lines to 
call centres (Apt et al. 2016). At the same time, they bear risks. First, 
they may be conducive to de-qualification, as unused skills wither, 
second, they put pressure on workers to acquire and maintain skills 
that complement technology, such as communication, creative and 
social skills (Patscha et al. 2017). But not everyone is apt to do so, 
which in turn is a key driver behind the polarisation outlined above. 
A second dimension of the conflict between humans and machines 
is that machines, in particular robots, may alleviate physical stress 
and thus support the promotion of physical health (Apt et al. 2016). 
The automation of routine tasks also implies an increased share of 
complex non-routine tasks in any given working day, however. This 
may be stressful for workers, and it leads many workers to perceive 
an increase in the density of work. This perception goes together 
with a strong increase in mental-health-related issues. The share of 
new disability benefits recipients who are unable to work because of 
mental health problems has increased from 15.4% to 42.9% between 
1993 and 2015 (DRV 2016).
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN WORK AND LEISURE
Related to this (perceived) intensification of work is the conflict 
between work and leisure. Technology increasingly blurs the tem-
poral and spatial boundaries of work. At the same time, the values 
that shape workers’ attitudes, needs and preferences regarding work 
and working conditions are increasingly pluralised. Multiple differ-
ent conceptions of what constitutes a quality job coexist across the 
population.
A recent study identified seven distinct groups, each with a dis-
crete, distinct system of values about work, ranging from people 
embracing technology to optimise their productive potential to those 
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who mainly seek a steady income to find meaning in life outside 
work (BMAS 2016, 32 ff). These two trends, blurring boundaries 
and pluralisation of value systems, collide, as technological oppor-
tunities for some are threats for others. Flexible working times, for 
example, may bring a gain in autonomy for some, while being a 
stressor for others (BMAS 2016).
Demographic change and significant urban–rural divides in 
demand for and availability of infrastructure move this debate to 
the intersection of work opportunities and care duties. In (growing) 
German metropolitan areas, and semi-urban areas located close to 
cities, job opportunities abound, but because of time constraints 
and the lack of a care infrastructure, care duties are often difficult 
to handle. For example, there is a significant lack of educators in 
metropolitan areas (Klemm and Zorn 2017) and an inadequate num-
ber of nurses across the whole country (BA 2017). In many rural 
regions unemployment is higher than in cities, and job opportunities 
are likely to worsen in the future, especially as digital infrastructure 
is of a low standard.
POLICY OPTIONS
To resolve these conflicts within the – challenged – German cor-
poratist system will require policy innovations. Four options are 
currently discussed by policymakers in Germany (BMAS 2016, 96 
ff). They are based on a set of three decisive criteria to shape the 
fundamental structural change: social partnership, social investment 
and social innovation:
First, labour market intelligence requires an update. This is not 
about developing the perfect forecast, nor about workforce plan-
ning. Instead, the dynamic of the digital transformation requires 
continuous monitoring of changes in labour demand and supply. 
Forecasts are only one part of such a new labour market monitor-
ing – they can take into account demography, skills and regional 
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differences to generate useful insights into emerging mismatches. 
But, crucially, forecasts will have to be embedded in the German 
system of social partnership and corporatist labour market policy-
making, so insights have to feed into the political debate between 
government and social partners at the federal level of coordination. 
It also requires the same approach at the regional level, making 
regionalised forecasts available to local labour market actors who 
are crucial in the design and implementation of professional educa-
tion, such as chambers of commerce and industry and chamber of 
crafts, as well as labour unions and the regional offices of the Fed-
eral Employment Agency.
Second, labour market policy has to be more preventive. To help 
workers (and not just the unemployed) invest early on and over 
their whole career in adapting and improving their skills is crucial. 
This requires counselling, financing and, in the medium term, a legal 
entitlement to continuous professional development. People need a 
clear idea of where they stand with their formal and informal com-
petences, and to get orientation about development opportunities to 
make lifelong learning work for all. This is especially the case for 
low-skilled workers, workers in small- and medium-sized enter-
prises (SMEs) and, to some extent, for older workers.
Third, we need new investment in social policies, such as individual 
activity accounts (see Weber this volume), to complement exist-
ing measures and thus accommodate individual needs and wishes. 
Such accounts would empower individuals to shape employment 
biographies in a more autonomous manner. It can be used for quali-
fication and further training as well as setting up an enterprise. The 
individual activity account especially would provide young people 
with financial scope for personal development, thus opening up new 
opportunities for them, as it combines individual freedom with social 
security. It can thus be an instrument to target problems arising from 
the digital transformation better than a universal basic income could. 
At the same time, it could take up some of its objectives. This could 
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be a crucial element of a comprehensive transformation strategy for 
professional and educational transitions throughout the whole career 
span of workers, and an option to react to the increasingly uneven 
distribution of wealth and opportunities.
Fourth, we need to enable innovation at the firm level. If we want to 
shape the future of work we need to involve those who know best: 
workers and managers on the shop floor. This will require new gov-
ernance tools. An interesting example are innovation spaces, a proj-
ect that the German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs is 
currently setting up. It aims to implement and experiment with new 
types of work organisation to respond to the challenges in a new 
world of work. This comprises a platform for exchange for compa-
nies that invest in new learning environment, or new organisational 
models, for example concerning working time or work place. But it 
also includes financial support for SMEs to innovate in these areas.
CONCLUSION
German labour market and social policy is still predominantly tar-
geted at activation. This system is under pressure from endogenous 
and exogenous factors, leading to significant societal conflicts. The 
digital and demographic structural change requires a paradigm 
shift away from the predominant activation-oriented policy system 
towards an empowering labour and social policy system.
The core task will be providing framework conditions to promote 
social partnership and social innovation as well as new and addi-
tional social investment. Social partnership will require strength-
ening through legal, non-monetary incentives such as innovation 
spaces for social-partner-led firm-level reform in areas such as 
working time and workplace regulation that go above and beyond 
the current regulatory framework. Social innovation such as socially 
insuring against the risk of loss of employability rather than (only) 
insuring the risk of job loss can contribute to an empowering social 
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security system. Following Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi (2009), social 
investment should especially promote the capabilities of people. 
Given limited resources, there is a delicate balance to find between 
different infrastructure needs, especially care infrastructure and 
services in cities versus digital infrastructure and services in the 
countryside.
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Over the last five decades Spain has undergone an accelerated 
modernisation process, which has been characterised by major 
changes in the structure of employment, demographic dynamics and 
the welfare state. These transformations placed Spain, objectively, 
in a more prepared position to face the challenges of the so-called 
fourth industrial revolution than it was to face previous industrial 
revolutions. However, since the beginning of the 21st century, the 
development of technological changes and digitalisation in Spain 
has had to coexist with an economic bubble and employment boom, 
and a deep economic recession and major employment crisis. In 
other words, in the midst of the accelerated changes of the fourth 
industrial revolution, Spain has had to weather quite a storm.
FROM THE ECONOMIC BOOM TO THE 
GREAT RECESSION IN SPAIN
From the 1990s onwards, the Spanish labour market began to 
expand strongly in all sectors, creating approximately 7 million jobs 
SPAIN
After the storm – at the crossroads 
between employment, job quality and 
technological changes
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between 1995 and 2007. In this growth, the incorporation of Spanish 
women into the labour market and the arrival of immigrants stand 
out. Spain is one of the countries with the largest number of immi-
grants in Europe. But only a small part of this growth has been due 
to the emergence of new sectors focused on new technologies and 
digitisation with highly skilled jobs. To date, economic expansion 
and employment growth have occurred primarily in labour-intensive 
and unproductive sectors, especially in the construction and low-
skilled services sectors (Bernardi and Garrido 2008).
The economic and financial crisis in 2007 quickly became a pro-
found employment crisis in Spain. Between 2007 and 2013, 16.5% 
of Spanish jobs were lost, amounting to some 3.5 million jobs. Low-
skilled jobs were especially affected. But the crisis did not turn out 
to be an opportunity for the technology or research sectors because 
of a lack of public and private investment, and the lack of political 
initiatives to promote industrial restructuring. Although Spain has 
begun to experience a slow economic recuperation since 2014, data 
from The Networked Readiness Index 2016 shows that Spain has 
regressed in its position with respect to the fourth industrial revolu-
tion when compared with neighbouring countries (Baller, Dutta and 
Lanvin 2016).
On the contrary, during this period there are trends that point 
towards growth in lower quality employment. First, the economic 
crisis in Spain has caused a lack of social protection for permanent 
workers in the primary segment of the labour market as a result of 
the 2010 and 2012 labour market reforms. And, among the workers 
of the secondary segment, we observe an increase in job insecurity 
and growth in temporary employment. An instructive example for 
this development is the significant rise in the number of ‘additional 
workers’ (Humphrey 1940), especially during the first phase of the 
crisis when adult women entered the labour market intending to 
balance job losses of male breadwinners and lessening the nega-
tive family income effects of the recession. This increase in female 
employment mainly occurred in the low-skilled position sector, far 
from the virtuous impacts of technological changes.
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Second, a major wage devaluation has led to a loss of purchas-
ing power and to an increase in the levels of the working poor. 
Relatedly, there has been a decrease in the rate of social security 
coverage due to the growth in the levels of unemployment (24.5% 
in 2014, 14% above EU average), which particularly affects less 
qualified and socioeconomically disadvantaged workers. Together, 
these factors lead to a significant increase in poverty (29% of the 
population are at risk of poverty, up from 23% in 2007).
Third, there has been a loss of highly qualified human capital, 
especially in the areas of health, architecture and engineering, as a 
result of the migration of young people from Spain to other European 
countries (Bermudez and Brey 2017; Lafleur and Stanek 2017).
During this storm, the fourth industrial revolution has continued 
to transform the structure of employment and job quality dynamics. 
We have to think about what the relationship between innovation 
and job quality in Spain is. What do we know about the polarisation 
of the labour market as a result of technological automation? How 
is the fourth industrial revolution impacting labour policy and the 
Spanish welfare state model? These are the questions we seek to 
explore in this short essay.
THE IMPACT OF COMPUTERISATION: 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES IN LABOUR DYNAMICS
When Jeremy Rifkin (1995) published his famous work The End 
of Work, few people in Spain could fully imagine the speed with 
which the transformation of the economy and labour market through 
technological changes associated with the fourth industrial revolu-
tion would take place. Frey and Osborne (2017) and Bowles (2014) 
have both estimated that approximately 40–50% of jobs in western 
society are currently at risk of computerisation. This is because it is 
not only manual or routine jobs that are being computerised, but also 
– and increasingly rapidly – non-routine cognitive tasks in the ser-
vices sector that are at risk. It is timely, therefore, for us to consider 
388 RAFAEL GRANDE
the potential positive and negative impacts of the computerisation of 
jobs on Spanish workers.
First, on the positive side, this digital transformation has led to 
a significant increase in productivity, partly due to the digitisation 
and computerisation of many productive processes (see Fernández-
Macías this volume). This bodes well for the possibility of sustained 
economic growth. However, as has already been said, the productive 
structure and the consequences of the economic and financial crisis 
have meant that Spain is still far from taking optimum advantage 
of the virtuous circles of technological change (see Atkinson this 
volume). For example, in the last decade Spain has not modified its 
Global Competitiveness Index (4.70), dropping from 29th to 34th 
place in 2007 to 2017 (Schwab 2017).
Against a pessimistic Luddite vision, many experts are stressing 
that technological change will not directly destroy jobs but will 
transform the structure of the labour market by creating new jobs, 
as happened in previous industrial revolutions. On the one hand, 
as Arnold et al. (this volume) explain, the potential for automation 
is arguably much smaller than many estimates suggest. This is 
because many extant jobs involve tasks that are difficult to auto-
mate, and workers often specialise in different non-automatable 
niches, and in tasks that can be enhanced by the introduction 
of new technologies, rather than be destroyed by them. On the 
other hand, the notable thing about these changes is that where 
there is a greater probability of computerisation in a given sector, 
there is a greater likelihood of these jobs requiring fewer skills 
and workers in these sectors, on average, will have lower levels 
of educational attainment (Frey and Osborne 2017; Levy and 
Murnane 1992). The implication of this is that low-skilled work-
ers might be reassigned to tasks that require resources of creative 
and social intelligence that the new generations are more used 
to. The high levels of educational formation among the young 
generations of Spaniards (at a level similar to the EU and OECD 
average, and significantly above the G20 average according to 
OECD statistics) could place the country in a good position to 
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face this transformation in comparison with previous industrial 
revolutions.
Finally, among the optimistic aspects of the computerisation of 
jobs on Spanish workers, there is a positive relationship between 
innovation and job quality. As in previous industrial revolutions, 
computerisation and robotisation have enormous potential for 
improving working conditions, which can translate into greater well-
being for workers. In previous work we have analysed the relation-
ship between innovation and job quality. It has been demonstrated 
that product and process technical innovation has a significant 
positive effect on the quality of employment (Muñoz-de-Bustillo, 
Grande and Fernández-Macías 2016, 2017) in European countries 
as a whole. There is growth in sectors with a higher quality of 
employment because there is an improvement in the type of tasks 
to be carried out in the workplace thanks to the introduction of new 
technologies, and because the increase in productivity can be used – 
at best – to increase wages or reduce working time.
To deepen the case of Spain, I analyse the relationship between 
the probability of automation of jobs and the quality of employment. 
On the one hand, I use the recent work by Frey and Osborne (2017), 
which seeks to estimate the probability of computerisation for 702 
different occupations. Those occupations used as training data are 
labelled as either 0 (not computerisable) or 1 (maximum risk of 
being computerisable). On the other hand, with data from the 2015 
European Working Condition Survey (EWCS) (Eurofound 2016), I 
constructed a Job Quality Index (JQI) with five dimensions follow-
ing the proposal of Muñoz-de-Bustillo et al. (2011).
Figure 29.1 shows the results of this relationship between these 
two variables for the 39 main occupations in Spain. In general, we 
observe a negative relationship between quality of employment and 
computerisation: in Spain the jobs with the greatest risk of disap-
pearing as a result of digitalisation and robotisation are those with 
the worst job quality. This reinforces the hypothesis that the fourth 
industrial revolution will progressively imply better job quality by 
replacing some jobs with others of higher quality.
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The data shows that this relationship is different when we disag-
gregate the different dimensions of the JQI. The relationship is nega-
tive and intense for wages and, especially, the quality of work. This 
is where up to now the digital revolution and robotisation have been 
yielding greater job quality. Negative effects are clear, but weaker 
between computerisation and employment quality and health and 
safety. However, computerisation does not have an effect on work–
life balance. In this respect the improvements depend fundamentally 
on labour policies since the employers most associated with the 
fourth industrial revolution don’t show significant differences in 
     
Figure 29.1 Dimensions of the Job Quality Index and probability of computeri-
sation in 39 occupations, Spain, 2015. Source: Author’s analysis from Frey and 
Osborne (2017) and EWCS 2015 microdata.
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working conditions related to work–life balance. In the future, as a 
result of greater levels of productivity, companies and governments 
may encourage the reduction of working hours at firm level, support 
men to actively participate in childcare and family life, for example 
by introducing more generous paternity leave, or take measures to 
prevent stress caused by greater flexibility, for example by restrict-
ing access to emails outside regular working hours.
Second, it is necessary for us to analyse the negative effects of 
computerisation, when they may interact with the serious effects 
of the economic crisis in Spain. As discussed above, the fourth 
industrial revolution has the potential to be a new ‘great transfor-
mation’ and there are social risks for workers associated with these 
changes (see Palier this volume). Many authors stress that techno-
logical change is producing a strong polarisation and segmentation 
of the labour market in Spain (Anghel, de la Rica and Lacuesta 
2014; Sebastián-Lago 2017) and throughout Europe (Fernández-
Macías 2012; Goos, Manning and Salomons 2009). The evidence 
shows that during the last decades the impact of technology is 
destroying middle-class or middle-skill jobs, a pattern that only 
increased during the economic crisis. This pattern affects more 
men than women. At the same time, we see a progressive increase 
in low-skill jobs in the service sector and a growth in the high-
est high-skill jobs, with higher remuneration on the occupational 
scale. These trends will most likely induce a progressive increase 
in inequality, which is one of the main problems of the Spanish 
labour market (Arnold et al. this volume). However, as Autor 
(2015) points out, this polarisation will not continue indefinitely 
because many middle-skill jobs with relatively good pay do not 
run the risk of being computerised in the coming decades, but 
there will be increasing demand for specific vocational skills and 
professional education, combined with basic technical abilities for 
the completion of tasks.
Table 29.1 shows the evolution of four categories of employees 
according to skill levels and occupation type (both white-collar and 
blue-collar workers) from the current version of the International 
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Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88). I analyse the 
change in the percentage of workers that includes each sector and 
the evolution of job quality in each category, using the data from 
the 2015 EWCS and the Spanish Labour Force Survey (LFS). The 
results show a steady growth of non-manual occupations (white-
collar jobs) which are also the categories of jobs with the highest 
levels of job quality. There has also been a steady decrease of 
manual-industrial occupations (blue-collar jobs) in relative terms, 
particularly as a result of the economic crisis and the loss of employ-
ment in construction.
This data shows how the Spanish labour market is adapting to a 
post-industrial society, where the dominant sectors are services in 
both high- and low-skilled jobs, which have the potential for polari-
sation. The quality of employment is increases for workers with 
higher skill sets and non-manual occupations have a better job qual-
ity. But job quality has a much higher growth rate from 2000 to 2010 
in blue-collar occupations than in white-collar ones. This points to a 
positive effect of the impact of technological change on non-manual 
jobs that, in an initial phase, are automating, while also improving 
the quality of manual jobs.
On the contrary, it is surprising that job quality for high-skilled 
white-collar workers fell during the period 2010–2015. This helps 
us to understand the post-crisis effects of labour market and aus-
terity policy and the flexibilisation of the Spanish labour market. 
These figures and the lower job quality for high-skilled white-collar 
workers suggest that we cannot expect higher competitiveness and 
productivity in this segment of the Spanish labour market, which is 
crucial for a successful transition into a digital economy. Therefore, 
when we speak of polarisation, as Atkinson (2015) explains, we 
have to understand that technological change is not exogenous, and 
its effects depend on the social system and the political economy 
(see Flecker this volume). Thus, some research has shown that one 
of the main causes of the deep segmentation of the Spanish labour 
market is increasing deregulation and the increase of temporary 
work, which occurred especially during the crisis.
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Therefore, finally, among the negative effects of this transforma-
tion on Spanish employment, we must consider to what extent these 
organisational changes, and the development of a new work ethic, 
are leading to an increase in job insecurity, which (even among high-
skill and well-paid jobs) translates into what Sennett (1998) calls the 
“corrosion of character”. On the one hand, in contrast to other types 
of innovation, organisational innovation and labour flexibility, when 
applied to different aspects of work, may not be as positive and can 
lead to a decrease in the wellbeing of individuals. Amid the Spanish 
economy’s incipient recovery, we observe an increase in the rates 
of temporary work, involuntary part-time work, labour deregulation 
and outsourcing practices, which is deepening the segmentation of 
the labour market. This is seen, for example, with ‘clickworkers’ 
who are engaged in delivery work with platforms such as Deliveroo, 
Glovo and foodora. The demand for such work is on the rise because 
of the growing online trade, which is still based on tasks that are 
far from being fully automated – transport and delivery services. 
Workers are engaged as independent contractors or as ‘false free-
lancers’ instead of being considered as salaried workers. Workers 
endure a reduction in labour rights (see Berg and De Stefano this 
volume). However, it is clear that digital platforms did not invent 
precarious work – as Cañigueral (2017) identifies in the Spanish 
case – and in general a large part of the increase in precarious work 
is due to the outsourcing of activities that had previously been done 
in-house.
On the other hand, as has been stated previously, the new models 
of work organisation have led to increases in productivity, based 
mainly on a wage adjustment and the demise of the (low produc-
tivity) construction sector. Since the late 1980s, in most OECD 
countries labour share of income has been declining. Among other 
factors, this trend has led to greater levels of inequality and pov-
erty in increasingly large sections of the population. During the 
toughest years of the economic crisis in Spain (2008–2013), more 
than 80% of the fall in Spanish GDP was caused by a decrease of 
wages.
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POLITICAL DISCUSSION: BEYOND THE WELFARE  
STATE WEAKNESS
How is the welfare state adapting to this transformation of the labour 
market? Beyond the weakness of the Spanish welfare state, we start 
from the idea that, as was the case with previous industrial revolu-
tions, the models of the past will not return because social and labour 
contexts are completely changed. However, it is necessary to reflect 
on the future of the welfare state in Spain in light of the impact of 
the fourth industrial revolution.
First, along with the challenges posed by the fourth industrial 
revolution, Spain faces a demographic challenge due ageing of the 
population. By 2066, the population is projected to be around 5.4% 
smaller than in 2016 (McMurtry 2016). Today, people in Spain are 
living longer and healthier lives, a fact that Spain should be proud 
of. However, the demographic situation is being used as an excuse 
to justify welfare state reforms, and to implement substantial cuts 
to public expenditure. As Miret-Gamundi and Zueras (2016) affirm, 
Spain is not facing any lack of workers, but rather a lack of work. 
There is a lack of capacity in the labour market to employ a large 
number of workers. In Spain, there has been a significant increase in 
the number of highly qualified workers in recent decades, which has 
not been accompanied by equivalent growth in the demand for jobs 
for highly skilled workers.
Therefore Spain currently faces three important challenges:
• Over-qualification is growing as many workers have higher levels 
of qualification than are required for the work that they undertake 
(Ramos 2017).
• Involuntary part-time work and underemployment is increasing. 
Together with over-qualification, this goes hand in hand with 
precarious working conditions. As a result there has been a sig-
nificant drop in the amount of income tax that can be collected, 
which is depleting the state’s ability to cover the cost of paying 
social benefits.
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• Qualified young Spaniards are emigrating, fuelled by the inability 
of young workers to find work in high-skilled, productive sectors.
In short, a change in the orientation of labour policies and public 
intervention is needed to better foster the creation of jobs in the 
highly productive sectors that are based on information, knowledge 
and creativity that high-skilled workers are seeking employment in 
(higher rates of employment in the highly productive sectors would 
also be a way to solve problems of welfare state resources). Given 
the initial difficulty of private investment, it is advisable to promote 
medium- and long-term public investment policies that attract the 
private sector to the technology and knowledge sectors as a means 
of reviving the economy and of creating higher quality jobs.
Although the increase in research and development (R&D) activi-
ties should be a priority, from 2009 to 2016 investment in R&D in 
Spain declined by 9.1%, representing 1.19% of the GDP in 2016, 
compared with 2.03% of the average GDP in the EU. For example, 
the renewable energy sector and the number of green jobs were seri-
ously reduced between 2008 and 2015. Despite the low investment 
in R&D, proposals such as the plan by the Ministry for the Economy 
to develop a strategy on skills for Industry 4.0 are being seen as 
positive steps, because they give financial support and technical 
training to companies that are seeking to undertake steps towards 
the carrying out the necessary digital transformation. Regional poli-
cies also have a very important role to play because they provide 
much-needed extra resources in this area, although in the medium 
term they point to an increase in inequality between Spanish regions. 
The best example is the Basque Industry 4.0 strategy of the Basque 
country government, which pays special attention to small- and 
medium-sized enterprises, worker training and the development of 
new technologies.
Second, along with technological changes, there is a growing 
tendency on the part of governments and international institutions to 
deregulate labour markets and reduce the role of social dialogue by 
favouring the individualisation of labour relations. Recent data and 
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experiences in Spain point to the need to strengthen different social 
dialogue mechanisms and the means of communication between 
workers and employers as an effective tool to improve the deterio-
ration of working conditions (Muñoz-de-Bustillo and Pinto 2016).
In order to take advantage of the positive correlation that can exist 
between technological changes and job quality and social welfare, 
Spain must counteract the labour policies of recent years that have 
favoured the reduction of labour rights or the cost of layoffs. For 
example, the decline in investment in science and R&D has also led 
to increasing job instability and uncertainty in the careers of many 
highly skilled and highly productive researchers and workers (see 
Bell this volume). In the face of this trend, it is necessary to take up 
a political agenda that prioritises social protection and the adaptation 
of the welfare state in the context of labour changes that are linked 
to the fourth industrial revolution. Like other European countries, 
Spain should start discussing the redistributive model on which a 
universal basic income or basic income guarantee model is based. 
These models can encourage redistribution in the face of the grow-
ing inequality caused by the increase in part-time and temporary 
work. If the segmentation of the Spanish labour market continues, 
other redistributive models should be implemented, for example to 
implement policies for equality and work–life balance. Proposals 
such as minimum wage coordination at the EU level (Fernández-
Macías and Vacas 2015) may be positive in order for wages to 
increase, favoured by productivity increases caused by automation 
and the implementation of new technologies.
Finally, the need to implement new social protection policies 
makes it necessary for trade unions to adapt. In many cases, trade 
unions are modelled on outdated Fordist organisations of work, 
which explains in part low union membership rates among younger 
workers (see Benhamou in this edition). Updating collective action 
would make it necessary to strengthen bargaining power and mod-
ernise labour relations. It would reveal more rigorously existing 
precarious conditions in the workplace and emphasise demands 
to reduce stretched working hours, promote job security, facilitate 
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labour inspections and limit outsourcing of services. What has 
changed is that union action focuses on specific sectors rather than 
traditional collective bargaining between employers’ organisations 
and established trade unions, eg the resistance of Coca-Cola workers 
against a planned factory closure in Madrid and a successful legal 
battle of Deliveroo drivers over their employment status. In both 
cases established trade unions were not a precondition for collective 
action but were empowered by more flexible workers’ movements 
at company level. Whether technology and innovation will leave a 
positive imprint on job quality in the future economy will largely 
depend on the degree of impact and success of these new trade union 
movements.
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The fourth industrial revolution, characterised by the convergence 
of digital, physical and biological technologies, will fundamentally 
alter modern economies on a large scale and at full speed all over the 
world, and Portugal is no exception.
As a generator of economic value, the revolution has the potential 
to improve people’s quality of life, but while the advantages are 
clear for those workers who can adapt to the requirements of a new 
economy and a new labour market, others are in danger of falling 
behind. Government policy, legislation and economic institutions 
must not only be adapted to the needs of a faster and more complex 
economy but must also intervene to lessen the potential negative 
impacts for the losers of technological development. The relation-
ship between humans and robots must be appropriately weighed 
and integrated into the professional and personal day-to-day lives of 
workers and citizens.
Although it has been a major challenge for Portuguese workers 
and companies – as well as the international companies operating 
in Portugal – Industry 4.0 has made it possible to achieve advances 
in multiple areas, such as product quality control, mobility, the 
use of human capital for functions with higher added value (to the 
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detriment of more routine functions), and new and more active col-
laborations between technology companies. Gradually, industries 
are moving away from complete value chains, towards more special-
ised and focused activities.
PORTUGAL’S POTENTIAL: 60 POLICY MEASURES
Upgrading business operations is inevitable given that, with the increas-
ing introduction of digitisation and new technologically enhanced pro-
duction processes, there are fewer and fewer routine jobs.
To counterbalance Portugal’s current position vis-à-vis the digital 
revolution, the Portuguese government announced that it would ded-
icate €4.5bn (half of this via European funds) of public investment 
over the next four years to prepare the economy for the fourth indus-
trial revolution. The main aim is to provide technological training to 
more than 20,000 workers, managers and entrepreneurs, to enable 
them to face the difficulties created by digitisation, and ultimately to 
remain in viable employment.
This was announced in January 2017 as the Strategy for Industry 
4.0 (BF Consultores 2017), including more than 60 policy measures. 
Beyond helping workers with the new digitisation processes, their 
main goal is to bring Portugal to the forefront of this industrial revo-
lution. The policy agenda spans across several different industries, 
such as trade, tourism, retail, agriculture and the automotive sector. 
The strategy further envisions the creation of a visa scheme that 
will enable the recruitment of qualified citizens from abroad, and 
the provision of incentives for the exhibition of national technology 
companies at major international trade fairs (eg FABTECH Canada 
and Mexico, Hannover Messe, IoT Solutions World Congress 
Barcelona), aiming to share the products and services developed in 
Portugal in the Industry 4.0 context.
This is the largest single initiative planned by the Portuguese 
government in its national reform plan, an ambitious set of pro-
posals, which has allowed Mário Caldeira Cabral, the minister for 
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the economy, to state that Portugal is “one of the eight European 
countries that [has] a strategy for digitisation in industry” (Carvalho 
2016). There are 64 companies with a proven background in the 
application of new technologies involved in this project, alongside 
various government bodies and trade associations.2
Elements of the project are being jointly discussed and imple-
mented by various social actors, including the government and the 
private sectors, with the aim of tackling different problem areas 
identified as critical for Portugal:
• human capital qualification: fostering collaboration between uni-
versities and the corporate sector (following success cases such 
as the Science and Technology Park of the University of Porto 
or Startup Braga with the University of Minho) and developing 
in-demand qualifications and skills through the education system
• technological cooperation: at the development and implementa-
tion level between companies, universities, technology centres, 
business associations, public bodies and other stakeholders
• start-up modernisation: recognising the important role of start ups 
in technological innovation, developing measures in line with the 
national strategy for entrepreneurship (launched in 2016 by the 
Ministry of Economy, to foster competitiveness and attract domes-
tic and foreign investment).
• financing and investing incentives through public financing policies 
to develop mechanisms for projects within the scope of Industry 
4.0 (such as credit lines to support exports and reinforcement of 
the technology centres’ role); within this, the government’s plan 
includes the allocation of a €7,500 Industry 4.0 voucher to small- 
and medium-sized companies, which play an important role in 
Portugal in providing employment and value-added share, helping 
companies adopt technologies that can absorb disruptive changes in 
their business models, such as in digital marketing and commerce
• internationalisation: promoting the Portuguese technology indus-
try’s positioning in foreign markets and supporting the companies 
that are in the process of going global
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• the need to adopt best practice in standards and regulations, in 
order to allow the development of technological enablers based 
on legal guarantees that provide legal and regulatory certainty that 
increase the supply and adoption of technology.
The final goal is to support high-tech industry and innovation, by 
trying to bring together the principal actors that play a crucial role in 
the implementation and development of this revolution: the entities 
involved in the national reform plan, other policymakers, educators, 
employers and trade unions. The proposals were sourced from more 
than 200 entities, and the employers’ organisation COTEC Portugal 
is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the measures.
The fundamental pillars of this strategy are improving training, 
and strengthening partnerships between large traditional companies, 
start ups and educational institutions. While this is commendable, 
a more structured approach would be preferable: examining and 
measuring the current and forecast human capital shortcomings to 
address the needs of Industry 4.0, and evaluating what is needed to 
address these with concrete labour force data to determine the neces-
sary volume and distribution of resources. In this way, shortcomings 
in important and crucial areas could be avoided, such as tackling the 
problem of young people who are in not in employment, education 
or training (NEET), which poses a double threat: as a social prob-
lem, and a situation that exacerbates the lack of qualified workers in 
the country.
RISKING A LOST GENERATION: 
YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT
To counter the potential negative effects that technological change 
can pose for employees with traditional jobs, the government is 
focusing on improving training activities for entrepreneurs, manag-
ers and other workers, so that all have the necessary technical and 
managerial skills to prosper in the new working environment. This 
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therefore benefits individuals who already have a job, particularly 
those who will have to be more closely involved with processes that 
are likely to be partially or fully automated in future.
However, there are still young people who have difficulties with 
entering the labour market – 23.9% of the workforce in 2017 (INE 
2018) – as they lack skills and training for increasingly digitising 
economy.
The EU has attempted to counteract high levels of youth unem-
ployment with a number of different measures. For example, the 
Erasmus+ programme (2014–2020) supports projects designed for 
youth organisations or groups of young people with a focus on non-
formal learning. These include youth exchanges, opportunities for 
volunteering, training and networking opportunities for youth work-
ers, cooperation for innovation in youth work, and projects to engage 
young people in a structured dialogue with policymakers. Another 
example is European Employment Services (EURES), a cooperation 
network designed to facilitate the free movement of workers within 
the EU28, and an attempt to compile labour market trends in a way 
that can be accessed by national labour agencies while serving as a 
source for individual job vacancy data. Portugal has adopted some 
measures too: the Active Youth Employment policy, which provides 
hands-on work-experience opportunities for disadvantaged young 
people, and the Youth Warranty initiative, a commitment that within 
four months of leaving the education system or labour market young 
people will be offered a job, additional education, professional train-
ing or internship.
Despite these efforts, youth unemployment is still a serious 
problem, with severe social and economic consequences for the 
economy.3 In 2017, 11.2% of Portuguese young people were NEET, 
an improvement on 2016 (when 13.2% young people were unem-
ployed, versus the EU28 average of 11.6%) (INE 2018 and Eurostat 
2018). These young people are not participating in the fourth indus-
trial revolution, and not receiving the support or gaining the skills 
needed to face the challenges it presents. As they are not in work, 
they do not have opportunities to get practical experience. As they 
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are no longer in education, they are increasingly at risk of becoming 
totally disconnected from the labour market.
Youth unemployment in Portugal has fallen as the economy has 
recovered. It peaked at 38.1% in 2013 and fell to 24% by 2017, 
though this is still above pre-crisis levels (see Table 30.1). Youth 
unemployment has also fallen in many other EU countries, though 
this has been partially driven by increasing numbers of young people 
being involved in temporary work; unstable and precarious work is 
becoming increasingly common across the EU.
LINGERING SKILL MISMATCHES AND PORTUGAL’S 
POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE DIGITAL AGE
To master the challenges of the fourth industrial revolution, Portugal 
will have to be able to create high-skill jobs, which is inseparable 
from the overall challenges that the Portuguese economy faces to 
ensure durable medium- to long-term growth rates. Current forecasts 
for the future evolution of potential GDP and productivity growth 
are not encouraging (in the 0.8–1.2% range in both cases over the 
next few years, see eg IMF 2017) and structural problems persist 
(see eg Blanchard and Portugal 201; Gershenson, Jaeger and Lall, 
2016).
In these circumstances, youth unemployment – particularly the 
high rate of NEETs – is a particular challenge. The levels of com-
munication and meaningful cooperation between the Ministry of 
Labour, Ministry of Education and Ministry of Economy (which is 
in charge of the Strategy for Industry 4.0) must improve, to achieve 
the ministries’ objectives and to deal more appropriately with the 
unemployment crises. In addition, despite very significant improve-
ments in educational attainment in Portugal in the past few decades, 
this has not yet completely fed into the labour market, so Portugal 
still has one of the lowest proportions of people working (25–64 
years) and lowest level of qualifications among the population in the 
OECD (OECD 2017), with many industrial associations claiming to 
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have difficulty in finding qualified workers (Silva 2017). This lack 
of qualified workers is increasingly seen as a hindrance to poten-
tial growth and new industrial investment, which could result in 
Portugal being left behind: the lack of supply of qualified workers 
to meet demand today could lead to a lack of demand for the young, 
qualified workers of tomorrow.
An adequate bridge must be built to better link education and the 
modern realities of labour to address this structural gap. Education 
systems need to provide not only basic skills, but also transferable 
skills. There should be greater engagement between education and 
employment, so as to better understand the skills that are currently 
needed in the market. The fourth industrial revolution is thus an 
opportunity to address labour market mismatches and imbalances 
that have existed since before the crisis. There is a need for stra-
tegic thinking to improve links between education providers and 
employers and, at the same time, to make sure that young people 
are aware of and informed about employability opportunities and 
requirements.
To better prepare future workers for the fourth industrial revolu-
tion, the Portuguese government must help to foster partnerships 
between educational institutions, enterprises, employers and young 
people themselves. This government is already attempting to 
address this with its Strategy for Industry 4.0. Portugal must also 
focus on young people who are willing to learn new techniques and 
are more accustomed to new technologies. At 6%, the share of low-
skilled NEETs in Portugal is above the OECD average of just over 
5% (OECD 2016a). This poses a long-term challenge as this group 
risks being left behind in the labour market permanently. There is an 
urgent need to reconnect NEETs with the labour market and to pro-
vide them with new career prospects. If Portugal wants to be ahead 
on this revolution and move forward, it must see this as a long-term 
investment.
In a broader sense, however, when discussing Industry 4.0 we 
are talking about transformations that will inevitably occur in the 
modes of production, which take shape through a deep digitisation 
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across all sectors of the economy, not just automation of indus-
trial processes (Fernández-Macías this volume). This precipitates 
changes in the work model and, more broadly, the daily lives of 
workers and citizens. Historically, Portugal has been a laggard in 
previous industrial revolutions not least as a result of geographical 
and politico-historical specificities (see eg Costa, Lains and Miranda 
2016), which, arguably, might bear resemblance to the technological 
transformation that is unfolding now.
PUBLIC DEBATE REGARDING WORK  
4.0 IN PORTUGAL
Analysis of the specific effects of this revolution on the Portuguese 
labour market as has been carried out in other European countries 
(eg Wolter et al. 2015) is scarce. The Confederation of Portuguese 
Business expects that “10 to 15 per cent of current jobs in the indus-
trial sector will disappear in the next 10 years, but others [more qual-
ified] will be created” (CIP 2018, 16). In the Portuguese information 
and communications technology (ICT) sector alone, about 15,000 
professionals will be required to fill available vacancies. If potential 
is met – which requires dealing with the labour market challenges 
– in the next decade 157,000 jobs will be created in the industrial 
sector, due to the expansion of the economic activity allowed by the 
revolution. About 17,500 new jobs will be for specialists in physical 
sciences, mathematics and engineering. Nowadays, high-tech indus-
tries are already considered one of the pillars for Portugal’s future 
growth, alongside the tourism and ICT sectors.
Thus, in Portugal, rather than a widespread increase in unemploy-
ment, a change in the type and profile of employment is predicted, 
with decreasing demand for blue-collar workers and administrative 
support workers. Demand for mid-level technicians in Portuguese 
industry will fall, with doctorates and graduates in science, technol-
ogy, engineering and mathematics becoming increasingly important. 
However, this trend in demand does not reflect those of labour 
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supply: despite progress Portugal is far behind the leading countries 
in Europe in its PhD graduation figures, and especially worrisome 
is the low number of PhD graduates integrating within industry, 
with only 25% of researchers being employed outside the public 
sector (OECD 2016b). Industry 4.0 could therefore accentuate the 
mismatch between demand and supply of workers with appropriate 
qualifications.
There is still reluctance among some companies to proceed with 
the necessary investments, although some have already adopted 
reactive positions and new technologies associated with Industry 
4.0 – connectivity, cloud computing and advanced analytics – which 
allowed Portugal to be ranked 15th out of 29 European economies 
its digital maturity of domestic companies, according to the Digital 
Maturity Enterprise Index (Deloitte and Siemens 2015).
The topic has attracted public attention. Meetings and confer-
ences have attempted to gather the multiple social actors and rel-
evant stakeholders in the digitalisation of the economy, particularly 
government ministries, technology companies, labour and trade 
unions, and academics. Both socio-economic and labour issues have 
been addressed, covering subjects such as the modernisation of the 
economy, competitiveness and productivity within Industry 4.0.
The Tripartite Conference on the Future of Work, organised by 
the Ministry of Labour, Solidarity and Social Security of Portugal 
in collaboration with the Lisbon office of the International Labour 
Organization, was held in Lisbon on 19 October 2016. It involved 
the prime minister and the employment state secretary from the gov-
ernment side, several academics, representatives of trade unions and 
the president of the Confederation of Portuguese Business. Focusing 
particularly on labour market reform challenges, the ministry ulti-
mately recognised the difficulty of giving a homogeneous answer 
to the challenges of the digitalisation process and a need to adjust 
the collective contracting to this new reality: “collective contract-
ing will be misfit, namely at the level of the professions committee, 
which will also imply that we need to look at vocational training 
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and qualifications in a more focused and sharper way” (MTSSS 
2017, 62).
There is a consensus among stakeholders to focus on qualifica-
tions, since “in the digital era, qualifications are the best weapon 
against unemployment” (MTSSS 2017, 33). In this respect the future 
looks more encouraging, as international studies (eg OECD 2015) 
show that Portugal has improved its qualification levels and quality 
of education outcome indicators.
Portuguese policymakers agree that the transformation of work 
is a complex problem, and that a complex policy will be required, 
even while the exact changes that will take place remain uncertain. 
Industry leaders and, to a certain extent, labour and trade union 
representatives are on par with common knowledge on the subject. 
At the same time, and as in other countries, public opinion is split 
on potential opportunities and risks of automation, fearing it might 
result in higher long-term unemployment.
Improving the availability of data and resources devoted to 
research on this subject is of vital importance to allow for better pol-
icy action and for public opinion to be better informed. The success 
of the transition to Industry 4.0 and Work 4.0 will be determined by 
the strength of the economy and the balance between the economy, 
society and citizens in the degree of qualification and skills adjust-
ment. “In order to fully understand the challenge, it is necessary 
to take a systematic view of the aspirations and needs of different 
actors for managing behavioural change in organizations and in 
societies” (COTEC Portugal 2018: 1). Public policies should there-
fore privilege the training of workers, to allow them to benefit from 
the advancement of the new technologies, and to meet the growing 
and often unmet demands of current and potential future companies 
dealing in high-technology sectors.
Despite robots being the apparent stars of this new technological 
revolution, as always, the human factor will be decisive not only in 
reaping its fruits, but in moving it forward. In Portugal, this is par-
ticularly clear, given the size of the challenges it faces.
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NOTES
1. IPP and the author would like to thank Luís Teles Morais and Elena 
Garcia Mañes for the comments and support given to this article.
2. These include among others, the Ministry of Education, Ministry of 
Economy, Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education, Minis-
try of Labour, Solidarity and Social Security, the Institute of Employment 
and Professional Training (IEFP), engineering colleges, the Coordinating 
Council of Polytechnic Institutes, Foreign Services and Borders, COTEC 
Portugal (Business Association for Innovation) and the Agency for Com-
petitiveness and Innovation (IAPMEI).
3. Here, we adopt the definition of youth unemployment used by Euro-
stat (2018): “Youth unemployment includes all the youth (people between 
the ages of 15 and 24, inclusive) who are unemployed”. Relatedly, the 
“Youth unemployment rate is the percentage of the unemployed in the age 
group 15 to 24 years old compared to the total labour force (both employed 
and unemployed) in that age group”.
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In recent years, we have witnessed intensive discussion across 
politics, research, business and wider society surrounding the impact 
of digitalisation on the working world. The development of digital 
technology is expected to have a profound effect on the use of human 
labour, with debates about the new world of employment spanning 
job sustainability, working conditions, labour market regulation and 
skills training. This chapter is based on a comprehensive study by 
the Institute for Employment Research (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt 
und Berufsforschung; IAB) on digitalisation in Europe (Grass and 
Weber 2016), which we use to examine the example of France, and 
the impact of digitalisation on country’s economy, as well as the 
political response to recent change.
INTEGRATION OF TECHNOLOGY AND  
ECONOMIC EFFECTS
France was placed 16th on the European commission’s 2016 Digital 
Economy and Society Index (DESI) (European Commission 2016a). 
The commission classifies France as ‘falling behind’ because of 
FRANCE
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limited progress in connectivity, development of digital skills and 
the digitisation of public services. In integrating digital applications 
in business processes in particular, France takes only 18th place 
among EU states.
In the Index on the Aptitude Effect of Information and 
Communication Technologies of 2014, according to Evangelista 
et al. (2014), France has made progress compared with previous 
years for example in its rational use of information and communi-
cations technology (ICT) in business processes, job placement and 
education and doubling its index rating among all EU countries 
between 2004 and 2008.
In 2012 the business processes of French companies made moder-
ate use of mobile applications: in 35% of companies, mobile devices 
were used to surf the internet, in 40% they were used for email, and 
in 27% they were used to access cloud applications or exchange 
servers from outside the companies (Eurostat 2016a). France was 
not among the leading EU countries in 2014 to integrate multifunc-
tional industrial robots, having 120 industrial robots per 10,000 
production employees (International Federation of Robotics 2016).
In 2014, the European commission’s Joint Research Centre used 
data from seven countries – including France – to examine whether 
there were indications of job losses due to ICT for the period 
2007–2010 (Pantea, Biagi and Sabadash 2014). The authors argued 
that none of the countries examined showed developments in ICT 
to have a significant impact on employment. Although there were 
isolated variations, the authors concluded these could not be consid-
ered replacement phenomena. Contrary to trends in other countries, 
the broadband coverage of employees in the French manufacturing 
sector decreased from 44.7% to 38.8% between 2007 and 2010, 
while the provision of mobile web-enabled devices increased from 
24.3% to 37.3% of employees. The percentage of online sales as a 
percentage of all sales decreased from 15.4% to 11.5% – another 
unusual trend compared with the other countries studied. In the 
service sector the proportion of workers with broadband coverage 
decreased from 57.3% to 48.1%, but the percentage of employees 
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with a web-enabled mobile device increased to 42.4% from 27.3%. 
Online sales also decreased, from 7.9% to 6.0% of all sales.
In a 2015 report on the future of employment by 2022, govern-
ment political consulting agency France Stratégie prepared three dif-
ferent scenarios (Aboubadra, Argouarc’h and Bessière 2015). In the 
so-called ‘target scenario’, the authors explicitly include the effects 
of digitalisation and strong technological progress. Here they expect 
an increase in productivity of 1% per year and GDP growth of 1.8% 
per year until 2022. The employment rate would then increase by 
0.8% per year, with the unemployment rate dropping from around 
10% in 2016 to 7% in 2022.
In 2015, the economic advisory council for the French government 
outlined potential future changes to the economy due to digitalisa-
tion, and made proposals on how to support these through regulation 
(Colin et al. 2015). With reference to the OECD Digital Economy 
Outlook 2015, the authors criticised that in France the ICT sector 
only makes up 4.33% of GDP, compared with an OECD average of 
5.5%. In 2014, only 63.6% of companies had a website, while the 
OECD average was already at 76.2% and France had relatively few 
ICT specialists among its workforce compared with other countries. 
According to the advisory council, France suffers a lack of venture 
capital for business formation; while infrastructure conditions – eg 
broadband access – are actually good, the regulatory systems of the 
French economy are by no means ready for a digitalised or even 
internet economy.
In 2014, the French Ministry of Labour assigned the National 
Council for Digitalisation with the task of discussing several spe-
cific problems related to digitalisation. The council argues that 
large, medium-sized and small European companies would need to 
work together closely to achieve successful digital transformation 
(Conseil National Numérique 2016). Compatible cloud systems, 
communication and computer programmes for networking vari-
ous components should therefore take priority and possibly also be 
subsidised. The council advocates giving systematic support for 
research networks and their projects in the automobile, healthcare, 
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biotechnology and robotics sectors. At the same time patent law 
and copyright would need to be adapted so as to regulate the com-
mercial use of open-source and open data options appropriately and 
compensate contributors.
EDUCATION AND SKILLS
According to the evaluation of the Digital Economy and Society 
Index of the EU of the population’s basic and advanced computer 
and internet skills, France performs just above average (European 
Commission 2016a). More than half (57%) of the population have 
basic computer and internet skills (compared to an EU average of 
55%), but IT specialists only make up 3.5% of the population (com-
pared to an EU average of 3.7%) and, according to the European 
commission, France has not recently made any considerable prog-
ress in this area. However, there is an above average number of 
STEM graduates among all 20–29 year olds (2.3%, compared with 
an EU average of 1.8%), but there has been stagnant progress in this 
area in recent years.
Only around 1.8% of all workers in the manufacturing sector had 
specific ICT knowledge, with France performing below average in 
2012 and showing little improvement since 2008 (Lorenzani and 
Varga 2014). However, the proportion of the entire employable popu-
lation in France with general computer skills improved between 2006 
and 2014. For example, the percentage of people with moderate to 
advanced computer skills grew from 57% to 69%. There was more 
moderate progress among the population in attaining internet skills: the 
percentage of the employable population with moderate to advanced 
internet skills grew from 29% to 41% between 2007 and 2013, while 
the percentage with advanced internet skills was practically stagnant. 
In 2015, 29% of the employable population had few or no digital skills, 
while the EU average was just 25% (Eurostat 2016b; 2017).
In addition to its recommendations on the economy, the National 
Council for Digitalisation provided proposals for education. The 
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committee first recommended conducting a systematic analysis 
on which skills will be needed in which industries in a digitalised 
economy. Based on the findings, new forms of training should 
then be developed to promote improved creativity, abstraction 
and interpretation skills and focus less on selective knowledge. 
The report included a call for a right to training and continuing 
education not directly related to the occupation, and encourages 
employment agencies to take personal skills as well as aptitudes 
into account more. Individuals should be given more say in which 
of the acquired skills they want to emphasise most and which they 
want to improve in the future. To improve early vocational orien-
tation there should also be more interaction between schools and 
companies.
In 2015, the French labour ministry asked the personnel manager 
at Orange, Bruno Mettling, to produce a report on the effects of 
digitalisation on the working environment. Mettling involved both 
employer and employee representatives in creating the report, which 
also addressed topics related to education and skills (Mettling 2015). 
In order to prevent a painful structural change with major turning 
points for the population, the report found it would be necessary 
to incorporate continuing education and special training on the use 
of digital applications and ICT structurally within the educational 
system.
The association of trade unions, Force Ouvrière, believes past 
(continuing) education efforts have been inadequate. In a 2015 
position paper Force Ouvrière references a survey that shows 79% 
of French workers feel the current system does not offer adequate 
training on the use of new technologies (Force Ouvrière 2015). The 
aforementioned France Stratégie report on employment in 2022 
(Aboubadra, Argouarc’h and Bessière 2015) also demands that 
in light of the massive decline in employment opportunities to be 
expected for persons with average qualifications, it would be nec-
essary to improve vocational training provisions in all sectors and 
further facilitate entry-level career opportunities at a relatively high 
qualification level.
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DIGITALISATION AND CHANGE IN 
THE WORKING ENVIRONMENT
According to France Stratégie, there has been a casualisation of 
employment since the 1980s – a trend that has grown since the turn 
of the millennium due to the increasing use and shortening of limited-
term employment. In addition, the percentage of workers with multiple 
parallel jobs has increased. Since the turn of the millennium, the rate 
of solo self-employed among the employable population has grown 
again, after being low for years, and their average income has declined 
compared with previous years (Jolly and Prouet 2016). Furthermore, 
pressure on workers has increased because of new organisational 
structures of labour. Thus, more employees than in the past are stating 
that automated machine processes are setting the pace for work.
Necessities in the workplace, such as prompt response times to 
customer enquiries, may in some way also protect many workers 
against automation. At least this is the belief of France Stratégie 
experts, who argue it is still quite difficult to have these types of 
tasks performed by machines (Le Ru 2016). The number of jobs in 
France with these not easily automated requirements grew by 33% 
from 1998 to 2013, to 9.1 million total. The economic advisory 
council for the French government primarily considers labourers, 
office workers, bank employees and salespeople, as well as less cre-
ative elite professions such as certain types of physicians or solici-
tors threatened by digitalisation and learning algorithms (Colin et al. 
2015). However, digitalisation would not simply drive the working 
population to unemployment but could also free them from routine 
tasks and have them perform new tasks that require more interaction 
with people or individual requests and cannot be automated.
Whether digitalisation will result in the net elimination or creation 
of jobs cannot yet be predicted, according to France Stratégie (cf 
Jolly and Prouet 2016). In the aforementioned technology-driven 
‘target scenario’, its report on employment in 2022 predicts 212,000 
new jobs per year in the medium term, compared with 177,000 in 
the ‘central scenario’. From a purely numerical perspective, in this 
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scenario, newly created jobs, in healthcare and nursing for example, 
would more than compensate for job losses in administration, for 
example among clerks. These new jobs may not necessarily be filled 
with the same people, or those with a similar level of qualification. 
The authors of the France Stratégie report expect the country’s 
labour market to be less intensely polarised than other countries, 
such as the US, yet they paint a picture of job profiles drifting apart 
severely (Kalleberg this volume).
The government’s economic advisory council also assumes there 
will be further polarisation of the labour market. This would primar-
ily leave management or creative jobs for well-trained workers and 
non-routine jobs for the less qualified. The advisory council refers to 
a clear U-curve, which already shows the thinning of average quali-
fications in France between 1990 and 2012. However, in a specific 
report on polarisation, France Stratégie points out that the thesis on 
technological progress and digitalisation is not the only explana-
tory pattern for polarisation. Instead, globalisation (by outsourcing 
jobs to low-wage countries), fewer channels for social partners 
to negotiate, deregulation and the transformation of France into a 
service economy are often listed as the key drivers. France is bet-
ter equipped, particularly in its social dialogue and regulation, than 
perhaps the US, and may therefore be able to prevent excessive and 
uncontrolled polarisation.
The Mettling report assumes that in a few years a high percentage 
of workers will be working on a mobile basis. Furthermore, digi-
talisation will result in a massive change towards collaborating and 
cooperating more, which could lead companies to break with previ-
ous rigid and hierarchical forms of control and reporting.
According to the French government’s economic advisory coun-
cil, working modes would change considerably in a digitalised 
economy. For example, jobs for the low-qualified would rather be 
offered in the form of freelance work, while digitalisation would 
facilitate coordination between client and external service providers 
as solo self-employed. Workers would have the advantage of being 
able to hold several parallel jobs at once. However, it would be 
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extremely difficult for social security systems or even lending cri-
teria to continue to be completely based on employment, and these 
systems would need to change. The council specifically calls for 
taxation systems to improve for the solo self-employed to facilitate 
transitions between different forms of work, a challenge the National 
Council for Digitalisation also shares in its aforementioned report. 
The council generally advocates rediscussing social security and 
collective representation for the self-employed.
Unions such as Force Ouvrière warn that people could easily be 
degraded to being servants of technology. The unionists call not to 
create new forms of contract or employment for the man-machine 
interaction to prevent degrading people in this system and to main-
tain securities for workers. Force Ouvrière also stresses that labour 
in fully automated processes, in some cases merely managing emer-
gencies, is not a trivial matter because of the psychological stress it 
entails. Force Ouvrière also demands politicians set tight limits for 
employers over how much they are allowed to monitor employees 
with the available technologies (Force Ouvrière 2015).
The National Council for Digitalisation also wants to see a focus 
on the human factor by including criteria such as average employee 
health in the assessment of the performance of management. Workers 
should further be granted extended leave or part-time working 
arrangements in certain situations, for example to undertake research, 
to participate in continuing education, to attend to social commit-
ments, to form a business, or to allow for professional advancement 
and adjustment to new challenges. The council further sees the need 
to adapt employment agencies, which should adjust to companies’ 
changing forms of employment and contract. The council recom-
mends promoting contracts for so-called ‘travail en temps partagé’, 
which have existed in France since 2005, in order to increase flexi-
bilisation within companies. These allow a worker to work simulta-
neously for several companies or institutions through a contract with 
a group of employers – and to be paid through the group.
The members of the council also demand adding more data and 
more reliable information to discussions on alternative forms of 
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social security financing, such as unconditional basic income. A 
feasibility study should first be conducted on this with a detailed 
analysis of the economic effects, potential labour displacement and 
the impact on the supply of labour when introducing a basic income.
The union Confédération française démocratique du travail 
stresses that technological change could only be used optimally if 
employees could make a conscious decision on digitalisation and the 
use of digital applications. There would still need to be the option 
to also decide against the use of modern technology in some situa-
tions. Furthermore, the position of the union is that technology used 
in the workplace would need to be developed with much greater 
involvement from the workers, so they will then be able to use this 
technology to its full potential. Force Ouvrière demands new regu-
lations to limit availability and to set boundaries between work and 
family time, and stresses that digitalisation should not result in mas-
sive crowdsourcing of work with all contractors being responsible 
for themselves (Degryse 2016). Mettling was not quite as critical on 
this point, but he also warned: one should contemplate, now, how 
to incorporate crowdworking and voluntary work in economic and 
social processes better than in the past without unlegislated areas 
arising to the detriment of workers or other companies.
Force Ouvrière fears more flexible and decentralised ‘normal’ 
employment to hold disadvantages for the working population. 
Although it recognises the advantages for employees in these forms 
of work, it also refers to studies that state telecommuters have to 
manage higher workloads and increasingly to work at night and on 
weekends. There would need to be safe zones without digital avail-
ability; Force Ouvrière touches on the right to digital disconnection.
The Mettling report recommends that working hours and work-
loads should be modified for digital jobs. With uncharacteristic 
and increasing contractual relationships and employment or work 
modes, one can no longer only use fixed working hours in calcula-
tions. Instead, the workload also needs to be included. A disconnec-
tion ‘duty’ should be added to the right to disconnection, including 
workers at all levels learning to use media more deliberately – with 
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companies offering training on this. Telecommuters and mobile 
workers should be protected against accidents at work. The Mettling 
report further calls for the planned personal activity account to be 
used to equip each worker with a certain base of rights, based on 
their social contributions, which they would then not lose when 
switching between forms of employment.
POLITICAL AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE MEASURES
In 2017, the so-called personal activity account (compte personnel 
d’activité; CPA) was launched for every French citizen aged 16 and 
over. This account is intended to prevent breaches in the rights of 
the employable, for example when changing from being employed 
to solo self-employment or other forms of employment. People can 
collect points in their account, for example through work activity, 
and government institutions can award points. The points can be 
used for various purposes, for example to set towards educational 
activities, financial assistance for business formation, or leave for 
family obligations or social commitments. The points are not lost if 
a person’s employment status changes.
Even before the CPA, in 2015 the personal education account and 
the personal account to prevent occupational hazards entered into 
force, both of which are also specified in the discussion on changes 
in the digitalised working environment. Employees can use the latter 
to collect points for exposure to hazards throughout their working life 
and then use these for specific qualifications for less hazardous posi-
tions within the company, shorter working hours or early retirement.
As of 2016, programmes are being implemented in primary and 
secondary schools – previously, there were only optional courses at 
the secondary level in specific schools’ technical education groups. 
Upper-level secondary school students can choose a subject called 
exploring computer sciences and digital work (enseignement 
d’exploration d’informatique et de création numérique). However, 
according to a European Schoolnet report, teachers are not provided 
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with training to master the skills needed for the new course through 
the Ministry of Education (Balanskat and Engelhardt 2015).
In 2013 the Ministry of Education, in line with the EU Grand 
Coalition for Digital Jobs, wanted to create an action plan for how 
to draw more young people to ICT degree programmes and jobs. 
That year, there was to be an agreement between companies and 
the Ministry of Labour on ICT training for the employed or those 
entering the workforce. Both measures combined were to prepare 
3,000 people per year for digital jobs, on top of those already in 
the B2i training and certification programme for youth and the C2i 
programme for adults, which both teach digital skills.
The so-called Grand École du Numérique is committed to intro-
ducing uneducated and low-qualified people to ICT jobs. This is not 
a physical educational institution, but rather a construct to support 
educational institutions and companies in educational projects and 
initiatives (Grande École du Numérique 2016).
Most recently, a mission statement from President Macron out-
lined 15 key reforms on digitalisation, including the promotion of 
investments in start ups, the improvement of internet coverage and 
the extension of education on digital competencies in schools and 
professional training (Paquette 2017). Digitising governmental ser-
vices in general constitutes a strong focus of the Macron administra-
tion and is to receive significant funding (Rolland 2017). In addition 
the Code du Travail (labour legislation), which was reformed in 
2017 regarding aspects of collective bargaining in small companies, 
for example, will be made available online in an understandable 
and accessible format by 2020 (Absalon 2017; Belouezzane 2017). 
The system of professional training will be newly regulated along 
several lines, such as setting up a flexible training contract, a new 
national standard of minimum remuneration, fiscal support by a 
single instrument, a strengthened role of industry in the design of 
vocational education programmes, a business-led certification of 
apprenticeship, better tailored professional development support to 
workers, additional finance for the personal training account as well 
as simplified administration of and access to training. However, the 
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reform proposal has also been criticised for insufficiently addressing 
digital skills (Sigere 2017).
REFERENCES
Aboubadra, S., J. Argouarc’h and S. Bessière (2015), Les métiers en 2022, 
Paris: France Stratégie, http://www.strategie.gouv.fr/sites/strategie.gouv.
fr/files/atoms/files/fs_rapport_metiers_en_2022_27042015_final.pdf.
Absalon, J. (2017), ‘Code du travail numérique: à quoi cela v-a-t’il servir?’, 
Radio Télévision Luxembourg (RTL), 31 August, http://www.rtl.fr/
actu/societe-faits-divers/code-du-travail-numerique-a-quoi-cela-va-t-il-
servir-7789912733.
Balanskat and Engelhardt (2015), ‘Computing our future: Computer 
programming and coding. Priorities, school curricula and initiatives 
across Europe’, Brussels: European Schoolnet, http://fcl.eun.org/docu-
ments/10180/14689/Computing+our+future_final.pdf/746e36b1-e1a6-
4bf1-8105-ea27c0d2bbe0.
Belouezzane, S. (2017), ‘Réforme du code du travail: ce que contien-
nent les ordonnances’, Le Monde, 31 August, http://www.lemonde.fr/
politique/article/2017/08/31/reforme-du-code-du-travail-ce-que-contien-
nent-les-ordonnances_5179082_823448.html.
Colin, N., A. Landier, P. Mohnen and A. Perrot (2015), ‘Economie numéri-
que’, Les notes du conseil d´analyse économique, 26, October.
Conseil National Numérique (2016), ‘Travail emploi numerique: les nou-
velles trajectores’, Paris: Conseil National Numérique.
Degryse, C. (2016) ‘Digitalisation of the economy and its impact on labour 
markets’, ETUI Working Paper 2016.02, Brussels: ETUI.
European Commission (2016a), ‘The Digital Economy and Society Index, 
Scoreboard France’, Brussels: European Commission.
Eurostat (2016a) ‘Mobile Connection to Internet’, eurostat: Statistics 
Explained, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/
Mobile_connection_to_internet.
Eurostat (2016b) ‘Internet access and use statistics - households and 
individuals’, eurostat: Statistics Explained, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
statistics-explained/index.php/Internet_access_and_use_statistics_-_
households_and_individuals.
Eurostat (2017) ‘Digital economy and digital society statistics at regional 
level’, eurostat: Statistics Explained, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statis-
tics-explained/index.php/Digital_economy_and_digital_society_statis-
tics_at_regional_level.
 429FRANCE
Evangelista R., Guerrieri P. and Meliciani V. (2014), Taylor and Francis, 
‘The economic impact of digital technologies in Europe’, https://www.
tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10438599.2014.918438
Force Ouvrière (2015), ‘L’impact du numérique sur le travail: ni catastro-
phisme, ni angelisme, les réflexions de Force Ouvrière s’inscrivent dans 
le realisme’, Réflexions de Force Ouvrière.
Grande École du Numérique (2016), ‘Qu´est-ce que la Grande École 
du Numérique?’, press release, https://www.grandeecolenumerique.
fr/2016/03/grande-ecole-numerique/.
Grass, K. and E. Weber (2016), EU 4.0 – the Debate on Digitalisation and 
the Labour Market in Europe, IAB Discussion Paper 39.
International Federation of Robotics (2016), International World Robotics 
Report 2016, Frankfurt: International Federation of Robotics, https://ifr.
org/ifr-press-releases/news/world-robotics-report-2016.
Jolly, C. and E. Prouet (2016), L’avenir du travail: quelles redefinitions de 
l’emploi, des statuts et des protections?, Paris: France Stratégie.
Le Ru, N. (2016), ‘L’effet de l’automatisation sur l’emploi: ce qu’on sait et 
ce qu’on ignore’, La note d´analyse 49, Paris: France Stratégie.
Lorenzani D. and Varga J. (2014), ‘The economic impact of digital struc-
tural reforms’, Economic Papers 429, European commission http://
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_paper/2014/pdf/
ecp529_en.pdf
Mettling, B. (2015), Transformation numérique et vie au travail, Paris, 
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-pub-
lics/154000646.pdf.
Pantea, S., F. Biagi and A. Sabadash (2014), Are ICT Displacing 
Workers? Evidence from Seven European Countries, JRC Technical 
Report, https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/JRC91122_ICT_displac-
ing_workers.pdf.
Paquette, E. (2017), ‘Numérique: les 15 réformes de Macron’, L’Express, 
19 July, https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/numerique-les-15-re-
formes-de-macron_1928518.html.
Rolland, S. (2017), ‘L’État 100% numérique de Macron coûtera 9,3 
milliards d’euros’, La Tribune, 26 September, https://www.latribune.
fr/economie/france/l-etat-100-numerique-de-macron-coutera-9-3-mil-
liards-d-euros-751606.html.
Sigere, S. (2017), ‘The Future of Work: a New Deal for Skills in France?’, 
London: Policy Network, 21 November, http://policynetwork.org/opin-
ion/the-future-of-work-a-new-deal-for-skills-in-france/.

 431
The dependent nature of industrialisation and a weak innovation 
base has made central and eastern Europe vulnerable to economic 
restructuring related to the introduction of new technologies. An 
effective innovation policy requires an improvement of the broader 
institutional environment. A shift to an innovation-driven growth 
model is needed to sustain a further convergence of living standards 
between old and new EU member states. This would require a break 
with the current paradigm, which is based largely on competition 
based on cost efficiency.
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: A SECOND-RANK 
EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL BASE
Framing much of the debate on the impact of the use of digital tech-
nologies on manufacturing and its related support services, the con-
cept of Industry 4.0 comes from the discussion in Germany around 
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the future prospects for that country’s industrial base. Germany is 
indeed Europe’s manufacturing hub, but there is actually a higher 
share of industry in terms of value-added and employment in the 
group of central and eastern European (CEE) countries – including 
Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia – than in the sup-
posed European manufacturing power house.1 The CEE region is 
thus exposed to possible restructuring that may be induced by the 
introduction of digital technologies to an even greater extent than is 
the case in Germany. At the same time, the impact will be different 
in the CEE countries from elsewhere in Europe, given the region’s 
specific, and somewhat second rank, position in global and regional 
value chains. Their intermediate-level manufacturing specialisation 
makes the CEE countries more vulnerable to the restructuring that 
will be induced by automation and the adoption of digitalisation 
technologies. At the same time, Industry 4.0 technologies provide 
an opportunity to upgrade the CEE countries’ position and hence to 
revive the process of catching up with western Europe. However, the 
CEE bloc needs to address its weak learning and innovation infra-
structure to be able to seize the opportunity that the fourth industrial 
revolution presents.
DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
After much of the industrial base that had been inherited from the 
Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, the CEE countries were 
reindustrialised by foreign investors who acquired or inherited firms 
and, in most cases, through the establishment of greenfield manu-
facturing sites (Drahokoupil 2008; Myant and Drahokoupil 2010). 
Taking off in the run up to EU enlargement, the inflows of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) fuelled rapid growth in the region. Much 
investment was driven by the exploitation of lower labour costs and 
the modernisation introduced by FDI failed to develop local innova-
tion systems. Instead, the region relied on the transfer of technology 
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and knowhow through the networks of multinational corporations 
(Galgóczi, Drahokoupil and Bernaciak 2015). Dependent reindus-
trialisation thus gave rise to a group of second-rank economies with 
low research and development (R&D) intensity. In 2015, total R&D 
spending accounted for 2% of GDP in Czechia, 1.4% in Hungary 
and for just 1–1.2% in Poland and Slovakia, while it reached 2.9% 
in Germany.2
Dualised economies have emerged, with highly productive, often 
foreign-controlled firms, paying higher wages, but employing fewer 
people than domestic firms with less complex products and often 
in a position of second-tier suppliers to multinationals (Galgóczi, 
Drahokoupil and Bernaciak 2015). Multinational corporation affili-
ates also exhibit much higher levels of R&D spending and innova-
tion intensity (Knell 2017). There appears to be little or no growth in 
domestic R&D activity in most of these countries (although Poland 
fares better on this indicator). While typically exhibiting superior 
performance to domestic firms, the local subsidiaries of multina-
tional corporations are themselves in a dependent position in the 
value chains. These subsidiaries often specialise in activities with 
low R&D intensity and much of the R&D that does occur is only 
secondary, such as adapting products for local markets. Subsidiaries 
have typically been able to upgrade and thus improve employment 
quality and wages, but upgrading was often not accompanied by 
an improvement in the value captured by the affiliates (Szalavetz 
2015).
Nevertheless, FDI inflows drove a dynamic process of catching up 
with the EU15 that characterised much of the 2000s (Hunya 2015). 
The crisis of 2008 was a breaking point. Foreign direct investment 
inflows stopped and convergence in many CEE countries actually 
reversed. CEE countries started to grow again in 2013, but the pro-
cess of convergence has lost its momentum. FDI picked up again, 
particularly in Czechia and Slovakia, but EU structural fund trans-
fers replaced FDI as the main source of external investment financ-
ing for the CEE countries (Hunya, 2017).
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WHY HAS THE FDI-DRIVEN CONVERGENCE  
DISAPPOINTED?
The FDI-dependent economic model allowed CEE countries to 
reach output levels that are comparable to that of southern Europe. 
By 2017, Czechia has reached 84% of EU15 GDP, if differences in 
price levels are adjusted for purchasing power parity; Slovakia was 
at 72%, Poland at 66% and Hungary at 64%.3 The wealthiest of the 
group thus has well exceeded the level of Portugal (72%) and almost 
reached the level of Spain (86%). However, capital outflows make 
actual incomes of these countries somewhat poorer. This is most 
pronounced in Czechia where the 2016 gross national income was at 
78% of EU15, while the Spanish gross national income was almost 
identical to its GDP (all measured in purchasing power parity).
High profit repatriation, which lowers national incomes, is a 
dominant characteristic of the FDI-dependent model. In 2016, such 
capital outflows exceeded 8% of GDP in the Czech Republic in 
2016, a value that is high by regional standards. The general dif-
ficulty of retaining the value added was expressed also in the low 
share of wages in national income. Wage convergence thus lagged 
well behind economic performance. The convergence achievement 
is, indeed, even less impressive if incomes of workers are compared 
(see Drahokoupil and Piasna 2017). For instance, in 2017 GDP in 
the Czech Republic, adjusted for differences in price levels, reached 
74% of the German level, but compensation per employee was only 
about 68% of German levels (adjusted for price differences). The 
levels in Slovakia, Poland and Hungary were lower, at 64%, 62% 
and 56% of Germany compensation respectively.4 There were large 
wage increases in 2016 and 2017, but these came after a lost decade, 
and the convergence trend effectively stalled after the crises of 2008.
The wage gap is much wider if measured in nominal terms. In 
2017, compensation in Czechia was at 42% of the German level, 
Slovakia at 40%, Poland at 33%, and Hungary at 31%. While 
workers face different price levels, particularly for services, a full 
convergence in price levels would thus also require convergence in 
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real earnings. The price differences for some goods are already low 
or absent altogether, implying differences in consumption levels 
that are commensurate with nominal wage differences. Moreover, 
low prices lead to lower incomes from exported goods and ser-
vices. In principle, higher prices could harm regional competitive-
ness, but the evidence suggests that recent wage increases did not 
affect FDI inflows and export performance in the region (Galgóczi, 
Drahokoupil and Bernaciak 2015).
Many policymakers thus had second thoughts about the devel-
opmental prospects of the FDI-based economic model. In this con-
text, Hungary and Poland have somewhat reconsidered their stance 
towards FDI, aiming to promote national companies at the expense 
of foreign investors in the service sectors (Sass 2017). Hungary was 
most active in this respect, discriminating against foreign investors 
through sector-specific regulations and taxes that targeted foreign 
companies that are active in the financial, retail, media and energy 
markets. However, the approach to investors in export-oriented 
industrial sectors has not changed in any of the CEE countries. The 
dependence on multinational corporations thus remains the defining 
feature of industrial structures in them.
VULNERABILITIES: WEAK INNOVATION, SKILLS 
COMPOSITION AND VALUE CHAIN STATUS
The dualised economies with weak innovative performance seem to 
be a weak basis for reviving a process of convergence that would 
allow the region to catch up with the west, particularly as far as 
living standards are concerned. What is more, the second-rank 
integration in the international value chains makes the region more 
vulnerable to restructuring through digitalisation and automation.
First, in the last two decades, the countries managed to upgrade 
the skill composition of jobs through a growth in non-routine cog-
nitive tasks at work, but this was accompanied by an increase in 
routine cognitive components of jobs, a trend that distinguishes the 
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CEE region from the advanced economies. Middle-skilled men in 
the manufacturing sectors and middle-skilled women in the service 
sectors thus jointly represented 33% of workers in the region in 
the early 2000s (Keister and Lewandowski 2017). A technology-
induced reduction in the demand for routine work would thus affect 
a large fraction of workers and increase wage inequality in the 
region. The 2016 OECD assessment of the risk of job loss indeed 
ranked Czechia and Slovakia as countries most affected by the risk 
of job losses due to automation, with over 45% of workers in jobs 
at high and medium risk of automation (Arntz, Gregory and Zierahn 
2016; see also Arnold et al. this volume).
Second, automation may represent a threat to the intermediate-
level specialisation of the region in the manufacturing activities that 
provide labour input to international production networks. Industry 
4.0 technologies may undermine prior upgrading and innovation 
achievements as they could become digitalised (eg in production 
planning, tooling and scheduling) and also undermine future upgrad-
ing opportunities in the field of process development (Szalavetz 
2017). That would undermine the value capture and retention poten-
tial of multinational corporations affiliates in the region. However, 
the emergence of new manufacturing technologies could even pro-
vide incentives for multinational corporations to consolidate manu-
facturing activities and to reshore the intermediate tasks outside the 
region.
DIGITALISATION AS AN OPPORTUNITY
At the same time, digitalisation represents also an opportunity for 
the region. As demonstrated by Szalavetz (2017) through case 
studies of multinational corporation manufacturing subsidiaries 
in Hungary, Industry 4.0 technology adaptation can allow the 
affiliates to upgrade existing manufacturing facilities, develop 
‘Industrialisation 4.0’-related competences, and thus benefit from a 
possible reconfiguration and consolidation of value chains. However, 
as such upgrading achievements go hand in hand with higher skills 
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requirements, they are necessarily conditional on the availability of 
skills (Szalavetz, 2017). The case studies indeed showed that secur-
ing access to skilled workers was the main challenge and potential 
constraint in seizing the upgrading opportunities involved in the 
adoption of digital technologies.
The weaknesses in the skills and innovation systems, and the insti-
tutions that underpin them, thus may limit the extent to which these 
countries can seize the upgrading opportunities offered by Industry 
4.0 technologies. There are some promising trends in certain sectors, 
such as software development, but the overall innovation capacity 
appears to be relatively weak. Apart from the low levels of R&D 
(which apply also to business R&D), the region also lags behind in 
other indicators of innovation capacity, including in the weak links 
that exist between science and business, the barriers to knowledge 
diffusion and learning processes that exist, and the insufficient 
development of digital skills in the workforce (Weresa 2017).
KEY POLICY CHALLENGES: INNOVATION 
RATHER THAN CHEAP LABOUR
The key policy challenge for the CEE countries is to create a frame-
work for achieving competitiveness through innovation rather than 
merely through low labour costs. Given the size of the wage gap, 
there is scope for wage increases without harming the competitive-
ness of the countries. Trade unions, particularly in Czechia, have 
successfully politicised the unsatisfying progress in convergence that 
has occurred, and have actively campaigned for an ‘end to cheap 
labour’ (see Myant and Drahokoupil 2010). Political parties, includ-
ing the Czech social democrats and the far-right party in Hungary, 
have taken this up across the spectrum. Employers, as well as the 
European Commission, have typically responded with the unconvinc-
ing argument that any wage increases should not exceed productivity 
improvements. In any case, in 2016–2017 there were substantial wage 
increases in many countries, in the context of tight labour markets and 
the dynamic economic growth that came in that period.
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However, economic fundamentals need to change in order for the 
CEE countries to achieve sustainable convergence in living stan-
dards. Addressing the low innovation capacity and skill basis is also 
key to averting the threats that automation and Industry 4.0 presents 
for jobs and industrial investment in the region. Improving the learn-
ing and innovation infrastructure is also necessary for allowing the 
companies in the region to take advantage of the opportunities that 
Industry 4.0 presents.
Governments have discussed tackling digitalisation and supporting 
a shift to innovation-driven growth across the region. Trade unions 
had an important role to play putting the challenges of Industry 4.0 
on the agenda, particularly in the countries where social dialogue 
plays an important role (see Jolly this volume). For instance, Czech 
trade unions have called for a shortening of the working week, and 
the introduction of a framework for lifelong learning and worker co-
determination at company level.
At this point, however, there are scant signs of major changes in the 
actual policies that are being pursued. The investment support seems 
to be stuck in the paradigm that encourages new investment through 
subsidies, with little effective support for the upgrading of existing 
operations and technological spillovers between foreign and domes-
tic firms (Szent-Iványi 2017). A substantial share of EU cohesion 
funds was actually earmarked for innovation, but the CEE countries 
used these funds mainly to investment in hardware and infrastructure 
rather than enhance their innovation capacity (Ferry 2017).
The conventional advice includes reforming the education and 
science sectors, increasing the role of development banks, support-
ing entrepreneurship, and establishing start ups through seed funding 
and venture capital, boosting business R&D, investing in knowledge 
diffusion and cluster development, and strengthening local supplier 
networks around foreign investments (see Kenny and Zysman this 
volume). However, designing an effective innovation policy is not 
an easy task as it requires also an improvement of the broader insti-
tutional environment. On their own, none of the policies can work as 
a silver bullet. Building innovation capacity involves a cumulative, 
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path-dependent series of activities and strategies for capacity devel-
opment and network building. It can only be successful if the para-
digm of competing through lower costs is finally left behind.
NOTES
1. See Eurostat (online data code: nama_10_a10; nama_10_a10_e), 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database.
2. See Eurostat (online data code: tsdec320), available at: http://
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database.
3. Compare macro-economic database AMECO, European Commis-
sion (online code: HVGDPR), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_
finance/ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm.
4. Compare macro-economic database AMECO, European Commis-
sion (online code: HWCDW), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_
finance/ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm.
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The fourth industrial revolution is a contested concept that encom-
passes the advancements in digital technology and the related 
changes to working and living conditions that have come about 
since the beginning of the 21st century. Many commentators view 
new technologies with optimism, and as potentially innovative 
instruments for positive social change (see Atkinson this volume). 
Other commentators view new technologies with pessimism, and as 
a primary cause of social decay. In this essay I will comment on the 
nature of the contemporary changes to work and to people’s lives 
that has been induced by these changes, and will argue that, con-
trary to the widely held view of technological change as evolving 
and influencing society through an inevitable logic of its own, these 
changes can only be understood as being embedded in the existing 
social and political context in which they are found.
We will reflect on these changes in an environment that, aside 
from technological developments, has undergone other substan-
tial change over the last decades. Slovenia is one of the European 
countries that recently experienced multiple economic and politi-
cal restructurings, having re-established a capitalist economy, and 
SLOVENIA
Grassroots trade unions and the 
empowerment of the young
Aleksandra Kanjuo Mrčela
442 ALEKSANDRA KANJUO MRČELA
having introduced multiparty political democracy since gaining 
political independence in 1991. These changes have placed major 
demands on Slovenian society, which has had various far-reaching 
consequences for the different social groups in the country. This has 
prepared the ground for the specific set of challenges and opportuni-
ties that are now faced by Slovenian society regarding the transfor-
mation of working and living conditions in the context of the fourth 
industrial revolution.
NEW TECHNOLOGIES ARE NOT 
AUTOMATICALLY BETTER
Contemporary scientific and technological advancements are impres-
sive. Technological innovations are expected to alter radically the 
performance of education, work, transport and other activities as 
well as the organisation of health, social security and other systems 
that are of the utmost important for our lives. Numerous studies 
now predict that computerisation jeopardises a great deal of existing 
jobs and that a large proportion of activities currently being per-
formed by workers could already be automatised (see Arnold et al. 
this volume). Experts in the field expect that artificial intelligence 
will outperform humans in the next decades, not only in some less 
demanding tasks (such as driving or performing sales work) but also 
in writing fiction and non-fiction text, in translation services, and in 
performing demanding, highly skilled professional work, such as 
that undertaken by surgeons (Grace et al., 2017; see Petropoulos this 
volume). Still, as has been the case many times before in history, it 
is very probable that the predicted changes will be less radical than 
this, and it remains difficult to foresee all the potential positive and 
negative consequences that may come to pass for individuals and 
societies. However, it is almost certain that new technologies will 
not produce inherently good or bad social results automatically. The 
impact of new technologies will depend on how they are adopted, 
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which is determined by factors including social norms, expectations 
and political decisions, as we shall see (see Hofheinz this volume).
In his contribution to the debate around the future of work in the 
middle of the 20th century, Daniel Bell (1974) argued that services 
would replace manufacturing in the post-industrial society and that 
as a consequence, workplaces would be humanised as people would 
work with people and not just with machines, and that relations 
between people would be based on bargaining and not conflict. That 
did not come to pass. Harry Braverman’s (1998) estimation that new 
technologies would not bring any improvement as long as the pre-
vailing production relations remained unchanged. Thus, the notion 
of work as being primarily profit-oriented proved to be a more accu-
rate prediction. Technological advancements in the past changed 
living and working conditions only in as much as social relations 
and norms allowed. To explore this, we can look at the case of the 
length of paid and unpaid work.
Over recent decades, new technologies have provided us with 
productivity gains that could have been used to shorten working 
hours and to improve the working and living standards of workers. 
Instead, higher rates of productivity emerged alongside higher rates 
of unemployment, and many of those in employment were required 
to work even more hours than before. The growing culture of work-
ing longer hours seems to be in direct conflict with the potential ben-
efits that are presented by new technologies. Jeremy Rifkin’s (1995) 
analysis points to the fact that the beneficiaries of the productivity 
gains yielded by technological advancements were shareholders and 
not workers. Rifkin proposed a new social contract that would affirm 
the notion of a globalised social economy in which workers would 
work shorter hours, and where productivity gains provided benefits, 
not for shareholders, but for society. Historical analysis shows that 
shorter or longer working hours are not anything to do with tech-
nological advancement, but rather are shaped by the strength of 
organised labour and the bargaining power of workers (or the lack 
thereof).
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The proliferation and widespread use of household appliances in 
the last century provided for a decreasing burden of unpaid house-
hold work, which had primarily fallen on the shoulders of women. 
However, in spite of this, a combination of rising expectations 
regarding the nature and standards of household chores (eg regard-
ing cooking and cleaning) and the persistence of the traditional 
gendered division of labour caused further overburdening of women 
with domestic responsibilities. It seems that the style of living and 
the strength of gender equality norms (or the lack thereof) provides 
for the scope and distribution of unpaid household work, rather than 
this being anything to do with technological advancement.
NEW TECHNOLOGIES ARE NOT RESPONSIBLE  
FOR POOR JOB QUALITY
Technological innovations themselves are socially conditioned and 
depend primarily on political and social decisions that are made to 
enable them. For example, we can see today that more and more jobs 
are mediated by web platforms (see Schor this volume). Workers 
who perform these jobs enjoy some time and place flexibility, but 
they also experience many serious problems caused by the insecure 
nature of their employment, and the lack of labour standards and 
protectionism, to name a few. The gig economy and crowdsourcing 
have not flourished because web platforms have enabled them, but 
because neoliberal discourse has enabled web platforms to function.
Neoliberalism was successful in naturalising the existence of 
poorer quality jobs. That is why we can observe a paradox: in 
the time of the glorification of knowledge and the development 
of advanced digital and technological advancements at work over 
recent decades, many young, highly educated and digitally com-
petent people all over the world are members of the precariat – the 
workers who are in the weakest position in the labour markets.
So, instead of expecting too much from digitalisation, we should 
find the best ways to restore social expectations and the strength of 
social forces that are the basis for more decent jobs.
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CHANGES IN WORK AND WELFARE IN SLOVENIA 
IN THE TIME OF DIGITAL REVOLUTION
The latest phase of the digital revolution has been accompanied 
by other important shifts in Slovenian society. The last 30 years 
of political and economic turmoil provided Slovenia with valuable 
experience in managing change. The political and economic reforms 
that precipitated the establishment of Slovenian state independence 
were socially and politically demanding. The initial widespread 
enthusiasm for the new state of affairs in the 1990s was followed 
by economic and financial crisis, political turmoil, a weakening of 
previously strong social actors, including trade unions and political 
parties, and rising dissatisfaction and concerns among the citizenry 
with the course of change over the last two decades (Stanojević, 
Mrčela and Breznik, 2016). While strong social dialogue was an 
important instrument for establishing a consensus that was needed in 
a time of change, the latest developments reflect a rise of conflictual 
relations in Slovenia and the country’s position in the European and 
global economy.
At the same time, according to the Digital Economy and Society 
Index (European Commission 2017), the Republic of Slovenia ranks 
17th in the EU and there are ambitious plans on how to improve the 
country’s position in this ranking (MPA 2017). A high degree of 
digital literacy persists among the population and especially among 
the youngest Slovenians. According to the EU Kids Online survey, 
the average index of digital literacy of children aged between 11 and 
16 in 25 European countries is 3.1, while Slovenian children are in 
second place with 4.4 just after children in Finland with 4.6 (RIS 
2017).
The younger generations in Slovenia is very well educated and 
highly digitally literate, which renders them both equipped for, 
and involved in, digitalisation. However, recent analyses show that 
young people are especially vulnerable in the labour market, and 
they are overrepresented in all forms of precarious work (Ignjatović 
and Mrčela 2016). In 2015, the proportion of young people who were 
employed for a limited period of time in Slovenia was the highest in 
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Europe. Younger workers are the cohort that are most at risk of pov-
erty among employed persons in Slovenia. Ultimately, young people 
now often have limited experience of what had become regarded as 
the standard forms of employment since the second world war. The 
uncertainty and exploitation of young people – who often have a lot 
of knowledge and skills, but cannot obtain what previous genera-
tions of workers had regarded as the appropriate remuneration for 
their work – is particularly characteristic of young ‘freelancers’ who 
are forced into risky working arrangements, often supported by new 
technologies and digital platforms. This generation is experiencing 
the consequences of ever more individualisation in our societies, 
flexible employment and competition in the labour market where 
only the fittest can survive. This is the generation which, if the 
growth of precariousness does not relent, will in older age be in a 
significantly worse position than the elderly today.
The precarious position of the younger generation is essentially 
universal. It remains to be seen how a specific combination of the 
legacy of the socialist economic system based on the ideology of 
egalitarianism and solidarity on the one hand, and the only recently 
embraced neoliberal logic, based on the necessity of privatisation, 
free markets and competition on the other, will influence the position 
of young workers in Slovenia. As a reaction to the challenges they 
face, young people in Slovenia have established a representative 
association for young workers, which is not a branch of an estab-
lished professional trade union, but rather exclusively engages and 
mobilises young people. According to information available to us, 
this is a unique example in Europe. This organisation is a mixture 
of a trade union and a social movement and has a very important 
discursive and symbolic meaning. After decades of distrust and 
detachment of young people from trade unions, young people are 
getting organised, and young activists use this form of organisation 
to partake in collective action (Ignjatović and Mrčela 2016).
Naomi Klein (2017) in her newest analysis of successful strategies 
for fighting neoliberal politics invests hope in the new social move-
ments that cherish alternative modes of operating based on respect 
 447SOLVENIA
for people, cooperation and the environment. Maybe the ways that 
young workers in Slovenia are organising and empowering their 
actions could be seen as an example of this.
FOURTH REVOLUTION?
Using Wallerstein’s understanding of revolutions as involving 
planet-wide transformations of political common sense, the new 
movements’ activists like Graeber (2013) see this new political com-
mon sense as being organised around the expansion of “the zones of 
freedom, until freedom becomes the ultimate organising principle”. 
If we overcome simplified technological determinism and start to 
look at technologies as being embedded in social and political struc-
tures, we can better understand the potential impact of technological 
advancements, and also provide informed suggestions on how to 
shape public policies in order to combine innovation and dynamism 
with greater social wellbeing. The revolution implies a total trans-
formation of society. If technological and scientific changes that 
are addressed by the fourth industrial revolution are to realise their 
revolutionary potential they will have to be accompanied by mean-
ingful social and political transformations that are embedded in a 
new economic, social and political common sense.
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Current debates around the emergence of the so-called fourth 
industrial revolution in Europe often consider the interrelations 
between labour bargaining power and digital infrastructure. Indeed, 
several chapters in this volume explicitly construct their analysis 
around these two factors (see Jolly this volume; Zanoni this volume). 
Latvia is worth paying attention to as an interesting case in this 
respect. On the one hand, a low degree of unionisation, strong busi-
ness lobbying powers and an above-average IT infrastructure rela-
tive to other EU member states all give Latvia good odds for making 
decisive progress in digitally revolutionising its economy on a par 
with larger western liberal capitalist countries. On the other hand, 
the poor digital literacy of the population and indecisive digitalisa-
tion by businesses, compounded by a ‘blockbuster’ policy for digital 
innovation, make it seem unlikely that Latvia will be able to undergo 
a fourth industrial revolution effectively. So where does this leave 
Latvia? Intent on becoming a regional entrepreneurship hub, Latvia 
is at risk of becoming a place where government policy and labour 
legislation begin moving into a digital economy with no one in it.
In this chapter I will first consider how historical emphasis on 
infrastructure is driving Latvia’s strategy of digital development. 
LATVIA
A case of paradigmatic misalignment
Dmitrijs Kravcenko
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I will then offer a way of understanding which type of digital econ-
omy is most likely to develop in Latvia and explain the reasoning 
behind my view. Finally, I will analyse the current state of the digital 
economy in Latvia and highlight areas requiring more attention as 
far as the fourth industrial revolution is concerned.
HOW LATVIA LEARNED THE IMPORTANCE  
OF INFRASTRUCTURE
While the final shape of the digital economy is still an open question, 
there are certain emergent characteristics that set this form of mar-
ket relations apart from its predecessors. Fundamentally, the degree 
to which any given country will be able to benefit from the fourth 
industrial revolution will depend on how well the economic actors 
within that country are able to reconfigure their exchange relations 
in the digital sphere, and Latvia is no exception. Because a digital 
economy is in any case an economy, the exchange relations within 
it will require their own digital marketplaces, complete with an 
enabling regulatory environment. Bearing all of this in mind, Latvia 
is an exemplary case of paradigmatic misalignment between gov-
ernment policy, business requirements and technological capability 
resulting in stagnation.
Located in northern Europe, Latvia is one of the three Baltic 
states, a member of both the European Union and NATO since 
2004, and a historically important transport hub between the west 
and Russia. Much like its Baltic neighbours, Latvia has been sub-
ject to foreign occupation for most of its recorded history. Unlike 
Lithuania, which has close historical and cultural ties with Poland, 
both Latvia and Estonia owe their initial statehoods to about 700 
years of Germanic rule in one form or another up until 1721, when 
the regional geopolitical balance shifted in favour of Russia. Known 
as ‘German Baltic provinces’ at the time, Latvia and Estonia were 
considerably more industrialised than Lithuania, which maintained a 
largely agricultural economy (Norkus 2012). A high degree of urban 
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development and, by the standards of the day, an advanced industrial 
capacity were made possible in Latvia and Estonia by a developed 
network of railroads carrying goods and raw materials to and from 
the ports of Riga and Tallinn.
It is striking just how much historical circumstances with respect 
to industrial development continue to shape Latvia’s foray into the 
digital economy today. Infrastructure is of supreme importance: in 
taking advantage of its geographical location and easy access to the 
Baltic Sea, by the mid-19th century Latvia had propelled itself into 
the second industrial revolution on the back of ports and railroads. 
Heavy industry, metallurgy and chemical production made use of a 
well-educated workforce to achieve world-class standards. At this 
time, the first universities in the country were built and the founda-
tions of modern Latvian society were laid down. Even throughout 
the politically and culturally traumatic years of Soviet occupation, 
Latvia remained one of the most industrialised countries in the 
region. Despite much of its industrial capacity being obsolete by 
western standards when Latvia’s independence was restored in 
1990, the country has since successfully repositioned its economy 
following the liberal capitalist model, focusing on services and 
value-added products. Perhaps having learned the lesson in the past 
of the importance of infrastructure in building up their state and 
society, Latvians have invested heavily in the new kind of infrastruc-
ture − information and communications technology (ICT).
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: A VEHICLE 
FOR DIGITALISATION?
Two decades later, Latvia found itself in a remarkable position with 
respect to ICT development. As recently as 2016, the country’s 
telecommunications infrastructure consistently ranked above the EU 
average and its speed and coverage was among the best in the world 
(Belskis 2017). This translated into an affordable, high-speed fibre 
optic internet connection for most of the population and businesses. 
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In 2014, the capital city of Latvia, Riga, nominated itself the ‘free 
wifi capital of Europe’ on account of its extensive free wifi coverage, 
which at the time amounted to three access points per square kilo-
metre (LSM 2014). Latvians are well aware of the potentialities that 
a high-quality internet infrastructure brings to their ability to com-
municate, access services and even engage in the process of gover-
nance. According to the European commission’s Digital Economy 
and Society Index (DESI 2016), Latvia ranks ninth, and above the 
EU average, for the propensity of individuals to use the internet, 
with a particular emphasis on access to the news (87% of the popula-
tion), video calls (55% of the population) and banking (81% of the 
population). Furthermore, 36% of internet users in Latvia actively 
participate in egovernment, which can provide all basic services 
online, is ranked eighth on performance in the EU and shows con-
siderable advances in digitalisation (European Commission, 2017).
Thus, as far as infrastructure goes, Latvia appears to be well 
positioned for jumpstarting its economy towards digital transition. 
But what do a digital economy and the associated fourth industrial 
revolution entail? What do we know about this phenomenon, and 
how is it possible to distinguish between it and a more traditional 
web- or network-based service sector, especially given that the revo-
lution towards the digital economy is not yet a foregone conclusion 
and is still very much in the developing stages? As was pointed out 
in the introduction to this volume, definitions vary. Schwab (2015) 
argues for a blurring between the digital and physical spheres of 
human activity, with an emphasis on the digital sphere gaining 
prominence relative to the physical sphere, and even becoming 
more central. On the one hand, this change is thought to be made 
possible by advances in robotics, nano- and biotechnology, big data 
and new, more sophisticated algorithms, the sharing economy and 
the resulting across-the-board automation (Braidotti 2013; Mager 
2014; Peters 2017). On the other hand, there are already signs that 
rapid technological change without an accompanying rise in the skill 
base of the labour pool, the reconfiguration of the welfare system 
and a reconsideration of new employment arrangements results in 
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talent shortages, digitalisation-induced unemployment and growing 
inequality (Schwab and Samans 2016).
Of the various factors driving the digital economy forward, only a 
selection will be available and, indeed, applicable to countries, such 
as Latvia, with small research and development industrial bases but 
strong service sectors amounting to just over 68% of the economi-
cally active population in 2016 (CSP 2017). Nanotechnology, bio-
technology, big data and advanced robotics are aspects of the fourth 
industrial revolution that build directly on the extensive industri-
alisation and market capitalisation experienced during the second 
industrial revolution, the benefits of which were all but nullified in 
Latvia during the years of Soviet occupation. Today, the country 
simply does not have the industrial and financial base needed to 
make sustained advances in developing these areas. However, with 
more than one path to digitalisation, Latvia can build on its devel-
oped service sector and approach the fourth industrial revolution 
from the side of automation, algorithms and the sharing economy.
THE MANY FACES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY
Taking a service-centred approach to the digitalisation of its already 
heavily service-oriented economy is likely to lead Latvia down 
the path towards what can be broadly described as a sharing and 
gig economy. These two types of economy are made possible by 
advances in mobile telecommunications and algorithmic distribution 
and management of work. In mediating a debate between proponents 
and opponents of this form of market exchange, Martin (2016) notes 
the disruptive effect that these two ‘entry-level’ varieties of the gig 
economy have on the labour and welfare market. Specifically, the 
commodification of work that these entail makes for a more flexible 
but less predictable, and more targeted but less sustainable labour 
market (De Stefano 2015). The move towards digitalisation of the 
economy via a sharing economy in Latvia makes sense on at least 
three levels:
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• Latvia has a highly developed telecommunications infrastructure, 
including mobile speed and coverage (DESI 2016).
• Latvian students still perform above the EU average in science, 
technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM), although these 
results have been deteriorating somewhat recently (OECD 2017).
• Most of the Latvian population is concentrated in urban centres, 
with about half of the total population (and 50% of GDP) found 
in the capital, Riga.
These three levels translate into a connected, economically domi-
nant workforce that has the skills (or the potential) to engage in 
algorithm-driven forms of market exchange.
It is important to note that the gig economy and sharing economy 
as parts of the fourth industrial revolution are two distinct concepts 
that are often conflated. The term ‘sharing economy’ refers to an 
ensemble of marketplaces that, while often digital, need not neces-
sarily be so (Sundararajan 2016). The sharing economy, first and 
foremost, describes a state of market exchange relations where indi-
viduals share personal assets for mutual satisfaction of their needs 
(see Schor this volume). It is historically a community-based model 
made scalable by the use of ICT and new forms of algorithmic 
resource allocation (see Hofheinz this volume). The gig economy, 
on the other hand, is a new model of organisational design and a 
configuration of work rather than exchange relations. It is an emer-
gent model of organisational service provision where workers inde-
pendently carry out disparate, ad hoc ‘gigs’ for a variety of clients. 
The gig economy, much like the digital sharing economy, takes 
advantage of advances in IT, digital technology and various form 
of algorithmic management in order to allocate, manage and bench-
mark work. Indeed, the only real point of convergence between the 
gig economy and the sharing economy is that a number of gig econ-
omy platforms do not invest in productive assets but instead rely 
on freelancers to use their own assets for the completion of ‘gigs’.
The reason why this distinction between the sharing and the gig 
economy is important for understanding Latvia’s potential transition 
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into the digital economy has to do with how economic actors within 
a market think about their work. To reiterate, a sharing economy is 
a different set of paradigms about exchange relations in a market, 
whereas a gig economy is a different model of employment rela-
tions. The two (or either) are then made digital through yet another 
ontological level that comes with the fourth industrial revolution – 
the digitalisation and automation of the economy, actors and markets 
included.
A DIGITAL ECONOMY WITH NO ONE IN IT?
Latvia was previously identified as being generally predisposed 
to digitalisation because of its weak labour unions, advanced IT 
infrastructure and geographical concentration of economically 
dominant actors, but it lacks the industrial and scientific base for 
a more technologically intensive entry into the digital economy. 
The country therefore seems like a fertile ground from which a 
comprehensive digital economy based on gigs, with or without 
the sharing element, should have emerged in recent years. A 
closer look at employment trends lends further support to this 
view: the most economically active segment of population is also 
the one that is more educated and younger, just over two-fifths 
of the entire workforce are managers and professionals, while 
one-fifth are skilled workers (CSP 2017). Given that the roots of 
both the sharing and the gig economy lie with skilled freelancers, 
work of this type, as well as more egalitarian market exchange 
relations, should be naturally appealing to most of the Latvian 
working population. And yet there are no domestic digital mar-
kets worth mentioning, the number of people in part-time work 
is well below the EU average (CSP 2017) and use of Latvia’s 
advanced telecommunications infrastructure is, at best, unrealised 
(DESI 2016).
While there may be more than a few reasons why the Latvian 
digital economy is failing to take off despite ostensibly favourable 
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conditions (see Wrobel 2015 for an institutional take on the mat-
ter), in this chapter I will argue that the fundamental cause is a 
paradigmatic mismatch between government policy and develop-
ment agenda vis-à-vis digitalisation, on the one hand, and some 
essential socioeconomic behaviours necessary for a working digital 
economy, on the other. In basic terms, government policy is gener-
ally focused on the development of infrastructure and support for 
high-tech ‘blockbuster’ enterprises in small numbers, while most of 
the working population that could provide a critical mass of activity 
and resources for a digital economy remains uninvolved in digital 
markets.
Let us first examine the former of these issues – govern-
ment policy aimed at augmenting infrastructure and fostering 
the Silicon Valley type of innovative start up. Latvia continues 
to invest in and develop high-speed internet and to extend its 
telecommunications infrastructure coverage as before. In 2016, 
the total value of tangible investment into the sector amounted 
to €83mn, which is considerable for a country with a popula-
tion of just under 2 million and a total active workforce of just 
below 900,000 (Akamai 2017; CSP 2017). Latvia also remained 
one of the best countries in the EU for its availability of fibre 
optic networks. In order to capitalise on the developed infra-
structure, the Latvian government set out to modernise some of 
the legislation so as to make the country more innovative and 
venture-capital friendly. Two particular pieces of legislation 
are especially relevant in this regard. First, a new law ‘on aid 
to start-up companies’, according to which the government will 
shoulder employers’ social contributions on salaries if the busi-
ness employs highly educated individuals (in order to qualify for 
full assistance, these individuals must have a PhD) and is engaged 
in developing and trading innovative products (that would result 
in a significant improvement on those in current use); second, a 
bill to regulate ride-sharing services, effectively paving the way 
for Uber and other such companies to enter the market in Latvia. 
The two pieces of legislation are brand new, with the law on aid 
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to start-up companies entering into force on 1 January 2017, and 
the ride-sharing bill on 1 March 2018.
These laws signal a distinctly top-down approach by the Latvian 
government to the digitalisation of the country’s economy. The new 
law on start-up aid, for example, is explicitly geared at generating 
‘blockbuster’ innovations modelled on Silicon Valley but without 
the technical and financial capabilities nor the cluster effect. It should 
be noted that amending the disparity in the ability of Latvian enter-
prises to raise funds to a degree that could be reasonably expected 
compared to that of their Californian models is one of the explicit 
aims of the law (Aseradens 2017). Still, with an explicit aim of help-
ing start only about 20 such enterprises a year it will be difficult to 
entice existing economic actors to the benefits and opportunities of 
the digital economy. Nonetheless, this particular way of legislating 
innovation may succeed in making Riga an attractive destination for 
regional innovative entrepreneurs (Treija 2018).
The new bill on ride-sharing is likely to be a better introduction to 
the advantages – and perils – of the nascent digital economy, how-
ever (see O’Connor 2016; 2018). Explicitly outlining a regulatory 
framework for app-based service delivery using electronic payments 
only, this new bill is Latvia’s first pure digital-economy-oriented 
piece of legislation. It fits well with three of Raisinghani’s (2004, 
177) ‘four pillars of the digital economy’, effectively stimulating 
the development and popularisation of ICT technologies (algorith-
mic management within the paradigm of the sharing economy under 
a ‘gig’ type of organisation) and generating microeconomic change.
Do the two recent pieces of legislation described above constitute 
a step in the direction of the fourth industrial revolution in Latvia? 
It is difficult to tell because the preconditions for a digital economy 
in Latvia differ markedly from those of larger Western countries; 
however, the overall signs do not paint a promising picture. Socio-
economic trends, as well as policy decisions (the new transport bill 
notwithstanding) do not point in the direction of a digital economy. 
As was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Latvia is a lib-
eral market economy with weak labour representation, a skilled 
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and educated workforce, a strong service sector, and a world-class 
telecommunications infrastructure. Furthermore, Latvia has devel-
oped effective and comprehensive egovernment and is building 
up a digitalisation-friendly body of legislation. And yet, economic 
activity in digital markets is rudimentary and at best peripheral to 
traditional marketplaces; high-speed internet is used predominantly 
for recreation, nationwide ‘brain drain’ is severe, scientific collabo-
ration between the public and private sectors is marginal, and the 
cornerstone of government policy appears to be built on spawning 
a ‘blockbuster’ type of innovation for reasons not wholly pertaining 
to the goal of stimulating widespread digitalisation of the economy 
(Akamai 2017; DESI, 2016; Schwab and Samans 2016).
FINAL THOUGHTS AND AREAS FOR  
URGENT ATTENTION
To put it simply, most of the economically active population in 
Latvia is not motivated and has no incentive to engage in digital mar-
ketplaces. To complicate matters further, businesses are not digitis-
ing despite having the available infrastructure to do so. In fact, Latvia 
ranks near the bottom of the EU on use of cloud services (Eurostat 
2016) and on use of digital technology (DESI 2016). Early signs 
pointing towards a service-driven digital economy exist, but they 
do not form any part of the public agenda (Belskis 2017), and those 
initiatives that are on the public agenda are not even close to being 
sufficient in propelling Latvia into the fourth industrial revolution.
Far more attention and concentration needs to be focused on the 
following four areas:
• reversing the decline in STEM graduates, especially in ICT and 
mathematics
• introducing incentives for the emergence of digital markets (like 
the new transportation bill stipulating use of digital payments 
only)
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• introducing greater flexibility into employment relations so as to 
create space for part-time and freelance work
• public procurement of domestic high-tech products and services, 
as well as mandating the use of collaborative, cloud-based soft-
ware solutions in relevant industries (eg architecture, construction 
and design).
Unless the very minimum highlighted by these four points is acted 
upon, it is quite likely that when some parts of the Latvian economy 
begin their transition into the digital sphere, there will be no one 
there to greet them.
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Every year, one country is spotlighted at the world’s biggest trade 
fair for industrial technology in Hannover. In April 2017, Poland was 
the chosen partner of this renowned event. With the slogan ‘Smart 
means Poland’ the country was presented as moving beyond its stan-
dard role of contract manufacturer and transforming into an active 
player through investments in innovative sectors, such as robotics, 
industrial IT, digitalisation and automation of industrial processes 
(Hannover Messe News 2017). Poland has developed tremendously 
within the last 26 years and has been often portrayed as the front-
runner of social and economic transformation in eastern Europe. 
Nevertheless, questions emerge: how sustainable will this growth 
be when confronted by rapid technological change? Which sectors 
are most vulnerable to the impending risks of the fourth industrial 
revolution? And what needs to be done to ensure a positive outcome?
In this chapter I set out to outline briefly the status quo in Poland 
at the doorstep of the fourth industrial revolution and then assess the 
national public debate on digitalisation and automation. Next, I for-
mulate conclusions with corresponding suggestions for cushioning 
the effects of the upcoming structural and lifestyle transformation 
resulting from the likely technological progress.
POLAND
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ANOTHER REVOLUTION ON THE HORIZON
The effects of ongoing automation and digitalisation are not yet 
fully known. On the one hand, one study suggests that 47% of all 
workplaces in the US are at risk of transition or disappearance over 
the next decade or two (Frey and Osborne 2013). Another study 
suggests that 30% of the constituent activities of 60% of occupa-
tions could be automated with technologies available today (Chui, 
Manyika and Miremadi 2016). On the other hand, more cautious cal-
culations, like those announced by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), find that across 21 OECD 
countries, on average only 9% of all jobs are automatable – 6% in 
Korea and as much as 12% in Austria and Germany (Arnold et al. 
this volume; Arntz, Gregory and Zierahn 2016). While forecasts 
vary depending on the method applied (occupation vs task-based 
approach) and the additional factors included in the analysis (eg 
workplace organisation, investments in technology and education), 
there is broad expert agreement on which professions are the most 
susceptible to automation. First, jobs requiring relatively low com-
petences, focused on routine, repetitive activities are at risk. Second, 
office and administrative work, sales and trade, production and pro-
cessing will be significantly affected by technological change. Call 
centre jobs, sales assistance and bookkeeping are also vulnerable 
to automation (Doellgast this volume). Robots and other machines 
are also likely to serve as substitutes in the automotive, energy and 
extractive industries. These potential developments should therefore 
be of particular relevance for Poland as they account for significant 
proportions of its labour market.
A POPULAR DESTINATION FOR OUTSOURCING, 
TRADITIONAL AND INNOVATIVE SECTORS
After a swift socio-economic transformation on joining the EU in 
2004, Poland has become a popular destination for outsourcing and 
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offshoring services. Business services have expanded three times 
faster than in India (Saxer this volume). Poland was the tenth most 
popular location in the Quality House Best Outsourcing Destinations 
2016 rankings, and the most attractive location in Europe (Quality 
House 2016). The outsourcing offshoring sector is estimated to 
have created around 160,000–200,000 jobs in over 900 companies, 
with business services becoming one of the largest employers in the 
country (Bogdan et al. 2015). These jobs were mainly concentrated 
in seven cities and metropolitan areas: Kraków, Warsaw, Wrocław, 
Katowice, Trójmiasto, Łódź and Poznań (EY Poland 2017).
Industrial manufacturing employs 2.3 million people in total 
(Włoch 2017). There are currently 180,000 people working in the 
automotive industry, making it the fourth largest industrial employer 
in the country. However, there are no domestic car producers, with 
the industry relying on original equipment manufacturers for Fiat, 
Opel and Volkswagen. Another important branch of Polish industry 
is mining, as the country has rich resources of steam coal, coking 
coal and lignite. More than 80% of the country’s electricity comes 
from coal and lignite. Unlike the ongoing energy transition in many 
other countries, maintaining the mining industry is considered a 
strategic pillar of Poland’s energy and broader economic security 
(EY Poland 2017). Whereas the automotive and machine industries 
are already considerably robotised, coal mining still depends on 
human labour. While robotisation would improve miners’ safety 
and productivity, it is likely also to result in jobs losses in an already 
declining industry.
Alongside these traditional sectors, the innovative informa-
tion technology and computer software sectors in Poland have 
also grown, and ecommerce is also developing rapidly. However, 
according to the European Innovation Scoreboard, Poland is less 
innovative than other European countries. The information and 
communications technology (ICT) sector generates only 3% of 
GDP in Poland, one of the lowest percentages of all European coun-
tries, even when compared with slightly more advanced Visegrád 
neighbours (Eurostat Database 2017b). Even though gross domestic 
464 MARIA SKÓRA
expenditure on research and development (R&D) doubled between 
2005 and 2015, it continues to lag behind European innovation lead-
ers like Austria, Germany and countries in Scandinavia, as well as 
south east Asian countries and the US (Eurostat 2017).
The automotive, metalworking, rubber and electronics industries 
account for 80% of all industrial robots in Poland. The limited use of 
robots in other branches demonstrates overall low levels of robotisa-
tion: in 2015, there were only 19 robots for every 10,000 workers 
– four times less than the European average (Fandrejewska 2017). 
If not addressed properly, the consequences of the fourth industrial 
revolution in Poland could result in profound structural mismatches 
and perhaps even the implosion of certain industries. Some of 
the dynamically developing branches of the Polish economy, like 
the outsourced business-to-business services, accounting, human 
resources and customer care, are prone to being affected by progres-
sive digitalisation of labour.
DIGITAL SKILLS
According to opinion polls, the Polish public is aware that digital 
skills are the key to professional success (Włoch 2017), but these 
skills are not yet very well developed. Around 80% of all households 
are equipped with internet access and a computer (Omyła-Rudzka 
2017); the online presence of Poles has nearly quadrupled within 
the last 15 years (Feliksiak 2017). At the same time, only 50% of 
the population uses the internet at work and the number of digitally 
qualified individuals is still low (Feliksiak 2017); the share of those 
with relatively low-level IT skills exceeds the European average 
(Eurostat Database 2017a). The reasoning behind this is complex. 
Mass emigration after joining the EU has resulted in a brain drain 
of young, high-skilled people. The outflow of well-educated work-
ers was partially compensated through economic migration from 
Ukraine, but there still are generational and competence gaps in the 
Polish labour market.
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DEBATING THE UPCOMING REVOLUTION
Concerns around the future effects of digitalisation and automation 
have not been widely discussed in public debates in Poland, and 
are only beginning to emerge. The liveliest debates are found in 
the business sector around concerns over digitalisation and roboti-
sation, technological progress, investment opportunities and how 
‘know-how’ transfers can significantly improve competitiveness. 
Polish entrepreneurs are aware that these processes will soon affect 
the country. It is crucial for them to catch up with the new reality 
that technological progress involves investment and postponing 
immediate profit returns. Nevertheless, the major concern of Polish 
business is not dealing with the effects of digitalisation but finding 
sufficient labour. Because of a demographic slowdown there is a 
visible generation gap in the labour market: 1 in 4 companies have 
difficulty finding employees with adequate skills, and a third of 
Polish employers have vacancies due to a lack of appropriate candi-
dates (Fandrejewska 2017). A recent further tightening of the labour 
market resulted from pension reforms that re-established a lower 
retirement age for women at 60 and for men at 65; this has reduced 
the labour supply of older female workers.
While there is some awareness of digitalisation debates in busi-
ness circles, the topic is barely discussed by trade unions in Poland. 
Labour unions still largely focus on fundamental problems such 
as precarious working conditions, low wages and violations of the 
labour code. This reflects the concerns of Polish employees for 
whom labour market liberalisation, even more tangible in times 
of financial crisis, heavily influenced working conditions, terms of 
employment, and the balance of power. While social dialogue is now 
being restored, unions’ focus is on tangible bread and butter issues.
Trade union density is highest in large-scale industry, which has 
already undergone significant and successful processes of automa-
tion. Tradeable sector and services remain the least unionised sectors 
of economy. Perhaps this is why concerns about technological prog-
ress are not vocally pronounced in public debates. Nevertheless, on 
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the rare occasions they are discussed, the main worries of the Polish 
trade unions are around the further diversification of work relation-
ships, flexibility and de-standardisation of working conditions, the 
possible disappearance of some professions, and the substitution of 
humans by machines in production. To address these challenges, 
they propose fostering codetermination and union participation in 
firm decisionmaking processes (OPZZ 2017).
GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES
The challenges of digitalisation are to some extent being addressed 
by the socially conservative and mildly Eurosceptic Law and Justice 
party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość; PiS), which came to power in 
October 2015. On a policy level, ‘re-industrialisation’ (a term used by 
the Polish government for a strategy of reinstating big-scale industrial 
production in the country) and innovation are top priorities. To meet 
the challenge of the digital revolution the Ministry of Development 
launched the Polish Industry Platform Foundation 4.0 (Powstanie 
Polska Platforma Przemysłu 4.0) within the framework of the gov-
ernment strategy of responsible development (Ministerstwo Rozwoju 
2017a). From 2018 onwards, the platform will support the transforma-
tion processes of Polish industry to achieve new levels of automation 
and data exchange in manufacturing technologies. The first so-called 
Robotisation Act was signed off on 19 July 2017; this amended the 
tax law allowing entrepreneurs to make a one-off tax depreciation 
write off when they invested PLN 10,000 (€2,400) or more in new 
technology for their firm (Ministerstwo Rozwoju 2017b).
While Industry 4.0 is on the agenda, there is no equivalent ‘Work 
4.0’ initiative (Rahner and Schönstein this volume). The issue was 
recently raised by an employers association, illustrating the high 
level of awareness in the business sector to future challenges. A 
recent major conference organised in November 2017 included 
the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Family and Labour, 
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and was strongly focused on business solutions, discussing pos-
sible changes to the labour code, wages and vocational training. 
While this demonstrates some concern for the social dimensions 
of employment, far more attention is being given to the technical 
aspects of digitalisation than the implications for the regulation of 
employment.
CONCLUSIONS
The process of digitalisation and automation in Poland is slow and 
uneven, so it is likely that the consequences of technological pro-
cess will be unevenly distributed in particular parts of the economy. 
The risks are lower in the more traditional mining and agriculture 
sectors. However, where Poland has successfully attracted foreign 
investments by offering a highly qualified labour force, a good infra-
structure, and an attractive business and financial environment, the 
risks of the fourth industrial revolution might hit it hard, in particular 
in the successful business-to-business sector, which is at high risk 
of digitalisation. Poland could easily be left behind technologically 
and economically if no measures are taken. If a ‘catching up’ strat-
egy is implemented too late, this might leave limited capacity for 
gradual adjustment and the avoidance of structural skills mismatches 
exacerbated by demographic trends and the brain-drain effects of 
migration.
In debates in Poland priority has been given to the technical 
aspects of change, with support for digitalisation, robotisation and 
innovation largely seen as improving the efficiency and competi-
tiveness of Polish companies. Little attention is paid to how these 
changes will influence employment opportunities and the labour 
market. It is to be expected that the changing technological envi-
ronment will influence not only the nature of work per se, but also 
employment conditions and lifestyles in general. Fragmentation and 
digitalisation of working processes will also affect the organisation 
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of work, the division of labour and working times. In times of 
structural transformation, ensuring social security and labour safety 
should remain in the spotlight not only for the trade unions, but also 
when designing governmental strategies.
Meanwhile, in Poland technological modernisation is imagined 
without sufficient consideration of its social and human aspects. It 
is evident that there is not much interest in the ‘soft’ aspects of the 
technological revolution and they are analysed in isolation from the 
technological debates. A better understanding of the intersections 
between technology and society, economic and social policy, and 
industry and work is much needed. With no bigger vision, without 
systemic links and a complementary approach in tackling these 
aspects, the fourth industrial revolution might disrupt the develop-
ment pattern of Poland.
Therefore, it is necessary to consider now what possible con-
sequences digitalisation and automation might have on the key 
industry sectors in the country, and long-term strategies should be 
drafted, to attract investment and launch domestic projects in future-
oriented sectors. Although it is difficult to compete with world 
leaders, increased spending on R&D should be part of this strategy. 
Technological progress is also likely to affect labour demand, and 
this requires a proactive, as opposed to reactive, approach in shaping 
curricula and systemic adjustments in managing educational institu-
tions, anticipating growing industries and demand for skills. Last but 
not least, a broader public debate on digitalisation and its possible 
consequences should be initiated in Poland. So far, the mainstream 
media has not covered the topic in any depth, nor been granted a 
prominent place in social dialogue. There is a need for a public 
debate on the possible structural, legal and – most probably – life-
style changes that will result from digitalisation of labour. Having 
recently experienced an abrupt socio-economic transformation with 
the fall of communism, a thorough public debate is necessary not 
only to prepare industry for the forthcoming changes, but also to 
secure social peace and cohesion on the way to digital transforma-
tion and a smart Poland.
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Replicants are like any other machine. They’re either a benefit or 
a hazard. If they’re a benefit it’s not my problem.
—Bladerunner, 1982
Bladerunner is set in a 2019 Los Angeles where synthetic humans, 
known as replicants, are used in extra-terrestrial colonies as work-
force. What looked like fiction in 1982 is, today, not far from reality: 
mining and oil companies around the world use autonomous trucks, 
drills and trains to boost productivity; people share cars, apartments 
and knowledge; books and music are liquid; people manage their 
bank accounts, shopping and social life out of a smartphone. More 
broadly, automation, robotics, machine learning, ecommerce, the 
shared economy and disruptive platforms are changing the way con-
sumers buy, while some industries work at a speed that is hard to for 
their employees to cope with.
All around the world these changes are bringing both opportuni-
ties and threats and raise fundamental questions about jobs, inequal-
ity, welfare and wealth redistribution. In Italy, a country plagued by 
the third largest public debt in the world and a deep intergenerational 
divide (de Franceschi 2017), policymakers have an even tougher and 
ITALY
Prioritising human capital
Carlotta de Franceschi1
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urgent mandate. Italy is ranked 25th in Europe on the Commission’s 
measure of digital development (EDPR 2017). The ranking takes 
into account five factors: connectivity, human capital, use of the 
internet, digital integration (integration of companies and ecom-
merce) and digital public services.
PREVIOUS REFORM EFFORTS
Recent governments have tried to address certain critical issues like 
broadband connectivity, tried to improve the start-up ecosystem and 
even launched a dedicated Industry 4.0 package.
Of these measures, the ultra-fast broadband plan has had a par-
ticularly positive impact. Launched in 2015 and running until 2022, 
it is supported by a €4 billion state budget that is attracting private 
investments, which ensured 72% coverage in 2016 (up from 41% in 
the previous year).
Measures around improving the start-up ecosystem (‘Start-Up 
Italia’ package) have proven less effective. These range from tax 
reliefs to venture capital, and from lighter bureaucracy to a simpli-
fied liquidation process for start ups. On the one hand this package 
shows both a new and positive attention to the start-up world and a 
holistic approach to address the issues it faced. On the other hand 
it seems to lack an understanding of international best practices, 
market mechanisms and developed innovation ecosystems. First 
of all, the tax reliefs granted were three times below what is con-
sidered the European best practice. Second, in the effort to fill the 
major venture capital gap with more advanced European econo-
mies, the Italian Development Bank seeded a Venture Capital 
Fund of Funds. This achieved a doubling of available venture capi-
tal in the country, but the stock available is still six or seven times 
less than what is available in Germany or France respectively, as 
a percentage of GDP (OECD 2016d, 20). The main pitfall of the 
Venture Capital Fund of Funds (Piol and de Franceschi 2014) pro-
moted by the Italian Development Bank is that it seeded venture 
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capitalists with no prior experience nor international network, both 
key ingredients in the success and scaling-up of start ups and in 
the fast development of an already rather underdeveloped local 
industry.
The Industry 4.0 Plan (September 2016) is a 12-year €18 billion 
plan consisting of four main areas: tax reliefs for corporate invest-
ments and borrowing for investments in hardware and software 
supporting the Industry 4.0, tax reliefs to train the workforce in the 
Industry 4.0, dedicated training for students in the Industry 4.0, and 
competence centres for small- and medium-sized enterprises. The 
tax reliefs in investments and borrowing were not met with strong 
demand and were therefore not very effective, while the tax reliefs 
for personnel training are yet to show meaningful results (Schivardi 
2017). On the students’ training side, the €220 million dedicated 
funding for vocational and university training is very positive, 
although a deeper approach to school, training and university would 
be advisable. Digital innovation hubs and competence centres are 
in the process of being activated, yet the European Commission has 
already warned that their success relies on the effective coordination 
of government, business associations and the higher education sec-
tor (European Commission 2017).
If Italy wants to be a ‘winner’ rather than a ‘loser’ in the tsunami 
brought by the fourth industrial revolution it should first develop 
a holistic approach to human capital: invest strongly in the school 
system, review the curricula, prioritise in-school orientation towards 
both university and the job market, strengthen (particularly voca-
tional) training, upskill the workforce and redesign the university 
system, with a focus on access, scholarships, interaction with the 
innovation ecosystem and e-education. Second, Italy should moder-
nise its job market by allowing a convergence of labour and capital 
favouring tax treatments for long-term equity investment and equity 
compensation, and provide a welfare safety net for entrepreneurs 
and non-standard workers. Third, it should focus its industrial policy 
on attracting the value-added functions of large foreign corporates 
and promoting the high-tech ecosystem.
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EDUCATION AS THE MAIN CHALLENGE
Education in Italy is a universal and constitutional right. It is an 
investment to guarantee equal opportunities and social mobility to 
future generations. However, the execution of this noble intention 
has been quite poor.
Between 2008 and 2013 public expenditure on education in Italy 
decreased by 14%, falling to 4% of GDP (versus 5.2% of the OECD 
average). This decrease reflects a political choice to redirect public 
expenditure away from education. Second, the percentage of adults 
who have never used a computer in Italy is almost 1.5 times the 
OECD average (OECD 2016b). Third, the teacher workforce is the 
oldest of all OECD countries: in 2014 out of every 10 teachers 6–7 
were over 50 (OECD 2016b). Finally, Galletti and Gualdi (2017) 
observe that according to OECD-PISA Italian students display a 
significant attainment gap in sciences and maths (Italy ranks 26 out 
of 28 EU countries considered in the OECD).
Italy has one of the worst social mobility scores in Europe 
(Darvas and Wollfs 2016) and the highest number of young people 
not in education, employment or training. Public expenditure in 
education is significantly lower than the OECD average, penetra-
tion of tertiary education is weak, and subject choice is poorly 
matched to the job market demands of today, let alone those of the 
future (OECD 2016a, 2016b). When assessing the human capital of 
the country’s digital evolution the European Commission observes 
that Italy has 26% fewer science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics (STEM) graduates, 29% fewer ICT specialists as 
a percentage of the working population and 21% fewer adults 
with basic digital skills than the European average (European 
Commission 2017).
In a fast-paced world, where careers might be increasingly shorter 
as machines quickly make up the skill gap with humans, education 
and training are key to giving people the valuable skills that will 
allow them to enter or stay in the job market. Countries that invest in 
education and training are more likely to prevail in the future global 
economy than others.
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What should Italy do then to best prepare its youth for the employ-
ment of the future? How can it provide continuous on-the-job train-
ing and retrain people who are out of work or in industries that have 
been disrupted?
MAKE INVESTING IN SCHOOLING A PRIORITY
If Italy wants to be prepared for the fourth industrial revolution the 
school system should be redesigned for a new concept of literacy 
and required learning. In particular, the generational renewal of the 
teaching workforce should provide an opportunity to review curricula 
by refocusing and improving the quality of STEM subjects, critical 
reasoning and logic, and skills such as network collaboration, creativ-
ity and critical judgement. Mandatory curricula should also include 
entrepreneurship, coding (Galletti and Gualdi 2017) and finance.
FIX THE WAY STUDENTS ARE ORIENTED 
TOWARDS UNIVERSITY AND JOBS
According to Galletti and Gualdi (2017) Italy is the worst country in 
Europe for ‘skill activation’ (the ability of students to transition to 
the job market) because of the low employment of recent graduates 
and high university and training dropout rates. They also point out 
that when choosing a training track (university vs vocational pro-
gramme) Italian students are more influenced by their school than 
students from other European countries. Furthermore, lacking solid 
career advice from counsellors, many students seek help from their 
families who can offer biased, often uninformed, advice that contrib-
utes to inequality and lack of social mobility (Forti 2017). On this 
point Ferrari and Carlana (2016) highlight that education choices in 
Italy are strongly influenced by the socio-economic conditions of the 
families and the education level of the parents. As a result, education 
is not a tool of social mobility. Instead, children’s levels of educa-
tion tend to remain anchored to those of their parents.
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Highlighting the findings of a research project,2 Zucchini, Lecce 
and Caputo (2016) recommend that high school students should be 
given two sets of options for their compulsory work-based train-
ing scheme (‘alternanza scuola-lavoro’ – introduced by the Buona 
Scuola reform). One set would allow students to attend university 
classes, receive credits, complete their university programme and 
enter the job market earlier. The other set would be for students who 
have not yet decided their track and would include classes focused 
on university and job orientation, and involve the participation of 
corporations and external parties. Students would be allowed to 
choose between regular internships, university credits and the orien-
tation track according to objective criteria that assess their predispo-
sition towards the chosen area of study or job.
IT’S NOT JUST ABOUT EDUCATION, BUT ALSO 
ABOUT TRAINING . . . AND RETRAINING
Italy must first make sure that even workers without a college degree 
can participate in the economy of the future by strengthening the 
vocational training system.3 Galletti and Gualdi (2017) recommend 
improving attractiveness and understanding of vocational training in 
Italy. They point out how this type of training in Italy is delegated to 
the regions, with big differences not just in the number of absorbed 
funds but also in effectiveness. The percentage of young people 
employed among those who followed a vocational training versus a 
technical or professional high school track is 62% versus 50% in the 
north east, 55% versus 39% in the north west, 30% versus 39% in 
the centre, and identical (28%) in the south. In the northern regions 
we do not only observe higher employment from the vocational 
training but also lower average costs to run the programmes and 
higher participation. Based on these findings Galletti and Gualdi 
(2017) identify two policy priorities: the harmonisation of the sys-
tems among regions and a strict evaluation of the various funded 
projects.
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Second, Italy must make sure that people who lose their job are 
properly retrained and upskilled. Galletti and Gualdi (2017) recom-
mend binding workers who lose their job, and who are also eligible 
for a monthly voucher to be spent on training, to join the reloca-
tion programmes in the first few months of unemployment. At the 
moment they can join at any time during the 24 months that unem-
ployment insurance covers them, and evidence from other countries 
shows that these programmes are more effective when people enrol 
in them during the first period of unemployment.
UNIVERSITIES MUST EMBRACE URBANISATION 
AND TECHNOLOGY . . . OR DIE
The first university in the world was founded in 1088 in Bologna, 
Italy. Almost a thousand years later, in 2016, the Italian tertiary 
education attainment is among the lowest ranked in the OECD, with 
only 18% of the Italian population having a university degree com-
pared with an OECD average of 36% (OECD 2016b). In addition, 
more than 30% of the Italian workforce with tertiary education stud-
ied art and humanities, compared with an OECD average of 19% 
(OECD 2016b). In 2015, 39% of students graduated in arts, humani-
ties, journalism and information versus 23% of the OECD average, 
leading to a serious mismatch in the country’s job market, with the 
business association Unioncamere commenting that it was “impos-
sible to find” STEM graduates (Zucchini, Lecce and Caputo 2015).
Three policy proposals could help increase the number of STEM 
graduates. First, after assessing policy recommendations by success-
ful Italian entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in the global digital 
sector we call for the number of scholarships for students and PhDs 
in engineering and computer sciences (Piol and de Franceschi 2014) 
to be increased. Second, despite the serious skills mismatch, in Italy 
access to engineering schools is capped, but not access to humani-
ties schools. To balance this, last year the dean of Milan University 
tried to cap access to degrees in literature, history, philosophy and 
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geography. The students’ union successfully objected, appealing to 
the administrative court and winning. We propose that policymak-
ers should be held accountable and restrict the offer of degrees in 
humanities and journalism and lift the cap on engineering schools.
Third, Italy has to rethink the way it organises and provides higher 
education. In the past 20 years there has been a proliferation of 
peripheral universities across the country whose quality and cost are 
often questionable. Today the best and most innovative universities 
are located in large metropolitan areas (Anvur 2016). Furthermore, 
universities located in urban areas also engage in more corporate 
partnerships and produce more start ups; their research feeds into 
local innovation ecosystems and strengthens them (Andes 2017). 
Universities located within innovation districts generate more eco-
nomic value as they are part of a bigger network, leading to strategic 
interplay between firms, entrepreneurs and research labs.
For these reasons Italy should strengthen universities in large 
metropolitan areas and rationalise the peripheral ones by asking big-
ger universities to provide online versions of their curricula. Italy 
should also foster competition between foreign and Italian universi-
ties on online curricula by assigning a voucher to the top university 
students who want to access e-education, which can be spent on 
either credited Italian or foreign courses. Finally it should shut down 
peripheral universities that do not excel. In this way Italy will be 
able to leverage technology to provide better education to students 
who cannot afford to relocate or have to work while studying in a 
cost-effective way.
IT’S NOT ONLY ABOUT EDUCATION 
AND TRAINING, IT’S ALSO ABOUT WORK 
AND CAPITAL . . . AND THE APPROACH 
CAN NO LONGER BE IDEOLOGICAL
Two characters are deeply rooted in the Italian imagination: Don 
Camillo (a democratic Christian priest) and Peppone (a communist 
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mayor). Both are deeply committed to their beliefs and antagonise 
each other openly in a small village right after the second world war. 
Their stories appeal to all generations for their ideological positions 
that make them extremely relevant even in today’s Italy.
The strong political dichotomy between capital and labour in Italy 
is not simply out of fashion, but is becoming very detrimental to the 
development of society and its ability to cope with globalisation and 
technological progress.
Policymakers should prioritise creating quality jobs and reducing 
wealth inequality. Nowadays, this is only possible when workers 
can participate in the company’s success through equity compensa-
tion, at all levels. They should also empower and support entrepre-
neurship, as the process of innovation will blur the lines between 
entrepreneurs, innovators and employees. Long-term capital gains of 
start-up owners and employees, stock options and equity compensa-
tion in general should have a more favourable tax treatment than 
they have now. Policymakers should also create a welfare package 
for – and extend unemployment protection to – entrepreneurs, non-
standard workers, contractors and freelancers.
ITALY NEEDS MORE HIGH VALUE-ADDED  
JOBS TO FIGHT INEQUALITY
High value-added jobs are the least threatened by automation. In 
general, hi-tech sectors create three times more jobs in their ecosys-
tem than manufacturing ones (Piol and de Franceschi 2014). Italy 
should work towards attracting successful international corpora-
tions and promoting employment and entrepreneurship in high-tech 
industries.
From 2014 to 2016 Italy made a promising start by supporting 
companies that hired PhDs or STEM graduates in research functions 
by making 35% of their costs tax deductible (for up to €200,000 per 
company and for a maximum of 10 hires per company). In France 
innovative start ups were supported between 2004 and 2016 by 
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fully exempting them from social contributions for researchers and 
research and development (R&D) managers. Italy should borrow the 
same measure, extending it to all companies and include ICT spe-
cialists as well as graduates and PhDs in STEM. It should also seek 
to apply a hyper-amortisation for small- and medium-sized enter-
prises onto R&D expenditures and make tax deductible the acquisi-
tion cost of start ups and other companies (Piol and de Franceschi 
2014). This way it would promote a virtuous cycle of investments, 
innovation and growth.
As Italy is gearing up for the elections, the different parties are 
appealing to the public in the effort to convince the electorate on 
crucial issues. At the heart of the debate are immigration, taxes and 
pensions. Education, training, innovation, research and industrial 
policy have slipped off the discussion. Media and influencers barely 
talk about the risks and opportunities of the fourth industrial revolu-
tion and most of the public probably ignores the problem.
Klaus Schwab, founder and executive chairman of the World 
Economic Forum, said,
We must develop a comprehensive and globally shared view of how 
technology is affecting our lives and reshaping our economic, social, 
cultural, and human environments. There has never been a time of 
greater promise, or greater peril.
If Italy wants to be prepared, it should embrace a revolutionary and 
very long-term vision, at least as revolutionary and as long term as 
the challenges that it is actually facing.
NOTES
1. I am grateful to Gabriele Diana, associate at Action Institute, for the 
great work and support on this chapter. I would also like to convey my 
thanks to Chiara Bellucci, associate at Action Institute, who supported me 
on collecting data for the first draft.
2. The project was conducted for Action Institute to assess and improve 
recent school reforms within the broader context of EuFactor, a joint 
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campaign of the European Commission and the European Parliament to 
influence 16–19 year olds to take STEM careers.
3. In 2017 the OECD estimated that 53% of the population in Italy is 
expected to graduate from a vocational programme in their lifetime (OECD 
2016c).
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The fourth industrial revolution is driven by the fusion of techno-
logical developments such as the increases in processing capacity 
and the shrinking size of computers, the lower cost of data storage, 
the expanded access to affordable internet facilities, artificial intel-
ligence and robotics (Schwab 2016). This fusion produces a cumu-
lative transformative impact on economies, which goes far beyond 
the technology-related economic sectors, and affects even industries 
such as retailing, transport and construction (Mulas 2016).
Following the widespread diffusion of technology, entrepre-
neurship and innovation, both cornerstones of sustained economic 
growth, have become more affordable and delocalised. Innovation 
increasingly becomes ‘open’; it is being co-created by large firms, 
entrepreneurs and other actors, and comes from start ups located 
in more and less advanced economies, which creates new growth 
opportunities, especially for the latter (Mulas 2016).
The potential consequences posed by the fourth industrial revolu-
tion have already sparked a significant debate on employment and 
work around the world. The two most hotly debated factors are the 
prospect of automation and robots displacing humans from jobs, and 
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the rise in employment in the so-called ‘gig’ or ‘platform economy’. 
The jobs most at risk of being automated are routine ones, whether 
cognitive or manual. This is likely to exacerbate the polarisation in 
the labour market, with jobs being created largely at the highly paid 
and lower paid ends of the spectrum (see Arnold et al. this volume). 
It is also likely to increase the pace of change in the skills that 
increase the employability of humans, which are likely to develop 
in directions that are difficult to predict (see Atkinson this volume). 
In view of these developments, softer skills such as creativity, com-
munication, critical thinking and the ability to work collaboratively 
become ever more important for employability in the future (see 
Benhamou this volume).
On the other hand, while the spreading of platform or gig employ-
ment can improve the matching of labour demand with labour 
supply (see Aubrey this volume), it also arguably shifts risks from 
employers and clients to workers. This shift can undermine the rel-
evance of the standard employment relationship for the provision of 
workers’ protection, and may have a negative impact on work and 
employment conditions (Drahokoupil and Piasna 2017; Doellgast 
this volume).
This contribution will look into the potential policy priorities 
that may be used to harness the opportunities, and may minimise 
the threats for work and welfare posed by the fourth industrial rev-
olution for Greece, which is a particularly interesting case in this 
respect. Traditionally, a country with weak industry, and with an 
economy oriented towards low and low-to-medium levels of tech-
nological penetration in manufacturing and services, and a ‘digital 
laggard’, Greece has been the EU member most badly affected by 
the recent Eurozone crisis, as has been well documented. Attempts 
to find a more sustainable growth model and to undertake reforms 
to the organisation of work and welfare are thus a pressing concern 
for Greek policymakers. While the fourth industrial revolution 
could present growth opportunities for Greece, unless key policy 
initiatives are taken it could also exacerbate the existing problems 
of precarity and inequality in the labour market, and may pose 
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challenges to the financing and strengthening of the Greek social 
safety net.
The chapter is structured as follows: the next section provides 
a broad-brush picture of the effects of the recent crisis in Greece. 
The following section discusses the strengths and weakness of 
Greece vis-à-vis the requirements for taking advantage of the fourth 
industrial revolution and the opportunities and threats that the 
fourth industrial revolution presents for Greece. Using this analy-
sis, the final section proposes a range of policy priorities for Greek 
policymakers.
GREECE: A TRAUMATISED ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 
EMERGING FROM THE CRISIS
Greece has been experiencing a deep economic, social and politi-
cal crisis since 2009. Between 2008 and 2013, real GDP per head 
in Greece fell by 26% and the average annual real GDP per head 
growth rate has been 0.5% ever since. Real gross investment 
declined at an average annual rate of 11% since 2008, compared 
with an average annual rate of decline of 0.8% in the euro area and 
of 0.5% in the EU28 (own calculations based on data from AMECO, 
the annual macro-economic database of the European Commission’s 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs). Between 
2010, when the first economic adjustment programme was put in 
place, and 2015 labour productivity per hour worked in the total 
economy declined at an annual average of 1% (own calculations 
using EU KLEMS data)
By 2016, Greece had eliminated its government budget deficit, 
which stood at 15.1% of GDP in 2009. To that end, real public 
spending (excluding interest payments) in Greece had fallen to 81% 
in 2016 from what it had been in 2010 while the country’s gross 
public debt had reached 181% of its GDP. By 2016, the country’s 
current account balance, at 15.8% of GDP in 2008, was also virtu-
ally eliminated, with reduced imports (and therefore consumption) 
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accounting much more for this adjustment than increased exports. 
Up until the crisis, Greece’s growth model relied on domestic 
demand. The Greek tradables sector has been rather anaemic and 
has specialised in low- to low-to-medium technology goods and 
services.
The economic crisis painted above was matched by a social 
meltdown. Starting at 7.8% of the labour force in 2008, and 21% 
for young people (18–24 year olds), the average Greek unemploy-
ment rate peaked at 28.7% in 2013, falling to 23.6% in 2016, 78% 
of which represented the long-term unemployed who had been 
without work for over a year. Youth unemployment peaked at 60% 
in early 2013 before declining to 43.7% in the second quarter of 
2017. Almost a million jobs (net) were lost between 2008 and 2016. 
Despite the developments in youth unemployment capturing the 
news headlines, two-thirds of these job losses concerned people of 
prime working age (25–49 year olds), mostly men. This was a grave 
development for a labour market and welfare state model that has 
been geared towards the protection of the male breadwinner. By 
2016, only about half (52%) of Greek residents aged 15–64 were 
employed, the lowest rate in the EU28. Meanwhile, the involuntary 
part-timers as a share of total part-timers had increased from 44% 
in 2008 to 72% in 2016, which suggests that there has been a large 
increase in underemployment. The crisis has also stripped Greece of 
a large part of its workforce; Greek workers either became long-term 
unemployed or left the country in search of (better) job opportunities 
elsewhere.
The risk-of-poverty rate (anchored to 2008 incomes) rose from 
20% to 48% between 2008 and 2016. Moreover, during the crisis, 
unemployment and the risk of poverty became much more tightly 
linked than before, which aggravated the risks of social exclusion 
for the jobless. In-work poverty stood at 19% in 2016.
The concurrent internal (labour cost) devaluation and fiscal adjust-
ment policies which Greece had to pursue in exchange for receiving 
financial support resulted in fundamental changes in labour rela-
tions, and in the social security, pensions and healthcare systems. 
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Total social protection spending as a share of GDP contracted from 
27.4% of GDP in 2012 to 26.1% of GDP in 2015 (the year for 
which the latest provisional data are available from Eurostat). Social 
protection functions such as unemployment and healthcare were 
not spared from cuts. By 2015, 11% of Greeks stated that they had 
unmet healthcare needs because they could not afford healthcare. 
Spending on unemployment benefits declined from 1.7% of GDP in 
2011 to 1.1% of GDP by 2015 while spending on healthcare benefits 
declined from 6.8% of GDP in 2010 to 5.1% of GDP in 2015. The 
Greek labour market, which was already highly segmented before 
the crisis, underwent changes that increased employers’ flexibility, 
while also reducing workers’ security, as employment protection 
legislation was eased for both regular and fixed-term contracts 
(Matsaganis 2018, forthcoming).
Last but not least, the crisis has led to major changes at the 
political and electoral levels. The electoral power of the two parties 
that alternated in government during the 1974–2009 period more 
than halved from a joint share of 77% of votes in October 2009 to 
32% in January 2015. Most starkly, support for the Socialists (the 
Panhellenic Socialist Alliance; PASOK) dropped from 44% to 4.7% 
of the vote during this period. There have been four general elections 
in Greece, and five different governments since 2009, the last four 
of them being, unusually for Greece’s most recent history, coali-
tion governments with weak or fragile parliamentary majorities. 
The number of parties represented at the parliament has risen from 
four to five to eight, with at least two of them being classified as 
‘anti-systemic’ parties, which has led to a fragmented and polarised 
multiparty system. At the same time, abstention from the general 
elections has increased from 29% in 2009 to 44% in 2015, which 
reflects – among other things – a disillusionment of voters with 
politics following the economic collapse and the harsh economic 
adjustment programmes that were imposed in exchange for financial 
support from the country’s international creditors.
Despite the large number of reforms that have taken place in 
Greece since 2010, there has yet to emerge a concrete and realistic 
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national vision that is widely shared across parties of what eco-
nomic, but also work and welfare model, the country should be 
steered towards – let alone a strategy for realising any such goal. 
The economic adjustment measures requested by the Troika of the 
EU, European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund (or 
Quadriga from 2015, following the inclusion of the newly created 
European Stability Mechanism) in exchange for financial support 
have for the most part prioritised an accounting approach aimed at 
meeting fiscal targets. There has been less concern about the effects 
of measures on the emergence of a sustainable growth model, and 
concerns about their social impact have only been reported since 
2015. The failure of the Greek parties – alternating in government 
from the 1970s until as late as 2015 – to reach even a minimal con-
sensus on how the high costs of economic adjustment should have 
been strategically distributed, the continued divisive rhetoric in the 
public policy debate, and the chronically deficient engagement of 
Greek policymakers with expert knowledge and subsequent continu-
ous failures in policy learning (Monastiriotis and Antoniades 2009) 
do not inspire optimism for the future, in this respect at least.
For example, a strategy for developing the digital economy is 
a precondition for taking advantage of the fourth industrial revo-
lution. In November 2016, the current government published its 
national digital strategy for the period 2016–2021 and established 
a ministry of digital policy, telecommunications and information, 
with a specific secretariat for digital policy. The strategy document 
contained several priorities, including one on integrating important 
Greek sectors into the fourth industrial revolution. This strategy has 
not been the first of its kind. In fact, every government since the 
1990s had published a similar document of its own. As Katsikas 
and Gritzalis (2017) argue, the problem with these strategies is that 
their time horizon always exceeds the term of each government and 
the next government taking office always disregards the strategy 
of their predecessors, which results in no strategy ever being fully 
implemented.
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THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 
AND GREECE: STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, 
OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS
According to the European Commission’s European digital progress 
report on Greece for 2017 (European Commission 2017), Greece is 
classified as a ‘digital laggard’ in Europe. While it scores fairly low 
in all of the dimensions (such as connectivity, human capital, use 
of the internet, integration of digital technology and digital public 
services) of the Digital Economy and Society’s Index (DESI), it also 
presents some strengths in certain areas, such as the fixed broad-
band coverage of households, the number of science, technology, 
engineering and maths (STEM) graduates, the proportion of people 
engaging in online activities, the proportion of firms using social 
media and electronically sharing information, the share of internet 
users that engage with egovernment services, and the provision of 
open data. On the other hand, Greece has the lowest share of infor-
mation and communications technology (ICT) specialists in total 
employed persons in the EU, a rather low share of the population 
with at least basic digital skills, very low take-up rates of mobile 
broadband and subscriptions to fast broadband, and very low online 
provision of public services.
In principle, the fourth industrial revolution presents growth 
opportunities for Greece. First, the changing open, affordable and 
delocalised nature of innovation in the context of fourth industrial 
revolution opens up opportunities for the creation of firms that 
provide high-tech innovative services and products that help the 
economy to move away from its specialisation in low- and low-
to-medium technologies. Such innovative services and products 
could be provided from Greece to anywhere in Europe or the world. 
These firms could start small (for example, with start ups) and, if 
successful, grow to attract foreign direct investment, a flow that the 
Greek economy will have to rely on to start growing again, given 
the constraints on public spending as part of the country’s bailout 
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arrangements, which are likely to last for decades, and given the 
high rate of non-performing loans that Greek banks have been 
saddled with.
Second, following investment, new technologies that are emblem-
atic of the fourth industrial revolution could be introduced in more 
traditional sectors to lower the costs of production while improving 
productivity and the quality of products or services, which could 
ultimately improve competitiveness in the economy. Third, automa-
tion and digitalisation could allow the provision of public services 
at a lower cost, thus helping to relieve some of the pressures on the 
Greek government budget, which are expected to remain for decades 
until the public debt to GDP ratio recedes to levels that pose fewer 
risks to the economy. The development of egovernment is also para-
mount for promoting digitalisation in an economy.
While such developments would generate income, they are 
unlikely to generate large numbers of jobs (again, with many poten-
tial new jobs coming in the form of relatively small start ups) and 
they are also likely to lead to job losses or to a shift of jobs towards 
less dynamic services sectors that depend more on domestic demand. 
Moreover, whether any productivity gains from innovation and new 
technologies will result in productivity growth at the aggregate level 
will depend on whether demand for the products and services of 
these sectors will increase commensurably. In turn this will depend 
on whether there is sufficient income across the economy to support 
demand for the products of these sectors and, insofar as these new 
products are digital, whether digital skills and fast internet access are 
widespread enough to support demand.
Digital platforms can provide a valuable tool for remaining 
employed in a labour market where jobs under more classic 
employment relationships are scarce, while also providing a source 
of income for Greek households, which on average lost a quarter 
of their income since the onset of the crisis. However, platform 
employment can involve pitfalls, as it is often precarious, insecure, 
undeclared and subject to sub-standard working conditions (for 
example as regards health and safety). Undeclared work can in turn 
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result in a lack of social security coverage for workers and to lower 
contributions to the system overall (Drahokoupil and Piasna 2017). 
These risks are particularly important in Greece, which has been 
traditionally characterised by a large informal sector where employ-
ment regulations are systematically violated, while the financing of 
the social security system has also suffered from the high unemploy-
ment and job loss rate, especially among men.
POLICY PRIORITIES FOR HARNESSING THE 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF THE FOURTH 
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN GREECE
Given the above mentioned strengths and weaknesses of Greece and 
the opportunities and threats that the fourth industrial revolution can 
present for the country, what should be the policy priorities for the 
Greek governments in order to enable the country to make the most 
of the fourth industrial revolution?
First, and in order to move up from the ‘digital laggards’ group in 
Europe, policymakers need to understand the importance of adopt-
ing a consistent digital strategy that will last beyond changes of 
political parties in office. The likelihood that the current national 
strategy might have a different fate appears slim. The aforemen-
tioned de-alignment of voters from the two parties that alternated in 
government between 1974 and 2009, the change in the Greek elec-
toral law towards a system that is closer to simple representation, 
and the maintenance of divisive rhetoric in national politics, at least 
from the part of the current government parties, taken together do 
not bode well for any elevation of the question of the digital strategy 
to a national priority. That does not give much hope for the creation 
of a strategy that can survive the term of any government, while the 
‘reform technology’ of the country is also weak (Monastiriotis and 
Antoniades 2009).
A second priority should be to maximise as far as possible 
the capacity of as many citizens and firms as possible to use and 
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participate in the digital society. For this, the education system needs 
to integrate the acquisition of digital skills from an earlier stage, 
and affordable training opportunities should be available for older 
people. The education system should also equip students with the 
‘softer’ skills that will shield them from being replaced by robots in 
the future. Digitalising public administration would also be an indis-
pensable step in that direction, thus providing incentives for citizens 
to acquire and use these skills, while also contributing to improved 
transparency and efficiency in public administration.
A third priority would be to establish a business environment that 
is friendly for innovative start ups. Elements of such an environ-
ment would be a more efficient judicial system, and a more predict-
able and transparent taxation system, coupled with the provision of 
high-quality public and social services, especially if taxes are high. 
Stronger links between start ups and university research, in which 
Greece is actually highly competitive, would also help.
A fourth priority should be the rethinking of employment and 
social protection (see Palier this volume). Employment in the plat-
form economy should be brought under the regulation that governs 
more traditional forms of employment, in order to secure the par-
ticipation of platform workers as contributors to, and ultimately as 
beneficiaries of, the social protection system, and to create the basis 
for better working conditions, provided that the enforcement of 
regulation will also improve (see Berg and De Stefano this volume). 
Recent reforms in the unemployment insurance system have been a 
step in the right direction for extending coverage to self-employed 
people. However, they have also been subject to biting budget con-
straints, whereas the eligibility rules failed to adjust to the realities 
on the ground and resulted in only a limited extension of the cover-
age (Matsaganis 2018, forthcoming).
More generally, the inevitable disruptions in the way that work 
and welfare are organised as a result of the necessary adoption of 
a new growth model for Greece, and given the advent of the fourth 
industrial revolution, suggest that social protection should become 
less tightly linked to the employment relationship, and more closely 
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associated with fiscal residence. The recent deployment of a (means-
tested) guaranteed minimum income is a first step in the right 
direction.
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Speculation on how technology can transform work and society, in 
either positive or negative ways, is hardly novel. It goes as far back 
as Aristotle’s Politics, where he describes an “(inanimate) instru-
ment” that “could do its own work, at the word of command or by 
intelligent anticipation” (Carol 2010), removing among other things 
the need for subordinates and giving deep thinkers more time to 
brood over life’s bigger meaning.
In the modern era, conventional wisdom is that innovation forms 
part of a continuous process of creative destruction, with some jobs 
eliminated, but over time many more added. From this perspective, 
the correct societal response is to embrace technological change 
while managing its downsides, whether it is the loss of employment, 
growing skill mismatches or rising inequality.
Yet, more than 2,000 years after Aristotle, the comforting prem-
ise of more gain than pain from technological change is being 
questioned. The feeling that ‘this time is different’, with employ-
ment creation being overwhelmed by its destruction, has grown. 
Advancements in such areas as artificial intelligence (AI) are pur-
portedly happening so quickly and of such a monumental scale that 
even high-skilled workers (eg doctors and lawyers) are under threat 
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(Suskind and Suskind 2016). Sensationalised reports of killer robots 
supplanting humans and triggering civilisational collapse are find-
ing a ready audience in today’s world of ‘trending’ and ‘clickbait’ 
media. Everyone from Stephen Hawking to Vladimir Putin to Yanis 
Varoufakis are weighing in with apocalyptic warnings of what the 
fourth industrial revolution and its technologies could augur for the 
world (Embury-Dennis 2017; Hearn 2016; Karpukhin 2017).
UTOPIA, DYSTOPIA OR THE SAME OLD SCENE?
For some, of course, the fourth industrial revolution is not all doom 
and gloom. ‘Techno-optimists’ like MIT’s Erik Brynjolfsson and 
Andrew McAfee see us “living in a time of astonishing progress with 
digital technologies” that will create vastly more wealth and – pro-
vided these benefits are broadly shared throughout society – greater 
opportunity as well (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014). Likewise, 
World Economic Forum (WEF) founder Klaus Schwab in his book 
The Fourth Industrial Revolution sees technologies like AI, robotics, 
3D printing and biotech as having the potential of lifting “humanity 
into a new collective and moral consciousness based on a shared 
sense of destiny” (Poole 2017, citing Schwab).
Meanwhile, somewhere between pessimists and optimists lie 
economists like Robert J. Gordon, who argues that from a productiv-
ity and innovation standpoint we have been going downhill since the 
1970s. Gordon (2016) sees a future of stasis or ‘secular stagnation’ 
as it is technically known, highlighting the Depression-era fears of 
economists such as John Maynard Keynes and Alvin H. Hansen, 
who saw a tendency for productivity and growth in mature econo-
mies to slow down (Gomez and Lamb 2013). In this middle-range 
scenario, the most important contributions of the digital revolution 
have already occurred. Sure, innovations will continue, but they will 
be evolutionary and not revolutionary according to Gordon (2016).
Irrespective of where one stands, there’s no denying that technol-
ogy in today’s disembodied and intangible economy is qualitatively 
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different from the goods-producing economies of yesteryear (Wolf 
2017). This point is illustrated by Jonathan Haskel and Stian 
Westlake (2017) who note that the tangible assets of Apple, the 
world’s largest company by market capitalisation, account for a 
meagre 4% of its $880bn market value. Likewise, Google, Alphabet 
and Microsoft have relatively little in the way of fixed assets (Mak 
2017). What makes these firms highly valued are elements not con-
sidered in traditional cost accounting, particularly brand-equity, data 
management and supply-chain expertise.
However, the emergence of these tech giants takes us back to the 
days of America’s gilded age when industrial giants like Standard 
Oil and Carnegie Steel dominated the economic landscape. And as 
in the gilded age, tech is creating its Rockefellers and JP Morgans in 
the form of Jeff Bezos and Mark Zuckerberg. Eight of the world’s 
most highly valued companies are now technology businesses.1 The 
total market capitalisation of these companies is $4.7tn, a startling 
30% of the combined market capitalisation of the other 92 compa-
nies that make up the world’s 100 richest firms (Wolf 2017). People 
are beginning to notice, which is perhaps why the Financial Times 
recently declared that only monopolies could deliver such super-
normal profits and valuations (Wolf 2017).
Like in the gilded age, the monopolistic and cartel-like position 
of these tech titans is contributing to an enormous concentration of 
wealth and power with highly worrying implications for workers, 
communities, small enterprises and our democratic institutions. The 
fall of labour’s share of GDP in the US and many other countries and 
commensurate rise in inequality since the 1980s is well documented 
(Piketty 2013) and has now been linked to the rise of these ‘superstar 
firms’ (Frick 2017).
While some of this concentration is undoubtedly due to higher 
productivity and innovative capacity, we should not discount the 
agency costs that this kind of corporate power creates. The top five 
US tech firms (Google, Facebook, Apple, Amazon and Microsoft) 
now outspend Wall Street 2:1 on lobbying to fight ‘unfavourable’ 
regulation (Solon and Siddiqui 2017). Moreover, the rent-seeking 
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activities of these firms, which include complex tax avoidance 
schemes, starve governments of revenues they need to maintain vital 
public infrastructure. As Haskel and Westlake point out, this does 
“no good for the economy . . . but instead (is) about slicing the exist-
ing economic pie to the exclusive benefit of the intangible investor” 
(cited in Mak 2017).
CANADA’S QUANTUM LEAP?
For mid- to small-sized countries like Canada, a very real challenge 
is how to play in a technology game fraught with so many risks. 
Certainly, there’s no shortage of opinions on the subject. In Canada 
people in a myriad of thinktanks, consultancies and government 
agencies talk of job losses, economic inequality and societal dislo-
cation (Lamb and Lo 2017), as new technologies replace workers 
and perhaps even make government obsolete (Johal 2017). One of 
the country’s longest running public affairs TV programmes, The 
Agenda, recently devoted a full hour in primetime to debate whether 
the rise of robots and AI means the end of work (Paikin 2017).
Not to be outdone, Canada’s prime minister, Justin Trudeau, gar-
nered international headlines at a public event hosted by a Canadian 
physics research institute. In response to a reporter’s slightly sar-
castic suggestion that he explain quantum computing, according to 
news accounts Trudeau surprised reporters by explaining the basics 
of this technology and stunned physicists in attendance with his 
understanding of their field (Wells 2017).
Trudeau’s bona fides as something of a techno visionary were 
cemented by his 2016 speech at the WEF. Notably, Trudeau argued 
that the fourth industrial revolution would not be successful unless 
it created real opportunity for the many, not just the elite attending 
the conference in Davos; something he felt Canada ‘gets’ (Trudeau 
2016). It was also a speech in which the prime minister sought to 
erase the reputation that Canada was simply a purveyor of natural 
resources. Instead the new Canada, in Trudeau’s words, was all 
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about “resourcefulness”, using our brains more than our brawn, as 
it were. These and other interventions prompted founder and execu-
tive chairman of the WEF, Klaus Schwab, to state that he “couldn’t 
imagine anybody who . . . represent[s] more the world which will 
come out of this [fourth industrial revolution] than Trudeau” (Wells 
2017).
The big question, now almost two years on from the Davos 
speech, is to what extent does Canada ‘get’ it or, more precisely, 
how well is it prepared for the challenges of creating shared prosper-
ity in a time of rapid technological change? In attempting to respond 
to this question, it is useful to take a step back in time for both inspi-
ration and insight into how Canada will perhaps navigate the fourth 
industrial revolution.
EXPO 67: CONSOLIDATING THE THIRD 
AND VISUALISING THE FOURTH 
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
In 2017 Canada marked two important and related milestones: the 
150th anniversary of its founding in 1867 as a confederation of 
former British colonies and the 50th anniversary of Expo 67, the 
world’s fair hosted by the city of Montreal. For Canadians with 
memories of Expo 67, in particular baby-boomers, a recent flurry of 
documentaries, articles and exhibitions were an opportunity to revel 
in some unabashed nostalgia. Often described as the best world’s 
fair ever,2 Expo 67 was more significantly a giant incubator for 
innovations in new media, architecture, design and laying the foun-
dations for the growth and vibrancy of Canada’s creative industries. 
Famed Canadian communications theorist Marshall McLuhan saw 
it as a mosaic “of culture and media, a global rendezvous unlike 
any before. What is happening today around the world” McLuhan 
proclaimed “is what is happening at Expo” (Fargo 2017).
From its conception to its implementation, Expo 67 was also 
emblematic of an increasingly ‘entrepreneurial’ Canadian state. It 
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embodied a notion, which economist Mariana Mazzucato (2015) 
today calls on governments to embrace, to create markets and not 
just fix them. State-owned enterprises like Hydro Quebec, TV 
Ontario and the Canada Development Corporation – often referred 
to as ‘crown corporations’ – shaped industries and created impor-
tant national markets in energy, aerospace, culture or transportation 
to name just a few. Such policies reflected a pragmatic economic 
nationalism, which though not eschewing foreign trade and invest-
ment reflected what historian Kenneth McNaught (1969) noted was 
a consensus among Canadians on the need to maintain control of the 
country’s key economic sectors.
Certainly, the success of this approach was borne out by results. 
By the 1970s Canada had become one of the world’s most prosper-
ous economies. And, remarkably, in little over a decade (from 1965 
to 1977), the country became a modern welfare state. Under the 
leadership of prime ministers Lester B. Pearson and, later, Pierre 
Elliot Trudeau (father of our current PM) Canada there were major 
enhancements to post-secondary education, physical infrastructure, 
pensions, unemployment insurance, income support and public hous-
ing, and the rollout of universal healthcare. The scale of this transfor-
mation was evident in Canada’s largest province, Ontario, where the 
government built and opened nine public universities in just under 
10 years. Moreover, as Canadian economist Pierre Fortin observed 
in his obituary of the prime minister, the ‘Just Society’, as it was 
defined by Trudeau, would contain the core of an effective human 
capital strategy: “a full-employment policy, a good income security 
policy (with few adverse work incentives), a redistributive income 
tax policy, a major effort in education, a fair minimum wage, and 
freedom to unionise” (Fortin 2000). A strategy that would produce 
significantly less poverty and inequality than its southern neighbour.
To be sure, Canada would not entirely free itself of the ills 
afflicting industrialised nations during the ‘stagflation’ period of 
the 1970s, whether it was inflationary pressures, labour conflict or 
terrorism and separatism in Quebec. Nonetheless, Canada demon-
strated itself much more resilient than many of its counterparts in 
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dealing with these socio-economic challenges. Canada’s positive 
response to the oil shock of the early 1970s, in particular, proved 
that the best shock absorber is a sound combination of proactive and 
adaptive public policies and a diverse economic base. This is a les-
son today’s policymakers should keep in mind.
IN 2017, WITH ECHOES OF 1967, THE PENDULUM 
SWINGS PROGRESSIVE ONCE AGAIN
Like much of the industrialised west, from the 1980s to the early 
2000s, Canada followed the standard playbook of neoliberal and 
third-way orthodoxy, and suffered as a result with its unemploy-
ment rate rising above and GDP per-capita falling below the US 
for the first time in the postwar period. Fortunately, this tendency 
to embrace neoliberal nostrums did not extend to deregulation of 
the financial sector, sparing Canada the worst effects of the Great 
Recession (eg, no Canadian bank required a bailout following the 
financial crash of 2008).
Since 2009, Canadian governments have embraced approaches 
with echoes of the entrepreneurial and welfare state of the 1960s 
and 1970s. This is evident in the realm of fiscal and macro-eco-
nomic policy where the federal government is making some not 
insignificant investments in physical and social infrastructure and 
forecasting modest deficits over the next several years. While not 
proportionately as large as those of the ‘Just Society’, these public 
investments and the rhetoric surrounding them marks a sea change.
In the context of the fourth industrial revolution, a major emphasis 
is being placed on innovation, skills development and modernising 
labour legislation. Though not quite a full-blown industrial strat-
egy, the federal government launched its Innovation Superclusters 
Initiative, which will invest substantial sums in areas, such as 
machine learning and AI. Interestingly, the fund also seeks to invest 
in projects that cross-pollinate high tech in more traditional sectors 
like agriculture, retail and energy. And while the development of AI 
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is most often associated with Silicon Valley, Canada has ‘the’ lead-
ing researcher in the field, Professor Geoff Hinton, who as a recent 
New York Times article noted, is “helping underpin a wave of new 
developments in the field” (Tam 2017).
In skills development, federal and provincial governments are 
meeting the growing demands of the knowledge economy by 
blending investments in apprenticeship, work-based learning and 
improved labour market information. This is buttressed by what is 
already a world-class primary, secondary and post-secondary educa-
tional system (Conference Board of Canada 2014; Coughain 2017).
Perhaps most promising are changes to labour and income support 
policies, which are responding to the increasingly low-wage and 
precarious nature of employment in the so-called gig and platform 
economies. In the country’s provinces, which have jurisdiction over 
most workplaces, policies like increased minimum wages, support 
for collective representation, giving workers a greater say in sched-
uling, equal pay for contract and casual employees, and stronger 
enforcement of labour legislation (eg hiring more inspectors) are 
becoming the norm.3
Ontario (Canada’s most populous province), like Finland, is also 
piloting a basic income programme, a concept that is not without 
its detractors on the left and right, but which has thus far attracted 
mainstream support (Segal 2016). It must be stressed, however, 
that a basic income is based on a not unreasonable demand from 
capital, particularly tech, for a quid pro quo of sorts. In exchange 
for allowing flexibility in employment relationships (and as some 
critics charge, allowing tech companies to get rich by mining our 
personal data and exacerbate income polarisation) support for basic 
income protection that provides a floor against employment loss is 
offered. In more than just a rhetorical sense, many tech captains of 
the industry support the basic income, though for some this is still 
a public relations exercise by which Silicon Valley can play ‘good 
cop’ to Wall Street’s ‘bad cop’, and there is concern that the existing 
welfare state will be replaced with a threadbare basic income.
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SO, DOES CANADA GET IT?
So, returning to the question we posed earlier, does Canada, as the 
prime minister suggests, ‘get it’ when it comes to creating shared 
prosperity in a time of the fourth industrial revolution? The answer, 
it would seem, is a very qualified yes.
In general, Canada’s focus on innovation, skills and modernising 
labour standards moves the country in the right direction. Canada, 
as noted, has the potential for a first mover advantage in fourth 
industrial revolution areas like machine learning and AI, with the 
city of Toronto already being recognised as an international hub 
for these activities. For decades, University of Toronto Professor 
Geoffrey Hinton worked on what was thought to be an arcane area 
of mathematics known as ‘neural nets’ but now, along with a group 
of Canadian-trained students, his work is part of the team develop-
ing cutting-edge AI technology (Gray 2017). And the world’s big-
gest tech companies are throwing millions of dollars into Canada’s 
neural net research programme, hiring many of Hinton’s students, 
who now run or conduct AI research at Apple, Twitter, Google and 
Facebook (Gray 2017).
This emphasis on neural nets and machine learning also helps to 
rebalance the economy from an overreliance on natural resources. 
Neural nets, developed by Canadian talent, are already powering 
most of the voice recognition software in mobile phones. They 
recognise faces in pictures and can distinguish different diseases on 
radiological scans, in some cases more accurately than humans can. 
This new fourth industrial revolution focus makes us more ‘resource-
ful’ and crucially builds in resilience and diversity, something that 
is needed given the inevitable ups and downs of the economic cycle 
and the very real potential for future ‘black swan’ events in capital 
markets. Likewise, the focus on fundamentals like education and 
economic supports for displaced workers will help reduce inequality 
and mitigate what could be difficult transitions for some industries in 
the fourth industrial revolution.
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FINAL THOUGHTS
Unfortunately, there are some dark clouds that overshadow the rosy 
picture. Notwithstanding the well-documented need for AI special-
ists, code writers and so on, there is perhaps too much of a tech-
centred focus on the labour market side, which ignores opportunities 
for meaningful employment in other sectors. It is no secret that in 
Canada, as in other advanced economies, aging demographics are 
driving massive growth and demand for personal services and care-
based work (Osterman 2017). Currently, these jobs are low paid and 
do not require a high degree of skill or qualifications to practice. But 
this does not have to be the case. Why not work to transform these 
jobs into more skilled occupations? Indeed, just a moderate amount 
of additional education and technology could improve job quality 
for workers and outcomes for care recipients. The objective should 
be to advance innovation and productivity improvements across all 
sectors and occupations, not only tech.
The lengths many Canadian politicians and regional economic 
development specialists are willing to go – often involving large 
tax breaks and subsidies – to attract the ‘big’ established tech firms 
are also worrying. They do this in the hope that they can transform 
a region’s economic fortunes with more jobs and growth. This was 
certainly evident during Amazon’s recently announced public tender 
process for the location of its second North American headquarters, 
during which Toronto and several other Canadian regions clamoured 
to make their community Amazon’s new home.
This approach produces splashy headlines and ribbon cutting 
ceremonies for politicians, but empirically we know that growth is 
more reliably correlated with the number of small independent firms 
based in a region or city (Glaeser, Kerr and Kerr 2015; Gomez, 
Isakov and Semansky 2015). Local tech investors know this all too 
well, which is why they are pleading with politicians to focus their 
efforts on supporting smaller, successful Canadian start ups (eg 
Shopify and Thalmic Labs) instead of rolling out the red carpet for 
Amazon (Lacavera 2017), which has no shortage of money but a 
 507CANADA
less than stellar record in the treatment of its global workforce (Head 
2014).
Likewise, it was disappointing that Waterfront Toronto, a world-
renowned state-owned entity responsible for managing North 
America’s largest urban regeneration project, effectively handed 
over to Alphabet (Google’s parent company) the redevelopment 
of a Toronto waterfront district called Quayside. Google envisions 
Quayside as a tech-rich and data-informed neighbourhood, using 
AI to create a safe, sustainable and affordable place to live. But as 
some open data advocates have observed, it may be less an urban 
planning initiative and more about a private actor insinuating itself 
into a city’s urban infrastructure and harvesting data for virtually no 
cost (Wylie 2017). Also concerning is “how this model may further 
erode the technological capacity of the state; and what that does to 
our ability as a nation to operate independently of technology ven-
dors” (Wylie 2017).
Although there is value in partnering with firms such as Google 
to improve the urban environment, it is perplexing that the city did 
not consider local tech players in addition to international expertise. 
This is an approach the agency has already successfully executed 
on redevelopment projects such as Corktown Common (Waterfront 
Toronto 2017).
Overlooked as well is the issue of how much control citizens (in 
their roles as workers and more broadly as voting citizens) should 
have over the deployment of fourth industrial revolution tech-
nologies at work and across society (see Crouch this volume). This 
points to the need for a reinvigorated democracy extending from the 
shop floor to the floor of parliament, so as to ensure multiple voices, 
not just well-paid lobbyists, shape our economic future (Gomez and 
Gomez 2016).
Given the global reach and increasingly monopolistic position 
of today’s tech giants, Canada also needs to think about how it can 
work with two of its biggest trading partners, the EU and US, to 
ensure that fair and open market access extends to smaller, nation-
ally based tech players.
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In a domestic context, it is also critical that Canada give seri-
ous consideration to a call from open data advocates for a national 
discussion about our information, related public infrastructure, and 
the degree to which we want private actors based in Silicon Valley 
influencing our governance and public services (Wylie 2017).
To conclude, the fourth industrial revolution once again calls for 
a pragmatic nationalism that keeps Canada open to the world while 
at the same time seeking to preserve what is good and unique about 
the country.
NOTES
1. Five companies (Apple, Alphabet and Google, Microsoft, Amazon 
and Facebook) are American, two are Chinese (Alibaba and Tencent) and 
one (Samsung) is South Korean.
2. The New York Times at the time praised its “sophisticated standard of 
excellence (that) almost defies description” (Wall 2017).
3. Finally, also notable from an income support standpoint is the federal 
government’s announcement of a new housing benefit for lower income 
Canadians. Again, this is a very real and practical response to the emerging 
prosperity and employment gap resulting from the new economy and the 
fourth industrial revolution. For more information on the housing benefit, 
see Canada’s National Housing Strategy (Government of Canada 2017).
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The confluence of technological changes linked to the so-called 
fourth industrial revolution will have a profound bearing on a wide 
range of issues, providing opportunities and creating threats for 
workers and employers and reconfiguring the organisation of work 
and welfare in all countries. I focus here on two major impacts of the 
fourth industrial revolution on the future of work in the US: its effect 
on the quantity of jobs as reflected in employment and unemploy-
ment related to automation, and the quality of the jobs in the earn-
ings that will be available to workers. This dynamic world of work 
will require workers to change jobs more often, and to learn new 
skills and adapt to new situations. These changes in the organisation 
of work will also require a new social contract among workers, the 
government and business.
THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
The term fourth industrial revolution refers to recent and fundamen-
tal changes in the organisation of work and labour market behaviours 
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that is being driven by digitisation and IT: the availability of big data, 
industrial robotics, the internet of things (see Fernández-Macías this 
volume), artificial intelligence (AI; see Petropoulos this volume), 
and the continued growth of precarious and polarised employment 
relations in the US. Descriptions of the fourth industrial revolution 
emphasise the profound impacts generated by the combination of 
digitisation and IT that are fusing physical technologies (eg 3D 
printing, self-driving cars), digital technologies (eg online platforms 
such as Uber and distributed computer systems such as blockchains) 
and biological technologies (eg genetic editing and engineering) in 
innovative ways. The convergence of these three technologies is the 
central feature of the fourth industrial revolution (Schwab 2016).
The spread of information and communications technology has 
had, and will continue to have, deep effects on productivity (see 
Soete this volume), the wage distribution (see Doellgast this vol-
ume) and long-term economic growth. Automation will require 
new skills and eliminate others (see Aubrey this volume). Income 
inequality is likely to grow and become increasingly linked to dif-
ferences in skills and educational credentials. Wealth inequality is 
also likely to continue to grow given the enactment of tax policies 
favouring the rich under the current administration.
There is disagreement over the consequences of the fourth indus-
trial revolution for the quantity and quality of jobs. It is generally 
assumed that automation will have important effects on the number 
and nature of jobs, though there is less agreement on the number 
of jobs that are likely to be eliminated or be created and their 
characteristics.
AUTOMATION AND EMPLOYMENT 
AND UNEMPLOYMENT
Concern over machines wiping out jobs has had a long history, 
famously represented by the early example of the destruction of 
machines by Luddite movements among English textile artisans of 
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the early 19th century. In 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson cre-
ated a commission to assess the likelihood that productivity growth 
would exceed the demand for labour. The commission concluded 
that while technology eliminated some jobs, it would not eradicate 
the need for work as new jobs would be created; hence, machine 
substitution of labour does not replace human labour but rather 
displaces workers from one part of the economy to another (Autor 
2015). At the same time, the commission recognised the reality of 
technological disruption and recommended policies to cope with its 
consequences: a guaranteed income, job creation by the government, 
and free education at community or vocational colleges, among 
others.
Similar concerns have re-emerged with the advent of the fourth 
industrial revolution. Again there are worries that we are headed into 
a ‘jobless future’ in which technological changes will reduce the 
demand for human labour. As in the past, these anxieties are likely 
overblown, as the destruction of some jobs will be accompanied by 
the creation of others.
The numbers and types of jobs that will be eliminated and created 
are less clear, however. Frey and Osborne (2017) examine occupa-
tions that could be automated and conclude that current technologi-
cal changes will make it possible to replace about half of the jobs 
in the US with machines in the next 10 to 20 years. They found that 
jobs at the greatest risk of being automated were occupations involv-
ing transportation, logistics, office and administrative support, and 
production. The jobs in these industries are routine in nature and 
typically involve rules-based logic that computers are particularly 
good at replicating (Levy and Murnane 2013).
By contrast, Arntz, Gregory and Zierahn (2016) focused on 
the automation of the task content of jobs within occupations and 
concluded that Frey and Osborne’s occupation-based approach 
overstates technological possibilities (see Arnold et al. this volume). 
They suggest instead that on average across 21 OECD countries only 
9% of jobs are potentially automatable since workers in automatable 
occupations often perform non-routine interactive tasks, which are 
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less amenable to automation. They also emphasise heterogeneities 
among countries in the share of automatable jobs, depending on fac-
tors such as investments in automation technologies and differences 
in education. Moreover, Arnold et al. argue that the labour-creating 
effects of technological change are likely to exceed its labour-elim-
inating effects, at least in Europe.
Any job whose tasks and overall functions can be digitised is 
likely to be automated. Those at the highest risk of losing their jobs 
to automation are low-skilled employees in industries such as manu-
facturing or customer service, since their tasks involve recognisable 
patterns that are more easily programmable and replaced by comput-
ers. Ford (2015, xiv) takes a fairly extreme position by arguing that 
no job is safe from the rise of robots:
while lower-skill occupations will no doubt continue to be affected, 
a great many college-educated, white collar workers are going to 
discover that their jobs, too, are squarely in the sights as software and 
automation and predictive algorithms advance rapidly in capability.
But not all jobs are liable to be automated. Recent technologi-
cal advancements such as the development of autonomous cars 
and the possibilities of 3D printing have provided insight into the 
skills needed for new jobs created by these advancements that only 
humans can perform (Ford 2015). The human mind has strengths 
that allow it to perform certain tasks that computers cannot:
The human mind’s strength is flexibility – the ability to process and 
integrate many kinds of information to perform a complex task. The 
computer’s strengths are speed and accuracy, not flexibility, and com-
puters are best at performing tasks for which logical rules or a statisti-
cal model lay out a path to a solution (Levy and Murnane 2013, 9).
Requirements for jobs that are less likely to be automated include 
extensive education and experience, critical-thinking and problem-
solving ability, and adaptability and creativity; these are all skills 
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which humans, and not computers, possess. Brynjolfsson and 
Mitchell (2017) agree that there are a number of tasks that machine 
learning is unlikely to be able to do, such as those that require 
unstructured tasks and complex reasoning, or planning that depends 
on common sense and experience.
Moreover, as automation and smart technology become more 
prevalent, new jobs will be created alongside those created by AI. 
Human workers will be required to “complement the tasks per-
formed by cognitive technology, ensuring that the work of machines 
is both effective and responsible – that it is fair, transparent, and 
auditable” (Wilson, Daugherty and Morini-Bianzino 2017). Because 
humans possess skills and strengths that computers do not, there is 
likely always to be a place for humans to complement and augment 
the tasks done by machines.
Other technological changes will redefine some jobs rather than 
eliminate them. AI and other technological innovations will change 
the way in which the expertise of a wide range of professions is 
made available to society (Susskind and Susskind 2015). Lawyers, 
for example, will likely face changes in their occupation to keep up 
with technology, possibly creating systems that offer legal advice 
rather than offering legal advice themselves (Mahdawi 2017).
IMPACTS ON THE QUALITY OF WORK
The transformation of employment relations in the US that began 
in the 1970s led to a growth of high-skilled, well-paid jobs as well 
as low-skilled, low-wage and short-term jobs. This labour market 
polarisation has enhanced economic inequality, as well as job and 
economic insecurity, in the US (Kalleberg 2011).
The gig economy – generally characterised by short-term engage-
ments among employers, workers and customers – illustrates the 
polarisation of opportunities spawned by the fourth industrial 
revolution. In this sense, the gig economy is not new. Instead, it 
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represents a digital version of the offline atypical, casual, freelance 
or contingent work arrangements characteristic of much of the econ-
omy before the middle of the 20th century and that have reappeared 
in the past 30 years (Kalleberg and Dunn 2016).
Although jobs in the gig economy (see De Stefano and Berg 
this volume; Schor this volume) differ from our traditional defi-
nitions of good jobs (stable jobs providing health and retirement 
benefits), the reality of the gig economy is more nuanced than 
many of the most critical portrayals: it produces both good and 
bad jobs (Kalleberg and Dunn 2016). Platforms such as Upwork, 
for example, provide relatively high wages and enable workers to 
have high control over their work, while Uber offers somewhat 
high wages at the expense of worker control. The rapid expan-
sion of the gig economy has attracted the attention of the media, 
social scientists and the public at large. While it is still a relatively 
small slice of the American economy (Katz and Krueger 2016), it 
is growing rapidly and is liable to become increasingly prominent 
in the future.
Looking ahead, education and skills are likely to be the source 
of the main divisions in the labour market. Workers with creative, 
social and other in-demand skills will have greater market power 
and thus be better able to adapt to the increasingly dynamic tech-
nological environment. Consequently, they should be able to take 
advantage of the greater opportunities for mobility among employ-
ers. On the other hand, those without such market power are most 
vulnerable in the changing labour market. These are the low-skilled, 
less-educated workers who do not have the resources to develop 
necessary skills or find new jobs when their old ones are automated 
(Sorgner 2017). In addition, demographic differences defined by 
gender, age, race, ethnicity and immigration status are associated 
with factors that affect the ability of members of these groups to 
obtain well-rewarded jobs. The challenge here is to provide all 
people with access to the opportunities for skill acquisition so as to 
be competitive in the labour markets shaped by the fourth industrial 
revolution.
 519US
NEW RISKS, NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT
“The challenge we face is to come up with new forms of social 
and employment contracts that suit the changing workforce and the 
evolving nature of work” (Schwab 2016, 49). Automation and AI 
will eliminate some jobs, redefine others and create new ones. While 
the relative size of these categories is somewhat unclear, what is 
certain is the need to provide people with the skills and social pro-
tections to cope with these changes. In order to tackle these issues, 
policies should maintain flexibility for employers yet still provide 
individuals with ways to mitigate the negative consequences pro-
duced by such flexibility. In every case, we need to consider indi-
vidual and group diversity in access to education and skills and in 
employees’ ability to use them in the labour market.
Examining the experiences of other rich democracies that face 
challenges similar to those of the US provides insights about strate-
gies to help individuals cope with the uncertainty and insecurity 
associated with the upheavals produced by automation and techno-
logical change. The idea of flexicurity – prominently illustrated by 
Denmark and the Netherlands (see Keune and Dekker this volume; 
Ilsøe this volume) – offers a general way of conceptualising the 
needed risk structures by involving both employers and workers in 
a cooperative effort (European Commission 2007). Flexicurity is an 
appealing concept in that it offers a narrative about how employers 
and labour markets can have greater flexibility and workers can still 
be protected from the insecurity created by employers’ search for 
such flexibility.
It is essential to have more robust social and economic protections 
to collectivise the risks associated with technological change. This 
includes basic forms of social insurance such as health insurance 
and health and pension benefits that are provided to all workers, 
regardless of their employment status. Particular attention must be 
paid to needs related to aging, the care of children and the elderly, 
and work–family balance. The provision of such a safety net should 
be the highest priority for economic and social welfare in the US in 
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order to alleviate the threats of new technology and to harness its 
potential.
These social protection policies need to be complemented by 
a second set of essential strategies: providing greater access for 
all to early childhood and formal education as well as lifelong 
education and retraining in order to prepare people for the inevi-
table changes that will occur in jobs. The evidence shows that 
early childhood education is vital for providing the foundational 
skills and abilities that are crucial for the acquisition of additional 
skills later in life. For example, a recent study by Garcia et al. 
(2016) that followed children from birth until age 35 found that 
high-quality care during the earliest years enabled both mothers 
and children born into disadvantage to be more engaged in the 
work force, have higher skills, and be more active participants in 
society. Moreover, active labour market policies and private and 
public partnerships (such as those between community colleges 
and businesses) are needed to enhance lifelong education and 
retraining so as to prepare people for the inevitable changes in 
jobs that I have discussed above.
Third, revisions to social labour regulations and laws are needed 
to protect those in both regular and non-regular employment. 
Many of our current labour regulations and laws were formulated 
on the assumption of a standard employment relation (see Berg 
and De Stefano this volume). Current debates over whether Uber 
drivers are employees or independent contractors, for example, 
illustrate the ambiguity that currently exists about the new forms of 
employment relations that have been created by the fourth indus-
trial revolution. A prominent policy suggestion here is to establish 
a third category between independent contractor and employee, 
such as ‘dependent contractor’. While such a third classification 
would acknowledge the complexity of modern work arrange-
ments, it is likely that this would encourage employers to classify 
more employees this way in order to forego their obligations to 
provide benefits and to deprive employees of social and statutory 
protections.
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POSSIBLE FUTURES
The rapidity of changes in technology and the organisation of work 
in the US should make us cautious about making predictions about 
the future. Nevertheless, recognising how and why these changes 
have occurred is essential to identifying the opportunities and coping 
with the challenges associated with technological innovations. We 
can imagine negative as well as positive scenarios.
It is relatively easy to envision a variety of dystopian futures, 
as we can only extrapolate from current trends. The confluence of 
forces related to globalisation, technological change, the financiali-
sation of firms’ organisation of work (see Kenney and Zysman this 
volume) and weak worker power (see Jolly this volume) may well 
continue and extend key social and economic trends. These include 
the expansion of low-wage jobs, outsourcing and subcontracting of 
the production of goods and services to lower-wage firms, growing 
polarisation between good and bad jobs and increasing economic 
inequality, expansion of digital platforms creating short-term and 
poorly protected jobs (the ‘Uberisation’ of the economy), and so on. 
Moreover, many of the implications of the automation of jobs are 
still unclear, fuelling fears that it will reduce drastically the need for 
workers.
It is more difficult to imagine utopian possibilities, given the pri-
orities of current political and economic debates in the US. Creating 
the necessary conditions for any optimism requires strengthening 
and expanding social welfare protections and providing active 
labour market policies to facilitate job mobility. These are basic for 
giving people the skills and education to thrive in the new employ-
ment relationships between employers and workers.
But more comprehensive and long-term solutions will require 
more basic changes. One optimistic scenario is Beck’s (2000) notion 
of an emerging ‘post-full-employment society’ or ‘multi-activity 
work society’, which defines work as something beyond market 
work, wherein people are able to shift their actions over the course 
of their lives across formal employment (albeit perhaps working 
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fewer hours), parental labour and civil labour (labour in the arts, 
culture and politics, which helps the general welfare). The latter 
activity could be rewarded with ‘civic money’ that is not a handout 
from the state or community but a return for engaging in these activi-
ties. Each person would control her own time-capital that she can 
allocate to different activities over time. Beck advocates that paid 
work and civil labour should complement each other and calls for 
greater equality of housework and outside care work with artistic, 
cultural and political civic labour in the voluntary sector, which he 
believes will help create a gender-neutral division of labour. The 
idea of work as going beyond paid labour is a notion also espoused 
by Supiot (2001), Vosko (2010) and Standing (2011), among others.
If we are to define work formally as something beyond paid 
market work, it is essential to decouple economic security and 
social protection from market work and labour force status. One 
increasingly popular option, which was also raised as a policy rec-
ommendation in the early 1960s in response to the threats posed by 
automation, is that of a universal basic income that would provide 
a foundation of economic security. This idea is still very controver-
sial for economic, political and cultural reasons, though we need 
to know more about how such unconditional grants affect labour 
market behaviours before evaluating its potential. Alternatively, the 
US might adopt social welfare protection systems that are relatively 
generous, inclusive and universalistic, where welfare benefits were 
provided to all citizens. The Affordable Care Act 2010 was a step in 
this direction, though it has yet to be fully implemented.
We may also need to reconceptualise our understanding of what 
constitutes value in a society. The commonly used economic indi-
cator of value, the GDP, is increasingly unable to capture develop-
ments such as widening inequality and the rise of precarious work. 
Alternative, ‘beyond GDP’ indicators of wellbeing could shift the 
emphasis from measuring economic production to assessing the 
multiple dimensions of peoples’ wellbeing.1 This idea, unfortu-
nately, has not gained much traction in the US and has lost momen-
tum in Europe in the past few years. To some extent this reflects 
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both the difficulties in measuring indicators of wellbeing other than 
GDP as well as the economic pressures on governments in the wake 
of the economic crisis of the late 2000s. Nevertheless, the profound 
changes to the economy that will accompany the technological 
changes discussed above are likely to make economic value as mea-
sured by the GDP increasingly problematic.
The likelihood that one or another of these dystopian and utopian 
scenarios will happen depends on whether we are able to implement 
the kind of social contract I have described above. This, in turn, 
rests primarily on the ability of workers to summon sufficient power 
resources to counteract the power of business and corporations and 
to exert significant influence on government policies.
NOTE
1. The Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi 2009) explores 
problems with the GDP indicator and alternative indicators to measure 
wellbeing.
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Every month, more than 1 million jobseekers enter India’s labour 
market, but although it is an investors’ darling, India’s employment 
generation track record has been disappointing. Despite great efforts, 
Delhi seems unable to repeat the east Asian economic miracle. Many 
of India’s challenges are home made. Simultaneously the global 
window for export- and manufacturing-led development is closing. 
What does digital automation mean for the emerging economies in 
Asia? And how can India, under these circumstances, create liveli-
hoods for its billion people?
THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION ACCELERATES 
THE RACE FOR DEVELOPMENT
In a number of Asian countries, most notably China, wages are ris-
ing (Johnson 2017). This is particularly significant in those countries 
which have already passed the Lewis turning point – the point at 
which the supply of surplus labour from rural areas for employment 
in cities is exhausted – and the reserve army of cheap labour in the 
agricultural sector has dried up, as well as in aging societies where 
INDIA
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the total labour pool is shrinking (Das and N’Diaye 2013). While 
labour costs are rising in many emerging economies, digital automa-
tion increases productivity in the old industrial countries. Total costs 
of manufactured goods in some emerging economies are approach-
ing those of the US (New York Times 2015; Sirkin, Zinser and Rose 
2014). All things considered, manufacturing in the US is only 5% 
more expensive than in China (Dumaine 2015). The combination 
of higher energy efficiency and the tumbling labour costs makes 
manufacturing in the old industrialised countries competitive again. 
The shrinking differential between labour costs in developed and 
emerging economies erodes the incentives for offshoring, which has 
been one of the major drivers of globalisation over the last decades.
The deglobalisation trend is accelerated by the need to react 
more quickly and flexibly to the demands of consumers. In the 
clothing and garment industries, shelf lives are getting increasingly 
shorter. Hence, long shipping times are the Achilles heel of fast-
moving consumer markets, so the time it takes to ship from factory 
to shelf will increasingly rival labour costs as the main motivator 
in inventors’ calculations. Consequently, multinational companies 
like Walmart, Ford and Boeing, as well as small- and medium-size 
companies, have increasingly started to reshore production facili-
ties back to their parent countries – they have started to reintroduce 
manufacturing after having previously undertaken production over-
seas. The Reshoring Initiative (2017), a non-profit organisation, 
estimates that 260,000 jobs have been created in the US as a result 
of this trend.
Whether this trend will be accelerated by populist promises to 
‘bring jobs back home’, or if it will be only robots who return to the 
old shores, remains to be seen. The US has already withdrawn from 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Given the dark political clouds on the 
horizon it can no longer be taken for granted that western markets 
will stay open for Asian exports. While digital automation is accel-
erating, globalisation seems to be going into reverse. In 2016, global 
trade has been growing slower than global GDP, for the first time 
since 2001 and for only the second time since 1982 (WTO 2016). 
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The global capital flow collapsed as a share of global GDP in the 
wake of the global financial crisis since 2008, and it is not yet recov-
ering (Donovan 2016). Some have even argued that global supply 
chains are beginning to disintegrate (Economist 2017). These deglo-
balisation tendencies are particularly worrying for Asia, the primary 
benefactor of open world markets. Asia’s emerging economies 
would therefore be wise to rethink their orientation towards exports.
These trends may spell the end of the export- and manufacturing-
led developing model which worked so well for many east Asian 
countries. The fourth industrial revolution will affect economies at 
the top, middle and bottom of the global value chains in different 
ways, and it makes a difference if population sizes are stable or con-
tinue to grow, and how big domestic markets are. All of these cases 
deserve an analysis on their own. This chapter will focus solely on 
the impact of digital automation on the Indian labour market.
THE IMPACT OF DIGITAL AUTOMATION 
ON THE INDIAN LABOUR MARKET
Actually India seems to be under a lucky star. A benign global 
environment of low oil prices is leaving room for public spending 
on infrastructure and encouraging consumption. The giant consumer 
market attracts a plethora of multinational companies. Japan, partly 
out of geopolitical rivalry with China, invests heavily in India. 
Given its massive surplus of cheap labour, India should be in a good 
position to compete for the labour-intensive industries currently 
leaving China (Government of India 2017).
However, even under these benign circumstances, India is unable 
to create jobs. The shiny new factories on its coasts are almost 
entirely empty of people. Whereas 20 years ago millions of rural 
workers could make a living in the growing number of factories in 
China, today robots have taken over in India. In fact, while continu-
ing to attract international investment from often foreign-owned 
firms, India loses 550 jobs per day (Mehta and Kulkarni 2016).
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So, while today no new jobs are created despite high growth rates, 
what will happen in a future when algorithms and robots start to 
replace human labour (Hindustan Times 2016a)? The World Bank 
gloomily predicts that a whopping 69% of jobs in India could poten-
tially be automated (Kim 2016). Outside the highly competitive 
export sectors, however, it remains unlikely that cheap labour would 
be automated, at least in the medium term. For an economy that is 
notorious for its poor track record in job creation, the combination 
of high population growth and accelerating automation gives cause 
for concern (Palanivel. 2016). According to some estimates, by 2050 
there will be 280 million more people in the job market in India than 
there are now (Mishra 2016). What will happen if the aspirations 
of these internal migrants remain unmet and if frustrations and ten-
sions rise (Kumar 2017)? Addressing these worries, Indian president 
Pranab Mukherjee attributed this slow employment generation to the 
rapid tendency for machines to replace humans, and has called for a 
paradigm shift (Hindstan Times 2016b). Today, the debate over job-
less growth has moved to the top of the political agenda.
Nonetheless, the Indian government is hoping that a surging man-
ufacturing sector could absorb millions of jobseekers. The ambi-
tious programme Make in India aims to increase the GDP share of 
manufacturing from 12% today to 25% by 2022, hoping to provide 
employment for 100 million people (IBEF nd). The government’s 
chief economic adviser, Arvind Subramanian, has pointed out that in 
order to achieve this, India would have to reverse the country’s long-
standing trend of premature deindustrialisation (Subramanian 2014).
Dani Rodrik observed that in a globalised market manufacturing 
moves on as soon as wages start to rise, which leads to premature 
deindustrialisation in newly industrialising economies (Rodrik 
2015). By the time manufacturing in South Korea accounted for its 
highest proportion of jobs, incomes were around $12,700 annually. 
In India, factory employment started to decline as a share of employ-
ment when income was around $3,300 annually (Zhong 2015). 
Meanwhile, breakneck international competition will increase the 
pressure to automate. India’s shiny automobile or smartphone 
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factories are already populated in large part by robots. Now, other 
domestic industries are starting to automate (Bhattacharya, Bruce 
and Agrawa 2015). Hence, even if the manufacturing share of GDP 
increases, it is unclear if this would create many more jobs.
Certainly, new employment will be generated in the manufactur-
ing sector, and old jobs will survive thanks to their competitive cost. 
Still, it seems safe to assume that in future manufacturing will not 
play the central role in employment generation in India as it did in 
Europe and East Asia in the past. If the historical window for export- 
and manufacturing-led development is closing, India has to find an 
alternative path (Economist 2015).
HOW CAN INDIA CREATE LIVELIHOODS 
IN THE DIGITAL AGE?
With the traditional route to development closed, the search for alter-
native development models is in full swing. Former central banker 
Raghuram Rajan warned against an export- and manufacturing-led 
model, and advocated an approach that focuses on the domestic 
market instead as an answer to the expected slowdown in global 
trade (Rajan 2014). Indeed, with a population of 1.25 billion, and a 
rapidly growing middle class, India has one of the biggest domestic 
markets in the world. Even if labour costs start to rise, multinational 
companies will keep their foot in these ‘future markets’. However 
increased consumption demand depends on rising wages, and in a 
jobless growth scenario such wage increases seem unlikely. Besides, 
India has had to learn the painful lesson of how too much focus on 
the domestic market can undermine incentives for technological 
innovation.
Some contributors have pointed out that the bulk of Indian work-
ers are still in the agricultural sector. However, the need to increase 
productivity in the agricultural sector would only accelerate the 
freeing-up of surplus labour, and will increase the migration pres-
sure on the urban centres, many of which are already bursting at 
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the seams. On the other hand, the emergence of ethics and health 
conscious young, urban, middle-class consumers offers opportuni-
ties for organic farming, local products and even urban farming. 
Producing high-quality agricultural products for this niche market 
can be a source of decent jobs for agricultural workers.
Green growth offers new opportunities for development. The 
International Renewable Energy Agency estimates that renewable 
energy employed 8.1 million people around the world in 2015 
(IRENA 2016). In India, reaching the government’s goal of produc-
ing 100 GW of solar energy through photovoltaic sources by 2022 
could generate a further 1.1 million jobs in construction, project 
commissioning and design, business development, and operations 
and maintenance (Mukul 2016). With its domestic focus, the con-
struction industry seems to be better shielded against international 
competition than other sectors. There is also enormous potential to 
create clean employment in jobs that might be created by initiatives 
designed to achieve energy efficiency.
With the manufacturing sector in decline, and given the notorious 
labour surplus in the Indian agricultural sector, all hopes lie in the 
service sector being the next job-creating machine. This is where 
the digital revolution can create new opportunities. With its millions 
of highly educated workers, India is in a good position to compete 
in the globalising service markets. The National Association of 
Software and Services Companies suggest that India aims to capture 
20% of market share in the ‘internet of things’ sector, which may 
be worth as much as $300bn (Mehta 2016). India aspires to build 
a $35bn cyber-security product and services industry by 2025, and 
to generate a skilled workforce of 1 million workers in the security 
sector (Mehta 2016). Multinational corporations have long started to 
outsource parts of their back offices (Benner 2014; Leimeister and 
Zogaj 2013). India, in particular, has attracted many of these ser-
vices from telephone hotlines to IT emergency assistance services, 
to accounting to coding. Compared with western workers, who are 
increasingly being deprived of social security, decent wages and 
workplace codetermination, the gig economy may still offer a way 
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for Indian workers to get ahead. Accordingly, domestic worker app 
companies that bring together households with domestic workers 
are expanding at a rate of 20–60% each month. However, while 
digital crowdsourcing platforms allow employers to choose from 
offers originating in labour markets that have vastly different wage 
levels, this extreme competition between the global labour reserve 
armies drives a race to the bottom in labour standards, where only 
the lowest wages tend to prevail. This competition will increase even 
more as digital automation accelerates. Whether the global division 
of labour in the services sector will keeps its promise of job creation 
remains to be seen.
What does the future hold for workers of work in India? The 
educated, entrepreneurial and flexible Indians seem poised for suc-
cess in the digital economy. India’s cosmopolitan middle classes are 
therefore likely to continue to grow. However, what will happen to 
the billion plus Indians who do not have such a background? East 
Asia’s success formula, built around export- and manufacturing-
led growth, offers little hope. It is hard to understate the social and 
political backlash to be expected if the aspirations of millions of 
workers are frustrated. It seems that India’s fate will be decided by 
the speed with which the country manages to shift to a new develop-
ment model. Whether any of the currently debated models can work 
is an open question. In the global race for development, India is at 
risk of running out of time. Encouragingly, its thinkers and decision-
makers seem to have recognised the challenge. Now it is up to all 
of us to support them in finding the first development model for the 
digital age.
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For progressive politics, the task remains of how to develop a 
public policy agenda that addresses the challenges of this new wave 
of ‘destructive creation’. This task comes at a time of exceptional 
volatility in European and North American politics, significant shifts 
in geopolitical power from west to east, and a profoundly changing 
global economic order where new forms of capitalism, with greater 
levels of state intervention, are emerging in countries such as China, 
Russia and India. These transformative shifts were accelerated by 
the global financial crisis of 2007/08, whose unanticipated magni-
tude led to a great recession, the worst global economic decline since 
the 1930s (IMF 2009).
The consequences of the great recession for the people of Europe 
have been painful and long lasting. They have increased the eco-
nomic divide between southern and northern Europe and impover-
ished many in Eastern Europe. With increasing rates of economic 
divergence, social exclusion and poverty in countries that were hit 
the most by the crisis, levels of trust in political institutions have 
also deteriorated among EU citizens (Muro and Vidal 2014; see 
Theodoropoulou this volume). As a consequence of these major 
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economic and social forces, the European political landscape has 
profoundly changed with voters questioning traditional allegiances 
and party affiliations (Dassonneville and Hooghe 2017; Hernández 
and Kriesi 2015). These developments have polarised and frag-
mented party systems across Europe and have led to the rise of a new 
generation of challenger parties on the left and right (Hobolt and 
Tilley 2016). It has also undermined the power of traditional centre-
right and centre-left parties who are being electorally squeezed, and 
find it increasingly difficult to build coalitions.
This shake up of the centre ground has meant that governing 
coalitions commonly include more than two parties (Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Norway), rightwing populist parties (Austria, 
Finland, Norway and Poland), or are formed as minority govern-
ments (Denmark, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the UK). Progressives 
are often relegated to nothing more than spectators. In some coun-
tries, the electoral success of rightwing populist parties has made 
it difficult to form any stable government at all, as was seen in the 
2018 elections in the Czech Republic and Italy. Only in very few 
cases have progressives broken the mould, notably in France and 
Portugal, where they remain electorally potent.
Adding to this post-crisis socio-economic and political era of 
uncertainty are new technologies and the debate on the robotisation 
of work that have left many people disorientated about their personal 
future and prosperity. There is not only increasing uncertainty about 
what the future of work will look like (Benhamou this volume) and 
whether there will be enough jobs to go round (Arnold et al. this 
volume), but also how new forms of employment will be regulated 
(Berg and De Stefano this volume) and what the consequences 
of change will be for the environment, racial discrimination and 
inequality (Schor this volume). Although there is an intellectual 
debate unfolding, to which this volume seeks to contribute, in mod-
ern economies traditional political concepts, solutions and narratives 
are no longer resonating with large parts of the electorate.
In this phase of ‘diffuse nervousness’ (Braun 2018) people 
feel that politics needs a fresh start and must offer, among other 
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essentials: affordable housing, modern infrastructure, world class 
education, social and health care, a secure workplace and a sustain-
able economy that creates jobs, growth and higher wages. Yet, the 
solutions on offer from traditional parties do not seem to be convinc-
ing. Arguably, this explains the rise in support for populists who 
have successfully exploited this vacuum with anti-establishment 
strategies, claiming that traditional parties are unable to respond to 
these challenges by highlighting the dangers of migration and open 
borders (Goodwin 2011).
There is a risk that the effects of digitalisation may exacerbate 
the next populist backlash, which could be directed at machines and 
their owners. This makes it more relevant for progressives to offer 
a convincing narrative that addresses the concerns of voters and at 
the same time recognises the vast economic opportunities for busi-
ness, industry and the public sector that this revolution presents. 
There is time for policymakers to respond to the challenges outlined 
in this volume. But it is imperative for them to be better prepared 
and develop a deeper understanding of the changes that lie ahead. 
This requires the identification of new concepts of work and the 
role of business and the state in the promotion and provision of 
modern social welfare and social dialogue systems (see Jolly this 
volume; Palier this volume). These new concepts need to explain 
how a friendly environment for growth, innovation and job creation, 
with high-quality training and education and fair taxation of firms 
and corporations, can be developed. Such an approach also needs 
to include a more rigorous consideration of the social and political 
– not only industrial – consequences of an economy where value 
is increasingly created from intangible assets, including data, data-
sharing, branding and marketing (Hofheinz this volume).
Soete argues in this volume that the third industrial revolution was 
dominated by a sense of technological determinism and international 
competitiveness during the 1980s. Despite the belief in developing 
a malleable European model of the information society, the speed of 
change made it feel impossible to govern; liberalisation and deregu-
lation became the default options. This created the feeling that there 
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was no capacity for policy action to address the threats of job loss 
and low productivity. This sense of incapacity cannot be repeated 
with the advent of the fourth industrial revolution.
In this book the scene-setting theoretical chapters and case studies 
offer insights into the current state of the debates about the future 
of work in Europe, what the challenges and solutions are, and who 
the main actors are that may promote and precipitate change. We 
can identify a number of responses where new coalitions of actors 
emerge to develop existing concepts of work and labour relations 
and to address some of the negative consequences of digitalisation 
at work (Flecker this volume; Kanjuo Mrčela this volume).
The chapters often highlight the social and political response to the 
main challenges of the fourth industrial revolution, which have more 
on offer for policymakers and politicians than just liberalisation and 
deregulation. The contributions also offer brief yet comprehensive 
analyses from experts, and perspectives from different countries, 
which catalyse the debates at regional, national and supra-national 
level. The book makes it clear that countries are moving at different 
speeds. Our comparison of the different levels of digital density, 
even within the EU, illustrates the variety of challenges different 
social and political actors face. Such a comparative perspective has 
until now been surprisingly lacking in the vast volumes of research 
on the fourth industrial revolution.
As people feel increasingly insecure about what the future of 
work will mean for them, there is a need for democratic discourse 
and control relating to socio-technical changes caused by digital 
advancements. While conservatives and right-wing populists offer 
easy solutions to complex scenarios, either by protecting vested 
interests or deregulating industries, the centre left must claim leader-
ship by providing individuals with strong safety nets and empower-
ing tools in a new work environment, and by advancing a narrative 
of an open and updated society.
This book illustrates that we are at a key political juncture where 
these issues need a more informed public policy-based discussion 
about the direction of change, a debate that has not yet received 
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the attention it deserves. Otherwise we risk sleep walking into a 
potentially turbulent political environment where the disruptions 
created by technological change are blamed on other social groups 
and minorities. There is a chance for progressives, but they have to 
discuss it more rigorously and must project themselves more reso-
lutely into the future.
So what should a progressive agenda on work in the digital age 
encompass? We believe the following constitute the crucial building 
blocks for progressive policymakers:
• Don’t fall for the dominant discourse. Developing and using the 
right maps is essential and helps to see beyond the disruption talk.
• Get serious about high-quality initial education and training. 
That’s more than teaching kids how to code.
• Build institutions that guarantee secure transitions and foster 
employability. Focus on enabling good transitions for everyone.
• Translate employment standards and social protection into the 
digital age. Recognise technology as an enabling force.
• Update tax and transfer policies to tackle income and wealth 
inequality. Aim to distribute ownership more widely.
• Re-invent the state as the lead investor. Go for mission-oriented 
innovation.
• Mind the regional gap. Make regional development great again.
• Broaden your view. Envision a good working society that includes 
all forms of work, paid and unpaid.
FRAMING: FROM HYPE TO DISCOURSE  
AND SCENARIOS
A progressive agenda on work in the digital age must be based on 
a critical analysis of the current discourse around digitalisation. We 
must talk about factors including interests, power and control. The 
idea that technology itself will deliver fast and clear-cut solutions 
to social problems (‘technological solutionism’) is misguided and 
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dangerous. So is the notion that technological innovations render 
only one distinct model of work in the future possible (‘technologi-
cal determinism’) (Benhamou this volume). In fact, we have to talk 
about the different possible futures of work – with some that will 
possibly be more desirable than others.
To have any effect, a progressive agenda must be more than 
merely a list of measures that are needed for societies to adapt to 
the coming change. Any progressive agenda must present policies 
that explicitly seek to shape the future of work. Progressives recog-
nise that a world of work where technology autonomously shapes 
all aspects of human action is a myth; in fact the opposite is true. 
Since human decisions shape how technology is implemented, the 
question is: Who makes those decisions and what consequences do 
they have? How do we develop a discourse about the types of tech-
nologies being developed in the workplace and wider social life, and 
the purposes they serve for different social groups? Only then can 
we begin to define the conditions, and the rules and norms through 
which the digital revolution can improve the living standards of all 
members of our societies, rather than just those of a privileged few. 
Critically, technology is not only about jobs becoming automated. 
Technology will also define the kinds of new jobs that we will end 
up with in the future, and how jobs that we currently have may 
change (Bernhardt 2017). The language surrounding the fourth 
industrial revolution, including terms like ‘Industry 4.0’, is embed-
ded in certain discourses and pursued by actors with their own inter-
ests; we must not neglect the political dimension of this revolution 
(Pfeiffer 2017).
Progressives must be sure to make use of the right ‘maps’, as 
O’Reilly (2017) puts it, to make sense of the digital transformation. 
Downplaying technological disruptions does not help, nor does 
being blinded by the relentless disruption talk – ‘automation angst’ 
(see Arnold et al. this volume). New technologies might pose new 
challenges for policymakers, but the basic questions remain the 
same. How can policymakers equip citizens with the skills that will 
be needed to thrive in the future? How can governments guarantee 
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decent work and social protection for all? How can productivity 
gains be shared fairly? Engaging with key stakeholders through 
social partnership arrangements remains vital for governments and 
policymakers to establish better ways of promoting equity and pros-
perity. Addressing the challenges of the fourth industrial revolution 
effectively will require institutions to be transformed, as many con-
tributions to this volume have argued. Progressives should call for 
meaningful reform, which is something different from a ‘disruption’ 
of the status quo. The future of work remains unknown and some-
what unpredictable, but that should not leave us feeling paralysed.
There are key policy challenges that progressives must address 
now, regardless of how future scenarios will materialise. Focusing 
on the implications of change at the individual level draws atten-
tion to policies that affect successful transitions throughout the life 
course: transitions from school to work, and between jobs and differ-
ent forms of employment and working time arrangements.
INITIAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING: EQUIPPING 
EVERYONE WITH THE RIGHT SKILLS
Digitalisation will lead to major changes in the demands for skills. 
However, it is unclear to both businesses and policymakers precisely 
what skills will be needed (Aubrey this volume).
Much of the debate on the digital transformation of the labour 
market has been in relation to skills-biased technological change 
(where high skills yield a wage premium that rises over time), 
routine-biased technological change (demand for routine skills 
decreasing over time) and capital-biased technological change 
(productivity-enhancing technological advances reducing labour’s 
share of aggregate output) (Berger and Frey 2016). While the latter 
two are important, the race between developments in technology and 
investment in skills is pivotal for labour market outcomes (Martin 
2018). One answer to the challenges posed by skills-biased techno-
logical change lies in making education and training more widely 
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available to all citizens over their life course, regardless of income 
or age.
The importance of education in science, technology, engineering 
and mathematics (STEM) has become central to discussions about 
the future of work in the digital age, but focussing on STEM alone 
will not suffice (see de Franceschi this volume). Teaching young 
people how to code is useful, but does not solve the problem. Autor 
(2015) expects the future workforce of advanced economies to fea-
ture a significant proportion of ‘T-shaped’ skill profiles that combine 
specific vocational skills with transversal foundational middle skills 
including literacy, numeracy, adaptability, capacity for problem 
solving and common sense. With nurses, teachers, construction 
supervisors, tradespeople or physical therapists we find such profiles 
that bring together technical skills with interpersonal interaction, 
flexibility and adaptability to offer services that are uniquely human 
(Autor 2013).
It is crucial to understand that the increasing use of digital 
technologies at work is raising the demand for skills along four 
lines (OECD 2016a). Generic ICT skills involve being able to use 
technologies in daily work; specific ICT skills include program-
ming, developing and managing; complementary ICT skills allow 
processing complex information, communicating with co-workers 
and clients, and solving problems. However, all three require sound 
levels of general cognitive skills as a prerequisite. While enhancing 
the provision of new digital skills we also need to recognise that the 
general cognitive skills level of a substantial proportion of the work-
force in advanced economies is already today below or at the level 
of computer capabilities (Elliott 2017; OECD 2016c). Proficiency in 
problem solving in technology-rich environments is relatively low 
for the majority of adults in advanced economies (OECD 2016b). 
Thus, legitimate demands for substantial investments in digital skills 
have to be complemented by investments in non-digital skills. The 
challenge is that the need for investment in non-digital skills might 
even surpass that which will be required for developing digital skills 
(Elliott 2017).
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So how can the skills challenge be tackled? There is general agree-
ment on the importance of early childhood education (Kalleberg this 
volume; MGI 2017) and high-quality future-oriented primary and 
secondary education, which includes generic, specific and comple-
mentary ICT skills and a change to how core subjects are taught, 
with increased emphasis being placed on conceptual understanding 
and problem-solving (Levy and Murnane 2013). Where generic 
ICT skills are insufficiently developed on a broader scale (see in 
this volume Drahokoupil for central and eastern Europe and de 
Franceschi for Italy), updating syllabuses and curricula in primary 
and secondary schools must be a priority to prevent a ‘lost genera-
tion’ of young people with low competences in the key information-
processing skills that are in increasingly high demand in the labour 
market (Martin 2018). Policymakers should look to Sweden, which 
has been successful in integrating ICT skills in its curricula (OECD 
2016d).
The idea of complementary ICT skills has to be taken seriously 
in tertiary education. ‘Hard’ technical knowledge and skills alone 
will not be enough (Kremer and Went this volume). Workers in 
an Industry 4.0 manufacturing scenario will need higher levels of 
‘soft’ skills, such as the capacity for trans-disciplinary collabora-
tion, an understanding of how the material and the abstract level of 
production processes are linked, or the ability to act confidently in 
conditions of uncertainty (Pfeiffer 2015). Italy’s plan Industria 4.0, 
for example, dedicates €220 million to vocational and university 
training that is focused specifically on the fourth industrial revolu-
tion (de Franceschi this volume).
The emphasis on STEM fields has to be expanded to an emphasis 
on STEAM, that is, the interaction of STEM subjects with arts and 
humanities (Land 2013). For example, the French National Council 
for Digitalisation recommends the promotion of creativity, abstrac-
tion and interpretation skills while focusing less on static knowledge 
(Weber this volume).
In addition, it seems crucial not only to focus on university-based 
tertiary education, but to update vocational training and to foster its 
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attractiveness. Routine-biased technological change has the potential 
to produce a polarised labour market with the middle being hollowed 
out. High-quality vocational training with a significant component of 
work-based learning is one key measure that may prevent this from 
happening. The stigmatisation of non-university tertiary education as 
a second choice option to university education remains a problem in 
some countries. Where vocational training is more widespread, occu-
pational profiles must be modernised and training methods opened 
up. This does not mean that occupational profiles become imposed 
by bureaucratic decree but rather that government provides the right 
framework for social partners to become actors in this process. 
Trade unions and employers associations possess deep knowledge of 
industries and service sectors, which can help gather data on skills 
demands and identify key challenges in adapting to the fourth indus-
trial revolution. Pfeiffer (2015) emphasises that vocational schools 
must be modernised, and that teaching staff must be offered continu-
ing education and training opportunities, particularly with regard to 
new learning methods and accruing digital skills.
Finally, we need better intelligence-based careers advice for 
school leavers about future skill demands. Too often there is insuf-
ficient information for school leavers to understand whether demand 
is increasing or decreasing for certain occupations, leading to unin-
formed career decisions (see in this volume de Franceschi for Italy 
and Aubrey for the UK). Counselling will not be based on perfect 
forecasts, which we do not have, but should rather focus on robust 
individual strategies to promote the development of relevant and 
adaptable skill sets.
SECURE TRANSITIONS AND EMPLOYABILITY: 
AN ACTIVE WORKING LIFE FOR ALL
While getting initial education and training right is necessary, it 
is not sufficient for tackling the challenges of the fourth industrial 
revolution for two reasons:
 547CONCLUSION
• Skills demand will change, so frontloading skills is of limited 
effectiveness.
• Most of the workforce in 2030 is already in employment today, 
therefore more attention needs to be focused on maintaining and 
improving their employability.
As Arnold et al. (this volume) emphasise, the main challenge for 
labour and social policy in the digital age is not the elimination 
of human labour by technology. The risk of jobs being eliminated 
through automation tends to be overestimated in the public discourse 
as the task composition of jobs, the macroeconomics of technol-
ogy diffusion, and hurdles to digitalisation are not fully taken into 
account. While the net employment effects of new digital tech-
nologies could be small, this does not preclude massive structural 
changes. The demand for human labour is likely to increase in 
sectors such as IT and education, but there could be a substantial 
reduction in the number of jobs in manufacturing industries, where 
the use of machines and technical equipment is widespread (Arnold 
et al. this volume).
Structural change also unfolds within occupations. When machines 
take over tasks that are comparatively easy to programme and auto-
mate, human labour is mainly needed for less routine and skill-
intensive tasks that involve creativity and social interactions. Thus, 
occupations change markedly with regard to task composition and 
skill requirements (Arnold et al. this volume).
If the challenge is about a future with different jobs, not one 
with no jobs, the main problem is one of matching. In a worst-case 
scenario, advanced economies will see high levels of technologi-
cal unemployment and high levels of skilled labour shortages at 
the same time. Therefore, ensuring employability over a person’s 
life becomes the primary objective for policymakers. To prevent 
large-scale structural skill mismatches between workers and jobs, 
opportunities for upskilling and reskilling as well as for develop-
ing transferrable skills must be expanded (see Karjalainen this 
volume).
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Addressing the challenges outlined above begins with acknowl-
edging that the digital transformation will lead to a more ‘fluid’ 
world of work. Rates of job turnover are likely to increase within 
companies as well as between sectors and occupations. The task 
content of jobs will change faster. The answer to this ‘fluidity’ is to 
provide for secure transitions for those who have to change jobs, and 
employability for those whose jobs change.
Let us begin with transitions. Since protecting companies from 
technology-based disruptions does not seem to be economically or 
socially desirable (Atkinson this volume; Kalleberg this volume), 
workers have to be provided with secure transitions between differ-
ent jobs and occupations. Job security measures must be translated 
into a comprehensive set of policies that ensure that workers who 
lose their jobs are taken care of and given access to training and new 
skills that will allow them to return to the labour market.
The term ‘flexicurity’ has been used to describe reforms in this 
direction that have been implemented in recent years most notably in 
the Nordic countries, and most prominently illustrated in Denmark 
and the Netherlands (see Ilsøe this volume; Keune and Dekker this 
volume). While the term is often misused as a catch-all phrase, pro-
gressives should focus on its essence as an explicit alternative to the 
mantra of liberalisation and deregulation. Obviously, flexicurity is 
not a simple one-size-fits-all tool. It depends heavily on institutions, 
for example, the tax-based social security and training systems in 
Denmark, and a culture of consensus between the social partners. 
Tripartite agreements between business, unions and the government 
are at the heart of the Danish flexicurity model along with extensive 
active labour market policies. The implementation of this model 
presents significant challenges in countries lacking these features.
A progressive version of flexicurity should not be about promot-
ing any kind of mobility but rather about ‘good transitions’ (Ranft 
and Thillaye 2015; Schmid 2003), which allow people to end up in 
desirable positions and to have a meaningful career. The overall goal 
is not the creation of a flexible labour market per se, but rather to 
enable more people moving into higher quality jobs or to maintain a 
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continuity of employment (O’Reilly, Cebrián and Lallement 2000). 
To achieve this, flexicurity measures must be embedded in a broader 
paradigm of prevention. Most importantly, such a paradigm would 
comprise improved access to life-long learning. In most advanced 
economies life-long learning is an empty phrase. Adult participation 
in education and training activities varies vastly across the countries 
covered in this volume, from high rates in the Netherlands, the 
Nordic countries and Canada to low participation rates in southern 
Europe, Slovakia, Poland and France (Martin 2018).
In most countries examined in this volume, institutions that miti-
gate the effects of structural change for individuals are reactive. For 
example, access to unemployment insurance and corresponding 
reskilling measures are often only granted once redundancy has 
taken place. Söderqvist and Arnold et al. (this volume) emphasise 
that reforms will need to push existing institutions to introduce pro-
active measures that are focused on the individual, particularly those 
groups whose skill levels would otherwise fall further and further 
behind the rising skills requirements. This would also need a change 
in culture and narratives, with upskilling and reskilling becoming 
an integral part of a successful working life (Hofheinz this volume; 
Keune and Dekker this volume).
Such a prevention paradigm must consist of two building blocks: 
financing and allowing people to make informed choices. Upgrading 
skills and taking time off to do so needs to be financially viable 
for people. Those with the greatest need for upgrading their skills 
– particularly those in non-standard employment, workers in small- 
and medium-enterprises, or the non-employed – often do not have 
access to necessary financial resources to invest in their skills. Here, 
governments can play an important role, for example by creating 
individual activity accounts. France recently introduced a measure 
to spread access to education over the lifetime with the ‘compte per-
sonnel d’activité’ (Weber this volume). The account runs throughout 
the working life and is not attached to an employment contract. 
Whether the current model will allow for substantial investments in 
upskilling or reskilling remains to be seen. Germany is discussing 
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the implementation of more generously funded ‘individual activity 
accounts’ (Rahner and Schönstein this volume). Up to €20,000 per 
individual could be used for qualification and further training as well 
as for starting a business. The individual activity account would par-
ticularly provide younger people with financial scope for personal 
development.
If the financial barrier is overcome, institutions must support 
individuals to make sound investments in their human capital. To 
accomplish this, an encompassing and sound careers advice infra-
structure is needed. The German government is discussing the pro-
posed introduction of a legal entitlement to careers and continuous 
education advice based on labour market forecasting (Rahner and 
Schönstein this volume). In Finland, trade unions play a key role 
in career counselling (Karjalainen this volume). No matter who 
provides it, counselling has to be located at the regional and local 
levels, as Aubrey (this volume) points out. To help individuals track 
their human capital investments and to help future generations make 
more informed choices lifetime digital individual learning records, 
as suggested in the Taylor report (Taylor 2017), seem promising. 
For a comprehensive approach to skills advice and development, 
policymakers should look to Singapore and its Skills Future initia-
tive (Ng 2017).
Measures of primary prevention (preventing displacement by 
automation) have to be complemented by measures of second-
ary prevention (reducing the risk of longer-term unemployment). 
Sweden, for example, has been very successful with the model 
of job security councils helping redundant workers to retrain and 
find new employment (Söderqvist this volume; OECD 2015). 
These councils began as private unemployment offices that were 
owned by employers’ associations and trade unions with a focus 
on white-collar professionals, but now they cover most of the 
Swedish workforce. Transposing this model to other countries 
would depend on fostering social partnership, which is seen as an 
essential precondition. Another option to be considered is using 
publicly funded employment, something Germany is currently 
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experimenting with (Bauer, Fertig and Fuchs 2016), for secondary 
prevention.
Finally, understanding the role of policies at the workplace level 
is crucial when it comes to fostering employability over the life 
course. Workplaces have to become ‘learnplaces’. Workplace-
based measures of reskilling and upskilling have to be available for 
all workers, not only for those in standard forms of employment 
(Keune and Dekker this volume; Doellgast this volume). However, 
Crouch argues that ‘non-employees’ working on digital platforms 
are less likely to be seen as an asset to be invested in. Meanwhile, 
systems design at the workplace level is equally important. To 
enhance human capabilities and skills development, technology 
must be designed with human factors in mind (Taylor 2017). In 
addition, progressive policymakers must seek to link the issues of 
employability and working time. Technology has the potential to 
allow for more individual working-time arrangements to fit in with 
different stages of the life course. Life phase oriented working time 
arrangements improve workers’ health, wellbeing and motivation 
and are therefore a crucial factor for fostering employability (Chung, 
Kerkhofs and Ester 2007). While there are clearly very differentiated 
patterns of the take up of these flexible working time arrangements 
by gender, age and ethnicity (O’Reilly and Fagan 1998), facilitating 
an active working life for all will be a major challenge in the digital 
age, especially as new employment platforms emerge.
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS AND SOCIAL 
PROTECTION: SAFEGUARDING STANDARDS
Digital platforms that mediate work, such as Upwork or Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk, and platforms that provide services, such as Uber 
or Airbnb, transform the nature of work. Platforms may improve 
labour market efficiency and increase opportunities for flexible 
employment. Yet, depending on the national regulatory frame-
work, they potentially erode the standardised relationship between 
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employers and employees that is needed to finance and deliver social 
protection and benefits in most advanced economies (Berg and De 
Stefano this volume; Huws et al. this volume; Schor this volume).
So far, the amount of gainful employment that is delivered 
through digital platforms is the subject of considerable controversy. 
Some experts doubt that digital platforms will lead to more than 
a marginal rise in self-employment (Atkinson this volume), while 
others argue that that the phenomena are already more widespread 
than official statistics now reveal (Hill 2015a). Nonetheless, by their 
very architecture, including the inherent network effects, digital 
platforms have the potential for a vast diffusion and for the creation 
of an internet-based ‘distributed workforce’ in which it is increas-
ingly difficult to enforce national labour laws. Furthermore, digital 
platforms might catalyse some of the ongoing trends towards a 
destandardisation of employment relationships (Schor this volume; 
Weil 2014). Unregulated, the proliferation of platform business 
models could lead to a two-tier workforce and society (Benhamou 
this volume; Tyson 2015). On the one hand, there could be an upper 
tier populated by fully employed highly skilled workers with state- 
or employer-provided benefits (Howcroft and Rubery this volume), 
alongside highly skilled self-employed individuals who finance their 
own benefits. On the other hand, there could be a lower tier popu-
lated by contingent middle- and low-skill workers, with low pay and 
little social security (Berg and De Stefano this volume). However, it 
is important to note that the disruptive potential of digital platforms 
also applies to highly skilled knowledge workers (Boes et al. 2017; 
Crouch this volume).
At the moment, the main challenge that digital platforms pose to 
policymakers might be the inherent ontological ambiguity over what 
a firm is, who an employee is according to labour law, and what con-
stitutes an employment relationship (Kalleberg this volume; Keune 
and Dekker this volume). Social policy and labour law require clear 
answers to these questions, particularly when benefits are financed 
through employer and employees contributions, and when represen-
tation and social protection depend on an employee status.
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Broadly there are four options, which are discussed in more detail 
here:
• the adaption and enforcement of existing statuses to move (some) 
platform workers towards an employee status
• the creation of a new, hybrid status halfway between employees 
and independent workers
• the expansion of some rights and benefits currently reserved for 
employees towards independent workers
• the creation of one single worker status for all.
First, many commentators and analysts describe a widespread mis-
classification of dependent platform workers as independent con-
tractors. To contain this trend a modern and enforceable definition 
of dependent and independent employment and of the relationship 
between platform workers and their employers would be needed. 
Prassl (2015) calls for the promulgation of guidelines that provide 
clear definitions of self-employment relating to tax, insurance con-
tributions and social protection entitlement, where the onus of proof 
rests with the employer rather than the worker. The issue of classi-
fication is currently being debated in several countries, for example, 
France, Germany and the Netherlands. There are a number of major 
legal cases in the UK and the European Court of Justice (Berg and 
De Stefano this volume) as well as some legislative reforms in Italy 
and Spain (Jolly this volume). Based on an updated definition of 
the status of a ‘worker’, and what this means, platforms could be 
required to provide regular benefits and protections for workers who 
are essentially full-timers – those who work over a certain number of 
hours a week (see Schor this volume). However, this could lead plat-
forms employers to make sure workers never reach this threshold.
Second, there is an international debate on the establishment of a 
new, hybrid category of employment halfway between independent 
contractors and employees. In the US and the UK the introduction 
of a ‘dependent contractor’ status is being discussed, and Spain and 
Italy have already introduced new definitions in labour law reforms 
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(Jolly this volume). Proponents argue that such measures acknowl-
edge the complexity of modern working arrangements and could 
extend ‘employee-like’ statuses so those with this status receive 
adequate and high-quality social protection. The recently introduced 
Belgian federal law on the platform economy (Zanoni this volume) 
actually creates a third employment status in addition to employees 
and the self-employed: individuals who offer services on platforms 
occasionally have to register as self-employed but pay a reduced tax 
rate, which is levied from the platform employer. However, progres-
sives should be aware of the risk of introducing such a third category 
as employers might seek to classify more employees in this way 
to avoid providing social contributions, benefits and entitlement to 
statutory protections (Kalleberg this volume).
Third, some of the rights associated with standard employment 
could be extended to the self-employed, for example representa-
tion on works councils, through collective organisation and in 
collective bargaining (Berg and De Stefano this volume; Keune 
and Bekker this volume). The new categories of emerging self-
employed workers associated with digital work platforms are not 
easily subsumed into the established institutional framework of 
labour relations (Jolly this volume). But platform workers have 
shown their willingness to organise. Granting platform workers 
the right to collective bargaining would require solutions to issues 
of competition law that can arise, as the recent case of Uber in 
Seattle shows (Miller 2017). Where platforms largely accept their 
responsibility as employer, as is the case in Sweden, unions and 
platforms should come together to integrate collective agreements 
with the platform firms’ software and make them mutually com-
patible, as Söderqvist (this volume) argues. Organising dispersed 
platform workers is a major challenge for unions, although there 
have been some significant examples of new unions emerging 
for example in relation to Deliveroo riders and Uber drivers in 
the UK (Berg and De Stefano this volume). Mainstream unions 
are also developing new organisational strategies to target these 
groups of workers (Vandaele 2018). Progressive policymakers 
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need to think about how to make organising easier for platform 
workers.
The need to expand rights also applies to basic social protection. 
Schor (this volume) argues that platform workers lack basic welfare 
provision, and platforms work best when workers participate freely 
and without compulsion. This requires access to social measures to 
reduce workers’ dependency. Therefore, the self-employed should 
be included in basic social protections, particularly pension and dis-
ability insurance systems, and (maybe) unemployment benefits. For 
example, Germany aims to include the self-employed in the statu-
tory pension insurance system (Rahner and Schönstein this volume).
The French National Council for Digitalisation advocates a revi-
sion of the social security and collective representation status of the 
self-employed (Weber this volume). Obviously, the crucial question 
will be who pays for welfare provision. Keune and Bekker (this 
volume) argue that the respective costs could be carried either by 
the companies through social contributions, as with regular employ-
ees or, alternatively, all fiscal incentives and tax allowances for the 
self-employed could be used for social security coverage instead. 
To allow for the former, the non-trivial issue of portability has to be 
solved. Some ideas on how to address this issue are emerging. Hill 
(2015b), for example, proposes an individual security account to 
be established for each worker. Any business that hires that worker 
would pay the employer’s share of social security costs on a pro-rata 
basis into this account, based on the number of hours that a worker 
works for any given business. Recently, US Senator Mark Warner 
introduced the Portable Benefits for Independent Workers Pilot 
Program Act, which would establish a pilot programme for innova-
tions (Portable Benefits Bill 2017).
Besides social benefits, ensuring minimum wage and, possibly, 
minimum hours has become a key issue. Here, technology can play 
a crucial role (Berg and de Stefano this volume). The online free-
lance marketplace Upwork, for example, offers its corporate clients 
the option of paying by the hour, as it can monitor the workers by 
recording their keyboard strokes and mouse clicks and by taking 
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random screenshots of a worker’s activity. Including a minimum 
wage into the algorithmic back-end of platforms such as Uber would 
be a technological triviality. Keune and Bekker propose introducing 
regulations that would guarantee a minimum number of hours of 
work to be paid that take into account the average number of hours 
worked over a reference period. This is already the case for zero-
hour contract workers in the Netherlands.
And finally, a fourth option would be to create one single worker 
status for all (France Stratégie 2016) whereby everyone regardless 
of their employment situation has the same rights to access train-
ing and social benefits. The principle would be to go beyond the 
distinction between wage earners and self-employment, creating 
a universal status for all, defining a right of professional activity 
encompassing existing statutes. It is argued that a single worker sta-
tus category would make it easier for people to switch more easily 
from one job to another and give everyone equal access to training 
and social protection (France Stratégie 2016, 7). For instance, this 
would require the creation of a unified pension scheme or personal 
activity account that would cover everyone, across all sectors 
regardless of employment status. This concept of a single and com-
mon protection of all would lead to profound transformations of the 
architecture and financing of the welfare state, including simplifying 
its active and passive labour market policies. However, this option 
has rarely been discussed outside France and the UK (see Future of 
Work Commission 2017) and it remains to be seen whether it can 
resonate in other European countries.
What an updated welfare system that mitigates the risks for 
digital platform workers will look like is affected by institutional 
path dependencies of the specific welfare state regimes (Palier this 
volume): a Bismarckian solution will differ from a Nordic or liberal 
one. Still, progressive policymakers should not expect digital plat-
forms to disappear but take the need for reform upfront.
Education, employability and social protection of individuals 
in the future world of work are essential to a progressive agenda. 
In addition, broader challenges related to tax policy and capital 
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ownership as well as the provision of infrastructure and stimulus for 
innovation need to be addressed at the governmental level.
TAX AND TRANSFER POLICIES: ADDRESSING 
INCOME AND WEALTH INEQUALITY
Recent technological change is producing vast profits and rents 
for some ‘superstar firms’ (Autor et al. 2017) and winner-take-all 
incomes for some individuals working for the most successful firms 
(Atkinson this volume; Appelbaum, 2017; Haskel and Westlake 
2017). Guellec and Paunov (2017) illustrate how rents from digital 
innovation typically go to shareholders, investors, top executives 
and key employees of such ‘superstar firms’, while the wage pres-
sure on average workers only increases.
To the extent that the ongoing digital transformation contributes 
to these trends, three questions have to be addressed:
• Is the tax burden on (dependent) employment adequate?
• Are gains in productivity distributed fairly?
• Is the level and concentration of private ownership of the means 
of production appropriate?
The business and technology community frequently refers to 
earned income tax credits (EITCs) to address income polarisation 
and the decrease in workers’ share of national income. EITCs raise 
income and work incentives by subsidising incomes. Brynjolfsson 
and McAfee (2014) suggest an expansion of EITCs to ensure that 
the benefits of innovation are more equitably shared. Without doubt, 
EITCs have proven effective in the US and the UK (Hofheinz this 
volume). However, it is difficult to raise significantly the after-tax 
incomes of workers in low-productivity low-skill industries for the 
simple reason that wages cannot exceed the output of the worker 
(Atkinson this volume). EITCs will not suffice, and a broader rebal-
ancing of taxation is required.
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It can be argued that as machines become better at substituting 
human labour, taxing workers’ incomes has increasingly negative 
effects on employment. Arnold et al. (this volume) raise the question 
of whether lower tax rates for capital income than for wage income 
create disincentives to using human labour as an input factor. An 
adjustment of the relative tax burdens, they argue, could lead to more 
positive employment effects in the context of the digital transforma-
tion. Bailey and Harrop (this volume) call for rebalancing taxation, 
including a shift towards taxing wealth, non-employment income 
and negative externalities such as greenhouse gas emissions. One 
might also think of the global, coordinated wealth tax as prescribed 
by Piketty (2014). However, the technical obstacles to taxing wealth, 
related to issues of global assessment and enforcement, are severe 
and require further consideration. Therefore, progressive policymak-
ers should focus on updating national regulations on inheritance tax, 
top marginal income tax rates and capital gains tax.
With regard to the (re)distribution of productivity gains, leaders in 
politics, business and civil society frequently promote the idea of a 
‘robot tax’, where a tax is levied on the use of robots, for example. 
Bill Gates (cited in Delaney 2017) famously argued that a robot 
tax could finance jobs in the care, health or education sectors. EU 
lawmakers considered a proposal to tax robot owners to pay for the 
retraining of workers who lose their jobs, but ultimately rejected it. 
Proponents of a robot tax face the question how to avoid discourag-
ing innovation. Atkinson (this volume) describes proposals that call 
for the taxation and regulation of robots as “progress-killing ideas”. 
This does not necessarily apply to big platform companies that profit 
from network effects (Soete this volume) and accumulate vast prof-
its. Thus, the European Commission’s recent proposal to tax large 
digital companies’ revenues at a common rate based on where their 
users are located, rather than where they are headquartered, seems 
sensible (Guarascio 2018).
Considering the difficulties that are related to taxing wealth, it 
makes sense to think about distributing the means to generate wealth 
instead. Kremer and Went (this volume) and Freeman (2015) argue 
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that by pluralising the ownership of the means of production, for 
example robots, productivity gains can be shared without disincen-
tivising innovation.
Three options to pluralise ownership are discussed here: social 
wealth funds, non-classical business forms, for example platform 
cooperatives, and tackling the ownership of data.
First, several commentators and analysts argue for the introduc-
tion of some form of social wealth fund through which to distribute 
the returns from technological progress more widely and to boost 
consumption demand (Kremer and Went this volume; Lansley 
2016). The proposals differ with regard to who pays into the fund 
and what the fund should be used for. While Fratzscher (2018) sug-
gests an inheritance-tax-based sovereign investment fund to invest 
in future-oriented industries, Varoufakis (2017) suggests establish-
ing a fund-based returns system on all capital that is used to pay for 
a universal basic dividend to all citizens. Setting up social wealth 
funds would be an effective and practical way for progressive 
policymakers seriously to address the concentration of wealth in the 
hands of the few in the digital age.
In many debates, distributing the returns from technological 
progress is linked to a universal basic income, which has both sup-
porters and detractors, from economists to CEOs, entrepreneurs and 
activists. For progressives, however, a universal basic income is not 
the answer to the labour and social policy challenges posed by the 
fourth industrial revolution, for technical (OECD 2017) and political 
reasons (Hassel 2017). More sophisticated commentators allude to 
Ulrich Beck’s (2000) “multi-activity society”, where civic labour is 
supported by a state-funded social wage, or to Frithjof Bergmann’s 
concept of “new work” (van Gelder 1994), to name only two. All of 
these models have their flaws. But they also pose relevant questions 
and can provide us with inspiration to understand how we concep-
tualise work and address issues around income and ownership that 
are so central.
Second, in many countries there is a rich tradition of non-classical 
business forms, from worker cooperatives to mutual benefit societies 
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or social enterprises (Borzaga, Salvatori and Bodini 2017). Examples 
like Mondragon, the Basque corporation and federation of worker 
cooperatives, demonstrate that these non-classical businesses can 
flourish in the 21st century economy. Scholz and Schneider (2017) 
and others argue that particularly cooperatives should be redis-
covered since they have a huge potential for rendering the rising 
platform economy more equitable (see Schor this volume; Berg and 
de Stefano this volume). Digital cooperatives are digital platforms 
that are collectively owned and democratically governed by workers 
(and sometime by users as well) to guarantee pay, representation and 
security. They particularly flourish in the ride-hailing business in the 
US (for example Juno) but can also be found in the care or cleaning 
sectors (for example ‘Up and Go’). Digital co-operatives show that 
the efficiency gains of digital platforms (which should be welcomed 
in low productivity sectors, see O’Reilly 2017) can go hand in 
hand with decent work. It is crucial for progressive policymakers to 
understand that digital platforms are based on technological build-
ing blocks that can be combined in very different ways, leading to 
very different business models and societal outcomes. Progressives 
should be at the forefront of such innovative regulatory frameworks 
as well as taxation and funding mechanisms that encourage digital 
platform models to promote decent work and benefit society at large. 
For some sectors even state-owned digital platforms could be an 
option, as Howcroft and Rubery (this volume) allude to.
Third, spreading ownership within our societies could also lead 
to the ownership of data being regulated, based on the argument 
that this data ‘belongs’ to citizens and is increasingly becoming a 
crucial factor of production (Fratzscher 2018). Obviously, issues of 
collective ownership or taxing multinational corporations may not 
be workable within national borders and may require a coordinated 
effort in the context of the EU or the World Trade Organization, as 
Keune and Dekker (this volume) explain.
In sum, digitalisation of work raises a number of significant chal-
lenges for developing new tax and transfer policies to address the 
emerging and widening disparities in income and wealth. A further 
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dimension of the way inequalities are presenting themselves relates 
to issues of investing in infrastructure, innovation and supporting 
regional development.
INFRASTRUCTURE AND INNOVATION: 
INVESTING IN THE FUTURE
The digital era creates demands for new investments in public goods 
and infrastructure. These include physical infrastructure related to 
housing, renewable energy, care for the young and the aging, as well 
as digital infrastructure with open source software, public data and 
digital courseware, to boost inclusive growth. Just as the industrial 
economy needed roads, sewers and public libraries to prosper, new 
kinds of digital public goods are needed, not only to drive innovation 
and employment but also to rejuvenate the democratic project so the 
benefits are more widely distributed.
To deliver inclusive growth in the digital age we need innova-
tion policies that are different from traditional industrial policies 
that supported targeted industries. Historically, government, in the 
form of the ‘entrepreneurial state’, has funded risky and most pio-
neering research activities (Mazzucato 2013). In many cases these 
have contributed to significant technological advances creating and 
shaping markets, and increasing growth and prosperity; the internet 
itself would not exist without massive public investments in basic 
and applied research. In recent years, despite the advent of many 
innovative technologies these have not had the equivalent effect on 
productivity growth (Gordon 2016). To improve living standards 
this ‘productivity paradox’ must be addressed (Atkinson this vol-
ume; Soete this volume). Government will be central in the third 
wave of digitalisation (Case 2017), which is expected to have major 
productivity effects on health, education, transport, energy and food. 
For progressives, the role of government should be one of a lead 
investor and smart regulator. Innovation cannot be left to the private 
sector alone. It will depend on flourishing cross-sectoral innovation 
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networks, where the state as catalyst is “sparking the initial reaction” 
(Mazzucato 2013). Since growth has not only a rate, but also a direc-
tion, innovation policy must be mission-oriented (Mazzucato and 
Caetano 2015): the state must set the direction of travel, based on 
public and political debates specifying society’s ‘grand missions’, 
while at the same time enabling bottom-up experimentation and 
learning, and developing new and fragile innovations.
TAKING A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE
In many advanced economies, GDP per capita in the richest and 
poorest regions has been diverging over the past two decades 
(Chazan 2018). ‘Good workers’ and ‘good firms’ are increasingly 
colocated in large cities (Dauth, Findeisen and Suedkum 2016). 
Many of those citizens who will be most severely hit by digital trans-
formation and globalisation are spatially concentrated and relatively 
immobile (Suedekum 2017). In addition, the social prestige associ-
ated with urban life has increased (Florida 2002). Many policies 
proposed above – for example on education and training or secure 
job-to-job transitions – can only become effective if they account 
for dramatic regional differences. Understanding regional differ-
ences with regard to the effects of the digital transformation and the 
capacities to deal with them must be a defining characteristic of a 
progressive agenda on work in the digital age. ‘Solving’ intensifying 
regional economic disparities by increasing spatial labour mobility, 
as it can be observed in the US, does not seem to be viable – nor 
politically desirable. Notably, Gidron and Hall (2017) show how 
regional decline and a loss in subjective social status increase sup-
port for the populist right. Therefore, progressives must revitalise 
regional development, to demonstrate that the digital transformation 
is about not only urban co-working spaces and start-up incubators, 
but also better working and living conditions for all. In particular, 
regional ecosystems centred on innovation and digital technologies 
must be better understood, promoted and nourished.
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In the digital age, the regional and global levels are closely 
intertwined. Regional ecosystems are connected to and embedded 
in international ecosystems, and global value chains can become 
global value networks (Srai and Christodoulou 2014). It is crucial 
for policymakers to understand where countries, regions and com-
panies are positioned in these global ecosystems and value networks. 
Progressive policymakers should take an active role in nurturing 
high value activities involving emerging technologies that seeks to 
secure decent work for their citizens.
CONCLUSION: UPDATE, RECHARGE AND RELOAD  
THE CONCEPT OF WORK IN SOCIETY
As evidenced by the rich and diverse range of contributions to this 
volume there is no lack of ideas about how to address the challenges 
of the fourth industrial revolution across a number of dimensions. 
By drawing on a wealth of cross-national evidence we are able to 
spotlight areas of effective policymaking, and draw attention to 
factors that have contributed to this. A progressive agenda needs to 
equip everyone with the right skills, ensure stable employment tran-
sitions across the life course, safeguard social standards and create 
innovative transfer policies that can both stimulate innovation and 
capture the rewards in a more inclusive way.
We call on progressive policymakers to broaden their view and to 
envision a good working society in the digital age, which includes 
and values all forms of human work: paid and unpaid, in industry 
and in services, dependent and self-employed. Progressives should 
take a more comprehensive perspective and engage in a debate on 
the working society that includes work in a broader sense (Kalleberg 
this volume). A large proportion of work is undertaken not in formal 
gainful employment but in family labour (caring for children or par-
ents) or voluntary civil labour (in the arts, culture and politics sec-
tors), which all contribute to the general welfare. Without this kind 
of work our societies could not function. As Howcroft and Rubery 
564 CONCLUSION
(this volume) argue, we need to recognise and value this unpaid, 
caring and voluntary work more adequately.
Work in the digital era requires us to update, recharge and reload 
our concept of a good society.
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